BRITISH

FOREIGN POLICY

DURING

WORLD WAR 11

; 1939-1945

Progress Publishers

Moscow

Translated from the Russian by David Skvirsky

B. T. TpyxaHOBCKHH

BHEIUHJ13 nOJlHTHKA AHTJ1HH 1939-1945

Ha OMAUUCKOM HSblKe

First printing 1970

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CONTENTS

AUTHOR’S NOTE. 7

INTRODUCTION.9

Chapter One

MUNICH LIVED ON IN SPITE OF EVERYTHING (September

1939-April 1940). 17

Britain Declares War. 17

The Real Worth of the British Guarantees to Poland ... 28

The Phoney War.30

Anglo-French Relations.36

Bid to Win Over Italy.38

Peace Negotiations, Autumn of 1939 . 40

Political Situation in Britain.44

Economic Warfare.48

Anglo-US Relations.51

British Policy in the Far East.57

Anglo-Soviet Relations During the Phoney War.62

Chapter Two

“ONLY TO SURVIVE” (April 1940-June 1941).85

End of the Phoney War.85

Fall of the Chamberlain Cabinet. Churchill in Power ... 87

Fall of France.91

Emigre Governments in London.101

Strategy of Survival.102

Battle of Britain.107

Anglo-US Relations.112

Emergency Measures by the Churchill Government. Britain

Gears Her Economy to War-Time Requirements .... 121

The Home Situation and the Class Struggle.122

British Attempts to Create an Allied Front in the Balkans . 125

Economic Warfare at a New Stage.128

British Far Eastern Policy.131

Anglo-Soviet Relations After the Phoney War.135

The Hess Mission. Britain Makes Her Choice.150

Chapter Three

BRITISH POLICY IN THE PERIOD OF THE FORMATION OF

THE GRAND ALLIANCE (June 1941-December 1941) . . . 158

Anglo-Soviet Agreement of July 12, 1941.158

The Question of the Second Front in 1941.171

Anti-Soviet Forces in Britain.176

Anglo-US Relations. Argentia Meeting.180

The Atlantic Charter and the Colonial Peoples.191

The Main Front of the War Shifts to the East.194

Anglo-Soviet-US Conference in Moscow.198

Joint Anglo-Soviet Action in Iran.202

British Far Eastern Policy.204

Chapter Four

THE TURNING POINT (December 1941-February 1943) . . . 211

The Battle for Moscow.211

Eden’s Talks in Moscow.213

Churchill-Roosevelt Conference, December 1941-January 1942 223

Transitional Stage of the Economic War.227

Anglo-Soviet Relations in the First Half of 1942. The Second

Front Issue.230

Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance.244

Britain and the USA Break Their Second Front Commitment 256

Churchill’s First Visit to Moscow.262

Anglo-US Relations in 1942 . 268

Problems of Home Policy.272

Britain and the Governments in Exile.274

The War in the Far East. Sino-British Relations .... 276

Anglo-French Relations.283

The War in the Middle East. The Allied Landing in North

Africa.288

El Alamein-Stalingrad.295

Chapter Five

FROM STALINGRAD TO NORMANDY (February 1943-June

1944). 306

More Commitments to the USSR Are Not Honoured . . . 306

Anglo-French Relations.314

Italy’s Unconditional Surrender and Withdrawal from

the War.321

Britain Supports the Anti-Soviet Stand of the Polish

Reactionaries.328

Britain, Governments in Exile and the Resistance

Movements.335

Anglo-Turkish Relations.347

Britain’s Relations with Spain and Portugal.351

Anglo-US Contradictions Become Aggravated.354

Britain and the Arab Middle East.359

Far Eastern Strategy and Policy.365

Problems of the Post-War Settlement.369

Final Decision on the Second Front.380

Chapter Six

CONCLUDING STAGE OF THE WAR (June 1944-September

1945). 386

British Economy and Home Policy in 1941-45 386

Allied Invasion of the European Continent.392

Last Stage of the Economic War.394

British Policy in Occupied Territories.397

Britain’s Struggle Against Revolution in Southeastern

Europe.402

Questions of Strategy at Yalta.420

The Problem of Germany.426

Churchill Seeks to Turn the War Against the Soviet Union 433

Britain and the United Nations Organisation.441

Britain and the Potsdam Conference.454

1945 Parliamentary Elections in Britain.467

End of the War in the Far East.471

CONCLUSION.474

BIBLIOGRAPHY.488

AUTHOR’S NOTE

It is scarcely possible to name a subject that embroils

historians in such sharp clashes of opinion as the Second

World War. In the interpretation of the history of that war

the widest divergences exist between Marxist and Western

historians. Even within these two large groups of scholars

opinion is divided on many questions.

The author of this book, first published in the Soviet

Union in the Russian language in 1965 and now available

in the English and French languages, has made an attempt

to give a Marxist view of British foreign policy during the

Second World War on the basis of published documents

(for reasons that will be appreciated the author has had no

access to British archives), memoirs by many prominent

politicians and military leaders and the works of historians.

The war-time documents of the British Government have

not been published, and the author has therefore had to make

use of approved British histories of the war whose authors

had drawn upon those documents. It was much easier to

reconstruct Anglo-Soviet relations, which form the main

substance of this book, because many of the most important

war-time documents of the Soviet Government have been

published. These include the full correspondence of

J. V. Stalin with Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roose¬

velt (which has not been published either in Britain or in

the USA), diplomatic documents covering Soviet-French

relations, and the verbatim reports of the Teheran, Crimea

and Berlin conferences. Moreover, where the author’s assess¬

ments differ from his Western, mainly British, colleagues’,

he has reinforced his arguments with facts and materials

published in Britain and other Western countries or with the

views of Western authors. He feels that this will make his

arguments more understandable to the foreign reader.

The English and French translations faithfully reproduce

the Russian edition, except in cases where for the reader’s

convenience the book has been somewhat abridged.

INTRODUCTION

Wars are capitalism’s greatest crime against humanity.

This is particularly true of the Second World War, which

cost mankind countless lives and brought it enormous

suffering.

The British ruling classes bear a responsibility for this

war because in the 1920s and 1930s their policy facilitated

the preparations for the war and enabled Germany, Italy

and Japan to start it. That, perhaps, is the reason why many

doctored views regarding the events leading up to the war

have been current in Britain for more than a quarter of a

century. From time to time these views somewhat vary, but

their substance remains unchanged: their authors assert that

Britain never wanted the war.

In these assertions truth rubs shoulders with untruth. The

truth is that the overwhelming majority of people in Britain

never really wanted war. But the ruling classes had other

ideas. They did not want a war in which Britain would

fight Germany, much less on the side of the Soviet Union;

they wanted a war between Germany and the Soviet Union.

This was their objective throughout the two decades between

the two world wars. Any assertion that Britain did not want

the Second World War is thus a piece of classic humbug.

On the eve of the war British policy was determined by

the contradictions in operation in the world, the prime con¬

tradiction being that between capitalism and socialism. After

the Great October Socialist Revolution the main process

determining world history has been the struggle between

these two opposing social systems. The antagonism between

moribund capitalism and nascent communism is a class con¬

tradiction operating in international politics. In the British

socio-economic system the class antagonism between the

working people and the bourgeoisie embraced and influenced

both home and foreign policy. The contradiction between

socialism and capitalism objectively pushed Britain towards

unity with other imperialist states for a struggle against the

socialist Soviet Union, against the revolutionary movement

throughout the world.

Besides there were contradictions between the imperialists.

They had been in existence before the October Revolution,

but they grew more acute with the general crisis of capital¬

ism, which started as a result of the October Revolution. In

their turn they greatly exacerbated the class contradictions

between the bourgeoisie and the working people of Britain

in home and foreign policy.

At different periods these contradictions influenced Brit¬

ish foreign policy in one way or another. Aggravation of

the antagonism between socialism and capitalism blunted the

inter-imperialist contradictions and then sharpened them

again. These changes in the degree of exacerbation of vari¬

ous contradictions were observed before and during the

Second World War.

The Second World War was most closely linked up with

the nature of imperialism. The law of the uneven develop¬

ment of capitalist countries in the epoch of imperialism

swells the economic and political contradictions within the

world capitalist system and inevitably gives rise to the

requisites for war. That is what led to the outbreak of both

world wars, in which Britain played an active part. More¬

over, the uneven development of capitalism, in view of its

general crisis, was much more pronounced than at the be¬

ginning of the 20th century.

Subjective factors, too, played a role in giving rise to the

Second World War—the actions of individual governments

and political parties influencing world developments and

determining the alignment of forces in war. The main respon¬

sibility for unleashing the Second World War devolves

on Germany and her allies—Italy and Japan. These were

aggressive states with fascist and militarist regimes which

were out to win world domination. However, a very large

measure of this responsibility reposes in Britain, France and

the USA, which likewise fought for a dominating position in

the world and were bent on removing the opposition of their

rivals to their imperialist designs.

In the complicated conditions in which the various con¬

tradictions interacted, the British ruling classes charted a

policy which they hoped would kill two birds with one stone:

destroy or, at least, undermine socialism and seriously shake

the position of their imperialist adversaries. British states¬

men felt this could be achieved by instigating Germany and

Japan to go to war against the Soviet Union. To this end,

Britain, France and the USA took the enormous risk, in

contravention of the Versailles Treaty, of allowing and help¬

ing their imperialist adversaries to arm and seize important

strategic positions, from which Germany, Italy and Japan

could threaten not only the Soviet Union but also the

Western Powers.

The Soviet Union saw through this policy, time and again

warning Britain, France and the USA that as a result of

their manoeuvres the aggressive forces of Germany, Italy

and Japan, which they were doing their best to prepare for

an anti-Soviet crusade, would ultimately start a war against

them. That is what happened. Germany and Italy at first

attacked Britain and France, and started a war against the

Soviet Union only after they had seized nearly all of con¬

tinental Western Europe.

The Soviet Government felt it was necessary and possible

to curb the aggressive powers and prevent them from

unleashing a war. This could be done by creating a powerful

peace front of all nations desiring to avert war. The Soviet

Union pressed for an anti-aggression alliance with Britain,

France and other states threatened by Germany, Italy and

Japan, justifiably believing that such an alliance could cut

short the policy of international brigandage and, at the time,

avert another world war. However, obsessed by hatred of the

socialist state and doing their best to precipitate an attack on

it by Germany and Japan, the Western Powers wrecked all

of the Soviet Union’s efforts to set up a peace front.

The designs of the politicians steering towards an anti-

Soviet war might have been frustrated and they might have

been forced to conclude an alliance with the Soviet Union

in defence of peace through the joint efforts of the Soviet

Union and other countries pursuing a peace policy and also

through the efforts of the working class and the democrat¬

ic forces of different countries. Such an alliance would have

blocked the road to nazi aggression and averted the Second

World War. But this opportunity was lost chiefly as a result of

the treachery of the opportunist labour leaders in the West.

Inasmuch as in those years the British Labour Party

played a leading role in the world Social-Democratic move¬

ment and carried extensive weight among the British work¬

ing class, which gave it the possibility of influencing the

policy of the country’s ruling classes, its responsibility for

the failure to set up a peace front in the 1930s is particularly

great. This is admitted by leaders of the British Labour

Party. One of them, Ernest Bevin, said at the end of the

war: “If anyone asks me who was responsible for the Brit¬

ish policy leading up to the war, I should, as a Labour man

myself, make a confession and say ‘all of us’.”*

In connection with the 25th anniversary of the outbreak

of the Second World War, British historians and propa¬

ganda propounded the thesis that Britain, France and the

Soviet Union were equally responsible for allowing Ger¬

many and her allies to start the war. All had committed

gross mistakes: Britain and France had made their mistake

by striking the Munich deal with Hitler; the Soviet Union’s

mistake was in signing the pact with Germany in 1939. All

had atoned for these errors: Britain by Dunkirk, and the

Soviet Union by its contribution to the defeat of Germany.

This argument is used to dispute the fact that in pre-war

international relations there were two lines—the Soviet line

of consistently advocating steps to rule out a world war,

and the line pursued by Britain and some other countries

which were out to kindle war between Germany and the

Soviet Union.

Marxist and other historians have accumulated a vast

body of facts which leave not the slightest doubt that the

governments of Britain and some other imperialist powers

went to all ends in their efforts to spark a war between Ger¬

many and the USSR and thereby fomented the Second

World War. Evidence of this is also to be found in pub¬

lished official documents from the diplomatic archives of

Britain, Germany and the USA, and in the memoirs of many

statesmen and politicians of different countries. For instance,

* Daily Notes, June 26, 1945.

a study of the diplomatic archives of the US State Depart¬

ment, including communications from the US Ambassador

in London, brought the American historians William L.

Langer and S. Everett Gleason round to the conclusion that

Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister in 1937-40,

believed a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union

would be of “great benefit to the whole Western world”.*

Sir Stafford Cripps, who was closely connected with Brit¬

ish Government circles and, consequently, well-informed,

gave the following explanation why Chamberlain and other

representatives of the British ruling classes felt the interests

of the bourgeois world would be furthered by a war between

Germany and the USSR. “When the change of Government

came in Great Britain in 1931,” he said in February 1940,

“a new train of very important international events began.

“The new National Government ... was in fact over¬

whelmingly controlled by conservative and imperialist

forces. The leaders were known to be extremely hostile to

Russia and to be unsympathetic to the tendency towards

socialism and communism in Germany and other European

countries. The Conservatives for some years after 1917 had

regarded the Russian Revolution as something unstable and

which must inevitably fall within a few years; but when it

had stood through years of difficulties and was obviously

becoming more and more stable they became extremely

alarmed at the prospect of the spread of the ideology of

communism through Germany and France to Great Britain

itself. They were, therefore, prepared to do almost anything

to build up protection for British capitalism and imperialism

against the spread of this, to them, dangerous disease, which

had already gained a considerable hold amongst the British

working class. That basic attitude has been the determining

factor in all British foreign policy since 1931 and up to

September last year, and even to a large extent since that

date....

“The great enemy to British capitalism was thus the ideol¬

ogy of the Russian Revolution permanently embodied in the

successful Government of Soviet Russia. To fight this ideol¬

ogy must mean hostility to Russia.. . .

“It will thus be seen that throughout this period the major

factor in E uropean politics was the successive utilisation by

William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Iso¬

lation, 1937-1940, New York, 1952, p. 76.

Great Britain and to some extent by France as well, though

largely as the result of Great Britain’s lead, of various fas¬

cist governments to check the power and danger of the rise

of communism or socialism.... Japan was tacitly encouraged

in the east, Germany on the west of Russia and fascism was

reinforced in Italy and Spain. ... All this despite the evident

and growing danger to British imperialism.... It was then

the failure of Britain to conclude a pact with Russia that

made the Russo-German pact and war inevitable.”*

Such was Sir Stafford Cripps’ generally correct assessment

of British foreign policy on the eve of the war and of

Britain’s responsibility for the war. He cannot be suspected of

being sympathetic to communism if only because he was

British Ambassador in the USSR in 1940-42 and then a

member of Churchill’s War Cabinet. He was, consequently,

a reliable executor of the will and protector of the interests

of British imperialist circles.

John L. Snell, a well-known American bourgeois histo¬

rian, writes that many of the British Conservatives “admired

Hitler or feared Communism so greatly that they would not

resist Germany’s resurgence”, while Chamberlain regarded

Germany as a “strong bulwark against Russia”.**

The allegation, made by British historians and propagan¬

da, that Britain and the USSR share the responsibility for the

Second World War is evidence that even the apologists of

British foreign policy feel the policy of appeasing aggressors

pursued by the British Government in the 1930s cannot be

justified. This is indirect admission of the fact that this

policy led to the Second World War.

Many British authors, among them Colin Reith Coote

writing in the Daily Telegraph, say this policy was a mis¬

take, and in order to save the Munichmen from being re¬

garded as having deliberately engineered the war they go

so far as to call them not very clever people.

Similarly, English bourgeois historiography refuses to rec¬

ognise that Soviet actions on the eve of the war were justi¬

fied, that there were grounds for them and that they had the

safeguarding of peace as their aim. Therefore, in spite of

facts, attempts are made to “divide the responsibility” for

* Eric Estorick, Stafford Cripps: Master Statesman, New York, 1949,

pp. 215, 216, 217, 219.

** John L. Snell, Illusion and Necessity. The Diplomacy of Global

War, 1939-1945, Boston, 1963, pp. 11-12.

the war between the USSR and the imperialist powers. To

this end English historiography unscrupulously presents the

Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty as an instrument

that paved the way to war even though this is belied by the

treaty’s very name.

These authors are not in the least disturbed by the fact

that they contradict not only history but also themselves. In

every more or less reputable work on the history of pre-war

international relations one finds approximately what, for

example, W. N. Medlicott writes: “We must at least bear in

mind throughout that the decision to go to war was taken by

Hitler before the end of 1937.”* This corresponds to the

truth and is borne out by German archival documents. Ob¬

viously there is no connection between this decision and the

Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty, which was signed

in 1939. Nobody will venture to assert that in deciding, in

1937, to go to war in the near future Hitler made this deci¬

sion conditional on the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty

with the USSR two years later. But it is unquestionable that

in adopting his decision he took the stand of the Munich

appeasers into account. History confirmed that his calcula¬

tions were correct—a year later Chamberlain and Daladier

went to Munich, and the deal they made with Hitler was

the prelude to the Second World War.

Another fact, in this connection, which cannot be ignored

is that in March 1939 Britain gave her notorious “guaran¬

tees” to Poland. Why? Because it was felt Germany was

jockeying into a position to attack Poland. Thus, as early as

March 1939 the British Government’s point of departure was

that Germany would soon start a world war. It will be noted

that all this took place before the talks on a Soviet-German

Non-Aggression Treaty were started on German initiative

and was in no way linked with that treaty.

The arguments of some British historians drip with

melancholy and regret over the failure of the Munich policy.

Candid admissions on this score have lately become more

and more frequent in Britain. By attacking the policy pursued

by the Soviet Union in 1939, British and other historians

defend the abortive Munich policy which history has

condemned.

* W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. II, London, 1959,

p. 3.

What kind of Soviet foreign policy would have suited

British historians? Here, for instance, is what Medlicott says:

“How much stronger the Soviet case would be if Russia and

not the Western Powers had gone to war in September

1939!”...* An interesting thought. In other words, had the

Soviet Union yielded to the provocation of the Chamberlain

Cabinet and gone to war against Germany singlehanded in

1939, thereby according Britain the role of a jubilant onlook¬

er, Medlicott would have approved Soviet policy. No seri¬

ous scholar can condemn the Soviet Government for not

having pursued an obviously mad policy and for evading

the trap set for it by British and other politicians.

The outbreak of war between Britain and Germany in

September 1939 and, in particular, the military defeat suf¬

fered by Britain and France in the summer of 1940 signified

the collapse of the foreign policy which Britain had pursued

in the 1920s and 1930s. In face of this catastrophic setback,

the British ruling classes had temporarily to change their

course and steer towards an alliance with the USSR in

order to have its assistance against their imperialist adver¬

saries. They were forced to take this step by circumstances

and by the will of the British people, who rightly considered

that Britain’s national independence could not be upheld

without an alliance with the Soviet Union. However, this

did not imply a radical and final rupture with the old

policy. Such a rupture could not take place because Britain’s

foreign policy was determined by the long-term class inter¬

ests of the British bourgeoisie and by the contradictions

operating in international politics; these contradictions could

not disappear or radically change.

Although Britain was a member of the anti-fascist coali¬

tion, her policy in 1939-45 was, naturally, a continuation of

her policy of the 1920s and 1930s under the new conditions

and with due account for these new conditions. For that

reason, the policy which the British ruling classes and their

imperialist allies pursued during the Second World War

had two closely intertwining objectives: the first was- to

defeat their imperialist rivals with Soviet assistance, and the

second was to weaken the Soviet Union, which was their

Ally. These two objectives made British foreign policy com¬

plicated and contradictory.

* The Times, March 17, 1964, p. 11.

Chapter One

MUNICH LIVED

ON IN SPITE OF EVERYTHING

{September 1939-April 1940 )

Britain Declares War

No matter how hard British bourgeois politicians, publi¬

cists and historians have tried to persuade people to believe

the contrary, Britain did not enter the war because of

Poland. The fulfilment by Britain of the guarantees* given

to Poland is the official version doggedly underlined by

those who desire to conceal the truth. Facts, however, indi¬

cate that in its eagerness to reach agreement with Germany,

the British Government was prepared, in the summer of

1939, to scrap these guarantees and betray Poland to Ger¬

many, naturally, on terms that would benefit Britain. Hitler

was well aware of this and prepared a military attack on

Poland, planning to crush and conquer her and decide her

destiny at his own discretion, without asking the British

Government for advice.

He was confident the British Government, which had left

Austria and Czechoslovakia to his tender mercies and

* On March 81, 1939, the British Prime Minister Neville Chamber-

lain told Parliament that in the event of an action which clearly threat¬

ened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accord¬

ingly thought was vital to resist with their national forces, the British

Government “would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish

Government all support in their power” ( Parliamentary Debates. House

of Commons , Vol. 345, col. 2415). These unilateral guarantees soon be¬

came mutual, as recorded in the Anglo-Polish communique of April 6,

1939 ( The Times, April 6, 1939). An Anglo-Polish Treaty turning

these guarantees into a formal mutual assistance pact was signed in

London on August 25, 1939 [The Times, August 26, 1939).

2-1561

demonstrated its readiness to settle the “Polish problem” in

Germany’s interests, would also swallow his seizure of Poland.

The British Government had itself convinced him of

this. Medlicott writes that Dr. Wohlthat’s discussions in

London with Sir Horace Wilson and R. S. Hudson on July

18-21 had taken place on British initiative. The mere fact

that in these discussions the British offered a blanket agree¬

ment on economic and colonial questions “evidently con¬

vinced Ribbentrop that the British were desperately seeking

to escape from their Polish entanglement”.* In order to

make this unpleasant operation easier for the British, Hitler,

on August 25, 1939, offered Britain through her Ambassador

in Berlin Nevile Henderson a broad agreement which

“would not only guarantee the existence of the British Em¬

pire in all circumstances as far as Germany is concerned,

but also if necessary give an assurance to the British Empire

of German assistance regardless of where such assistance

should be necessary”.** He made the reservation that this

offer could be implemented “only after the German-Polish

problem was settled”, implying that Germany would settle

this “problem” by force. The British Government was pre¬

pared to start talks on a broad agreement with Germany,

but insisted that Germany reach a peaceful settlement with

Poland. The substance of the divergences was that Hitler

wanted first to seize Poland and then talk with Britain, while

Chamberlain was prepared to let him have Poland on con¬

dition this would be part of a general Anglo-German agree¬

ment. Hitler expected Chamberlain would in the end yield

and that matters would not go to the extent of war between

Germany and Britain. “It is likely,” writes the American pub¬

licist William L. Shirer, “that his experience with Chamber-

lain at Munich led him to believe that the Prime Minister

again would capitulate if a way out could be concocted.”***

Hitler’s offer of August 25 was that way out.

The Italian dictator Mussolini, who dreaded being drawn

into a war prematurely, notified Hitler that Italy could not

support Germany in a war over the impending German in-

* W. N. Medlicott, The Coming of War in 1939, London, 1963, p. 28.

** The British Blue Book. Documents Concerning German-Polish Re¬

lations and the Outbreak of Hostilities Between Great Britain and Ger¬

many on September 3, 1939, 6106, London, 1939, p. 121.

*** William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A

History of Nazi Germany, New York, 1960, p. 557.

vasion of Poland, and actively engaged in organising another

Munich, this time for the dissolution of Poland. The Dala-

dier Government in France displayed readiness to strike such

a bargain. The British Government was likewise prepared

to go to another Munich in the hope it would lead to a

broad agreement with Germany.

This added fuel to Hitler’s adventurism and aggressive¬

ness. He was becoming convinced that Germany’s seizure

of Poland would not lead to war with Britain and France.

In the evening of August 31, only hours before the invasion

of Poland, General Franz Haider, Chief of the German

General Staff, wrote in his diary: “Fuehrer calm ... he ex¬

pects France and England will not take action.”' 1 ' The im¬

mediate future did not justify these hopes. Hitler miscalcu¬

lated. Nevertheless he had had weighty grounds for his

expectations.

From the letter and spirit of the British guarantees to

Poland it followed that if Britain intended to honour her

pledge she had to declare war on Germany as soon as Ger¬

many attacked Poland at dawn on September 1, 1939. This

applied to France in equal measure. However, neither Britain

nor France took this step either on September 1 or 2.

“Under the terms of the Mutual Assistance Agreement of

August 25, Britain was pledged to act ‘at once’, with ‘all

the support and assistance in its power’. She did not. If

Hitler calculated that it was possible once more to make

gains in Eastern Europe without British interference, it was

a shrewd calculation. Those who were responsible for Brit¬

ish foreign policy were unwilling to honour their Polish

Pact simply because Polish territory had been attacked....

With that onslaught, and with the bombing of cities and the

encroachment of armies, the British willingness for negotia¬

tions remained.... The clear terms of a treaty signed five

days earlier were ignored.”**

Instead of discharging their obligations to Poland, the

British and French governments looked feverishly for a

possibility to avoid declaring war on Germany and reach

agreement with her at the expense of Poland’s freedom and

independence. The British Cabinet met to discuss the crisis

* Ibid., pp. 595-96.

** Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers, Boston, 1963,

p. 301.

2 *

at midday on September 1, and by 13:25 hours the situation

had become clear. The British Government decided not to

regard the German invasion of Poland as a casus belli, and

to try to work towards a settlement of the issue through ne¬

gotiation. “The idea of a solution ‘without war’ once war had

begun was a strange one,” Gilbert and Gott note.* This

strange idea was behind the actions of the British Government

in the course of two days after the German invasion of

Poland.

British diplomacy concentrated on talks with the govern¬

ments of Germany, Italy, France and Poland with the pur¬

pose of convening another Munich-type cpnference. The

British Government jumped at Mussolini’s suggestion, made

to Britain and France, of August 31, that a conference should

be held on September 5 “for the revision of the clauses of

the Treaty of Versailles which were the cause of the present

great troubles in the life of Europe”.** It sent the German

Government a communication stating that by “attacking

Poland the German Government had ‘created conditions’

calling for the implementation of the Anglo-French guar¬

antee to Poland”.***

In this same communication it was pointed out that if the

German Government did not recall its troops from Poland,

the British Government would honour its commitments to

Poland. It is extremely important to note that Nevile Hen¬

derson was instructed to tell the German Government that

this “communication was in the nature of a warning, and

was not to be considered as an ultimatum”.****

Thus, in violation of her pledge to Poland, Britain did

not declare war on Germany on September 1 despite the

fact that according to the British communication Germany

had “created conditions” calling for war. More than that,

she did not even send Germany an ultimatum. Instead she

started a correspondence with the aim of convening the con¬

ference suggested by Mussolini. In a message to the German

Government on September 2, Mussolini said this conference

would ensure “a settlement of the Polish-German dispute

in favour of Germany”.

* Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, Op. cit., p. 305.

** Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World

War, London, 1962, p. 2.

*** Ibid.

***» Ibid.

Matters were clearly moving towards another Munich, a

fact confirmed even in approved British histories of the

Second World War. “For the first twenty-four hours after

the opening of the German attack there seemed to the For¬

eign Office a faint chance that ... Hitler might agree to a

resumption of negotiations on terms which the British,

French and Polish governments could accept.”* But Hitler

left the communication of September 1 unanswered. He

took his time, intending first to attain his military targets

in Poland and then negotiate with her Allies. He was confi¬

dent that neither Chamberlain nor Daladier would go so far

as to declare war. However, he failed to take into considera¬

tion the forces which ultimately determined the actions of

the British and French governments.

The fact that Poland would be the next victim of German

piracy had been obvious long before September 1. After

Germany seized Czechoslovakia in March 1939, and fol¬

lowed this up by raising the question of Danzig and the Polish

corridor, the British Government had no doubts whatever

as to which way the wind was blowing. We now know that

during the secret talks with the Germans in the summer of

1939 the British Government was prepared to sacrifice Po¬

land to the nazis for a broad agreement with them. London

was positive that after seizing Poland, Germany would move

farther east and finally start a war against the Soviet Union,

a war so long-awaited and passionately desired by the

Western ruling circles. Obsessed with these calculations the

British and French governments obstructed an agreement

with the USSR on ensuring peace in Europe, refused to

accept its assistance in the struggle against German aggres¬

sion and declined its offer to act jointly with them in de¬

fending Poland. They thereby doomed Poland to defeat and

helped Germany to ignite the fuse of the Second World

War.

The Treaty of Non-Aggression signed by Germany and

the USSR on August 23, 1939 opened the eyes of many

British statesmen to Germany’s immediate plans. They saw

that Germany had no intention, at least in the near future,

of attacking the USSR. This meant she would threaten the

West. This was appreciated in London, and in the British

ruling circles the balance of forces changed in favour of

* Ibid., pp. 1-2.

those who felt, belatedly it is true, that Germany’s bid for

supremacy in Europe had to be opposed by force. True,

Neville Chamberlain, who had long ago staked on an anti-

Soviet deal with Hitler, did not catch this change in the mood

of the ruling circles. Hence his desire to reach agreement with

Hitler at Poland’s expense even after September 1. Hitler,

too, did not understand the changes that were taking place

in Britain and went on hoping that the Chamberlain Cabinet

would officially betray Poland.

But developments moved in the opposite direction. At

19:30 hours on September 2, when Chamberlain appeared

in the House of Commons, the MPs believed he would in¬

form them that the Government would declare war or, at

least, present an ultimatum to Germany. But they heard

nothing of the sort. Chamberlain said he was hoping nego¬

tiations were still possible. It was obvious to MPs that the

Government was concocting another Munich, but they fun¬

damentally disagreed with it in the question of whether

another bargain was opportune and served Britain’s inter¬

ests. The Chamberlain statement, therefore, aroused pro¬

found indignation not only among the Labour and Liberal

factions but also among the majority of the Conservatives.

Hugh Dalton, a Labour leader, considered that if there had

been a free vote in the House of Commons, the Chamberlain

Cabinet would have been voted out of office. “It seemed,”

he noted in his diary on September 2, “that appeasement

was once more in full swing, and that our word of honour to

the Poles was being deliberately broken.’”*' On the same day,

Leslie Hore-Belisha, Chamberlain’s Secretary for War,

wrote in his diary that had Arthur Greenwood, who spoke

on behalf of the Labour Party, “turned on the Government,

he would have had Tory support, and it might have meant

the fall of the Government”.**

The mood in Parliament communicated itself to members

of the Cabinet. Some Ministers—Leslie Hore-Belisha, Sir

John Anderson, Herbrand Edward de la Warr and Walter

Elliot—asked John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer,

who was close to Chamberlain, to tell the Prime Minister to

* Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years. Memoirs, 1931-1945, London,

1957, pp. 264-65.

** R. J. Minney, The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, Garden Citv,

New York, 1961, p. 226.

declare war on Germany.* A group of leading Tories—

Anthony Eden, Robert Boothby, Brendan Bracken, Duncan

Sandys and Alfred Duff Cooper—gathered at Churchill’s

home. “We were all in a state of bewildered rage,” writes

Duff Cooper.** Boothby said that if Chamberlain did not

declare war within the next few hours his chances of re¬

maining in office were nil. This group felt that if on the next

day Churchill spoke in the House of Commons against

Chamberlain he would cause the downfall of the Govern¬

ment. But Churchill refused to take this step because in his

pocket he had Chamberlain’s invitation to join the Cabinet

as First Lord of the Admiralty.

That same evening the Tory_ Chief Whip saw Chamber-

lain and “warned him” in no uncertain terms “that unless

we acted on the following day [i.e., declared war— V. T.]

there would be a revolt in the House”.***

The Cabinet met at 23:30 hours on September 2. It was

now obvious to everybody that there were only two alterna¬

tives before the Cabinet: either to declare war on Germany

or on the following day Parliament would vote the Govern¬

ment out of office. It was decided to send Germany an ulti¬

matum at nine o’clock in the morning of September 3. The

ultimatum would expire at 11 o’clock that same morning,

i.e., one hour before the House of Commons opened.

The ultimatum stated that if the German Government

failed to give satisfactory assurances that it would cease the

invasion of Poland and quickly withdraw its troops, Britain

would be in a state of war with Germany as of 11:00 hours

on September 3, 1939. This caught the Germans by surprise.

When the ultimatum was reported to Hitler he asked Rib-

bentrop, his Foreign Minister: “What’s now?” This ques¬

tion meant that Ribbentrop had deluded himself and the

Fuehrer regarding Britain’s possible reaction to the German

invasion of Poland.*'

Yet, until the very last minute neither did the British

Government expect to have to declare war. It did so against

its own will, being forced by a number of factors. Its anti-

Soviet designs had gone astray. The British ruling classes

* Ibid., pp. 226-27.

** Alfred Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, London, 1954, p. 259.

*** Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, Op. cit., p. 322.

*) P. Schmidt, Hitler s Interpreter, New York, 1951, pp. 157-58.

felt they had been tricked by Hitler: he had been paid in

advance for a war against the Soviet Union and now he was

refusing to act according to the plans of the London politi¬

cians. In August 1939 these same politicians had refused to

sign a treaty with the Soviet Union against aggression in

Europe, i.e., mainly against nazi Germany, and now after

Germany had signed the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the

USSR, they were compelled to declare war on Germany. On

September 3, 1939 Britain and France alone went to war

against Germany; only a couple of weeks before that they

had turned down an alliance with the USSR against Ger¬

many’s aggressive aspirations. What was behind this devel¬

opment? It was by no means the German attack on Poland.

Firstly, although Britain and France had given Poland

“guarantees”, they had no intention of enforcing them.

Secondly, while the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks were in

progress in the spring and summer of 1939, it was obvious

that Germany was getting ready to attack Poland. Properly

speaking, that was why these negotiations were conducted.

The crux of the matter was that before the Soviet-German

Non-Aggression Treaty was signed, Britain and France had

regarded Germany as the main shock force against the USSR

and, naturally, did not wish to hinder her counter-revolu¬

tionary mission. Now they saw her as a “traitor”. Her signa¬

ture under the non-aggression treaty was tantamount to a

declaration that she had no intention of fighting the Soviet

Union. Naturally, at the time neither in London nor in

Paris did anyone suspect that Germany regarded this treaty

only as a stratagem and was planning to attack the Soviet

Union in violation of this treaty after she had defeated

Britain and France. Even if the governments of Britain and

France had any inkling of this, it could hardly have given

them any pleasure inasmuch as under the German plan a

Soviet-German war had to be preceded by the defeat of

Britain and France and the German occupation of the whole

of Western Europe. Churchill said in one of his speeches

that Britain declared war on Germany because Hitler, who

had promised “war against the Bolsheviks”, had “deceived

Western civilisation” by signing a non-aggression treaty with

the USSR. In a brochure containing a preface by Viscount

Halifax, Lord Lloyd of Dolobran says the motive behind

Britain’s declaration of war on Germany was the latter’s

“betrayal of Europe”, “Hitler’s last act of apostasy”, which

was to sign a non-aggression treaty with the USSR. Accusa¬

tions in this vein were hurled at Hitler by the British press

at the close of 1939 and in early 1940. In Liverpool on

February 28, 1940, Anthony Eden, then Secretary of State

for Dominions, bitterly reproached the German Government

for betraying the struggle against the Soviet Union. “It is

strange to think,” he wrote, “how many hours I used to

spend in the Foreign Office listening to the present German

Foreign Secretary when he was Ambassador in London, and

when he used to expound to me at no small length the dan¬

gers and horrors of Bolshevism.”* It never occurred to

Eden that in addition to charging the German Government

with “treachery”, he was giving away his own Government.

If Ribbentrop had spoken of this for hours at the British

Foreign Office, it meant the British Government had wanted

to discuss the “Bolshevik threat” with him and had stinted

neither its time nor energy.

But there was more to it than Germany’s “betrayal” of

the anti-socialist cause. By her actions she aggravated

Anglo-German contradictions to the extent that British rul¬

ing circles found they had to go to war against Germany.

“The Munichites,” Labour Monthly wrote, “replied by de¬

claring war on nazi Germany as soon as it had signed the

Pact of Non-Aggression with the Soviet Union and thus

made clear that its offensive would be directed against their

imperialist interests.”**

One of the major factors determining Britain’s stand was

the desire of the British people to help stamp out the menace

of nazism. While a section of the ruling classes urged that

Germany should be repulsed because her actions were a

direct threat to British imperialist interests, the working

people considered that a military rebuff should be given to

Germany because German nazism was a threat to the free¬

dom of nations, to progress. On the example of Austria,

Czechoslovakia and Spain, as well as Germany herself, the

British people by then knew the meaning of nazism. All

illusions regarding the Munich deal had crumbled long ago,

and the shame of Munich was obvious to anyone who cared

to open his eyes.

The Soviet Union, whose foreign policy had fostered the

* The Times, March 1, 1940, p. 5.

** Labour Monthly, August 1941, p. 347.

growth of political consciousness among the nations, had

done much to expose the aggressive nature of nazism and

the Munich compact. The mood of the masses powerfully

influenced the stand of British MPs. It so happened that

this mood coincided with the considerations of the ruling

circles. Therefore, on September 3, the House of Commons

unanimously voted for a declaration of war. The Conserva¬

tive, Labour and Liberal parties were at one on this question.

. An important role was played by the United States, which

in the autumn of 1939 felt its imperialist interests would be

furthered if war broke out between Germany and the Anglo-

French bloc. At the time of Munich the US Government

urged Hitler’s appeasement at the expense of Czechoslova¬

kia, the reason being that in 1938 a war against Germany

might have ended before the USA could intervene. Such a

war held out nothing for the US monopolies. The situation

changed radically by the summer of 1939. Germany’s power

had grown and if she attacked Britain and France the war

promised to be a long one. Such a war would weaken the

USA’s imperialist rivals and clear the way for the materiali¬

sation of US plans for world domination. Moreover, a big war

in Europe was desirable because it could smooth away the

USA’s own economic difficulties. US President Franklin

D. Roosevelt admitted that his New Deal had not improved

the American economy. He now pinned his hopes not on

“planned capitalism” but on gearing the economy to the mili¬

tary situation. No country, he said in 1938, “has devised a

permanent way, a permanent solution of giving work to

people in the depression periods. ... The only method devised

so far that seemed to give 100 per cent of relief, or nearly so,

is the method of going in for armaments.’” 5 '

Hoping that orders for military supplies would cure US

economy of its chronic ailments, the US Government,

much to the surprise of the British Government, urged firm

opposition to Hitler’s claims on Poland. This happened at

the close of August 1939. The Roosevelt Administration

made it clear to the British Government that it had to

honour its guarantees to Poland. Joseph P. Kennedy, the

US Ambassador in London, said that “.. .neither the French

nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if

'The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1938,

it had not been for the constant needling from Washing¬

ton. ... In the summer of 1939 the President kept telling him

[Kennedy] to put some iron up Chamberlain’s backside.”*

The US Government informed Britain and France that if

they “did not go to Poland’s aid, those countries could ex¬

pect no help from America”.**

Lastly, the fact that most of the British Dominions like¬

wise considered it was necessary to put up armed resistance

to Germany, which was threatening the interests of Britain

and the British Empire, also played its role. In March 1939

the governments of the Dominions, which had supported the

appeasement policy and had approved the Munich bargain,

began to reassess values and at the close of August all of

them, with the exception of the Government of the Union

of South Africa, came to the conclusion that appeasement

had failed and that no further concessions would lead to

agreement with Germany on acceptable terms.

Being independent in their internal and foreign policy, the

British Dominions were not parties to Britain’s guarantees

to Poland. Therefore, in September they were free to choose

between fighting the war on Britain’s side or remaining

neutral. The German threat to Canada, Australia, New

Zealand, the Union of South Africa and Eire (Ireland) was

not as direct as to Britain, but the economic, political and

military interests of Britain and the Dominions intertwined

so closely that a menace to Britain was, at the same time, a

menace to the Dominions. In the long run this was what

drew all the Dominions (save Eire) into the war on Britain’s

side.

The many British colonies with their large populations,

with a vast country like India among them, were declared

by the British Government to be in a state of war with

Germany. This declaration was made without consulting

the peoples of the countries concerned, and, naturally, could

not fail but hinder the mobilisation of the resources of the

British Empire for the conduct of the war. Formidable dif¬

ficulties of this kind were subsequently encountered by

Britain in India.

* The Forrestal Diaries, Ed. by W. Mills and E. S. Duffield, New

York, 1951, p. 122.

** Charles C. Tansill, Back Door to War. The Roosevelt Foreign

Policy 1933-1941, Chicago, 1952, p. 555.

The Real Worth

of the British Guarantees to Poland

“War was declared,” write M. Gilbert and R. Gott. “But

appeasement lived on.”* Such was Britain’s policy during

the initial period of the war, a period that lasted seven

months.

Poland was the first victim of this policy. No attempt was

made by Britain or France to honour the guarantees they

had given her. Had these countries the practical possibility

of honouring their pledge to Poland? Unquestionably. On

the European continent they had the necessary forces to

strike Germany a blow which could have saved Poland.

First and foremost, evidence of this is to be found in the

depositions of leading German generals. General Alfred

Jodi maintained that “in 1939 the world could not avert

the catastrophe because the 110 divisions, which the French

and British had, were completely idle in face of 23 German

divisions in the West”.** General Siegfried Westphal wrote

that if early in September the Allies had started an offensive

they could easily have reached the Rhine and even crossed

it, adding: “The subsequent course of the war would then

have been very different.”*** But this did not happen.

J. F. C. Fuller, the British military historian, put the matter

in a nutshell with the words: “The strongest army in the

world, facing no more than twenty-six divisions, sitting still

and sheltering behind steel and concrete while a quixotically

valiant Ally was being exterminated!”** An entry in the

diary of Hugh Dalton, made at this time, says: “It was im¬

possible to justify our treatment of the Poles. We were lett¬

ing them down and letting them die, while we did nothing

to help them.”***

The Polish military mission which arrived in London on

September 3 had to wait an entire week before it was re¬

ceived by General W. E. Ironside, Chief of the Imperial Gen¬

eral Staff. And this during the German blitzkrieg in Poland,

when every minute counted. The talks lasted from Septem-

* Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, Op. cit., p. 326.

** Pravda, July 22, 1959.

*** The Fatal Decisions, New York, 1956, p. 3.

** J. F. C. Fuller, The Second World War 1939-1945, London, 1948,

p. 55.

**) Hugh Dalton, Op. cit., p. 277.

ber 9 to 15, and at the closing session Ironside declared that

in the way of war supplies—tanks, anti-aircraft and anti¬

tank artillery, fighter planes and uniforms—the best Britain

could do for Poland was to send her 10,000 Hotchkiss rifles

(old British automatic rifles of World War I vintage) and

15-20 million cartridges. The first transports from Britain,

he said, would arrive in five or six months at the earliest.*

This statement was made when the President and Govern¬

ment of defeated Poland were already on the Rumanian

frontier, on their way out of their own country.

Political considerations lay behind Britain’s and France’s

non-fulfilment of their guarantees to Poland. “For the men

of Munich,” Wladislaw Gomulka said, “Poland was a pawn

which they lightly sacrificed in a dirty game in the hope that

after it rapidly overran our country, the Wehrmacht would

come face to face with the Soviet Army. Attempts were

continued, by somewhat different means, to implement the

objective underlying the Munich policy, namely that of

pushing the Third Reich against the USSR.”**

Another aspect of Britain’s unseemly behaviour towards

Poland was that when she pledged to help her in the event

of German aggression she knew beforehand that she would

not keep her word. The Treaty of Mutual Assistance was

signed by Britain and Poland on August 25, 1939, the day

after US Ambassador Kennedy had informed Washington

that Chamberlain had told him that “after all they cannot

save the Poles”.*** Moreover, J. R. M. Butler makes it clear

that British policy for the conduct of the war “had been

concerted with the French in the spring of 1939”, that the

“implications of the Polish alliance should war break out

were further discussed during the summer”, and, as a result,

the British and French governments came to the conclusion

that “the fate of Poland will depend upon the ultimate out¬

come of the war, and that this, in turn, will depend upon

our ability to bring about the eventual defeat of Germany,

and not on our ability to relieve pressure on Poland at the

outset”.** Consequently, these governments decided to leave

* F. Yuzviak, The Polish Workers’ Party in the Struggle for National

and Social Liberation, Moscow, 1953, Russ, ed., p. 37.

** Pravda, July 22, 1959.

*»>- William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 196.

*) J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. II, September 1939-June

1941, London, 1957, pp. 10-12.

Poland to Hitler’s tender mercies long before Britain signed

the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Poland. Deprived of

assistance from her Allies, Poland with her corrupt

bourgeois-landlord rulers was quickly crushed by the German

armies.

The Phoney War

Pressure of circumstances forced Britain and France into

war against Germany. For very many people in Britain,

France and other countries the declaration of war was testi¬

mony of the failure of the appeasement policy, which the

British and French governments had been pursuing, but for

Chamberlain and his colleagues in London and Paris even

this testimony was not enough. They regarded the declara¬

tion of war on Germany not as an end to their anti-Soviet

conspiracy with Germany but as a means of pressuring her

into a partnership in that conspiracy on terms acceptable to

them. The British appeasers reckoned that if Hitler persist¬

ed in ignoring them the war would in the end influence

“Germany’s internal front”, i.e., bring about the replace¬

ment of the Hitler regime by some other reactionary govern¬

ment prepared to reach agreement with London. Naturally,

with this objective in view, the war had to be conducted in

such a way as to make Hitler feel the pressure being brought

to bear on him and, at the same time, to prevent it from

reaching proportions that would rule out the possibility of

an agreement. That was the situation during the first seven

months of the war. It was the direct outcome of the policy

which Britain and France had been pursuing for many

years. That policy had led to war, and it was continued

during the war. All this fully conformed to the well-known

postulate that war is the continuation of policy by other

means.

This strategy was framed by the British and French gov¬

ernments long before the German attack on Poland. In the

event matters would deteriorate to the extent of war against

Germany, the British and French General Staffs decided in

the spring of 1939 that “during this time our major strategy

would be defensive”. This initial stage, it was planned,

would last three full years, in the course of which Britain

and France would build up their strength. In this period

“the steady and rigorous application of economic pressure

would be reducing the powers of resistance of our enemies”/ 1 '

Economic pressure, or economic warfare as it was called in

Britain, had, essentially, to consist of solely a blockade, in¬

sofar as defensive strategy ruled out air strikes with the

purpose of undermining Germany’s economy.

At first glance this would seem to be an extremely strange

and incomprehensible strategy. Chamberlain was obviously

aware the war could not be won by a defensive strategy. In

London they could not fail to realise that the blockade of

Germany as the principal means of conducting the war was

clearly untenable if only for the reason that it could be im¬

posed only from the West, because the countries north, east

and south of Germany were neutral, and under international

law she could freely trade with them. Even if the blockade

really began to sap the German economy to the extent of

crippling Germany’s ability to fight, there was no guarantee

that she would not try to forestall the consequences of a blo¬

ckade by striking a blow at the West, at Britain and France,

in order to ensure victory.

From the standpoint of the conduct of the war against

Germany, the Anglo-French strategy is incomprehensible

and illogical, but it becomes understandable and logical as

soon as account is taken of the fact that it was directed not

towards a struggle until victory over Germany but towards

the creation of conditions for turning Germany against the

Soviet Union.

In the light of this policy and strategy one distinctly sees

what induced the British Government to betray Poland. “It

is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Poland was sacrificed

as deliberately as Czechoslovakia was,” writes the American

Professor D. F. Fleming. “Poland meant... to the Munich-

men ... another diversion of German conquest-mania tow¬

ard the East which would gain them a little additional time,

if it did not lead to a German-Soviet clash.”* **

Chamberlain’s pre-war policy and his line during the

initial stage of the war, which was a continuation of that

policy, are evidence of the inability of the men who headed

* J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 10.

** D- F. Fleming, The Gold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, Vol. I

1917-1950, London, 1961, p. 95.

the British Government at the time correctly to assess the

situation in Europe and foresee the actions of Britain’s

adversaries. “This unfortunate episode over,” Fleming

writes, having in mind the defeat of Poland, “Chamberlain

settled down for a comfortable war.... He doubted that

Hitler would dare to attack the Maginot Line. He did not

believe in an armoured blitz through the Low Countries. He

thought Hitler would shrink before ‘a breach of neutrality

so flagrant and unscrupulous’. He doubted, too, that Hitler

would attempt a great air blitz on Britain.... Chamberlain

waited calmly for ‘the collapse of the German home

front’. ”*

The most conspicuous result of this policy was that

Britain and France took no advantage of the favourable

situation and balance of forces in September 1939 for an

offensive which might have brought Germany to her knees

and thereby put a speedy end to the war. This was possible

in September 1939 when Germany’s main armed forces

were tied down in Poland and only 23 German divisions

faced the 110 Allied divisions in the West. This assessment

has been confirmed by Alfred Jodi, the German Chief of

Operations, and by Maurice Gamelin, former Commander-

in-Chief of the French Army.**

Hitler miscalculated in believing Britain and France

would not go to war. But when they declared war, he said

they would not fight. He was not mistaken, at least with

regard to the first seven months of the war.

Military action by the British and French was confined

to dropping leaflets on Germany. The Allied navies made

some effort to enforce a blockade of Germany. Naturally,

in this comfortable war neither the Allies nor Germany

sustained any losses. In Europe, Fuller notes, the British suf¬

fered their first casualty on December 9—“Corporal T. W.

Priday was shot dead when on patrol. By Christmas two

more men had been killed, and by that date the total French

casualties for Army, Navy and Air Force were 1,433.”*** In

the diary of King George VI of Britain, the entry for

* D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., pp. 95-96.

** Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Mili¬

tary Tribunal, Vol. XV, Nuremberg, 1947-1951, p. 350. M. Gamelin,

Servir, Vol. Ill, La Guerre (septembre 1939-mai 1940), Paris, 1947, p. 38.

*** J. F. C. Fuller, Op. cit., p. 55.

March 3, 1940 reads in part: “We have been at war for.

six months today.... The war in the first six months has

been one of words and propaganda mainly from Ger¬

many.”* Indeed, this was a phoney war, unprecedented in

history.

Nobody is quite sure who coined the phrase. John

W. Wheeler-Bennett writes: “Thereafter the fog of war

closed down upon the Western Front, and the conflict passed

into that phase of sinister inactivity, which the Americans

christened ‘The Phoney War’ or, more satirically, the ‘Sitz¬

krieg’.”** The French novelist and journalist Roland Dor-

geles claimed he had used the title “The Phoney War” for

one of his reports from the front in October 1939.*** The

phrase caught on. Staff members of the British Royal Institute

of International Affairs write that the phrase was coined by

the US Senator William E. Borah.**** The American publi¬

cist William L. Shirer writes: “Hardly a shot had been fired.

The German man-in-the-street was beginning to call it the

‘sit-down’ war—Sitzkrieg. In the West it would soon be

dubbed the ‘phoney’ war.”*'

Shirer adds: “Were the Germans surprised? Hardly.”**'

Indeed, Britain and France behaved as Hitler hoped they

would. On top of that he did his best to help them fight the

phoney war. In Directive No. 2 of September 3, 1939 he

ordered: “In the West the opening of hostilities is to be left

to the enemy.” The German Air Force was instructed to

refrain from attacking British naval bases until the British

began raiding German objectives.***' The British Govern¬

ment observed with joy and hope that Germany had no ob¬

jection to conducting the phoney war. In September the

British Chiefs of Staff Committee noted that “entirely con¬

trary to expectation” the Germans were taking no action

whatever against Britain. On September 12 the Anglo-French

* John W. Wheeler-Bennett, King George VI. His Life and Reign,

London, 1958, p. 435.

** Ibid., p. 425.

*** R. Dorgeles, La Drole de Guerre. 1939-1940, Paris, 1957, p. 9.

**** The Initial Triumph of the Axis, Ed. by Arnold and Veronica

M. Toynbee, London, 1958, p. 449.

*) William L. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 633.

**) Ibid.

***; Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D.

Vol. VII, Washington, 1956, p. 549.

3-1561

.Supreme War Council recOmmehded the continuation of the

policy of limited action."'

It was no accident that Germany put no obstacles in the

way of the phoney war. Such a war fell in with the designs

of the nazi leaders, for it allowed them to switch the German

economy to a war-time footing without hindrance, replace

the losses suffered by their armed forces in Poland and

build up strength for an assault on Britain and France in the

immediate future. For their part, too, Britain and France

were able to mobilise their forces unhindered. But that was

their only gain from this phoney war. Time unquestionably

worked for Germany. She prepared for the impending

battles more energetically and successfully than Britain and

France because she intended to settle the conflict on the

battlefield, while Britain and France hoped to settle it by

striking a bargain with Germany. The phoney war had a

demoralising effect on the armies and peoples of Britain and

France; it undermined their determination to fight and was

one of the major factors of the defeats suffered by these

countries in the spring and summer of 1940. Arnold Toyn¬

bee, the British historian, writes that this “strange twilight

state of existence, which was neither peace nor war, played

into Hitler’s hands”* ** While Germany was getting her war

machine into gear for a blow at Britain and France, the

governments of the latter countries doggedly looked for an

opportunity to end the war against Germany and get her to

embark on a military crusade against the Soviet Union. This

crusade, the politicians in London and Paris hoped, would

destroy socialism in the USSR and make it possible to

achieve a durable agreement with Germany at the expense

of Soviet territory and resources.

As soon as Poland collapsed, the bourgeois press and a

section of the politicians in Britain began moulding public

opinion in anticipation of a bargain with Germany. They

started with the assertion that there was little to choose be¬

tween the foreign policy aspirations of the USSR and

Germany,*** and then they quickly passed on to the argu¬

ment that the USSR was a greater menace than Germany.

Although the idea of a peace and alliance with Hitler had

* J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 20.

** The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 259.

*** The Economist, September 23, 1939.

the tacit approval of part of the British leadership,

nobody ventured to expound it openly because the atti¬

tude of the people towards nazism had to be taken into

account. In November 1939 the magazine Labour Monthly

wrote: “The most influential sections of British imperialism

openly and with a loud voice demand to ‘switch’ the war,

that is, to transform the war into war against the Soviet

Union. They demand that Germany speedily abandon its

present alignment in order to enter into the anti-Soviet com¬

bination, and they swear that their interests are really iden¬

tical. There is still a division of two schools of thought in this

connection. One school demands the speediest possible settle¬

ment with German reaction, even possibly with Hitler, in or¬

der to advance to the aim of anti-Soviet war. The other school

insists on the necessity of first inflicting a decisive military

defeat on Germany in order to compel its submission.’” 5 '

The press and some propagandists, among them the Tory

Alfred Duff Cooper, sought to persuade the Germans that

they had to organise a “Right-wing revolution” and replace

the nazi government by some other reactionary regime with

which Britain could reach agreement on peace and on

“switching” the war against the USSR. The Conservative

Sunday Limes wrote that the prospect of a decline in the

fortunes of Germany and of an expansion of Russia’s influ¬

ence “has no attraction for the vast majority of the English

people. If any way offered by which we could make peace

with what is admirable in German character and achieve¬

ment ... we in this country would eagerly welcome it.”* **

The people clearly had nothing to do with this. In speaking

of the people, the newspaper had in mind the reactionary and

imperialist circles of both countries, while by guardians of

“what is admirable in German character” it meant the Ger¬

man Junkers and monopolists who had fought Britain in the

First World War and put Hitler in power so that he could

unleash the Second World War. The ideas propounded by

the newspaper were shared by the Government.

From time to time members of the British Cabinet let the

cat out of the bag relative to their intentions. In the House

of Commons on November 28 Prime Minister Chamberlain

said nobody knew how long the war would last, how it would

* Labour Monthly, November 1939, p. 697.

** Sunday Times, October 1, 1939.

develop and who would be on Britain’s side when it ended.*

In his official statements Chamberlain spoke vaguely about

the vicissitudes of war, while privately, among his family

and friends he spoke of bringing the war between Britain and

Germany to an end. On November 5 he wrote to his sister

Ida: “Well it may be so, but I have a ‘hunch’ that the war

will be over before the spring.”** The source of this hunch

was not difficult to find: it seemed to Chamberlain that at

last he had the means for “switching” the war.

He had in mind the Soviet-Finnish War, which broke out

at the close of November 1939.

Anglo-French Relations

At the initial stage of the war, France was Britain’s only

Ally, in addition to Poland and countries of the British

Empire. She was her main Ally, but the relations between

them were complicated and far from being cordial. These

relations were weighted down by the burden of the recent

past, of the 1920s and 1930s, when the two countries had

been rivals for domination in Europe. The deadly threat

from Germany forced them to draw together but it did not

remove the contradictions dividing them. The relations

between them were poisoned by reciprocal suspicion that one

of them might form a bloc with the common enemy, Ger¬

many, at the expense of the other.

In the summer of 1939, taking into account the experi¬

ence of the First World War, when the Allied cause suffered

through the absence of a single military leadership, Britain

and France agreed that if war broke out they would have a

Supreme War Council consisting of the Prime Ministers of

the two countries and of one other Minister from each. The

functions of this body were only consultative, the final de¬

cisions being left to the governments. At the same time, they

set up the mechanism of liaison between their military staffs.

Close contact was maintained between the two Prime Min¬

isters until the fall of France in June 1940.

One of the major bones of contention was the partici¬

pation of British land forces in the war on the European

continent. With the memory of the great losses suffered by

* The Times, November 19, 1939.

** Ian Macleod, Neville Chamberlain, London, 1961, p. 281.

them in Europe in 1914-18 still fresh in their minds, and

clinging to their traditional policy of having someone else

pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them, the British at first

categorically refused to send troops to the continent, offering

only air and naval assistance. In the end they had to concede

and a few months before war broke out they approved a

plan , under which a British expeditionary corps would be

sent to France.

As in the First World War, one of the reasons Britain

was reluctant to have a large force in Europe was that she

wanted to have as many troops as possible in the Middle

East to protect her colonies and, if opportunity afforded, to

lay her hands on colonies belonging to other countries. In the

Middle East the British Government built up its second

strategic reserve to supplement the usual reserve kept in

Britain.* On the whole, history repeated itself. Britain

sought to let France have the honour of bearing most of the

burden of the war in Europe, while she herself tried to give

most of her attention to the colonial regions. The colonial

nature of British imperialism made itself felt, and this could

not but arouse the well-founded suspicions of the French.

To diminish these suspicions and have the possibility of

influencing French policy, Britain had to send an expedition¬

ary corps and a number of air units to France. The first con¬

tingent of British troops arrived in France early in October

1939. Avoiding anything that might break the calm of the

phoney war, the German Command let the British land in

France unhindered. Towards the spring of 1940 the British

expeditionary forces in France comprised 10 divisions,

including one motorised division.**

Edouard Daladier, who was French Premier when war

broke out, and some of his Ministers together with their

advisers were not at all anxious to co-ordinate their policy

with that of Britain any too closely, and in this there was

complete reciprocity on the part of Britain. These French

leaders felt conditions might arise that would enable France

to come to terms with Germany without British participation.

They were undoubtedly guided by the experience of history,

which showed that Britain had never shrunk from a deal

* J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 29.

** C. Falls, The Second World War. A Short History, London, 1948,

p. 25.

with Germany at the expense of her allies, and whenever

possible had been prepared to make such a deal at the ex¬

pense of France as well. British policy in the 1920s and

1930s furnished sufficient grounds for suspicions of this kind.

That was why it took the British Government a long time

to get French agreement to a joint declaration obligating

the Allies not to conclude a separate armistice and peace. On

December 11, 1939, when Viscount Halifax, the British

Foreign Secretary, asked Daladier on what terms such a

declaration could be signed, the latter avoided giving a direct

reply. Daladier told Gamelin of this conversation and ob¬

served that at first “a comparison must be made between

the purposes of France and Britain in this war”.*

The declaration was signed only on March 28, 1940, after

Paul Reynaud took over the French premiership from Dala¬

dier. Under that declaration the two governments pledged

not to negotiate or sign an armistice or a peace treaty during

the war without mutual consent.

Bid to Win Over Italy

Relations with Italy occupied a key role in British policy.

When the war broke out, although Mussolini had close ties

with Hitlerite Germany, he could not make up his mind

whether it was prudent to support the nazis unconditionally.

On the one hand, he was not at all confident that Germany

could crash through the Maginot Line and defeat Britain

and France; on the other hand, he realised that if Italy

deserted to the Allies she “might suffer the fate of Poland

without Britain and France doing anything to help her” **

This wavering was behind Mussolini’s refusal to enter the

war on Germany’s side in September 1939; his excuse was

that Italy was not prepared and he demanded large deliv¬

eries of armaments and various strategic supplies. The

Germans had to agree with this, with the result that for a

while Italy was a non-belligerent.

This raised hopes in London that Italy might be drawn

over to the side of the Allies or, at least, induced to remain

neutral. This was a continuation of the policy which Cham¬

berlain had been pursuing for a number of years in an effort

* M. Gamelin, Op. cit., p. 152.

** The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 213.

to win Italy over from Germany and, naturally, subordinate

her to Britain’s influence. Activity in this direction was now

resumed with redoubled energy, especially as Italy, being an

ally of Germany, threatened British interests in the Mediter¬

ranean, in Africa and in the Middle East. In their courtship

of Italy the Allies took into account Mussolini’s apprehen¬

sions that Italy would be left out of the division of the spoils

of war and, to use his own words, relegated to the junior

group in the European political football league. Churchill

had this in mind when in a radio broadcast on October 1,

1939 he officially offered Italy the position of a “great and

friendly nation”, membership in the European directorate,

which would administer European affairs after the war, and

the recognition of her interests in the Balkans* In November

1939 Churchill offered Italy “historic partnership” with

Britain and France in the Mediterranean.** A month

before this offer was made the British Government extended

de facto recognition to Italy’s seizure of Albania.*** These

political steps were accompanied by measures of an economic

nature.

It was not easy to appease Italy economically. In London

they knew that solely promises of future political blessings

and benefits would not give them any influence over Italian

policy; economic concessions had to be made, and without

delay. However, economic aid to Italy contravened the ob¬

jectives of the war against Germany, for such aid would

strengthen Germany’s ally. Moreover, economic relations

with Italy would make a considerable breach in the economic

war, on which the British Government was pinning much

of its hopes. Nonetheless, the British Government took the

road of economic co-operation with Italy.

By way of exception, Britain allowed Italy to import

German coal by sea via Rotterdam. The Allies placed large

orders with Italian firms. Britain purchased in Italy various

goods, including Army uniforms, footwear and blankets. In

payment for these items Britain supplied Italy with diverse

raw materials, some of which were of a strategic nature.

Britain and Italy signed an agreement on October 27, 1939,

setting up a Joint Standing Committee to consider means of

* The Times, October 2, 1939, p. 10.*

** Winston S. Churchill, Into Battle, London, 1942, p. 144.

*** Survey of International Affairs. The Eve of War. 1939, London,

1957, p. 254.

.»

economic collaboration.* In January 1940 Mussolini wrote

to Hitler, telling him that the “existence of these commercial

relations permits us to acquire those raw materials without

which we cannot complete our military preparations and

which therefore ultimately benefit Germany as well”.**

Some British politicians and historians would have liked

to bury in oblivion this aspect of Anglo-Italian relations of

the initial period of the war.

In March 1940, when Germany’s plans regarding an

offensive against Britain and France took final shape, the

Germans demanded a definite pledge from Italy that she

would enter the war on their side. This caused alarm in

London. E. W. Playfair, a high official of the British Treas¬

ury, was sent to Rome on March 15 with broad economic

proposals. Chamberlain followed this up with a “goodwill

message” to the Italian Government.*** But all this was in

vain. The Italian fascists had made their choice. On March

18, at a conference with Hitler in the Brenner Pass Mussolini

promised to enter the war as Germany’s ally.

Peace Negotiations, Autumn of 1939

Since Britain and France had declared war on Germany

against their will and since a considerable section of the

British ruling circles were eager to turn the war into a cru¬

sade against the Soviet Union, it was inevitable that there

should be a series of attempts to start peace talks between

the Allies and Germany. An excuse was all that was needed.

That excuse was the defeat of Poland. The governments of

Britain and France had maintained, in defiance of truth, that

they had gone to war over Poland. Now that Poland lay

crushed and had ceased to exist as a state, it seemed that the

grounds for war against Germany had likewise disappeared.

In mid-September this argument was brought forth by Hitler

and by the British politicians, who desired to come to terms

with him.

Numerous official, semi-official and unofficial channels for

contact between the ruling circles of Britain and Germany

* The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 234.

** Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. VIII,

Washington, 1954, p. 605.

*** The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 239.

came into being in the 1930s, when the Munich policy

flourished. The war cut short diplomatic relations between

the two countries, but semi-official and unofficial contact

was maintained, and in September and October 1939 these

contacts were used for reciprocal peace feelers. The system

of contact was extraordinarily intricate and it is doubtful

if all of its ramifications are known even today though much

has come to light with the publication of the German

archives. For the same reason it is virtually impossible to

establish who—the Germans or the British—first brought

up the question of peace in September 1939. Most probably

both sides dropped the corresponding hints and put out peace

feelers simultaneously as soon as they found themselves in

a state of war. The English historians Martin Gilbert and

Richard Gott write that “perhaps the various peace moves

began once war broke out” and went on to qualify them as

“routine exercises for the Foreign Office”.*

In this connection both British and Soviet historians give

the closest attention to the activities of the British intelli¬

gence agent Baron de Ropp and the British diplomat Ogilvie

Forbes. On the eve of the war Ropp was the liaison man be¬

tween the British Munichmen and leading German nazis.

At his last meeting with Rosenberg in Berlin, when war

seemed inevitable, Ropp said “it to be in the best interests

of both countries [i.e., Britain and Germany— V. T.] if,

after the disposal of Poland, which was assumed to be likely,

ways and means should be sought to prevent a European

struggle from finally breaking out”.** Ropp and Rosenberg

kept in touch with each other after the outbreak of war,

and in the second half of September Rosenberg received from

Ropp a proposal for “a private exchange of views” on the

possibility of ending the war. In this communication Ropp

said he was acting on behalf of the British Air Ministry.

Another peace feeler was put out by Ogilvie Forbes, coun¬

sellor at the British Mission in Norway, who before the war

had been a counsellor at the British Embassy in Berlin. On

September 24 he had a talk with a Swedish businessman

named Birger Dahlerus, who in August and the first week

of September engaged energetically in mediation between

Britain and Germany. Forbes told Dahlerus that his Govern -

* Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, Op. cit., p. 331.

** Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D. Vol.

VIII, p. 134.

ment desired peace talks with Germany, asking him to act

as mediator, and even discussed the approximate terms for

a possible peace.* The Swede lost not time. Two days later

he was received by Hitler, whom he informed that the British

Government was looking for a way to conclude peace and that

what worried the British was how to do it without losing face.

Hitler spoke in the Reichstag on October 6, putting for¬

ward the idea of a European conference to settle problems

arising from Poland’s defeat and also the question of colonial

claims and of armaments restrictions.** This speech was print¬

ed in a brochure in the English language, and the Germans

planned to drop it over Britain. But they did not have to

trouble themselves. The Hitler speech was given such wide

publicity in Britain that the astonished nazis gave up their

intention of circulating the prepared brochure. The speech

was printed in full by Manchester Guardian.

Was Hitler really eager to sign a peace with the Allies in

that period? It is quite probable that his peace move was

a stratagem designed to disarm the Allies, sow political

discord in Britain and France, undermine their efforts to

mobilise resources for the war, and strengthen the hand of

the Munichmen. Moreover, it enabled Hitler to win

time in which to complete his preparations for dealing

Britain and France a crushing blow and to create the condi¬

tions for striking this blow suddenly. A fact in favour of this

surmise is that on October 9, without waiting for a reply

to his “peace” overture, Hitler signed Directive No. 6 order¬

ing preparations for an assault on Britain and France via the

Netherlands and Belgium. Parallel with the directive, a

memorandum was drawn up which stated that the “German

war aim is the final military dispatch of the West, that is, the

destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers

ever again to be able to oppose the state consolidation and

further development of the German people in Europe”, in

other words, the complete subjugation of Europe by

Germany.***

The German proposal was attentively studied in Britain.

In Government and other circles there was strong pressure

* Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. VIII,

pp. 143-45.

** Manchester Guardian, October 7, 1939.

*** William L. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 645.

in favour of peace with Germany. Ian Macleod writes of the

efforts of the “defeatists at home”, who were urging “a

negotiated peace”.* The documents from Chamberlain’s

private archives, used by Macleod, show that Chamberlain

was not averse to official peace negotiations on the basis of

what he called “Hitler’s clever speech”. What deterred him

was that Hitler never kept his word. “The difficulty,” Cham¬

berlain wrote in a letter to his sister on October 8, 1939,

“is that you can’t believe anything Hitler says.’” 1 '*

The discussion of this question in British ruling circles

ended in favour of continuing the war. In the House of

Commons on October 12 Chamberlain officially rejected

Hitler’s offer of October 6. The keynote of Chamberlain’s

statement was that Hitler could not be believed, that “the

German Government must give convincing proof of its

sincerity”.***

Hitler’s proposal was unacceptable to Britain because it

meant agreeing to German domination in Europe and to the

restoration of the German colonial empire. Another factor

was that the USA and the Dominions were opposed to agree¬

ment with Germany. The British people, who no longer

wished to tolerate the shame of appeasement, would not have

tolerated another bargain with the nazis. US Ambassador

Kennedy discussed the question with the Chancellor of the

Exchequer Sir John Simon and was told that “if they [the

Government] were to advocate any type of peace, they would

be yelled down by their own people, who are determined to

go on”.**

Chamberlain and his group fell in with those who wanted

to continue the war. They rejected Hitler’s peace overture,

but that did not mean they had basically changed their policy

and renounced their inclination to reach agreement with

Germany. By no means. They hoped that the groups of

military and politicians opposed to Hitler would depose the

dictator and set up their own government with which it

would be possible to come to terms without fearing that it

would not-keep its word. On October 8, 1939 Chamberlain

* Ian Macleod, Op. cit., p. 278.

** Ibid., p. 279.

*** Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, Vol. 352, col. 568,

London, 1939.

*) William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 252.

wrote to his sister that “the only chance of peace is the

disappearance of Hitler and that is what we are working

for”.*

The British Government maintained contact with these

opposition groups through various channels. But Chamber-

lain underestimated the difficulties of reaching agreement.

First, he had overrated the significance of the opposition

groups and their willingness to oppose Hitler. These groups

were perfectly satisfied with Hitler’s foreign policy objec¬

tives. The only thing they did not always agree with was his

methods and means, fearing that his actions, which were of

an adventurist nature, might have dangerous consequences

for Germany. Franz Haider, who belonged to one of these

groups, told his supporters at the close of 1939: “We ought

to give Hitler this last chance to deliver the German people

from the slavery of English capitalism.”** What he meant

was that Hitler should be supported in the war against

Britain for supremacy in Europe and for the seizure of

Britain’s colonial positions. Second, the British Government

failed to take proper account of the fact that while thinking

of the desirability of replacing the Hitler regime and nego¬

tiating with the Allies for an end to the war, the opposition

groups were not in the least inclined to renounce the fruits

of nazi Germany’s long years of aggression. The leaders

of the opposition wanted firm assurances that Britain and

France would not take advantage of action against Hitler in

Germany to deprive her of the fruits of nazi brigandage.

Hitler ki^ew of the British Government’s intentions to come

to terms with opposition elements among the German ruling

circles and decided that if the Allies were dealt a powerful

blow London would agree to come to an understanding with

him as well.

Political Situation in Britain

When war broke out, a considerable reshuffle was carried

out in the British Government in line with the experience

gained during the First World War. Chamberlain replaced

his peace-time Cabinet of 23 Ministers with a more compact

* Ian Macleod, Op. cit., p. 279.

** U. von Hassel, The von Hassel Diaries. 1938-1944, London, 1948,

p. 89.

War Cabinet, which consisted of eight members in addition

to the Prime Minister. The War Cabinet took over the func¬

tions not only of the peace-time Cabinet but also of the

Committee of Imperial Defence, with the result that the

entire leadership of the war was concentrated in its hands.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee, which functioned under the

War Cabinet, was a collegial super-chief of a War Staff.*

The first War Cabinet consisted, besides Chamberlain, of

Sir John Simon (Chancellor of the Exchequer), Viscount

Halifax (Foreign Secretary), Sir Samuel Hoare (Lord Privy

Seal), Lord Hankey (Minister without Portfolio), Admiral of

the Fleet Lord Chatfield (Minister for the Co-ordination.of

Defence), Winston Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty),

Leslie Hore-Belisha (Secretary for War) and Sir Kingsley

Wood (Secretary for Air). Chamberlain declared that in

selecting the members of the Cabinet “personalities must

be taken into account”. With the exception of Churchill and,

perhaps, Hore-Belisha, the Cabinet consisted of devoted and

consistent supporters of the Munich policy. The first four

named above were directly responsible for the help accorded

to Germany in starting the Second World War; since Sep¬

tember 1938 these four Ministers had been charting British

foreign policy.** Britain’s war-time leadership was thus in

the hands of men who clearly had no desire and were unable

to conduct a real struggle against nazi Germany.

In order somewhat to strengthen the Government’s position

and calm the people, who rightly regarded Chamberlain

and his supporters as being responsible for the war, Cham¬

berlain brought Winston Churchill into the War Cabinet

and gave Anthony Eden the post of Secretary of State for

the Dominions. On the eve of the war Churchill won popu¬

larity by his criticism of Chamberlain’s policies and by

demanding that the preparations for a possible war with

Germany should be stepped up. Eden was known to be in

favour of collective security, although actually this reputa¬

tion was not quite well earned. In some degree Chamberlain

strengthened his own position by including Churchill and

Eden in the Government. Not only did this make the

Government more acceptable to the people but it consider¬

ably narrowed the split in the Tory leadership, with the

* J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 6.

** Ibid., p. 5

result that the Government could count on almost unanimous

support from the whole Conservative Party.

Yet the Government’s position was far from being firm.

The replacement of the Chamberlain Government had been

demanded over a number of years by the Communist Party

of Great Britain and other progressive elements in the British

working-class movement. This became a widespread demand

after war broke out, following the failure of appeasement.

A struggle under the slogan “the Munichmen must go”

became a feature of the British political scene. The weekly

Tribune, published by Left-wing Labour publicists, voiced

the thoughts of many Englishmen when in mid-September

1939 it wrote: “If any real national unity was to be sustained,

there must be a swift change of Government: Chamberlain

and his closest associates must go.”* This was not an unrealis¬

tic wish. It could have been materialised if it had the support

of the leadership of the Labour Party and the trade unions.

However, the Right-wing Labour leaders thought other¬

wise. On September 3, 1939 Arthur Greenwood, who acted

as Labour leader when Clement Attlee fell ill, declared in

Parliament that the Labour Party whole-heartedly backed

the Government’s conduct of the war against Germany.

An analogous stand was adopted by the Liberal Party.

The British trade unions likewise promised their support.

The corresponding resolution was passed, with two absten¬

tions, on September 4 by the Trades Unions Congress.**

Benjamin Disraeli, the 19th-century Tory leader, had

noted that coalition governments were not liked in Britain.

But from the experience of the First World War the Tories

knew modern war could not be conducted without the sup¬

port of the people and in September 1939 they made an

attempt to form a coalition Government by the inclusion in

it of Labour and Liberal representatives. They were partic¬

ularly eager to draw into the Government members of the

Labour Party, which exercised considerable influence among

the working class and formed the Opposition in the House

of Commons, where it had 154 seats. The Liberals had only

21 seats*** in Parliament and represented small sections of

* Michael Foot, Aneurin Bevan. A Biography, Vol. I, London, 1962,

p. 305.

** G. D. H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914, London,

1948, p. 373.

*** Ibid., p. 310.

the middle and merchant bourgeoisie; they had little influ¬

ence in the British political scene. The reason Chamberlain

wanted them to be represented in the Government was that

he desired to call it a coalition Government without reserva¬

tions.

In the summer of 1939 Chamberlain had made an attempt

to improve his personal relations with Attlee, but his offer

of posts in the Government was rejected by the Labour

Party. Chamberlain had compromised himself much too

much in the eyes of the people and he could not be safely

supported without sacrificing political influence among the

masses. The Liberals refused to join the Government on the

same grounds. However, although the Labourites did not

accept posts in the Government they gave Chamberlain

strong support. If on September 3 or later they and the trade

unions demanded Chamberlain’s resignation, the Tory Gov¬

ernment would have fallen. Instead, the Right-wing Labour

and trade union leaders declared their support for the Gov¬

ernment’s military efforts and thereby allowed Chamberlain

to remain in power. Ralph Miliband, a Labour historian,

writes that a “remarkable feature of the Labour leaders’

attitude, once war had been declared, was their unwilling¬

ness to apply all possible pressure for a radical reorganisa¬

tion of the Government”.*

The Labour and trade union leadership promised Cham¬

berlain co-operation and assistance without demanding a

policy change, and thus helped him to pursue his own policy.

“Without the help and support of the Labour movement,”

writes Arthur Greenwood, “the Government could not stand

in office for another day.”**

The policy which Chamberlain pursued with the col¬

laboration of the Labour leaders determined the country’s

economic pattern in the period of the phonev war. This

resulted in a slow and ineffective switch of British economy

to a war-time footing. The ruling circles, hoping ultimately to

come to an understanding with Germany or, if that proved to

be impossible, to sit things out and then intervene in the war

at its concluding stage, did not hurry that switch. Their

motto was “business as usual”.

* Ralph Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism. A Study in the Politics '

of Labour, London, 1961, p. 268.

** Labour Monthly, May 1940, p. 268.

Economic Warfare

The British Government hoped that the economic war

would enable Britain to attain her foreign policy and

military objectives in the Second World War; this hope was

not destined to come true. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s

British military agencies had studied the experience of the

blockade which had been imposed on Germany during the

First World War and planned similar action in the event

another war broke out between Britain and Germany.

These carefully laid plans provided for action going far

beyond a conventional blockade. This range of action was

therefore called not a blockade but economic warfare. Ap¬

proved by the Committee of Imperial Defence on July 27,

1939, this plan stated in part: “The aim of economic warfare

is so to disorganise the enemy’s economy as to prevent him

from carrying on the war.’” 5 ' It was thus equated to a military

operation. The instructions of the Ministry of Economic

Warfare, to be set up as soon as war broke out, stated that

“economic warfare is a military operation, comparable to the

operations of the three Services in that its object is the defeat

of the enemy, and complementary to them in that its func¬

tion is to deprive the enemy of the material means of resist¬

ance. But, unlike the operations of the Armed Forces, its

results are secured not only by direct attack upon the enemy

but also by bringing pressure to bear upon those neutral

countries from which the enemy draws his supplies.”**

Economic warfare was to be carried on by three kinds

of weapons. Firstly, by legislation establishing control over

British firms and individuals not only to deprive them of the

possibility of helping the enemy but also to use them to

pressure neutrals who might help the enemy. Secondly, by

diplomatic action aimed at persuading or forcing neutral

governments, firms and individuals to abstain from transac¬

tions that might benefit the enemy. Thirdly, by military

action providing for the use of Armed Forces to deprive the

enemy of the supplies needed for the conduct of the war—

the seizure of enemy merchant ships, the establishment of

so-called contraband control (over the transportation of

* W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. I, London, 1952,

p. 1.

»* Ibid., p. 17.

freight for the enemy by neutral vessels), the blockading of

enemy coastal areas, the seizure of enemy exports transported

under neutral flags, direct attacks on enemy ports, the

invasion of economically strategic areas on enemy territory,

and air attacks on enemy ships on the high seas, major trans¬

port junctions, and storage, production and distribution cen¬

tres. Unlike the blockade of World War 1 days, economic

warfare embraced air attacks and other means of destroying

important economic objectives on enemy territory.

A Ministry was set up to direct economic warfare, and one

of its first steps was to build up a control network to halt

the smuggling of goods into Germany. Two control posts

were formed on the British Isles to keep the main shipping

lanes across the Atlantic to Europe under observation. In

the Mediterranean similar posts were set up on Gibraltar

and at Port Said and Haifa. The British Navy intercepted

neutral vessels sailing to neutral ports adjoining Germany

and sent them to the control posts for inspection. After

inspection the freight was either held up or allowed to be

taken to its destination.

Contraband control at once aroused dissatisfaction and

protests in the neutral countries. The protests of small states

were ignored, while in the case of major powers, primarily

the USA and Italy, the British Government proceeded cau¬

tiously and more often than not made concessions to them,

desiring to avoid complications. For example, early in 1940

friction with the USA compelled Britain to accede to the

American demand that she issue clearance certificates to

US vessels transporting freight from the USA to neutral

states in Europe. These certificates gave exemption from

forcible escort to British ports for inspection.

The British Government adopted a similar stand with

regard to fascist Italy. When a law on the seizure of freight

exported from Germany was passed in Britain on Novem¬

ber 27, 1939, it meant that Britain would have to halt the

transportation of German coal to Italy by sea. Physically

this was very easy to do, but Britain hesitated. She made

large concessions in this question to Italy for a number of

reasons. One was the policy of appeasing aggressors. Besides,

if the attempt to “switch” the war failed, the London politi¬

cians hoped to hold Italy back from entering the war as

Germany’s ally. Some of the most optimistic of these politi¬

cians, with memories of the First World War still fresh

4-1561

in their minds, even hoped to win Italy over to the side of

the Allies.

British diplomacy made every effort to sign war-time

trade agreements with Germany’s neighbours. She tried to

induce neutral countries to ban the re-export to Germany

of goods received through Allied control and limit the sale

of other goods to Germany to the average pre-war level.

The Ministry of Economic Warfare increased the purchase

of goods in neutral countries not so much to satisfy the

demand in Britain herself as to prevent Germany from

acquiring them. This was done through the newly-formed

United Kingdom Commercial Corporation,* which was subsi¬

dised by the Government.

The fourth basic task of the Ministry of Economic War¬

fare was to seize German exports.

The economic war was clearly unsuccessful in the period

from September 1939 to April 1940; unquestionably it failed

to yield the expected results. W. N. Medlicott, author of a

two-volume work on the economic blockade, writes: “Too

much was certainly expected of it in the winter of 1939-40.

This was a time of almost complete quiescence on the part

of the Allied fighting services, and both Government and

country regarded the blockade as Britain’s chief offensive

weapon, and looked to it for decisive, or at any rate dra¬

matic, results.”** However, developments showed that the

hopes placed on it were not justified.

The phoney war in which the fighting forces were idle

against Germany and, in the event of necessity, prepared

only for strategic defence, gave prominence to economic

warfare, turning the economic offensive into the chief

weapon. However, inasmuch as this weapon was used not to

defeat Germany but to pressure her into a bargain with the

Allies against the Soviet Union, its use was rigidly limited.

The bombing and shelling of German industrial enterprises

of a military or paramilitary nature, as well as of ware¬

houses, transport lanes and so forth were ruled out from the

very beginning, with the result that this economic warfare

never went beyond the framework of a blockade. Essentially

it remained as such to the very end of the war. However, the

phoney war made its imprint on the blockade as well, giving

it features of its own.

*W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., pp. 57-58.

** Ibid., p. 43.

Anglo-US Relations

Relations with the USA had always been a complex

problem for Britain, and this holds true of the early stage of

the war. Despite the extremely acute economic and political

contradictions between the two countries, the British Gov¬

ernment, which now had a war on its hands, wished to avoid

any conflict with the USA. Prior to the outbreak of the war

British statesmen and publicists went out of their way to

stress that war between Britain and the USA was incon¬

ceivable,"' but beginning with the close of 1939 this subject

was not broached for it was considered as going without

saying. The USA was the most powerful imperialist state, and

in London it was appreciated that Britain could not afford to

alienate the United States and push it to the side of her

adversaries. The British Government was aware that US

interests made any US-Axis bloc quite improbable and was

not particularly troubled on this account. Its worries during

•the phoney war were to obtain US supplies for the conduct

of the war.

In its relations vis-a-vis the USA, the British Government

adhered to a policy charted jointly with France in the spring

of 1939. The General Staffs of the two countries agreed that

“in war all the resources of diplomacy should be directed

to securing the benevolent neutrality or active assistance of

other powers, particularly the United States of America”.**

During the phoney war Britain required nothing more than

the USA’s benevolent neutrality.

Since the British Government was determined to pave the

way to another Munich and “switch” the war, active US

intervention in European affairs could only upset the game.

That explains why the British eyed Washington’s diplomatic

activities in Europe with the utmost suspicion. The British

Government wanted another Munich, but it had to be or¬

ganised by Britain in her own interests. A compact with

the aggressors initiated and directed by the USA obviously

did not suit her for it would further primarily US and not

British interests. At this stage what worried London most

was that Washington might hinder an Anglo-German

betrothal and take the matter of a new settlement in Europe

into its own hands.

4 *

* J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Op. cit., p. 502.

** J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 11.

Lord Lothian, the new British Ambassador in the USA,

arrived in Washington on August 29, 1939. British historians

maintain that his task was cautiously to persuade the Ameri¬

cans that a German victory would not benefit them. In fact,

Lord Lothian’s own statements show he had to get US

backing for British policy in Europe in order to induce Ger¬

many to come to terms with Britain. He said that if the

“neutrals—with the United States in the lead—are prepared

to throw their weight behind the Allies, ... we can probably

convince Germany that victory is permanently out of reach,

and that if eventual Bolshevism of all Central Europe is to

be avoided, there must be a sufficient movement to the right

inside Germany to make possible a negotiated peace”.*

The implication is that the British Government was pre¬

pared, with US political support, to reach agreement not with

Hitler, who had repeatedly cheated his partners, but with

some other reactionary German regime which would replace

Hitler.

The US Government did not vacillate over whose vie-’

tory was more advantageous to it. Despite their contradic¬

tions and friction with Britain the US ruling circles obviously

did not desire her defeat, because if predatory, aggressive

Germany and her allies won the war, US interests and

security would be directly menaced. German supremacy in

Western Europe would mean German control over the West

European countries and all or at any rate most of their

vast colonial possessions. US capital and goods would be

ousted from these territories. Moreover, the Middle East

with its raw material resources would fall to the Germans

and Italians, and the Americans would lose access to that

part of the world. A German victory in Europe would

strengthen Japan, the USA’s principal enemy in the Far East

and thereby expose US interests in that region. Lastly,

Germany would have greater influence in Latin America.

Taken together this would mean that Germany, which was

out to win world supremacy, would ultimately risk a war

with the United States.

Besides these considerations, another factor that de¬

termined the stand of the Roosevelt Administration was the

mood of the American people. The Americans were disgusted

* J. R. M. Butler, Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr), 1882-1940, London,

1960, p. 274.

with nazi aggression, and their sympathies were clearly with

the countries at war with Germany.

The Neutrality Act, passed in 1937, was in operation in

the USA when the Second World War broke out; this act

encouraged aggressive states and rendered a disservice to

their victims. On September 5, 1939 President Roosevelt

published two declarations—one proclaiming US neutrality

in the war, and the other banning deliveries of arms and

other war supplies to the belligerents in line with the Neu¬

trality Act. Although this stopped the delivery to Britain and

France of war supplies to the tune of 79 million dollars, for

which licenses had already been issued, 1 * it by no means

signified that the US Government planned to make things

more difficult for Britain and France. This decision was

required under the Neutrality Act. The US Government

did not desire to deprive Britain and France of the possibility

of purchasing armaments in the USA or prevent American

industrialists from profiting by the war. It therefore took

steps to help Britain and France by finding loopholes in the

Neutrality Act** and immediately initiated steps to revise it.

US imperialism felt that the war was opening wide pos¬

sibilities and had no intention of letting these possibilities

slip out of its hands.

US ruling circles based themselves on the calculation that

the war would weaken both Germany and her adversaries.

They planned to utilise this situation in order to win world

supremacy. Henry R. Luce writes: “And the cure is this: to

accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the

most powerful and vital nation in the world and in conse¬

quence to exert upon the world the full impact of our

influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means

as we see fit.”*** Charles Beard, the American historian,

quotes Walter Lippmann: “What Rome was to the ancient

world, what Great Britain has been to the modern world,

America is to the world of tomorrow.”*' Another American

historian, Robert E. Sherwood, analysed US policy during

the initial stage of the war and drew the conclusion that it

had committed “the United States to the assumption of

* Charles C. Tansill, Op. cit., pp. 561-62.

** William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 202.

Henry R, Luce, The American Century , New York, 1941, p. 23.

*) Charles Beard, Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels, New York,

1939, p. 78.

responsibility for nothing less than the leadership of the

world”.*

When war broke out in Europe the US Government as¬

sumed that the forces opposed to each other were approxima¬

tely equal and that there would be a drawn-out struggle bet¬

ween them. From the very outset Britain’s possibilities were

assessed quite pessimistically. On September 3, 1939, after

leaving a conference at the office of US Secretary of State

Cordell Hull, where the war in Europe was discussed, US

Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle noted down in

his diary: “In this war we cannot, as far as I can see, count

on a military victory of Britain, France and Poland. Should

they be on the eve of defeat, the square question would be

presented to us whether to enter the war using them as our

outlying defence posts; or whether to let them go, treble our

Navy, and meet the ultimate issue ... somewhere in the Mid¬

dle Atlantic. My mind is rather running on the latter.”

This way of thinking, Langer and Gleason observe, “was

probably influenced as well as shared by many other

Administration officials”.**

Germany’s swift victory in Poland made it plain that

the war was not going in favour of the Allies. This gave the

US Government further incentive to modify the Neutrality

Act so that Britain and France could get the armaments

needed by them from the USA.

On September 13, 1939 President Roosevelt announced

that Congress would meet in special session on September 21

to modify the Neutrality Act. The US Government contem¬

plated repealing the ban on the sale of armaments to

belligerents and making such armaments available on a cash

and carry basis.

This intention to lift the embargo on the sale of arma¬

ments gave rise to noisy debates in the press and in Con¬

gress. Many Congressmen, chiefly Democrats, favoured lift¬

ing the embargo, considering that it was in the interests of

the USA to render the Allies as much aid as possible.

Economic factors, too, demanded the lifting of the em¬

bargo. The US capitalists had long been thirsting for a big

war that would promise them large profits. Such a war had

* Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins , New York, 1948,

p. 151.

** William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 203.

materialised, but business was hindered by the embargo.

Consequently, the embargo had to be repealed.

The isolationists opposed the lifting of the embargo, their

main argument being that it would involve the USA with

Britain and France, undermine its neutrality and, in the

long run, draw it into the war. They made the most of the

American people’s aversion to war, maintaining that the

USA could keep out of the war only by pursuing an isola¬

tionist policy. This was nothing but smug hypocrisy, because,

as Robert E. Sherwood noted, “their attitude toward the

Soviet Union—and also, in some cases, toward Japan—was

one of extreme belligerency”.* Some of the isolationists were

motivated by a desire to see the belligerents exhaust them¬

selves to the utmost. Objectively, their actions played into

the hands of nazi Germany because the embargo made it

easier for her to fight her adversaries.

In spite of this opposition the US Congress repealed the

embargo on November 3, 1939, and on the next day Roose¬

velt signed a bill introducing cash and carry, thereby

extending both material and moral support to the Allies.

However, the new act contained a provision which greatly

benefited Germany—the Baltic Sea and the Northeastern

Atlantic from Norway to Spain were placed out of bounds

to US merchant ships. By withdrawing these ships from the

zone of hostilities, the USA facilitated the German U-boat

war against Britain and France. The presence of US ships

in this zone had somewhat restrained the nazis in their

attacks on merchant shipping for they were not disposed

to provoke a worsening of relations with the USA. Hitler

wanted the USA to stay out of the war for as long as pos¬

sible. Having learned to smash his adversaries one by one,

he did not want a quarrel with the USA at this stage.

The situation in Western Europe at the close of 1939 and

beginning of 1940 seriously alarmed the US Government.

It was aware that in Britain and France influential circles

favoured an agreement with Germany and it therefore

feared Hitler’s “peace overtures” might lead to the conclu¬

sion of peace between Germany and the Western Powers

without US participation. US imperialism would gain noth¬

ing from such a peace: the war which was lining the

pockets of the US monopolies would end and, on top of

* Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 131.

that, the peace might result in an Anglo-German compact

directed against the United States. The US press raised a

hue and cry. It began to speak of “active neutrality”, saying

that it was vital for the USA to exercise the decisive

influence on the course of the war and, particularly, on the

kind of peace that would be signed, that the President had

to make sure that the peace proposals among certain circles

in Europe did not threaten US interests.

The US Government did not wish an early peace in Eu¬

rope but the uncertain outcome of a long war between Ger¬

many and the Allies aroused its apprehensions. What suited

Washington was that the war should equally weaken the

belligerents. But what if that did not happen? US Assistant

Secretary of State Sumner Welles wrote that in January

1940 Roosevelt feared lest “a victory by Hitler would

immediately imperil the vital interests of the United States”

and that, on the other hand, “an eventual victory of the

Western Powers could probably be won only after a long

and desperately fought contest which would bring Europe

to total economic and social collapse”.* To forestall what

the US press called “social chaos” in Western Europe,

Washington urged London and Paris to cling to their

“defensive strategy”.

A “defensive strategy” could only be temporary. As a

way of reaching a radical settlement, US ruling circles were

not averse to bringing the war to an end through their own

mediation, and to forming, with their participation, an

alliance between Germany, Britain, France and Italy

against the USSR. Sumner Welles was sent to Europe in

February 1940 to explore and, if possible, prepare the

ground for such a settlement.

He visited Rome, Berlin, London and Paris, meeting the

leaders of the four powers and sounding them on the pos¬

sibility of a European peace. This was an obvious attempt

to engineer another Munich with far-reaching consequences.

Langer and Gleason note that in the final weeks of the

phoney war “the mood of the United States” was akin to “that

of England before Munich”. Roosevelt, they say, believed

“a peace negotiated with Hitler was at least preferable to

a peace dictated by him”.** Welles sought to capitalise on

* Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, New York, 1945, p. 73.

* William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 375.

the fear of the spread of the revolutionary movement, of

socialism. He tried to persuade Hitler to be more tractable,

declaring that “if a war of annihilation now broke out ...

it would exhaust the economic and financial resources which

still existed in Europe”.*

The German leaders made it plain to the US emissary

that Germany sought supremacy in Europe, stating “Ger¬

many wished for nothing more in Europe than the United

States had in the Western Hemisphere through the Monroe

Doctrine”.** The nazis declared they “wanted peace, but

only on condition ... that the will on the part of England

to destroy Germany is obliterated once and for all”,*** in

other words, provided Britain was weakened and reduced

to a second-rate European power.

London was well aware that this time there might be a

Munich at the expense of Britain herself. Nothing came of

the Welles mission, mainly because of the violent contradic¬

tions between the imperialist powers. Hitler made demands

which Britain could not accept. Moreover, London was

aware the United States intended tt> form an anti-Soviet

bloc at the expense of Britain’s interests. Hence the British

Government’s negative attitude to the Welles mission.

Upon Welles’ return to Washington the opinion became

current that the war would not end with a swift defeat of

the Allies.

Welles left Europe with the conviction that Hitler could

be stopped if the USA declared that in its own interests it

“would come to the support of the Western democracies”.**

But that did not happen. In fact the Welles mission had the

reverse effect. Hitler and Mussolini met in conference in

March 1940 and agreed they could assault the West without

fearing United States’ involvement in the war.

British Policy in the Far East

The Far East held a special place in Anglo-US relations.

Britain had economic, colonial, political and strategic inter¬

ests in the Far East, while the USA regarded this vast and

* Sumner Welles, Op. cit., p. 103.

** Ibid., p. 95.

*** Ibid., p. 97.

*) Ibid., p. 119.

potentially rich region as a key sphere of its economic and

political expansion. This brought the interests of the two

countries into collision. However, Anglo-US contradictions

were pushed into the background by two factors: first, the

national liberation and revolutionary movement which was

growing in China, a movement directed against all imperi¬

alist schemes for China, and, second, the aggressive ambi¬

tions of Japan, which was out to crush the revolution in

China by armed force and ultimately oust her rivals from

China. This range of contradictions and interests lay at the

root of the situation in the Far East. It was a precarious

situation as evidenced by the war raging in this region since

1931 in one way or another, and by Japanese military provo¬

cations against the USSR and its ally, the Mongolian

People’s Republic.

Britain’s position in the Far East had been deteriorating

since the turn of the century. It was greatly undermined

by the policy of appeasing aggressive Japan, which Britain

had been consistently pursuing since 1931 in the hope Japan

would play the principal role in suppressing the Chinese

revolution and initiating a big war against the USSR.

Britain’s Far Eastern policy thus complemented her Eu¬

ropean policy, the objective being to settle imperialist and

class contradictions by a war against the USSR on two

fronts—in the West and in the East. The close relations

that had been built up between Germany, Italy and Japan

in the course of the 1930s and the extreme hostility of these

countries for the USSR gave the British Government grounds

for designs of this kind. In Europe Britain threw sops to

the anti-Soviet aggressor, letting him swallow Austria,

Czechoslovakia and Poland; in the Far East she encouraged

Japan at China’s expense. The Craigie-Arita Agreement,

signed in July 1939, was a Far Eastern variant of Munich

in which Britain formally sanctioned the continuation of

Japanese aggression in China.

The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty upset the

calculations of those who were trying to embroil the USSR

in a clash with Germany. Moreover, it sowed discord in the

camp of the fascist powers as well. Both the Italian fascists

and the Japanese ruling circles were unable to conceal their

irritation. This was one of the reasons why Italy and

Japan—Germany’s allies—refrained from entering into the

war in September 1939. “During the first months of the

war,” Llewellyn Woodward writes, “the danger of Japanese

intervention was not great. The Russo-German agreement

had shocked Japanese opinion.”''' This was a substantial

advantage which the Soviet-German treaty created for

Britain and France.

On September 4 the Japanese Government declared that

“the Empire will not intervene in the present war in

Europe”.** This was a formal statement of Japanese neu¬

trality. Earlier, on August 30, the Japanese Government had

instructed the General Staff to put an end, as soon as

possible, to the military conflict with the Soviet Union and

the Mongolian People’s Republic on the Khalkhin-Gol

River. Talks were started in Moscow, and on September 15

they ended with the signing of an agreement terminating

hostilities.***

These developments galvanised British diplomacy into

feverish activity. In London the Japanese reaction to the

Soviet-German treaty was regarded as sufficient for an

attempt to wrest Japan away from Germany. This sprang

not only from the desire to split Britain’s imperialist rivals

but also from the fear that relations between Japan and the

USSR would be normalised. If that happened Britain would

have had to relinquish her hopes of getting Japan to attack

the USSR. “The British,” Langer and Gleason write, “fear¬

ing at first lest the nazi-Soviet pact be followed by a Soviet-

Japanese agreement, and then realising the discomfiture of

the Tokyo Government [over the Soviet-German agree¬

ment.— V. T.], were*eager to exploit the grievance. They

proposed to try for a settlement with Japan in the hope of

drawing that power to the side of the democracies.”** The

fact that the British Government entertained that hope is

evidence of how poorly it understood the nature of the con¬

tradictions operating in the Far East and the designs of the

Japanese ruling circles.

Japan was determined to repeat her experience of the

First World War, when she took advantage of the war in

Europe.to strengthen her position in China at the expense

of the European powers. In the neutrality statement of Sep-

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 11.

** Istoriya voiny na Tikhom okcane (A History of the Pacific War),

Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 307.

*** Ibid., pp. 307-09.

*) William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 194.

tember 4 and in the Japanese Government’s policy state¬

ment, published on September 13, it was declared that

Japan “founded her policy on a settlement of the Chinese

incident”.* This meant she was out to complete her con¬

quest of China.

The implications of this for Britain were explained by the

Japanese Government on September 5, when it demanded

that the European belligerents withdraw their warships and

troops from Japanese-held regions in China. Woodward

maintains that the “British Government left this ‘friendly

advice’ unanswered”.** This clashes with the truth. Firstly,

in October 1939 about 20 British warships were withdrawn

from China to Singapore, and on November 12 the British

announced the withdrawal of their troops from North

China.*** Secondly, this reply by action was supplemented

with a reply to the Japanese through diplomatic channels.

On September 8, Sir Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador

in Tokyo, handed the Japanese Foreign Ministry a message

from Lord Halifax proposing a peaceful settlement of the

China problem between Britain and Japan.**

Time and again the British offered to begin talks on this

problem, but the Japanese were not to be hurried—they

were waiting to see how matters would develop in Europe.

Later Craigie wrote in his memoirs of the “close influence

of events in Europe on the trend of Japan’s foreign and

domestic policies”.*** The Japanese saw through Chamber¬

lain’s phoney war policy and were not inclined to talk

seriously with the British until the outcome of that policy

became clear. In February 1940 the German Ambassador in

Japan Ott reported to Berlin that “no important decisions

can be expected before the impact of military operations in

Europe is felt”.****

Britain and France attempted to enlist American help

in reaching agreement with Japan, but they met with a

rebuff. Langer and Gleason say “these ideas were at once

* Istoriya voiny na Tikhom okeane, Vol. II, p. 307.

** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 164.

*** S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan, Vol. I, London,

1957, p. 23.

** Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, Vol. Ill, p. 69.

*** Robert Craigie, Behind the Japanese Mask, London, 1945, p. 85.

**** Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, Vol.

VIII, p. 806.

discouraged by the State Department, where it was felt that

any suggestion of interference in Tokyo would be resent¬

ed”."' The Americans did not object to a compact at the

expense of China but they disliked the idea of Britain

initiating such a compact, for it meant British interests would

be given prime consideration while American interests

would be pushed into the background. While refusing sup¬

port to Britain in her efforts to come to terms with the Japa¬

nese, the Americans recommended a firm British stand to

the Japanese demand on the withdrawal of British troops

and warships from China, and in November-December 1939

negotiated with the Japanese on the China problem; nothing

came of these negotiations.

The British Government appreciated that in the Far East

its forces were not strong enough to enable it to pursue an

independent policy, and that the USA was its natural ally

against Japanese expansion. In the event war broke out the

USA was the only country Britain could rely on and even

in 1939 it was obvious to the British that if the situation

deteriorated to a war between Britain and Japan it would

be expedient to draw the USA into that war. A US diplo¬

mat in London, named Johnson, reported to Washington

at the time: “... There is no doubt it [the British Govern¬

ment.— V. T.] would more than welcome an action on our

part which would involve US with Japan and therefore by

so much alleviate Great Britain’s desperate plight.”**

However, during the phoney war, when the British

Government went to all ends to turn the war against Ger¬

many into a war against the USSR it did not feel that a

close alliance with the USA in the Far East was urgent.

London wanted not war but agreement with Japan, and

it was not the British Government’s fault that this agree¬

ment was not reached.

The British conception of this agreement was stated by

Sir Robert Craigie in a speech on March 28, 1940, in honour

of the Japanese Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita. He de¬

clared that Britain and Japan “are ultimately striving for

the same objectives, namely, lasting peace and the preser¬

vation of our institutions from extraneous subversive

* William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 194.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, Vol. IV, Washing¬

ton, 1955, p. 229.

influences. It is surely not beyond the powers of constructive

statesmanship to bring the aims of their national policies

into full harmony_I ... hope that this goal may be

nearer today than it has seemed to be these last few years.”"

By efforts to preserve British and Japanese institutions from

“extraneous subversive influences” he meant joint action by

the two countries against the USSR and the revolutionary

movement in China. This was stated in plainer terms in a

talk between the Japanese Ambassador in London and

R. A. Butler. The Japanese Ambassador told the British

Assistant Foreign Secretary that Japan’s aims in China

ruled out “communist and Bolshevik elements” and were

aimed at “removing Bolshevism as a source of disorder and

at restoring peace and order”.* ** "' On April 5, 1940 Ihe New

York Times commented on the Craigie speech, saying it

resembled the speeches made by the British Ambassador

in Berlin Nevile Henderson. Thus, both in the Far East and

in Europe British policy had one and the same class founda¬

tion.

Dogged, virulent anti-communism prevented the British

Government from appreciating how this policy was imperil¬

ling British interests. In the hope of using Japan against the

Chinese revolution and the Soviet Union, Britain made it

possible for her to build up powerful positions and failed to

take effective steps to strengthen her own military position

in the Far East. This line of behaviour, pursued during the

phoney war, hourly changed the balance of forces to

Britain’s detriment. That explains Japan’s lack of haste in

her negotiations with Britain. She felt that time was work¬

ing for her. Britain began reaping the bitter fruits of her

policy as early as the summer of 1940.

Anglo-Soviet Relations

During the Phoney War

It would seem that Britain’s and France’s declaration of

war on Germany on September 3, 1939 should have marked a

turning point for the better in the relations between Britain

* T. A. Bisson, Americas Far Eastern Policy, New York, 1945,

p. 100.

** V. N. Yegorov, Politika Anglii na Dalnem Vostoke (Sentyabr

1939-Octyabr 1941) (British Policy in the Far East, September 1939-

October 1941), Moscow, 1960, pp. 37-38.

and the Soviet Union. It would seem that being engaged in

war against Germany, Britain would have wanted to main¬

tain good relations with the Soviet Union, a Great Power

which was neutral in that war. But that did not prove to be

the case. During the early months of the war Anglo-Soviet

relations deteriorated to the extent that early in 1940 the

two countries were on the brink of war. The reason for this

was Britain’s old policy of trying to provoke war between

Germany and the USSR.

In the course of the phoney war, while unnatural pas¬

sivity was observed on the military front, the diplomatic

front seethed with activity. The British and French govern¬

ments explored every possibility of rectifying Hitler’s

“error” and turning the war against Germany into a joint war

of the three powers and their allies against the Soviet

Union. This was a most sinister piece of adventurism even

from the standpoint of British and French imperialist

interests.

During the first two weeks of the war the British Govern¬

ment maintained vis-a-vis the USSR a cold reserve which

poorly concealed its feelings and intentions. At the same

time, it used every media to declare that Britain was fight¬

ing a war against Hitlerism."' This was designed to convince

the people that as far as Britain was concerned it was an

anti-nazi, just war, and win their support, which the Gov¬

ernment so sorely needed.

Having declared they were fighting a war against Hit¬

lerism, the British ruling circles could not, during the first

days of the war, openly start an anti-Soviet campaign.

However, their hostility for the Soviet Union in this period

was particularly deadly as a result of the USSR’s recent

major diplomatic success in signing the non-aggression

treaty with Germany and thereby foiling the anti-Soviet

designs of the British and French governments. Encouraged

by the Cabinet Ministers the British press said what the

former for the time being forbore to say officially. The

Labour and Liberal press showed particular zeal, hammering

on the idea that by signing the non-aggression treaty with

Germany, the Soviet Union had sparked the Second World

War. Ever since September 1939 this idea continues to be ped¬

dled by bourgeois historians in order to divert attention from

* Labour Monthly , November 1939, p. 645.

the fact that by rejecting an anti-aggression alliance with the

USSR, Britain and France enabled Germany to unleash the

Second World War.

The actions of the British ruling circles were not confined

to encouraging an anti-Soviet campaign in the press. Early

in September the British authorities imposed a ban on the

export to the Soviet Union of machinery, machine-tools,

rubber, cocoa and other items which had been ordered and

paid for.* The Soviet Government had no alternative but to

retaliate by prohibiting the export of Soviet goods to coun¬

tries creating unfavourable conditions for Soviet foreign

trade.

This exacerbation of relations with the Soviet Union hurt

British national interests. This was understood by the calmer

and more prudent members of the British ruling circles.

“Mr. Lloyd George and others,” write the progressive

English authors W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, “deplored the

loss of the USSR as an ally and urged strongly the need to

take steps to renew contact with the Soviet Government and

to come to a friendly understanding.”** Regrettably, at the

time these sober considerations were not shared by the ma¬

jority of the British ruling circles. In the second half of Sep¬

tember they began to speak openly of their hostility for the

Soviet Union, the cause being Poland’s collapse and the

entry of Soviet troops into Western Byelorussia and Western

Ukraine following the disintegration of the Polish state and

the flight of the Polish Government.

After the Great October Socialist Revolution Western

Byelorussia and Western Ukraine had been forcibly torn

away from Soviet Russia by the Polish military with the

support of the Western Powers and turned into a spring¬

board for anti-Soviet provocations. The entry of Soviet

troops into these regions was, therefore, an act of historical

justice. The American historian John L. Snell writes: “Weak

in 1921, the USSR had been forced to agree to a frontier that

left five million Byelorussians and Ukrainians inside

Poland.”*** At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 the then

British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon recommended a

* W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations,

London, 1945, p. 620.

** Ibid.

*** John L. Snell, Op. cit., p. 155.

frontier between Soviet Russia and Poland along a line

leaving the Byelorussian and Ukrainian population in Soviet

Russia. This was unequivocal British recognition of Russia’s

rights to the corresponding territories. On October 26, 1939

Viscount Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, declared in the

House of Lords that “the action of the Soviet Government

has been to advance the Russian boundary to what was sub¬

stantially the boundary recommended at the time of the

Versailles Conference by the noble Marquess who used to

lead the House, Lord Curzon, and who was then Foreign

Secretary”/ 5 '

In this action the Soviet Government was motivated by the

need to safeguard the Soviet Union’s security, protect the

nations from fascism, oppose German aggression and save

the Ukrainians and Byelorussians residing in Western

Ukraine and Western Byelorussia from the threat of nazi

enslavement as a result of the German occupation of Poland.

The advance of Soviet troops and their defensive installa¬

tions to the West blocked the road of the German invad¬

ers to the East and deprived Germany of the possibility of

seizing these territories and using their manpower and

material resources for aggression. It conformed to the

interests not only of the Soviet Union and of the Byelorus¬

sians and Ukrainians residing in the territories in question

but also of all other nations desiring the world’s liberation

from fascism.

Nevertheless, the entry of Soviet troops into Western

Byelorussia and Western Ukraine was used by the British

ruling circles for a frenzied anti-Soviet campaign, which

seriously undermined the relations between the two

countries.

On September 17, when the Red Army entered Western

Byelorussia and Western Ukraine, the Soviet Government

sent all diplomatic representatives in Moscow, including

the British representative, a Note with a copy of the Note

handed to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow substantiating

the Soviet action. It was stated that the Soviet Union “would

pursue a policy of neutrality in its relations with Britain”.**

It has now become known that the reaction of the British

Government to this Note was “to consider whether they

* Parliamentary Debates. House of Lords, Vol. 114, col. 1565.

** Pravda, September 18, 1939.

5-1581

would or would not declare war on the USSR”.* The

British had no legal grounds for raising this question for

discussion. The Anglo-Polish Treaty of Mutual Assistance of

August 25, 1939 had Germany and no other country in view.

A secret protocol appended to this treaty contained a special

reservation on this point.** In the House of Commons

R. A. Butler said on this score that during “the negotiations

which led up to the signature of the agreement, it was under¬

stood between the Polish Government and His Majesty’s

Government that the agreement should only cover the case

of aggression by Germany; and the Polish Government con¬

firm that this is so”.*** Thus, in considering whether to declare

war on the Soviet Union in September 1939 the British

Government displayed a meaningful initiative which charac¬

terised its true policy in regard to the Soviet Union. Wood¬

ward says the British Government hesitated to declare war

on the USSR because it “might make the defeat of Germany

more difficult”.** The British Government thus felt it could

not add a war with the Soviet Union to the war it was

already fighting against Germany, one of the reasons, ac¬

cording to Woodward, being that Britain simply did not

have the forces to fight two wars at one and the same time.

At the close of 1939 and beginning of 1940 the British

Government redoubled its efforts to turn the war with Ger¬

many into a war against the USSR in alliance or collabora¬

tion with Germany. It used the period of the phoney war

to look for ways of achieving this purpose and to prepare

the British people and world public opinion ideologically

and psychologically.

The second stage of British anti-Soviet propaganda began

with the defeat of Poland. In the words of Labour

Monthly , “full propaganda war against the Soviet Union

was unloosed”.*** The Conservative, Liberal and Labour press

hurled every possible abuse at the Soviet Union, misrepre¬

sented its foreign policy, blamed it for the fall of Poland,

and so on and so forth. This anti-Soviet clamour had two

objectives: envenom the British people against the Soviet

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 7.

** William L. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 733.

*** Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, Vol. 352, col. 1082.

*) Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 7.

**) Labour Monthly, January 1940, p. 8.

Union and divert their attention from Poland’s betrayal by

the British ruling classes. Commenting on this W. P. and

Zelda K. Coates write: “Apart from the Communists and

a comparative handful of Labour and Socialist adherents,

British ‘Left’ circles [i.e., Right-wing Labour and trade

union leaders.— V. T.) were more whole-hearted, certainly

more vocal, in their denunciation than the Right.’”''

Repercussions of this ideological campaign are felt to this

day with the difference that the arguments of the British

bourgeois and Right-wing Labour press of those days have

been adopted by bourgeois historians, who state them in a

calmer tone but with the same objectives as before.

Arnold Toynbee writes that when the line between Soviet

and German troops in Poland was demarcated, the Soviet

Government “knew, as surely as Hitler himself, that the

ultimate objective of all Hitler’s successive acts of aggres¬

sion was to acquire for the Third German Reich a vast

Lebensraum in the East which, if Hitler had his way, would

be carried far beyond the present demarcation line and

would tear the heart out of the Soviet Union”.* ** Today when

one reads the British press of the close of 1939 and the

bourgeois authors who condemn Soviet action in Poland in

1939, one is struck by the thought that Britain would have

liked the Soviet Union to have been inactive. In the situa¬

tion obtaining at the time Soviet inactivity would have

inescapably placed the population of Western Ukraine and

Western Byelorussia under the heel of nazi Germany and

given her the possibility of “tearing the heart out of the

Soviet Union”, to use Toynbee’s expression. This, therefore,

is what would have suited the British propagandists of the

autumn of 1939 and those who keep alive their “righteous

indignation”. Their wrath was aroused by the fact that that

development was forestalled by the Soviet Government.

True, in those days there were among British politicians

people who understood that the Soviet action in Poland in

the autumn of 1939 and the signing of mutual assistance

treaties with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in September-

October 1939 were part of the struggle against Germany

and, therefore, conformed to British interests. One of these

people was Winston Churchill. In a broadcast on October 1

* W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, Op. cit., p. 622.

** The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 40.

5 *

he “in effect welcomed the Russian action in Poland”.*

This was Churchill’s personal opinion and not the opinion

of the Government, most of whose members at the time were

supporters of the Munich line.

Lord Beaverbrook’s newspapers were in agreement with

Churchill. Daily Express, for example, wrote on September

18, 1939 that the Soviet action in Poland should not be re¬

garded as unfavourable to the Allies.

The old Liberal leader David Lloyd George came out

strongly against those who saw no difference between Ger¬

many and the Soviet Union and recklessly demanded a rup¬

ture of relations with and a declaration of war on the Soviet

Union. In a letter to the Polish Ambassador on September

28, 1939 he wrote that in Western Ukraine and Western

Byelorussia “the advancing Russian troops are being hailed

by the peasants as deliverers. The German invasion is de¬

signed to annex to the Reich provinces where the decided

majority of the population is Polish by race, language and

tradition. On the other hand, the Russian armies marched

into territories which are not Polish, and which were forcibly

annexed by Poland after the Great War, in spite of the

fierce protests and the armed resistance of the inhabitants.

The inhabitants of Polish Ukraine are of the same race and

language as their neighbours in the Ukrainian Republic of

the Soviet Union.

“I felt it was a matter of primary importance to call

attention at once to these salient considerations lest we com¬

mit ourselves rashly to war against Russia-In these cir¬

cumstances it would be an act of criminal folly to place the

Russian advance in the same category as that of the Ger¬

mans, although it would suit Herr Hitler’s designs that we

should do so.”** Nevertheless, that was exactly what most of

the British press and politicians were doing by fanning the

anti-Soviet campaign and thereby playing into Hitler’s

hands.

This lumping of Germany and the Soviet Union in one

category was also seen in the fact that in imposing an eco¬

nomic blockade on Germany the British Government was,

essentially, determined to blockade Soviet foreign trade as

well, thinking that in so doing it would damage the economy

* W. P. and Zelda K. Coate«, Op. cit., p. 625.

** Ibid., pp. 624-25.

of Germany which had trade relations with the USSR at

the time. Another object of this blockade was to cause dif¬

ficulties for the Soviet economy, inasmuch as Britain re¬

garded the Soviet Union as a potential enemy.

As a neutral country the Soviet Union had every legal

right to trade with any belligerent, and British encroachment

on this right was an encroachment on Soviet sovereignty

and could not but have had an adverse effect on Anglo-

Soviet relations.

We have pointed out that as soon as war broke out the

British Government refused export licenses for goods or¬

dered and paid for by the USSR in Britain/ 1 ' This “tough

policy”, Medlicott points out, was due rather to anti-Soviet

feelings activated during the events in Poland than to “the

interests of the blockade against Germany”.* ** However, the

British Government soon saw that these anti-Soviet feelings

clashed with Britain’s practical needs. As a retaliatory meas¬

ure, the Soviet Union halted the export of timber to Britain.

This had an immediate effect. Because of the war Britain

could now obtain timber only from North America—a dif¬

ficult task, especially from the standpoint of transportation.

Thus, “the vital consideration at the moment was the des¬

perate need of the country for Russian timber”*** and so,

on September 18, “the War Cabinet authorised an approach

to the Soviet Union; in exchange for the timber the Soviet

Union was to be offered the release of some of the de¬

tained machinery”.** The Soviet Government accepted this

offer, and on October 11, 1939 an agreement was signed

under which in exchange for Soviet timber Britain pledged

to supply the Soviet Union with a certain quantity of rubber

and tin.***

The Soviet Government was ready to promote trade with

Britain. The barter agreement of October 11 had shown

that such trade benefited both countries. In mid-October the

Soviet Ambassador in Britain I. M. Maisky had a series

of meetings with Viscount Halifax, Sir Stafford Cripps,

R. A. Butler and other British leaders, and in his talks with

them he urged that the barter agreement of October 11

* W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., p. 313.

** Ibid., p. 317.

*** Ibid., p. 313.

*) Ibid., p. 314.

**) Ibid.

should, serve as the starting point for expanding Anglo-

Soviet trade. The British did not go farther than to talk

about it.

They were preoccupied with other plans, formulated as

follows by the Liberal News Chronicle on October 25, 1939:

Russia knew that for a long time certain influential people

in Britain had been hoping sooner or later to set Russia and

Germany against each other so that they would destroy each

other. Britain would be the winner and pocket the stakes.

After Munich thick-skulled politicians openly spoke of the

desirability of giving Germany freedom of action in the

East. Germany had to become a mobile bastion against Bol¬

shevism and Britain had to encourage and help her. The

same thick-skulled politicians were still cherishing the idea

of fomenting a clash between Russia and Germany and

making them seize each other by the throat to Britain’s

advantage. The talk about signing peace with a conservative

German Government with the object of jointly fighting the

“red menace” was not calculated to add sincerity to Anglo-

Soviet relations. Talk of this kind was predominant.

The steps taken by the Soviet Union in the autumn of

1939 to strengthen its strategic position considerably in¬

creased its might and immediately caused alarm in imperial¬

ist circles. This development clearly did not suit the leaders

of Britain and France, who saw that even an “anti-Bolshevik

bastion” like nazi Germany had been unable to prevent a

substantial strengthening of the Soviet Union’s position.

They were aware that if they won the war they were offi¬

cially fighting against Germany, nazism would not recover

from its defeat and this would greatly weaken the position

of the reactionaries in Germany. Besides, this would create

favourable conditions for the growth of the revolutionary

forces not only in Germany but in Europe as a whole, thus

ultimately marking a gain for socialism. Fearing that the

liberation of Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine by

the Red Army would bring the peasants to power in place

of the landowners, the Conservative Daily Mail warned the

ruling circles: “This is a danger which all Europe must face.

Hitler must face it, like anybody else.”* The Times, styling

itself independent but in fact likewise a mouthpiece of the

Conservatives, warned that the war would help the revolu-

* Daily Mail, October 2, 1939.

tion in Germany to “mature”; this, it said, was the greatest

threat to the Western Powers.* The Western imperialists

thus did not desire any strengthening of the USSR or the

weakening of the reactionary forces in Germany. It was in

their interests to stop the war between Britain and Germany

and jointly attack the Soviet Union. It was decided to use

the Soviet-Finnish war to this end.

Two weeks before that war broke out the Conservative

Evening Standard engaged in some remarkable speculations:

“If Russia goes to war with Finland, what will happen?

Britain will probably be moved to give assistance to that

Northern democracy.... But Germany may also assist the

Finns.... So we may find this paradox emerging: Britain

and Germany co-operating to hold Finland up, and at the

same time fighting to bring one another down.”** In the

situation obtaining at the time, by assistance to Finland the

newspaper meant joint Anglo-German military action

against the USSR. As regards the “paradox”, the British

ruling circles felt it would disappear in the course of this

joint action: they couldn’t very well conduct joint military

operations against a third power and fight each other at the

same time. The actions taken by the British Government in

connection with the Soviet-Finnish war confirm that it had

such a plan.

When the Soviet-Finnish talks on a settlement of the

frontier issue got under way, the British Government along

with other imperialist governments made every effort to

cause them to break down. “Soviet Russia,” Churchill writes,

“.. . proceeded to block the lines of entry into the Soviet

Union from the West. One passage led from East Prussia

through the Baltic States; another led across the waters of

the Gulf of Finland; the third route was through Finland

itself and across the Karelian Isthmus to a point where the

Finnish frontier was only twenty miles from the suburbs of

Leningrad. The Soviets had not forgotten the dangers which

Leningrad had faced in 1919-Soviet garrisons also ap¬

peared in Lithuania. Thus the southern road to Leningrad

and half the Gulf of Finland had been swiftly barred against

potential German ambitions by the armed forces of the

Soviets. There remained only the approach through

* The Times, September SO, 1939.

** Labour Monthly, January 1940, p. 6.

Finland.”* The British imperialists went to all ends to keep

that approach open, and for that very reason, when war broke

out between the USSR and Finland, the governments of

Britain, France, the USA and some other countries hastened

to give Finland every assistance.

Britain began to help Finland long before the first signs

of a Soviet-Finnish conflict appeared. More than that, had

it not been for this “assistance”, i.e., had the imperialists

not turned Finland into a springboard for military adven¬

tures against the USSR, there would have been no conflict

between the Soviet Union and Finland. Britain played the

premier role in the anti-Soviet intrigues in Finland. Early

in 1940 the New York newspaper World Telegram report¬

ed: “Britain and France had sent $40,000,000 worth of war

supplies to Finland.”**

Sir Walter Kirke, Director-General of the British Territo¬

rial Army, visited Finland in June 1939 with the obvious

intention of fanning anti-Soviet feelings. He inspected Fin¬

nish war installations spearheaded at Leningrad (the Man-

nerheim-Kirke Line, as the Labour Monthly called it) and

declared that “no army can break through this line”.*** His

interest in the war preparations near Leningrad was not

accidental. Back in 1919 when Yudenich’s whiteguard army,

fitted out and supplied on money from Britain and some

other imperialist powers, was pushing towards Petrograd,

The Times wrote: “Finland is the key to Petrograd, and

Petrograd is the key to Moscow.”*' In a book published by

the British Royal Institute of International Affairs it is

rightly pointed out that these words written in The Times

“had sunk deeply into Soviet minds”.**' In June 1939 General

Kirke made a speech in Helsinki, saying that “everybody in

Great Britain appreciates Finland’s attitude”, implying her

anti-Soviet stand. The authors of the above-mentioned book

note that in the House of Commons the Kirke visit “was

described as having been ‘purely of a private nature’ ”.***'

Another “private” visitor to Finland in those days was Gene-

* Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War , Vol. I, London,

1949, pp. 484-85.

** Labour Monthly, April 1940, p. 200.

*** Ibid.

*1 The Times, April 17, 1919.

**) The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 60.

***) Ibid.

ral Franz Haider, Chief of the German General Staff. In this

case the quotation marks round the word private belong to the

authors who, thereby, express their attitude to the British

Government’s statement on the private nature of the Kirke

mission.

The advance of the Soviet troops in Finland was slower

than was expected in the West, and this, Churchill wrote,

was hailed with “relief” in Britain.* In London it was felt

that there was plenty of opportunity and time in which to

carry out the charted plans. “In British circles,” Churchill

notes, “many people congratulated themselves that we had

not gone out of our way to bring the Soviets in on our side,

and preened themselves on their foresight.”** Britain ren¬

dered Finland financial and material aid, including what

for those days were large-scale deliveries of aircraft, field

guns, ammunition, machine-guns, mines, bombs, anti-tank

rifles, means of communication and other armaments.***

“Volunteers” were enlisted for the front: some 2,000 men

were recruited.** All this was done to enable Finland to

hold out until the spring, when Britain and France planned

to send an expeditionary corps to the Finnish Front.

As early as December 19, 1939 the Supreme War Coun¬

cil had discussed the question of sending British and French

troops to Finland. “By the middle of January the principle

of an Allied intervention was accepted, and landings in

Murmansk, Petsamo, or Narvik were under consideration by

experts.”*** When it was becoming more and more obvious

that Finland would be defeated, steps were taken to speed

up the dispatch of troops to that country—the decision to

send troops was taken by the Supreme War Council on

February 5, 1940. Six British divisions and 50,000 French

troops were waiting to be sent to Finland. After the Finnish

Government, on February 29, decided to negotiate peace

with the USSR, Britain and France spared no effort to pre¬

vent Finland from getting out of the war.

Had Britain realised her intentions in the autumn of 1939

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 488.

** Ibid., p. 495.

*** On March 19, 1940, Chamberlain spoke in the House of Commons,

listing the armaments sent to Finland (Parliamentary Debates. House of

Commons, Vol. 358, col. 1836-1837).

*) The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 77.

**) Ibid., p. 79.

she would have found herself at war with the USSR. The

landing of troops in Murmansk, a Soviet port, would have

meant war, as would have the involvement of British divi¬

sions in the fighting against Soviet forces. In February 1940

Lord Halifax told US diplomats Britain would, without an

official declaration of war on the Soviet Union, pursue her

policies “in all directions regardless of the possibility that

as a result Russia may declare war”.* The fact that the

Chamberlain Cabinet’s actions might have resulted in war

between Britain and the USSR is admitted both by official

and semi-official British historiography. Speaking of the

Supreme War Council’s decision of February 5, Woodward

tells us that Chamberlain put before the Council a plan for

the dispatch of regular divisions, declaring that “Russia

need not declare war against the Allies unless she wished to

do so”.** Thus, hostilities were to break out without a decla¬

ration of war, much as the British intervention in Soviet

Russia was launched 20 years before. A review of interna¬

tional relations compiled by the Royal Institute of Interna¬

tional Affairs states that the planned “intervention in Fin¬

land was likely to commit the Allies to war against ... the

Soviet Union”.*** The US historian D. F. Fleming writes that

“the French and British governments were actually prepared

to go to war with Russia”, adding that when war broke out

between the Soviet Union and Finland “all the reactionaries

in the world saw their chance for an outburst of holy fury

against Red Russia.... Most of the powerful ones in France

and Britain (and many in the USA) forgot all about the war

with Germany_ Here in the Russo-Finnish war was a

war they could really put their hearts into.”**

In this connection arises the legitimate question: How

could Britain go to war with the USSR when she was in a

state of war with Germany? Did it imply she intended to

fight the combined might of the USSR and Germany? By no

means. Shortsighted as the British leaders were, they realised

Britain and France did not have the forces for such a

war. It is generally admitted in British bourgeois histori¬

ography that at the time Britain was in no state to fight

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, Vol. I, Washington,

1959, p. 293.

** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 25.

*** The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 78.

*) D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., pp. 101-02.

Germany, let alone a combination of powers. Woodward,

for instance, writes that the British and French governments

knew they could not open “a decisive campaign against

Germany in 1939 or 1940”.* Yet they went to all ends to

start a war against the USSR as well.

What was behind these seemingly incomprehensible

actions? There can only be one answer. Britain and France

hoped that by the time war with the USSR would start they

would be able to stop the war with Germany and draw her

into a concerted military crusade against the Soviet Union.

The British journal Statist wrote at the time that in Europe

the alignment of forces had not yet finally taken shape and

developed the idea of conciliation between Germany and the

Western Powers on the basis of the Soviet-Finnish War.

Eduard Benes, former President of Czechoslovakia, testifies

that in the winter of 1939/40 Daladier and Bonnet attempted

to draw France and Britain into a war with the USSR, hav¬

ing previously reached agreement with Germany. “Germany

was then to have been pressed to attack the Soviet Union,

having made peace with the Western Powers.”** In equal

measure this concerned the British Government, which in

this question acted in complete concord with the French

Government.

While the war between the Soviet Union and Finland

was raging the British Minister in Finland Sir Thomas Snow

suggested to the US Minister in Helsinki that the USA

sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He said

Britain and France would then do the same and that most

probably this would impress Germany.*** This shows that in

addition to its own efforts to “switch the war”, the British

Government endeavoured to enlist the assistance of the

USA.

At the same time steps were taken to prepare the British

people psychologically for a “switch” of the war. The bour¬

geois propaganda machine embarked upon an unbridled

anti-Soviet campaign, which brought to light the British

Government’s true intentions. The Times, for instance, held

that the Soviet Union feared “an eventual regrouping of the

powers, including .., Germany, on an anti-Soviet front”

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., pp. XXVII-XXVIII.

** “Memoirs of Eduard Benes”, The Nation, July 10, 1948, p. 42.

*** A. J. Schwarts, America and the Russo-Finnish War, Washington,

1960, p. 29.

[my italics.— V. T.]. The same newspaper published letters

calling for a “crusade” against the USSR. James Louis Gar¬

vin, a leading British political observer, welcomed the anti-

Soviet “moral alignment of nine-tenths of the world. It may

be ineffectual now. An overwhelming practical force might

emerge from it.”*

Right-wing leaders of the Labour Party and of the trade

unions were extremely active in this anti-Soviet campaign,

sending delegations to Finland to encourage the Finnish

reactionaries and instigate them to continue the anti-Soviet

war. David Rhys Grenfell, a prominent Labour MP, speak¬

ing in Australia, said if Britain declared war on the USSR

this decision would have the firm support of the working-

class movement. H. N. Brailsford, a Labour publicist, went

to the extreme of suggesting the formation of a Labour

Government to conduct a war against the USSR. He wrote:

“We may have to revise all the doctrines with which we

entered this war. If we mean to conduct it as champions of

a new civilisation against ... Moscow, we cannot hope for

success under Conservative leadership.”**

However, it was presumptuous of these people to talk on

behalf of the entire British working-class movement. The

anti-Soviet policy of the Conservative Government and its

Labour henchmen was condemned not only by British Com¬

munists but also by politically-conscious rank-and-file mem¬

bers of the Labour Party. There were honest, sober-minded

people in the Labour leadership as well. D. N. Pritt, member

of the Labour Executive and a prominent barrister, wrote in

the press against the attempts to start an Anglo-Soviet war.

In a letter to the Executive, he said he had been expelled

from the party for publishing two books in which he “stated

facts ... and gave arguments against any launching of war

by this country against the Soviet Union. Very grave issues

are raised for the future of the Labour Party if it is to be

taken as contrary to its policy and discipline to support the

one Socialist State in the world, and oppose war being

launched against it by the National Government, whilst at

the same time it is to be highly orthodox to support Manner-

heim, and to co-operate with Mussolini and Franco.”***

* Labour Monthly, January 1940, pp. 9-10.

** Reynold News, October 1, 1939.

*** Labour Monthly, May 1940, p. 271.

A conference of representatives of various workers’ and

public organisations was held in London on February 25,

1940 under the auspices of Labour Monthly. It was attended

by delegates from 379 working-class organisations with a

total membership of 340,000, and in its resolution it was

stated that the British ruling classes were playing the lead¬

ing role in staging a war against the Soviet Union, and to

this end they were helping Finland and preparing anti-

Soviet fronts in the Middle East. “The cause of the Soviet

Union, the resolution declared, “is the cause of world so¬

cialism, of the whole international working class. We ask

the working class to remember how it stopped the anti-Soviet

war in 1920, by agitation and strike action, and to act swiftly

now to prevent such a war once more.”*

The British and French governments failed to complete

the process of “switching” the war. Despite instigation and

the promise of direct military assistance Finland signed a

peace treaty with the Soviet Union on March 12, 1940. The

motives for this were twofold: the first was that Finland was

defeated and could not continue the war, and the second

was that her Government realised that an Anglo-French

military presence would turn Finland into a toy in the hands

of adventurist imperialist circles. Ralf Torngren, the Finnish

Foreign Minister, wrote in 1961: “Though Finland at first

appealed for outside aid, in the end her Government chose

to accept the Soviet peace terms ... rather than rely on the

military assistance offered by Britain and France. This de¬

cision was based partly on a realistic appraisal of the pos¬

sible efficacy of Allied aid: it was feared to be too little, and

too late. But it was also due to an almost instinctive reluc¬

tance to allow the country to become involved in the conflict

between the big powers.”**

The British Government’s refusal to help terminate the

Soviet-Finnish war can be appreciated in the light of its

intentions with regard to Finland. On February 22 the So¬

viet Government requested the British Government to act

as mediator in the Soviet-Finnish conflict, and communicat¬

ed the terms on which it was prepared to settle that conflict.

However, as Chamberlain declared in Parliament, Britain

declined this role.

* Ibid., p. 132.

** Foreign Affairs, July 1961, p. 602.

Noting Chamberlain’s endeavours “to switch the war ’,

William Rust, a prominent member of the British Commu¬

nist Party, wrote that “Finland was the highest point of this

anti-Soviet policy, pursued without regard to the interests

of the British people, and none will forget the mass incite¬

ment against the Soviet Union carried out in Britain by

Chamberlain with the help of Transport House”.*

Most of Chamberlain’s Cabinet were active supporters of

the Munich policy. But when war broke out posts in it were

given to men like Churchill, who was actively opposed to

the Munich line, and Anthony Eden, who had resigned in

1938 after a fall-out with Chamberlain. What was the stand

of these men when tension was highest in Britain in the

period of the Soviet-Finnish war? Churchill urged energetic

British action in Scandinavia up to the landing of British

troops. True, his memoirs and bourgeois British historiog¬

raphy emphasise that this action was urged in order to cut

the flow of Swedish ore to Germany. However, the British

and French governments planned to settle the Swedish ore

issue and start a war against the USSR by one and the same

action—the sending of troops to Finland via Norway and

Sweden. Woodward says that on December 22, 1939, after

the French had proposed what the British Foreign Office

considered was an invitation to “Sweden and Norway to go

to war with the USSR and pledged Allied support to them

if they did so”, Churchill wanted the War Cabinet “to accept

the French plan”.**

Churchill himself writes how he “sympathised ardently

with the Finns and supported all proposals for their aid”***

[my italics.— V. T.]. This is evidence that Churchill wanted

Britain and France to send troops to Finland to fight the

Soviet Union. As regards the “benefit” of this act to the

Finns, it was one of the literary exercises Churchill liked so

much and which cannot be interpreted literally. In any case

the Finns preferred to decline the “benefit” from the arrival

of British and French troops. Churchill supported “all pro¬

posals” concerning Finland and, consequently, was quite

aware of the possibility of war with the Soviet Union, for,

* Labour Monthly, October 1941, p. 434. Transport House—head¬

quarters of the Labour Party.— Ed.

** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 20.

*** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 489.

as he himself writes, “any action we might undertake to help

the Finns might lead to war with Russia”.*

It looks as if at times he even hastened developments in

that direction. He relates that on December 24 (when the

War Cabinet was considering plans for a new Allied front

in Scandinavia) he circulated among the Cabinet members

a paper in which he “summarised Intelligence reports” and

warned of “the possibilities of a Russian design upon Nor¬

way”. The Soviet Command, he wrote in the paper, had

“three divisions concentrated at Murmansk preparing for a

seaborne expedition”.** This was invented by Churchill him¬

self or by his Intelligence assistants. But the important thing

for us today is that Churchill did not shun such methods in

hastening military operations against the USSR on that

front. He speaks of this in his memoirs.

This can only mean that for a certain period Churchill

had no differences with Chamberlain regarding the desira¬

bility of “switching” the war to the USSR. There is nothing

to show that Eden too had anything against Chamberlain’s

policy at the time. Another point of interest is that Duff

Cooper, who shared the views of Churchill and Eden and

had resigned from the Government in 1938 in protest against

the Munich deal, declared during his United States propa¬

ganda tour, undertaken while the Soviet-Finnish war was

raging, that “Britain will be at war with Russia very soon”.***

In the period in question there was little to choose between

the speeches of Churchill and Chamberlain where the ques¬

tion concerned the USSR.

In February 1940, Labour Monthly wrote: “The most

chauvinist aggressive reactionary forces of British and

French imperialism, which seek by all means to extend the

war and to break the Western stalemate by the development

of an Eastern theatre of war here join hands with the former

Munich elements which stumbled into this war against their

intention, precisely because they were seeking to promote

anti-Soviet war, and would now be only too thankful to

find a means to transform this war into anti-Soviet war and

to build on this basis a world counter-revolutionary front

under British leadership.”*) In our view this aptly explains

* Ibid., p. 496.

** Ibid., p. 493.

*** Labour Monthly, February 1940, p. 81.

*> Ibid., pp. 74-75.

why Churchill, who represented the most chauvinist and

aggressive forces of British imperialism, and Chamberlain,

who represented the Munichmen, joined forces on one and

the same platform. Churchill’s stand on this issue clearly

shows that in this given case the adventurist side of his

character gained the upper hand.

However, none of the plans for “switching” the war could

be carried out without Germany. But German imperialism

had no intention at the time of doing any “switching” be¬

cause it did not desire to pull the chestnuts out of the fire

for its British adversaries. While the British Government

was nursing its adventurist ideas, the Germans prepared for

an offensive in the West. This dawned upon Churchill

probably when the Soviet-Finnish war came to an end. That

was when he began to speak on a new note. In a broadcast

on March 30, 1940 he made a violent attack on the Soviet

Union as of old, but, at the same time, explicitly stated

that “it is not part of our policy to seek a war with Rus¬

sia ... our affair is with Hitler and the Nazi-German

power”. -1 '

The plan for “switching” the war envisaged a British and

French military attack on the USSR not only in the North

but also in the South—from the Middle East where con¬

siderable forces were concentrated. The attack from both

directions was to be launched simultaneously, but the peace

signed by the USSR and Finland on March 12 upset the

British and French designs. In Grand Strategy, which is part

of the military series of the approved British history of the

Second World War, it is stated that both governments “de¬

clared that her [Finland’s— V. T.] capitulation to Russia

would be a major defeat for the Allies, most damaging to

their prestige throughout the world”.* ** In fact, that is what

it was. Moreover, the cessation of hostilities in Finland de¬

prived Britain and France of the possibility of using the

North to “switch” the war. “The war with Finland,” wrote

the Conservative Sunday ’limes, “gave us the first chance

of one military initiative which the peace has taken from

us.”*** Only the southern front now remained and, naturally,

its importance grew.

* W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, Op. cit., p. 637.

** J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 107.

*** Sunday Times, March 17, 1940.

Not only the governments but also the press of Britain

and France concentrated their attention on the southern

variant. The Daily Mail wrote: “The Scandinavian gate to

Central Europe, which for three months has been ajar, is

now fast-closed again. By so much the more is the impor¬

tance of the other open enemy flank in Southeastern Europe

increased.... We are well placed to deliver a dangerous

thrust at those Caucasian oilfields which are as vital a spot

to Germany as to Russia herself.”*

The Daily Telegraph argued that “the Allies, with the

aid of Turkey, might elect to strike in that area (the Cauca¬

sus oilfields)”.**

The intention was not simply to bomb the oil-rich regions

of the Caucasus but also to occupy them. Some people in

Britain were so confident that the British would seize the

Caucasus that they even began compiling tourist maps of

that region.***

In March 1940 the British War Cabinet seriously con¬

sidered the question of “bombing the Caucasian oil cen¬

tres”** and discussed it with the French. Woodward states

that “the War Cabinet were bound to consider ... whether

we should gain or lose by cutting off Russian oil supplies at

the price of war with the USSR”.*** On March 28 the

Supreme War Council decided to continue studying the

Caucasian project, but this study was never completed. The

project was also considered at a conference of British diplo¬

matic representatives in Turkey, Hungary, the Balkan coun¬

tries and Italy at the Foreign Office on April 8 and 11, 1940,

but soon, Woodward writes, “the German successes in Nor¬

way ruled out of practical consideration any project for an

attack on the Caucasian oilfields.”****

British bourgeois historiography insists that in all their

foreign policy initiatives the British played a secondary role,

that they were pushed by the French. In particular, in re¬

gard to the War Cabinet’s decision of March 29 approving

the Supreme War Council’s recommendations to study the

* Daily Mail, March 14, 1940.

** Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, March 14, 1940.

*** News Chronicle, June 7, 1941.

*) Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 29.

**) Ibid., p. 30.

***) Ibid., p. 31.

6-1501

Caucasian project, Woodward says: “Once again French

insistence had led the British Ministers to a decision which

they probably would not otherwise have taken.’” 5 ' He and

others waste their time attributing such modesty and plia¬

bility to the Chamberlain Cabinet. Actually, the reverse was

the case. During the phoney war the opinion of the British

Government was decisive in all major questions of strategy

and policy. Besides, neither do the historians cite facts to

show that there were serious differences between the Allies.

Facts of this kind are simply non-existent. Any discussions

that were held concerned tactics and not principle. William

Rust rightly noted in December 1940: “As the representative

of the subordinate imperialism, the French ruling class were

compelled to adapt their policy to the interests of Britain,

which meant, however, that they had to bear the brunt

of the war and suffered military defeat”* **- [my italics.—

V. 7.].

During the Soviet-Finnish conflict British policy in regard

to the USSR brought her to the brink of war with the Soviet

Union. Diplomatic relations were not ruptured, but the

British Ambassador Sir William Seeds left Moscow at the

close of 1939, and a successor to him was not appointed. The

Soviet Government saw what the British ruling classes were

up to and took steps to frustrate their aggressive plans. In

pursuance of this purpose it once again raised the question

of a trade agreement with Britain. This was of both eco¬

nomic and political significance. A settlement of trade rela¬

tions would have had a beneficial effect on the political re¬

lations between the two countries. On this point George F.

Kennan notes that when it had become obvious that “the

British blow was going to be directed towards the North

Russian borders”, the Soviet Government began the “culti¬

vation of better relations with England”.***

But this was no easy task because the British were de¬

liberately engineering a deterioration of these relations. In

addition to suspending trade negotiations with the USSR

during the Soviet-Finnish war, Britain began to detain

Soviet merchant ships. In the Far East the British seized

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 31.

** Labour Monthly, November 1940, p. 608.

George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin,

Boston, 1961, p. 338.

the Soviet ships Selenga and Vladimir Mayakovsky on the

pretext that their cargo of non-ferrous metals might be re¬

exported to Germany. This was a flagrant violation of the

sovereignty of the Soviet Union, which owned both the ships

and their cargoes. For that reason the Soviet Ambassador

in Britain told Lord Halifax on March 27 that the “Soviet

Government would consent to trade negotiations if the Brit¬

ish Government expressed genuine readiness to settle the

question of Anglo-Soviet trade favourably and, in par¬

ticular, prior to starting the negotiations released the Soviet

ships Selenga and Vladimir Mayakovsky, which have been

detained by the British authorities”.* At the same time, in

Moscow, V. M. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign

Affairs, told Sir Stafford Cripps that the Soviet Union de¬

sired a trade agreement with Britain.**

In the state Anglo-Soviet relations were at the time these

proposals could not have had any success. “The steps of the

British Government,” a TASS report stated on this score,

“to curtail and restrict trade with the USSR (the cancella¬

tion of Soviet orders for equipment), the detention of Soviet

merchant ships with freight for the USSR, the British

Government’s hostility for the USSR during the Soviet-

Finnish conflict, and the leading role played by the British

Government in the Soviet Union’s expulsion from the

League of Nations could not promote a satisfactory develop¬

ment of these negotiations.”***

On April 4, 1940 the Ministry of Economic Warfare drew

up a memorandum containing demands which the Soviet

Union had to satisfy before Britain would sign a trade

agreement. This memorandum required the establishment of

Allied reporting officers in Soviet territory to keep a check

on Soviet trade with Germany, the restriction of exports to

Germany of Soviet domestic produce, and other measures

flagrantly infringing upon Soviet state sovereignty.*) Ac¬

ceptance of these demands would have been tantamount to

a renunciation of political neutrality and a switch to pro¬

voking war with Germany. Medlicott notes that this “pre-

* Izvestia, May 22, 1940.

** Eric Estorick, Op. cit., pp. 221-23.

*** Izvestia, May 22, 1940.

*) W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 326.

«•

tentious programme” was “of a highly unrealistic charac¬

ter”.* It was supplemented with the War Cabinet’s

decision of March 28 providing for an intensification of the

measures against Soviet foreign trade in the Far East.**

Such was the state of affairs when on April 9, 1940 Hitler

attacked Denmark and Norway. This attack marked the

beginning of the German offensive in the West, which put

an end to the phoney war.

* W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 326.

** Ibid.

Chapter Two

“ONLY TO SURVIVE”

(April 1940-June 1941 )

End of the Phoney War

On April 4, 1940, in an assessment of the prospects of the

war, Neville Chamberlain declared that Hitler had “missed

the bus”.* What he meant was that during the seven months

of the phoney war, without hindrance from the enemy,

Britain and France had mobilised their forces, radically

changed the balance of power in their favour and ensured

their future victory. This was evidence of the British

Government’s amazing inability to understand and correctly

appraise the position of the belligerents and foresee the

course of the war in the immediate future at least.

Five days later the Germans struck at and swiftly over¬

ran Denmark and Norway. “The swiftness and suddenness

of the attack temporarily paralysed the British and French

governments,” writes J. F. C. Fuller.** There was, indeed,

an element of suddenness, but the blame for this devolves

chiefly on the British Government because, as Shirer points

out, it “did not believe the warnings in time”.*** The

governments of Denmark and Norway had been warned of

the impending German attack in March. On April 1 this

intelligence was received in London. On April 3 it was dis¬

cussed by the War Cabinet.

Berlin was well informed of the Anglo-French intention

of intervening in the Soviet-Finnish War in order to organise

* J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 119.

** J. F. C. Fuller, Op. cit., p. 60.

*** William L. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 916.

an anti-Soviet crusade. However, participation in such

a crusade held out for Germany extremely limited and

doubtful benefits, which clearly did not conform to her ap¬

petite. In her bid for world domination Germany intended

to inflict a military defeat not only on the Soviet Union but

also on Britain and France, who were trying to become

Germany’s allies. Thus, the “switch” of the war on British

terms did not suit Germany and having used the phoney

war to build up her forces she struck at the West.

It was no secret to the Germans that Britain and France

were getting ready to occupy Norway and Sweden in order

to move their troops to Finland, halt the supply of Swedish

iron ore to Germany and establish new naval bases against

German U-boats and raiders. To counter these moves prepara¬

tions for the seizure of Denmark and Norway were started

by the German Navy at the very beginning of 1940. On

March 1, 1940 Hitler signed the directive setting the opera¬

tion in motion.

The German invasion of Denmark and Norway signified

the German Government’s rejection of the British and

French overtures aimed at organising a joint anti-Soviet

crusade, and showed its intention to conduct the war against

Britain and France with the purpose of subjugating Western

Europe. The British Government was paralysed with dis¬

may, and for good reason, too. Its strategy and policy,

which it had framed in the course of many years, were

crumbling. A real war, a life and death struggle, was now

beginning.

British and French troops landed in Norway with naval

and air support. The British War Cabinet quite seriously

felt “our overwhelming sea power should enable us to dis¬

pose of the German landing-parties ‘in a week or two’

These troops were soon driven out by the Germans. Ger¬

many not only outflanked Britain and ensured an uninter¬

rupted supply of Scandinavian iron ore but also secured

important forward bases in the North from which to launch

sea and air attacks on British communication lanes in the

Atlantic. German prestige soared, neutral countries were

intimidated and the legend was born of the German Army’s

invincibility. British and French prestige dropped cata¬

strophically, the neutral countries saw that Britain and

* J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., pp. 127-28.

France were unable to oppose the German pressure, and the

morale of the British and French people waned. On the

basis of materials compiled by Major-General Leslie Hollis,

then Secretary of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee,

James Leasor points out that the “British landing in Nor¬

way to defend that country against the nazis was an ex¬

ample of how not to carry out such an operation.... The

Germans gained Norway as a most valuable air and sub¬

marine base on the North Atlantic coast, and also won

control of the iron ore, for a loss of only 1,300 men. Most

important, they now knew that Allied talk of welcoming

attack was bravado; they knew how weak we were, and so

did the rest of the world.’”*'

Fall of the Chamberlain Cabinet.

Churchill in Power

The Norwegian catastrophe was the natural outcome of

Chamberlain’s Munich policy under conditions of war. In

the spring of 1940 the blinkers fell from the eyes of many

of Chamberlain’s ardent supporters; they realised that if the

same course were pursued Britain would not escape a mili¬

tary debacle and German troops would inevitably invade the

British Isles. The only man who did not see this was Neville

Chamberlain.

Dissatisfaction with the Government’s conduct of the war

had been mounting for a long time. Now it was voiced not

only by the broad masses but also by top circles. Sober-minded

Tories were becoming more and more convinced that if

Chamberlain had been a poor leader in peace-time, he was

even worse in war-time. This was the theme of discussion

at the weekly meetings of Tory anti-Munichites headed by

Leopold Amery in the Observation Committee. Presided

over by Lord Salisbury, a veteran leader of the Conservative

Party, this committee consisted of Conservative members of

the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Lord Salis¬

bury negotiated with the Labour and Liberal leadership in

an effort to ascertain if there was a possibility “of bringing

about a change”. Clement Attlee admits that personally he

comported himself with great reserve at these negotiations,

* James Leasor, War at the Top, London, 1959, pp. 73-74.

showing reluctance to take an active part in demanding

Chamberlain’s resignation.*

The Allies’ failure to prevent the Germans from occu¬

pying Norway brought matters rapidly to a head. Debates

on the question of the conduct of the war were started in the

House of Commons on May 7, 1940. They were attended

by many Conservative MPs serving in the Armed Forces,

and some of them had taken part in the abortive landing in

Norway. Their indignation was expressed by Leopold

Amery, who demanded the formation of a genuine coalition

government and made the most dramatic denunciation of

Chamberlain, repeating Cromwell’s address to the Long

Parliament: “You have sat too long here for any good you

have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with

you. In the name of God, go.”**

But even this did not make Chamberlain realise the full

depth of the crisis.

However, the Labour leaders now saw that the Conserv¬

atives could alone make Chamberlain go. Initially they had

not intended to raise the question of confidence in the Gov¬

ernment, but the mood of the Conservative MPs voiced on

May 7 made them reconsider their position in the morning

of May 8 and take more energetic action, for Chamberlain’s

“overthrow” held out the promise of political capital. On

May 8, Herbert Morrison, speaking on behalf of the Labour

Opposition, moved that the question of confidence in the

Government should be put to the vote.*** In his reply Cham¬

berlain made another wrong move: he appealed to “his

friends” in Parliament to support him in the voting. He thus

reduced a crucial political issue to the personal loyalty of

his friends, who now, if they had not done so before, realised

that matters had gone too far. In the voting, the Govern¬

ment, which usually had a majority of 200, received the sup¬

port of only 81 MPs. This meant that not only the Opposi¬

tion—Labour and Liberal MPs—but also a section of the

Conservatives had voted against the Government; more than

100 Conservatives voted with the Opposition or abstained,

which was likewise a show of opposition. This revolt of the

* F. Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, London, 1961, p. 28.

** A. Marwick, The Explosion of British Society, 1914-1962, London,

1963, p. 124.

*** F Williams, Op. cit., p. 30.

Conservatives would have been even more massive if prior

to the voting their leaders had not set afloat the rumour

that Chamberlain had decided to reorganise the Govern¬

ment.*

The only thing Chamberlain could now do was to resign.

Yet he stubbornly clung to power, offering the Labour Party

posts in his Cabinet. They had not accepted a similar pro¬

posal in September 1939, and they were even less inclined

to accept it now. After this rebuff Chamberlain proposed for

the premiership Lord Halifax, who shared his views and

submissively carried out his will. The Labour leaders agreed

to this nomination, but divergences in the Conservative

leadership prevented the materialisation of this plan. Winston

Churchill was entrusted with forming the new Cabinet.

On May 10 Churchill formed the new Cabinet, which

consisted of Conservatives, Labour men and Liberals. The

Labour Party was represented by its leader Clement Attlee

(Lord Privy Seal and, in effect and then officially, Deputy

Prime Minister), Ernest Bevin (Minister of Labour and

National Service), Herbert Morrison (Minister of Supply),

A. V. Alexander (First Lord of the Admiralty) and Arthur

Greenwood (Minister without Portfolio). A Liberal, Archi¬

bald Sinclair, became the Secretary of State for Air. The

inclusion of these men in the Cabinet and Churchill’s ap¬

pointment as Prime Minister were calculated to make the

new Cabinet more palatable to the people. The Conserva¬

tives retained the key posts and did not deviate from their

former policies; the Labour Ministers, representing the ex¬

treme Right, reactionary wing of the Labour Party, gave

them every assistance. Attlee subsequently said he could “re¬

member no case where differences arose between Conserva¬

tives, Labour and Liberals along party lines. Certainly not

in the War Cabinet. Certainly not in the big things.”**

In the new Government the Conservatives retained the

posts of Lord President of the Council (Neville Chamber-

lain), Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Halifax)

and Secretary of State for War (Anthony Eden). Altogether,

in the Churchill Government the Conservatives had 54 posts,

Labour 17 posts and the Liberals four posts.*** The

* Ian Macleod, Op cit., p. 290.

** F. Williams, Op. cit., p. 37.

The Times, June 1, 1940.

overwhelming majority of the Tory Ministers were confirmed

Munichites, but their position was now weaker because

Churchill had brought in a number of his own supporters.

However, the former were still very influential, the reason

for this being that the Government was dependent on the

Conservative majority in Parliament, the same majority

that had given its blessings to Chamberlain’s Munich policy.

Another reason was that Chamberlain retained his post as

party leader, and this gave him extensive power over the

Conservative Parliamentary faction and over the Conserva¬

tives in the Government.

Chamberlain remained the Conservative Party leader in

defiance of British tradition, which required a Prime

Minister resigning under such circumstances to relinquish the

party leadership. The flaunting of this tradition in May

1940 was due to the hostility of some prominent Conserva¬

tives towards Churchill, a hostility springing from past

political collisions and from Churchill’s criticism of Cham¬

berlain, and also to a desire to curtail Churchill’s freedom

of action. Churchill saw his dependence on the Conservative

Munichites. When he was requested to form a new Cabinet

he wrote to Chamberlain: “With your help and counsel and

with the support of the Great Party of which you are the

Leader, I trust that I shall succeed.... To a very large extent

I am in your hands.”*

Chamberlain remained in the Government and at the

head of the Conservative Party until October 8, 1940, when

illness made him resign. In the course of these months he

was very active, and both Churchill and the Labour Minis¬

ters closely co-operated with him. Churchill took over the

Conservative Party leadership after Chamberlain’s death on

November 9, 1940, and that strengthened his position and,

correspondingly, weakened the position of the Munichites.

Churchill’s Government was thoroughly imperialist, not

only because of its great dependence on the Munichmen.

Churchill himself was an extreme reactionary and bellicose

imperialist, who had devoted all his life to a struggle against

everything revolutionary and progressive in Britain and the

whole world. Anthony Eden, who adopted the pose of a

“progressive”, was likewise an imperialist. The overwhelm¬

ing majority of the Conservative Ministers represented big

* Ian Macleod, Op. cit., p. 292.

banks and monopolies. These forces put Churchill in power,

rightly feeling that of the Conservatives he could best of all

organise the military struggle in defence of British impe¬

rialism’s vital interests.

As a result of the military developments in the spring and

summer of 1940, Labour Monthly writes, “a shift in the

balance of relations within the ruling class followed.... In

Britain the Munichite politicians were heavily discredited,

but remained strongly entrenched in positions of power.

Direct governmental leadership passed into the hands of

the alternative section of the ruling class, represented by

Churchill, which had consistently stood for an active policy

of opposition to Hitler.”* These governmental changes

unquestionably dovetailed with the country’s national

interests. Churchill and his associates were aware that ca¬

pitulation to Germany would mean Britain’s downfall, and

they were determined to fight Germany seriously, and in this

they relied on the support of the British people.

Fall of France

In the morning of May 10, 1940 German troops invaded

Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg aiming to crash

into France via the almost undefended Franco-Belgian

frontier, bypassing the Maginot Line. This time the German

attack was not unexpected by the British. Early in May

British military leaders had drawn their conclusions from the

German seizure of Denmark and Norway and had submitted

these conclusions to the War Cabinet, which considered them

on May 9. The Chiefs of Staff wrote that this seizure was

“a first step in a major plan aimed at seeking a decision this

year”. However, although the fresh westward invasion was

foreseen, a miscalculation was made in determining its direc¬

tion: it was believed that Britain rather than France would

be attacked.**

The German invasion of the West had two political

objectives: first, to resolve the imperialist contradictions be¬

tween Germany and the Allied Powers by force of arms and,

second, to create the conditions for the attainment of Ger¬

many’s principal aim in the war, namely, the conquest of

* Labour Monthly, August 1941, p. 348.

** J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 172.

the USSR and the solution of the question of Lebensraum at

its expense. On this point J. F. C. Fuller writes the follow¬

ing: “Clearly, when Hitler’s Lebensraum—his aim—is kept

in mind, and throughout the war in Europe it must be, or

else his strategy becomes unintelligible, it will be seen that

the conquest of Norway was the first necessary step in the

conquest of the West, a conquest which strategically was

essential before turning Eastwards against Russia, so that,

when her turn came, the war would be reduced to a one

front operation.”*

On the eve of the German offensive in the West, the

British had in France an Expeditionary Corps of 10 divi¬

sions under General John Gort; this force was deployed

along the Franco-Belgian frontier. In addition, in France

the British had three territorial infantry divisions, some

engineering units and 200 aircraft.** Against the 134 German

divisions on their Northeastern front the Allies could move

more than 130 divisions, i.e., roughly an equal number of

troops.*** If it is borne in mind that the Germans had to

advance against troops in powerful defensive positions, the

German superiority in aircraft and tanks did not by any

means give them a preponderance of strength. Nonetheless,

as soon as the Germans started their offensive the British

Government realised that the battle of France was lost.

Here the moral factor was largely decisive. The German

Army was fiercely determined to win and was prepared to

make sacrifices to this end. The Allied armies, on the other

hand, were disorganised by the policy which their govern¬

ments had been pursuing during the phoney war. The

“rottenness of France”, J. F. C. Fuller says, was “so stagger¬

ing that it would not have mattered much what weapons the

French Army had been armed with. It did not want to fight,

and it did not intend to fight, it was like a mouse before a

cat.”** In the case of the British troops in France, their

morale was not very high either. The French Government

was even more rotten than the army. Its stand was under¬

mined by those who feared the French people and were

* J. F. C. Fuller, Op. cit., pp. 62-63.

** J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., pp. 155-56; J. F. C. Fuller, Op. cit.,

p. 65. During the fighting in May General Gort received reinforcements

in the shape of one tank division.

*** J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 177.

*) J. F. G. Fuller, Op. cit., p. 65.

prepared to surrender to Germany rather than have a Pop¬

ular Front. The Dutchman L. Hartog tells us that ever since

1936 the “upper classes” in France had been guided by the

slogan “Better Hitler Than the Popular Front”/'

From the approved British history of the Second World

War we learn that as early as the night of May 13 London

found the course of the battle in France “particularly alarm¬

ing”, and that on May 16 it was reported to the War Cabinet

“that the situation was most critical”.* ** Realising that the

fall of France was inevitable, the Churchill Cabinet tried to

prolong the French resistance. This was the purpose of the

numerous talks Churchill and other British leaders had in

France with the French leaders. The task was a formidable

one. The French demanded additional British divisions and

air squadrons. The British, for their paft, tried to persuade

the French to go on fighting, but declined to send aircraft

and troops on the excuse that they were needed for the

defence of Britain. Naturally, the French regarded this

evasion as a desire to make France go on fighting for as long

as possible and, at the same time, preserve as much of

Britain’s forces as possible.

Britain had sufficient grounds for doubting the competency

and, more important, the desire of the French Command to

put up a real fight. Moreover, she knew that the French

Government, particularly after Marshal Petain had been

brought into it, contained many defeatists who wanted peace

with Hitler. The French Government, for its part, did not

trust Britain, feeling she had already written off her Ally

and would not throw the whole weight of her military

machine into the fighting in France. The British Government

had given more than enough grounds for this. On May 16

Churchill had promised Paul Reynaud six additional squad¬

rons of fighter planes, but the French never received them.***

On May 22, after the German troops had reached the English

Channel, cutting off the British Expeditionary Corps and

some French units, Churchill assured Reynaud that the

British troops would, along with the French, launch a coun¬

ter-attack with the objective of closing the breach made by

the Germans and forming a junction with the main French

* L. Hartog, Und morgen die game Welt, Gutersloh, 1961, S. 189.

** J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., pp. 182-83.

*** Ibid., p. 185.

forces. This operation never came off, and the French felt

the British were to blame.

For this, too, they had sufficient grounds. On May 10 the

British troops under Gort and a number of French divisions

began an advance into Belgium, but this advance did not take

them very far. Six days later they turned back and on

May 19 Gort was already “examining the question of a with¬

drawal towards Dunkirk”.* On that same day the British

Admiralty started preparations to evacuate Gort’s troops

from Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk to Britain.** On May 22,

when Churchill promised the French that British troops

would be sent to the south to close the breach made by the

Germans there, the Command of these troops and the

British Government were actually pre-occupied with the

thought of saving the Expeditionary Corps by evacuating it

to Britain.

The evacuation was accomplished and it stirred up bad

blood between the Allies. The French felt themselves grossly

insulted when during the evacuation the British Navy gave

priority to British troops, taking French troops on board

reluctantly. But more important than that was the fact that

after Dunkirk France felt she had been deserted by Britain.

Most British bourgeois historians portray the evacuation

at Dunkirk as an outstanding victory, as a miracle. But it

has been established beyond any doubt that one of the

“miracle-workers” was none other than Hitler. With his

sights on the future war with the USSR, he did not want

British prisoners of war in Northern France to complicate

the possibility of reaching agreement with Britain on a joint

invasion of the Soviet Union. J. F. C. Fuller writes that the

evacuation “has been called a ‘miracle’; but in war miracles

are no more than exceptional operations. In this case the

answer would appear to be an exceedingly simple one—

namely, that Hitler held back the final assault on his cor¬

nered enemy.”*** Field-Marshal Harold Alexander, a pro¬

minent British war-time military leader, who as Major-Gen¬

eral supervised the evacuation of the remnants of the British

troops from Dunkirk, wrote in 1962 that if “Hitler had

thrown the full weight of his armies into destroying the BEF,

* J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 187.

** Ibid., pp. 188-89.

*** J. F. C. Fuller, Op. cit., p. 76.

it could never have escaped. If I am asked, ‘who saved

the BEF?’, my reply is ‘Hitler’.””' The explanation is that

“Hitler was convinced that Britain would be prepared to

come to terms once France ... was eliminated”. Alexander

quotes a high-placed official of the German Foreign Min¬

istry, who said that “Hitler personally intervened to allow

the British to escape. He was convinced that to destroy their

army would be to force them to fight to the bitter end.”* ** ”

Lastly, there is the evidence of the so-called testament of

Hitler, which he dictated in the spring of 1945. “Churchill,”

Hitler said, “was quite unable to appreciate the sporting

spirit of which I had given proof by refraining from creat¬

ing an irreparable breach between the British and ourselves.

We did, indeed, refrain from annihilating them at Dunk¬

irk.”***

Two British divisions remained in France after the Dun¬

kirk evacuation. The British Government gave a negative

answer to the repeated French requests for more aircraft

and troops. At a meeting of the Supreme War Council in

Briare on June 11-12, Churchill declared: “This is not the

decisive point and this is not the decisive moment. That

moment will come when Hitler hurls his Luftwaffe against

Great Britain. If we can keep command of the air, and if

we can keep the seas open, as we certainly shall keep them

open, we will win it all back for you.”*) The French were

denied assistance on the grounds that Britain had to be

defended, and that if Britain withstood the test she would,

at some future date, win France from the Germans.

The above-quoted statement contains the admission that

it was hopeless to continue the fight in France. Nonetheless,

Churchill urged the French to continue resisting the enemy.

At Briare he pledged to dispatch fresh divisions to France

“as soon as they could be equipped and organised” with the

purpose of enabling French and British troops to entrench

themselves in Brittany and continue the struggle. This was

an unrealistic plan and Churchill obviously had no serious

intention of carrying it out. General Ismay writes that at

* The Alexander Memoirs, 1940-1945, Ed. by J. North, London,

1962, p. 75.

** Ibid., pp. 75-76.

*** The Testament of Adolf Hitler. The Hitler-Bormann Documents,

February-April 1945, London, 1961, p. 96.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. II, London, 1951, p. 137.

the Briare airport before flying to London he asked Churchill

“need we be in too much of a hurry” to send reinforcements

to France. “Could we not unobtrusively delay their depar¬

ture?” To which Churchill gave his famous reply: “Cer¬

tainly not. It would look very bad in history if we were to

do any such thing.”* Churchill had every reason to worry

over how history would assess Britain’s fulfilment of her

Allied duty to France. Ismay notes: “As Churchill had never

ceased to impress upon me, our contribution to the battle

in France had been niggardly.”** Notwithstanding Chur¬

chill’s pathetic statement at the Briare airport, Ismay’s

advice was followed to the letter. No reinforcements were

sent to France, and on top of that on June 16 the evacuation

of the British troops still in France was ordered.***

This was preceded by developments that seriously wors¬

ened the situation not only of France but also of Britain.

Influenced by German military successes and by Germany’s

obvious victory in the battle of France, Italy “hastened to

assist the victor”. The British and French governments

probably could not, at the time, say definitely if at the con¬

ference with Hitler in the Brenner Pass in March 1940

Mussolini had pledged to enter the war on Germany’s side

in the event she started her offensive in the West. After

May 10 the two governments made feverish attempts to,

as Churchill put it, “buy off Mussolini”.*) In Rome,

E. W. Playfair, representing the British Exchequer, discussed

a clearing agreement envisaging the placing of British orders

with Italian shipyards. Another British emissary, Wilfred

Green, was negotiating with the Italians an agreement to

free most Italian exports from the contraband control im¬

posed by Britain within the framework of economic war¬

fare. On May 16 Churchill personally joined in the efforts

to cultivate the Italians. He sent a personal message to

Mussolini in which he warmly recalled his meetings with

the fascist dictator in Rome and said he desired “to speak

words of goodwill to you as Chief of the Italian nation”.

He wrote: “I declare that I have never been the enemy of

Italian greatness, nor ever at heart the foe of the Italian

* The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay, London, 1960, pp. 141-42.

** Ibid., p. 141.

J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 202.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 108.

lawgiver”; he called upon Mussolini “to stop a river of blood

from flowing between the British and Italian peoples”.*

In the obtaining situation, Churchill’s words that he had

“never been the enemy of Italian greatness” were a direct

offer of concessions to ensure this “greatness”, i.e., to satisfy

Italian claims. On May 18 Mussolini replied in haughty

terms that Italy would honour her obligations under her

treaty with Germany. “From this moment,” Churchill writes,

“we could have no doubt of Mussolini’s intention to enter

the war at his most favourable opportunity.”** Yet on

May 25 Lord Halifax told Giuseppe Bastianini, the Italian

Ambassador in London, that the Allies were prepared to

consider any proposals for negotiations regarding Italian

interests and possible foundations for a just and lasting

peace.*** This was a declaration of Britain’s readiness to

satisfy Italian claims and examine the terms on which war

could be ended and a peace treaty signed. However, the

British were unwilling to state these terms and recommended

that this should be done by the Italians.

The French, whose position was more desperate than that

of the British, were prepared to go much farther than Chur¬

chill in appeasing Italy. The French wanted London to agree

to offer Italy concrete concessions with regard to Tunisia

and certain other French interests, and also at the expense

of Britain. In London on May 26 Reynaud sought British

agreement to the internationalisation of Gibraltar, Malta and

the Suez Canal.*) The British Government rejected these

proposals. “My own feeling,” Churchill says, “was that at

the pitch in which our affairs lay, we had nothing to offer

which Mussolini could not take for himself or be given by

Hitler if we were defeated. One cannot easily make a bar¬

gain at the last gasp.”** ! Mussolini’s negative reply on

May 18 made Churchill realise that Italy could not be

bought off.

The French Government, however, was in a plight where

it was willing to grasp at a straw. On May 31 it sent the

Italian Government a Note offering direct negotiations and

* Ibid., p. 107.

** Ibid., p. 108.

*** Ibid., p. 109.

*) The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 246.

**) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 109.

7-1561

promising the satisfaction of Italian claims in the Mediter¬

ranean through concessions on the part of both France and

Britain. The British Government dissociated itself from these

proposals. There was nothing it could do to change the

course of events. On June 10 the British and French ambas¬

sadors in Rome were informed by the Italian Foreign

Minister that Italy had declared war on Britain and

France.

This left the British Government in no doubt that France

would soon sue for peace. All its efforts to induce the French

to continue the battle had no result. The British Govern¬

ment was now faced with the problem of what stand to adopt

in connection with France’s inevitable withdrawal from the

war. This stand was determined, firstly, by considerations

regarding the further conduct of the war against Germany

and Italy and, secondly, by the desire to take advantage of

France’s defeat and appropriate as much as possible of the

French heritage. This could be achieved only if the French

Government co-operated. Inasmuch as the last of the British

troops were leaving the European continent and, conse¬

quently, the promise of military assistance could no longer be

used to influence the French, the British Government had

only one last means—France’s pledge of March 1940 not

to enter into separate peace negotiations with the enemy.

Britain used this very flimsy trump to gain possession of

the French Navy, whose surrender, she feared, the Germans

would definitely demand under the armistice terms. In

return for its agreement to France’s withdrawal from the

war, the British Government demanded the dispatch of

French naval units to British ports. This would have meant

harsher German armistice terms in retaliation. The French

Government, therefore, refused to put its Navy at Britain’s

disposal, but promised to take steps to prevent it from falling

into the hands of the Germans.

While the French Navy was needed by Britain mainly

for the war against Germany, the French colonies were the

cake from which she could snatch a piece, taking advantage

of France’s difficulties. On June 17 the British Foreign Office

instructed its Consuls in French colonies to tell the local

authorities that since France was surrendering to Germany

the British Government offered to protect them against the

enemy and hoped to have the co-operation of these author¬

ities. On the whole, the colonial administration took a nega-

tive attitude to this offer, while the French Government

protested to the British Ambassador. Nonetheless, Britain

continued her efforts to gain control of the French colonies,

and this evoked strong protests from the French Govern¬

ment.^

During these tense days London hit upon a method by

which it hoped to acquire the French Navy, the French colo¬

nies, the French merchant fleet and all other French resources

which the Germans had not yet seized. On June 17 the

British Government proposed that the “two governments

declare that France and Great Britain shall no longer be

two nations, but one Franco-British Union”,* ** with its own

Constitution, Parliament, Government and armed forces.

The French Government’s agreement to such a union and

its transfer to London, where it would have become part

of a united Government would have signified, firstly, that

Britain would have at her disposal all French resources not

yet captured by the Germans, secondly, that France would

continue the war against Germany and Italy, and, thirdly,

that under the obtaining balance of forces the British would

play the dominant role in the union. This fantastic plan

failed. The French refused the offer of a union for they

did not believe in Britain’s ultimate victory. In the French

Government the upper hand was gained by forces desiring

a deal with victorious Germany and believing that Britain’s

days were numbered. Those advocating co-operation with

Britain were frightened that Churchill’s plan, if it led to

victory over Germany, would in the end reduce France to

the status of a British Dominion.

On June 17, without agreeing the question with London,

the French Government, headed by the defeatist and pro¬

fascist Marshal Petain, requested Germany and Italy for

armistice terms, and the armistice was signed on June 22

at Compiegne.

That ended an important phase of Anglo-French rela¬

tions, a phase which began immediately after the First

World War. The struggle for the premier role in European

politics had ultimately been won by Britain, and France,

which had followed in the wake of British policies during

the difficult 1930s, found herself involved together with

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 183.

** Ibid.

7 *

Britain in war with Germany, a war she had mortally drea¬

ded. When war finally broke out the French were on the

whole justified in considering that Britain was not doing all

she could have done to help her Ally—France. Much of the

responsibility for the catastrophe that overtook France in

1940 rested with Britain. This feeling was very much in

evidence in France, which, as the British Ambassador Sir

Ronald Campbell put it, was swept by a “wave of Anglo¬

phobia”.* The French Munichites, who were mainly re¬

sponsible for the catastrophe, took advantage of this mood

to betray France, first surrendering to nazi Germany and

then collaborating with her.

Campbell and the entire British Embassy staff left France

in a torpedo boat on the day after Marshal Petain signed

the armistice with nazi Germany.

Contrary to what the British expected, the German

Government did not demand the surrender of the French

Navy. With the exception of the units necessary to protect

French interests in the colonies, all French naval vessels

were required to return to their home ports and disarm.

The Germans solemnly promised to make no claim on the

French Navy either during the war or at the signing of

the peace treaty. The British Government quite rightly did

not believe the nazi assurances and took steps to prevent

French warships from returning to their home ports. French

vessels that happened to be in British ports were seized on

July 3. The British attempts to gain control of the French

squadron at Mers-el-Kebir flared up into a battle in which

a number of French warships were destroyed and more than

1,300 French sailors lost their lives.** At Alexandria the

French naval vessels were disarmed but remained under

French control. The British efforts to seize the French Navy

and, in particular, the Mers-el-Kebir engagement strained

Anglo-French relations to the utmost. In the French

Government Admiral Darlan and Pierre Laval demanded

military retaliation but the other members of the Govern¬

ment understood that the country was fed up with war.

Matters ended with the French Ambassador’s recall from

London. The actions of the British Government “aroused

deep and lasting resentment in the French Navy and among

*7 he Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 209.

** J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 225.

100

many other Frenchmen.... The bombardment of July 3

drew a line of blood between Petainist France and

Britain.”*

Emigre Governments in London

Before the Franco-German armistice was signed, the

British had suggested that the French Government should

move to London or to a French possession in North Africa

and continue the war from there side by side with Britain.

After the British saw there was no chance of this suggestion

being accepted they contacted General Charles de Gaulle,

Deputy War Minister in the French Government, who was

determined to continue the war. On June 18 de Gaulle spoke

on the British radio network, appealing to Frenchmen to make

their way to Britain and contact him there with the purpose

of carrying on the struggle against Germany. On June 23

he made another appeal to the French people. This was

followed by an announcement, broadcast in the French lan¬

guage, that the British Government had refused to recognise

the French Government and would deal with the Provi¬

sional French National Committee “on all matters concerning

the prosecution of the war as long as it continued to

represent all French elements resolved to fight the common

enemy”.** On June 28 the British Government announced

its official recognition of General de Gaulle as “the leader

of all Free Frenchmen, wherever they may be, who rally

to him in support of the Allied cause”.***

De Gaulle’s Committee was not recognised by Britain as

a government. However, by that time there were in London

governments of a number of countries that had been occupied

by the Germans—Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and

Poland. These governments had the support of the British.

Their number increased with the occupation by Germany of

other parts of Europe. The British welcomed them to London

and created some conditions for their activities. The existence

of such governments enabled Britain to make use, for the

conduct of the war, of the corresponding countries’ material

and manpower resources that were out of Germany’s reach.

* Ibid., p. 227.

** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 76.

*** Ibid., p. 77.

101

Moreover, in the event of victory, these governments could

return to their respective countries where they would pursue

policies more or less in accordance with British interests and

would serve as the nucleus rallying anti-revolutionary forces

should a revolutionary situation arise in these countries in

the course of the war.

Strategy of Survival

The fall of France radically changed Britain’s political,

military and strategic position. She found herself alone

against the German threat. Western Europe with its vast

industrial and manpower resources was in German hands,

and they could be used by the Germans to deal Britain a

mortal blow. To counter this blow Britain had a large Navy,

a fairly strong Air Force and an almost unarmed Army,

which had just fled from France where it had abandoned all

its armaments. Italy had cut British communications across

the Mediterranean and, with her ally, was poised to seize

British possessions and positions in the Middle East and

North Africa. In the Far East Japan obviously intended to

use the favourable situation for capturing the possessions of

the European powers. Britain was thus in an extremely

difficult situation, and the fault for this lay squarely with

the Conservative Government, which had led the country

to the brink of disaster.

Recalling this period, Churchill quoted the words of Dr.

Samuel Johnson: “Depend upon it, when a man knows he is

going to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind

wonderfully.”''' 1 ' The British Government was clear about the

outcome of the Battle of France as soon as it started, and

therefore after May 10 it concentrated on two problems:

whether to continue the struggle after France’s capitulation,

and if the struggle was to be continued what should be the

political and strategic plan. These were closely intertwined

problems and they had to be considered and decided simul¬

taneously. As early as May 19 the Chiefs of Staff set up a

committee to draw up plans “just in case”, having in mind

the fall of France."' 5 ’ 1 ' This problem was discussed by the War

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 144.

** W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. I, London, 1952,

p. 60 .

102

Cabinet on May 27, and later, in August 1940 in connection

with the Anglo-US Staff talks.

After long discussion it was decided to go on with the

war. Churchill told the British people that Britain would

fight on after the French surrender. Hitler obviously did not

believe this statement and planned to sign a peace that would

benefit Germany. He was so sure of this that he did not even

order plans to be drawn up for the conduct of the war

against Britain after France was conquered. He waited for

the British to sue for peace and, at the same time, used

various channels for sounding British opinion. In the USA

head of the German Embassy Hans Thomsen tried to contact

Lord Lothian on this question. This choice was not acciden¬

tal: Lord Lothian was a confirmed Munichite.* The Ger¬

man representative Prince Max Hohenlohe met the British

Minister in Switzerland Sir David Kelly.** The Pope and

the King of Sweden joined this “peace campaign”.

As in October 1939 when it made its “peace overtures”,

the German Government hoped that the crushing defeat

suffered by the Allies would untie the hands of the adherents

of appeasement in Britain, who would replace Churchill by

their own man and sign a peace. On July 22, 1940 the Ger¬

man Minister in Eire Eduard Hempel reported to Berlin

that the German peace proposals would be favoured “by

Chamberlain, Halifax, Simon, and Hoare, ... also Conserva¬

tive circles (the Astors, Londonderry, etc.), high officialdom

(Wilson), the City, The Times”.*** The Duke of Windsor, for¬

merly Edward VIII, was accorded a prominent place in the

nazi “peace” plans.** These manoeuvres worried Chur¬

chill and he gave instructions that “Lord Lothian should be

told on no account to make any reply to the German Charge

d’Affaires’ message”.***

Hitler waited until mid-July for a British initiative and

then proposed peace himself. On July 19 he made a speech

in the Reichstag in which he declared he could “see no reason

why this war must go on” and promised that the British

Empire, “which it was never my intention to destroy or even

* William L. Shirer, Op. cit., pp. 983-84.

** Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. X,

Washington, 1957, p. 245.

*** Ibid., p. 262.

*) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, Vol. Ill, p. 41.

**) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 229.

103

to harm”, would remain intact. He did not make any concrete

proposals but the abuse he heaped on Churchill was tan¬

tamount to a demand for his removal from power."'

Later, in his 7estament, he wrote: “Britain could have pulled

her chestnuts out of the fire, either after the liquidation of

Poland or after the defeat of France. It would not, of course,

have been very honourable on her part to do so; but in

matters of this kind, the British sense of honour is not too

particular.”**

Thus, Britain was offered peace provided she recognised

German supremacy in Europe, in return for which she would

be allowed to keep her empire. Peace on these terms would

have reduced Britain to a subordinate position with regard

to Germany and would, in the long run, have led to the

gradual peaceful seizure of the British Empire by the

Germans.

Properly speaking, this was the only way Germany could

lay her hands on the greater portion of British imperial

possessions. General Franz Haider, Chief of the German

General Staff, says Hitler’s view was that “if we smash

England militarily, the British Empire will disintegrate.

Germany, however, would not profit from this. With German

blood we would achieve something from which only Japan,

America and others will derive profit.”***

The Churchill Cabinet had other ideas, and an hour after

Hitler’s speech was broadcast, the BBC declared his “peace”

overtures would not be accepted. This speed was needed

to prevent the German proposals from being discussed by

the nation, because that would only have played into the

hands of the Munichites and Hitler. Initially Churchill want¬

ed the House of Lords and the House of Commons to pass

a solemn resolution rejecting the Hitler proposal. But this

was impossible to do without lengthy debates, and such

debates were undesirable. In the end, on behalf of the Gov¬

ernment, Lord Halifax spoke on the radio on July 22,

turning down the German proposal. It is significant that

this was done not by Churchill himself, but by Halifax, a

prominent Munichite. It was a step taken to demonstrate the

War Cabinet’s unanimity on this issue.

The time span from May 10, 1940 to June 22, 1941 may

* William L. Shirer, Op. cit., pp. 990-91.

**■ The Testament of Adolf Hitler, p. 35.

*** William L. Shirer, Op. cit., pp. 752-53.

104

be termed the period of the “diplomacy of survival”.*

J. R. M. Butler rightly notes that “Grand Strategy is con¬

cerned both with purely military strategy and with poli¬

tics”.** This was particularly true of the twelve months

following the fall of France, when Britain’s relatively mea¬

gre military means induced her to employ all possible polit¬

ical means.

British historians speak in detail of the different plans

which British strategists drew up in the course of the second

half of 1940. In these plans the accent was on economic

pressure on Germany. The view prevailing among British

strategists was that the “defeat of Germany might be

achieved by a combination of economic pressure, air attack on

economic objectives in Germany and on German morale

and the creation of widespread revolt in her conquered

territories”.*** This strategy testifies to the naivete of its

makers. In 1955 Llewellyn Woodward, who had studied the

pertinent state archives, justifiably wrote that in the summer

of 1940 the people who knew all the facts hardly “believed

that there was much chance of the survival, let alone the

ultimate victory, of Great Britain”.**

Although the Government approved the economic pressure

strategy it concentrated mainly on diplomacy for it was

aware that if Britain remained alone she would be doomed

to defeat, that only new allies could save her. In the summer

of 1940 only two Great Powers—the USA and the USSR—

were not involved in the war and could bring Britain salva¬

tion if she managed to win their support.

Therefore, as soon as Churchill came to power the basic

policy adopted by him was to steer towards an alliance with

the USA. There were many obstacles on this road. Firstly,

in the summer of 1940 the Americans were very sceptical

about Britain’s ability to continue the war. On July 1, after

a talk with US Ambassador Joseph Kennedy, Chamberlain

wrote in his diary: “Saw Joe Kennedy who says everyone in

USA thinks we shall be beaten before the end of the

month.”*** Secondly, strong resistance in the USA came from

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. XLVII.

** J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. XV.

*** Ibid., pp. 212-13.

*) International Affairs, July 1955, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, p. 274;

Llewellyn Woodward, Some Reflections on British Policy, 1939-45.

**) Ian Macleod, Op. cit., p. 279.

105

the isolationists, who for various reasons did not desire

the USA to enter the war, and nobody could tell how long

it would take to overcome that resistance. Thirdly, the Axis

powers parried Britain’s steps towards an alliance with the

USA by signing a pact with Japan, which meant that if the

USA entered the war it might be forced to concentrate all

its efforts in the Pacific. Fourthly, even if the USA decided

to fight on Britain’s side in Europe it could not very soon

make an effective contribution to the war. Major-General

John Noble Kennedy, who in 1940 was Director of Military

Operations at the British War Office, notes in his memoirs

that in that period he often saw Colonel Raymond Lee, the

US Military Attache, whom he describes as “a very charm¬

ing and intelligent man and a good friend of ours, and he

was inclined to take an optimistic and philosophical view

of the prospects”.* “If we” [Britain and the USA.— V. T.],

the optimist Lee argued, left the Germans alone, “they would

finally exhaust themselves by offensives, although they might

drive us back at first even as far south as the Equator”.**

The prospect of being driven by the Germans into the

African jungles as far as the Equator and then returning to

Europe with US assistance clearly was not an enticing

one for the British. Lastly, the British were aware they

would have to pay dearly for this assistance, and that the

more Britain became dependent on the USA militarily the

greater would be the price she would have to pay. “So long

as the enemy held the initiative,” writes J. R. M. Butler,

“and especially after the collapse of France and while

American opinion was resolute not to enter the war, there

was bound to be something unrealistic about many apprecia¬

tions and proposals. But how that victory was to be won

could not be foreseen.” Nobody, he adds, could offer “prac¬

tical recommendations as to how to keep our heads above

water through the critical months immediately ahead”.***

These circumstances gave the Soviet Union an exception¬

ally important part in British political strategy. Step by

step Churchill worked towards better relations with the USSR

with the objective of ultimately procuring its assistance. On

this point Llewellyn Woodward writes that “for the Foreign

* John N. Kennedy, The Business of War, London, 1957, p. 65.

** Ibid.

*** J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. XVIII.

106

Office, these days of military disaster [second half of May

1940.— V. T.] were crowded also with other negotiations; an

attempt to discover how far the Soviet Government might

change their attitude”.*

Battle of Britain

It so happened that even before it entered the war in 1941

the Soviet Union played a vital part in saving Britain.

At the close of June and beginning of July 1940, while

awaiting a British reply to his “peace” overtures, Hitler

became more and more obsessed with the idea of attacking

the USSR, and that was the principal reason why peace with

Britain was desirable at the time. His military theories and

the plans of his General Staff ruled out war on two fronts.

“I had always maintained,” he said, “that we ought at all

costs to avoid waging war on two fronts, and you may rest

assured that I pondered long and anxiously over Napoleon

and his experiences in Russia.”** Britain’s vacillation induced

him to think of military means of making her more pliable.

This gave birth to the idea of invading Britain.

On July 2 Hitler issued his first directives to the German

Armed Forces to prepare for a possible invasion, which

“is still only a plan, and has not yet been decided upon”.***

On July 13 Haider jotted in his diary that the “Fuehrer is

obsessed with the question why England does not yet want

to take the road to peace”.** Meditating on the reasons,

Hitler came to the conclusion “that England is still setting

her hope in Russia”.*** Naturally, this became another

motive for attacking the USSR, but Hitler was not yet

inclined to take that step without first signing a peace with

Britain. Therefore, as Haider testifies, “he too expects that

England will have to be compelled by force to make

peace”.**** Directive No. 16, ordering preparations for a

landing operation in Britain, was signed on July 16. A

significant part of the wording is: “I have decided to pre-

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. XXIX.

** The Testament of Adolf Hitler, p. 63.

*** William L. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 751.

*) Ibid., p. 752.

**) Ibid.

***) Ibid.

107

pare a landing operation against England, and if necessary

to carry it out.” The “if” meant Hitler counted on the pos¬

sibility that no landing would be necessary, that the threat

of an invasion would be enough to force Britain to sue for

peace. This is confirmed by Hitler’s “peace” overtures of

July 19. At the same time, the “if” served another purpose:

if the British Government turned down the overtures it would

be blamed in both Germany and Britain for the loss of life

which an invasion would entail. On July 1 Hitler told the Ita¬

lian Ambassador that “it was always a good tactic to make

the enemy responsible, in the eyes of public opinion in

Germany and abroad, for the future course of events. This

strengthened one’s own morale and weakened that of the

enemy. An operation such as the one Germany was planning

would be very bloody.... Therefore, one must convince

public opinion that everything had first been done to avoid

this horror.”*

Horror was indeed in store for Britain. For the invasion

the Germans lined up 40 crack divisions which had the task

of smashing the 17 British divisions guarding the coast and

the 22 divisions in reserve. After Dunkirk the British land

forces were in such a state that it would not have given the

Germans much trouble to crush them. The biggest menace

to an invading force was the British Navy and also the Air

Force, which was strong. However, the general balance of

strength was such that if the Germans had made a serious

attempt to invade Britain they would have been successful.

The West German historian Karl Klee writes: “Unquestion¬

ably, there was every possibility of carrying out a successful

landing. The greatest opportunity for this was right after

Dunkirk.”**

Hitler, however, did not propose to fight for every inch

of British soil. He believed that as soon as German troops

landed on the coast and appeared in the vicinity of London,

the Churchill Government would fall and a new govern¬

ment would sign Britain’s surrender. A coup, he felt, would

be accomplished by the fifth column consisting of Mosley’s

nazi thugs and extreme reactionary elements in the Right

wing of the Conservative Party.

* Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D,

Vol. X, pp. 79-80.

** Karl Klee, Das Unternehmen “Seelowe”. Die geplante deutsche

Landung in England 1940, Gottingen, Berlin, Frankfurt, 1958, S. 244.

108

The most notorious of these elements was the Duke of

Windsor, who in 1936 was forced to abdicate because of his

attempts to interfere in the administration of the country

more than was allowed by British tradition. Hitler cherished

the idea of returning the Duke of Windsor to the British

throne, and in return the former and prospective king of

England would have to assist Germany. On July 2 the Ger¬

man Ambassador reported from Spain that “Windsor has

expressed himself ... against Churchill and against this

war”. On July 11 the German Minister in Lisbon reported

the Duke of Windsor as characterising “himself as a firm

supporter of a peaceful arrangement with Germany. The

Duke definitely believes that continued severe bombing

would make England ready for peace.”* The implication is

obvious: the Duke of Windsor was in some measure pre¬

pared to collaborate with the Germans in return for help to

recover the British throne.

In expecting that a landing would bring about a coup in

Britain, Hitler counted not only and not so much on the

Duke of Windsor and the former Munichites as on extremely

influential banking, industrial and other business circles and

on the landed aristocracy. Chamberlain’s group, too, the

British journalist Edward Bishop writes in his book The

Battle of Britain, might at the time have agreed to a peace

arrangement with Hitler.** Hitler had two objectives in

mind when he calculated on the creation of a pro-nazi gov¬

ernment in Britain: firstly, this would facilitate the con¬

quest of the British Isles and, secondly, it would prevent the

disintegration of the British Empire following the defeat of

the metropolis and help the Germans gain possession of at

least part of it.

The Germans carefully laid their plans for Britain’s

administration after her conquest. The regime would be

harsher than in any other West European country, and this

would refute the legend of Germany’s “special” attitude

towards Britain. A directive issued by the German General

Staff on September 9, 1940 stated in part: “The main task

of the Military Administration is to make full use of the

country’s resources for the needs of the fighting troops and

the requirements of the German war economy_The able-

* William L. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 786.

** Daily Worker, September 22, 1960.

109

bodied male population between the ages of 17 and 45 will,

unless the local situation calls for an exceptional ruling, be

entrained and dispatched to the Continent with the mini¬

mum of delay.”* The purpose of the laws drawn up by the

nazis for Britain “was to grind the British people to a state

of permanent and total subservience”.** SS General Walter

Darre, the top nazi racial expert, said in the autumn of

1940: “As soon as we beat England we shall make an end

of Englishmen once and for all. Able-bodied men will be

exported as slaves to the Continent. The old and weak will

be exterminated.”***

A Gestapo reign of terror, whose organisation was entrust¬

ed to Professor Franz Alfred Six, a racial expert, was to

be established in occupied Britain. The purpose was to ex¬

terminate physically not only progressive leaders but all the

cream of the British intelligentsia as well as many leaders

of the Conservative and Liberal parties. For a start a list

was compiled which contained 2,300 names, among which

were Churchill and a number of other statesmen and lead¬

ing members of different parties, prominent newspaper pub¬

lishers and correspondents. The nazis did not omit

H. G. Wells, Virginia Woolf, Edward M. Forster, Aldous

Huxley, J. B. Priestley, Stephen Spender, C. P. Snow, Noel

Coward, Rebecca West, Philip Gibbs and the publicist

Norman Angell. Also on the extermination list were

Gilbert Murray, Bertrand Russell, John B. Haldane and other

scientists.*'

The Luftwaffe began an offensive in July 1940 to force

Britain to surrender and prepare the ground for an invasion,

if an invasion was found to be necessary. The Germans

operated, as usual, in accordance with carefully laid plans.

The air strikes were at first aimed at airfields and then, in

September, directed against the civilian population. The

British Air Force fought skilfully and with courage. The

nazis suffered heavy losses. They miscalculated in hoping to

intimidate, demoralise and psychologically prepare the Brit¬

ish people for surrender. All they achieved was to make the

British people more determined than ever to defend their

freedom and independence. Walter H. Thompson, the Scot-

* Comer Clark, England Under Hitler, New York, 1961, pp. 47-48.

** Ibid., p. 69.

*** Ibid., p. 51.

*) William L. Shirer, Op. cit., pp. 1028-29.

110

land Yard inspector who was Churchill’s personal body¬

guard during the war, writes in his memoirs: “Hitler began

to bomb England severely in the early part of August....

What was the British reaction to all this? I think it was

astonishment first of all. Then, in turn, apprehension, bit¬

terness and anger.”*

In the autumn of 1940 the RAF losses reached such a high

proportion as to border on catastrophe. The Germans could

now have launched an invasion much more easily. The Luft¬

waffe would have had little trouble in disposing of the

Britain naval units in the English Channel. But this was the

very moment when Hitler cancelled the invasion. He did not

risk hurling his forces at the British Isles when in his rear

there was the powerful Soviet Union, which clearly dis¬

favoured the piracy of the nazis and their aspiration to

conquer other countries and dominate the world. Thus, the

very existence of the mighty socialist state saved Britain

from invasion in 1940 and, consequently, from a terrible

national and state catastrophe. In one way or another this

is admitted even by bourgeois historiography. US Rear-

Admiral Walter Ansel writes that in September 1940 “Hitler

linked together Problems Russia and England all of a piece,

making by implication the question one of, Which came first,

Russia or England?... The one thing he made clear was

that Russia stood in the forefront of his thinking.”** Alex¬

andre McKee notes Hitler was confident the “major cam¬

paign” would be fought against the Soviet Union and not

against Britain.*** Hitler discussed the question of a war

against the USSR with his accomplices as early as June 2,

and at the close of July told them that Russia had to be put

out of the way—the sooner the better.*) The preparations for

this “major campaign” were in full swing in the autumn

of 1940.

Germany’s switch to the East did not mean she had given

up her intention of settling accounts with Britain. Simply

Hitler was determined to safeguard his rear by making

peace with Britain, secure victory in the East and then crush

* Walter H. Thompson, Assignment: Churchill, New York, 1961,

p. 215.

** Walter Ansel, Hitler Confronts England, Durham, 1960, p. 295.

*** Alexandre McKee, Strike from the Sky, London, 1960, p. 277.

*) Walter Ansel, Op. cit., pp. 107-08; J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., 284.

Ill

Britain. Churchill was perfectly well aware of this and drew

practical conclusions in the spring of 1941.

It is extremely important to bear in mind that Hitler had

no intention of fighting the USSR and Britain simultane¬

ously. According to his directive of October 12, 1940, the

preparations for Operation Sea Lion were to continue with

the sole purpose of maintaining political and military pres¬

sure on Britain. This pressure was designed to “soften”

Britain for a peace in the spring of 1941, which would

deliver Germany from a war on two fronts, and deceive the

British ruling circles about the fate the nazis were planning

for their country.

Anglo-US Relations

The import of France’s downfall, the British historian

John W. Wheeler-Bennett points out, was that the task was

now “the substitution of the United States of America for

France as Britain’s chief ally”.* Formerly, all the British

Government wanted was material aid from the USA; but

in the summer of 1940 it bent its efforts towards bringing

the USA physically into the war.

Relations with the USA were so vital to Britain that es¬

sentially Churchill took the direction of these relations from

the Foreign Office into his own hands. He tackled funda¬

mental issues through direct correspondence with President

Roosevelt. In the course of the war Churchill sent Roosevelt

950 telegrams and received about 800 telegrams in reply.

Churchill signed these messages as “Former Naval Person”.**

His personal contact with Roosevelt facilitated his task of

directing relations with the USA.

When Lord Lothian died on December 12, 1940, his place

as British Ambassador in the USA was taken by Lord Hali¬

fax. This appointment of a member of the War Cabinet and

a former Foreign Secretary to the post of British Ambassador

in the USA gave weight to that office and underscored the

importance Britain attached to her relations with the USA.

Anthony Eden replaced Halifax as Foreign Secretary. Early

in 1941 John G. Winant, whose views were more in accord

with the aims of US policy in this period, took over the US

* John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Op cit., p. 501.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 22.

112

Embassy in London from Joseph Kennedy, an ardent sup¬

porter of the Munich policy. When Winant stepped down

from the train bringing him to London he was welcomed by

King George VI. This, said The Times on January 1, 1961,

was the first time in British history that an ambassador was

met by the king.

In May-June 1940 Churchill made his first attempt to

bring the USA into the war, painting for Roosevelt a gloomy

picture of the defeat of France and Britain. Together with

Reynaud he tried to press Roosevelt into declaring war on

Germany. “We feel that the United States is committed

beyond recall to take the only remaining step, namely, be¬

coming a belligerent in form.”* On June 14-15 Churchill

wrote to Roosevelt: “A declaration that, if necessary, the

United States would enter the war might save France.” But

the USA was not prepared for war and its involvement

would have changed little. For Britain, however, the impor¬

tant thing was that the USA should formally enter the war

on her side. “In any case,” Woodward says, “American

belligerency would have a great moral effect on our own

people and on our enemies.”**

The American response was restrained for, as we have

already pointed out, the USA was not prepared for war.

However, this must not be taken to infer that Roosevelt and

the other US leaders desired to see Western Europe com¬

pletely dominated by Hitler. In a speech before prominent

businessmen on May 23 Roosevelt underlined the danger

the USA would face if Germany defeated France and Brit¬

ain. The US Government counted on Britain being able to

withstand the German onslaught and on Hitler failing to

win complete domination in Western Europe. “Both the

President and Secretary Hull,” writes the American histo¬

rian Charles C. Tansill, “were certain that while France

‘was finished’, Britain, with the aid of American supplies,

could withstand a German assault.”*** This held the pros¬

pect of a drawn-out war, which suited American business.

Moreover, a long war would give the United States the pos¬

sibility of picking up the French legacy in the shape of a

navy and colonies without interference from embattled

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 185.

** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., pp. 63, 89.

**"■ Charles C. Tansill, Op. cit., p. 589.

8-1561

113

Britain, which was vitally interested in US aid. Here British

and American imperialist interests came into collision, re¬

vealing the contradictions dividing them.

Britain and the USA adopted different attitudes towards

France after her surrender, when the pro-nazi Vichy regime

was established. Although this was an undoubtedly fascist

regime and despite the fact that it was controlled by Ger¬

many, the United States decided to maintain diplomatic

relations with it. In this the US Government was guided by

a number of considerations. Through contact with the ring¬

leaders of the Vichy administration, the US ruling circles

hoped to prevent Germany from seizing the French Navy

and make an attempt to gain possession of it themselves.

William L. Langer tells us that Roosevelt established rela¬

tions with Vichy after he had decided “that the fate of the

French fleet could be influenced only by representation at

Vichy”.* Moreover, the US ruling circles hoped to use these

relations as a vehicle for penetrating into the French colonies

in Africa. That “entire region”, Langer says, “was of obvi¬

ous and vital interest to the United States”.**

In its bid to seize the French Navy and colonies, the USA

came into collision with similar claims on the part of Brit¬

ain. This was one of the causes aggravating Anglo-US con¬

tradictions during the war years. The struggle for the French

heritage was also mirrored in the fact that instead of estab¬

lishing diplomatic relations with the Petain regime Britain

pinned her hopes on General de Gaulle, who headed the

Fighting France movement. In this period the Americans

adopted a negative attitude towards de Gaulle, regarding

him as a British agent. This was one of the reasons the USA

withheld its support for the Fighting France movement.

A result of France’s surrender was that anti-nazi feeling

began to run high in the United States. This was only

natural, for the enslavement of yet another country by Ger¬

many was resented and, moreover, the conquest of the whole

of continental Western Europe by the Germans sharply

increased the nazi threat to the USA. To quote the words

spoken by a newspaperman in June 1940: “Revolution seems

not too strong a word for the change in American thought

from belief in security to dread of tomorrow.”*** This was

* William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, New York, 1947, p. 76.

** Ibid., p. 285.

William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 505.

114

said approximately when Roosevelt observed: “The domi¬

nation of Europe ... by nazism—including also the domina¬

tion of France and England—takes what might be called the

buffer out that has existed all these years between those new

schools of government and the United States.”"' This buffer

consisted of the British Navy and the French Army. Their

destruction would leave nothing between the USA and the

fascist countries in Europe.

This upsurge of anti-German feeling was accompanied

by a growing demand for more effective assistance to

Britain. The influence of the isolationists ebbed consider¬

ably. “But to many prominent businessmen, lawyers and

intellectuals, especially in New York City, not even this was

enough,” write Langer and Gleason. “In these circles it was

thought that ... Britain could stand if given adequate sup¬

port.”"” 5 ' Public organisations demanding more American aid

to Britain mushroomed into existence in the USA.

The increased threat to the United States made the Amer¬

ican Government substantially enlarge its military pro¬

gramme. The adoption of this programme and the enforce¬

ment of military conscription were a further departure by

the USA from its policy of neutrality and a major step that

took it towards involvement in the war. That that was where

matters were heading was clear to many people both in the

USA and abroad.

The conquest by Germany of a number of European pow¬

ers with colonies in the Atlantic heightened American in¬

terest in these colonial territories. Principally these were

French, Dutch and British administered islands situated in

the expanse from Puerto Rico to the northern coast of South

America. From the viewpoint of the struggle against Ger¬

many, it was important to the United States that vanquished

France and the Netherlands did not “cede” their Latin

American possessions to Germany and that the Germans

should not have the possibility of building war bases in these

territories. Besides these war-induced considerations, the US

ruling circles had other grounds for taking an interest in

these territories. The long and short of it was that they

wanted these territories themselves and were determined to

prevent them from being seized by either Germany or

8 *

* Ibid., p. 491.

** Ibid., p. 506.

115

Britain, whose marines had landed on the Dutch island of

Aruba in May 1940.*

In June 1940, in furtherance of these aims, the US Con¬

gress passed a resolution giving an extended interpretation

of the Monroe Doctrine. It stated that the United States

would not recognise the transfer of any territory in the

Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to

another. The backstage imperialist dealings behind this

resolution were divulged by the US press, which urged the

Government to take possession of definite territories.

Then the attention of the US ruling circles was switched

to the northern part of the American Continent. On August

18, 1940 President Roosevelt met the Canadian Prime

Minister Mackenzie King at Ogdensburg, USA, where they

formulated the Ogdensburg Agreement establishing a Per¬

manent Joint Board on Defence. Co-ordination of the mili¬

tary effort of these two countries was in the interest of the

war against Germany, but as far as the USA was concerned

there was another side to this agreement—it bound Canada

to the USA and, in the event of Britain’s defeat, cleared the

way for Canada’s complete subordination to the USA.

The United States did not wish Britain to be defeated or

to sign a peace with Germany, for such a peace would have

meant recognition of German supremacy in Western Eu¬

rope and the Middle East and the inevitable subordination

of Britain to Germany. As a result the German threat to the

USA would loom larger.

After France’s surrender the balance of strength between

Britain and her adversary was such that without US aid

Britain had no chance of winning the war. This was ap¬

preciated in both London and Washington. The US Govern¬

ment was prepared to extend to Britain any aid save direct

American involvement in the hostilities. In June 1940 the

US sold Britain more than 500,000 rifles, 22,000 machine-

guns, 895 field guns and 55,000 Thompson guns.** In addi¬

tion US military authorities agreed to let Britain have part

of the current US aircraft output earmarked for the US Air

Force.

While taking care to stiffen British resistance to Germany,

the Americans prepared to seize as much as possible of her

* William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 625.

** M. M. Postan, British War Production, London, 1952, p. 117.

116

possessions in the event she was defeated, namely her Navy

and the largest possible share of her colonial empire. One

of the means for attaining this goal, the US ruling circles

believed, was to set up a British Government in exile which

would be dependent on the USA. Roosevelt sounded Chur¬

chill on the possibility of moving the British Government to

Canada. He “wanted to be assured that the British would

do what the Dutch, Belgians, Norwegians, Czechs and Poles

had done and set up a Government in exile”.*

At this stage, R. Palme Dutt writes, the “choice before the

British ruling class becomes the choice between coming to

terms with German capital, at a price, or of coming to terms

with American capital, also at a price”.** Britain did not

have the strength to carry on the war against Germany

singlehanded. Continuation of the war in alliance with the

USA would, in the obtaining circumstances, inescapably in¬

volve the transfer of a number of strategic British bases to

the USA and concessions in foreign trade, in other words,

it would lead to Britain’s ceding some of her influence in

favour of US imperialism. On the other hand, peace with

Germany would place Britain in an even more difficult posi¬

tion. The British Government decided on an alliance with

the USA, and although it knew it would have to make con¬

cessions it was by no means inclined to become completely

subservient to the USA and meant to get something out of

the alliance.

In the summer of 1940 it stepped up its efforts to draw

the USA into the hostilities. The British warned the Amer¬

icans that if Britain were not given sufficient aid she might

be defeated and the USA would gain nothing from the

British heritage. In June 1940 Churchill instructed Lord

Lothian, the British Ambassador in the USA, to talk to the

US President “in this sense and thus discourage any com¬

placent assumption on United States’ part that they will

pick up the debris of the British Empire by their present

policy”.***

A cornerstone of Anglo-US relations after the fall of

France was the agreement to transfer 50 old US destroyers

to Britain. The question of these destroyers was first broached

* Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 147.

** R. Palme Dutt, “The Truth About Anglo-American Policy”, New

Masses, Dec. 17, 1940.

*** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 355.

117

by Churchill on May 15, 1940. Britain needed them to

protect convoys from the USA against German U-boats,

which were taking a heavy toll of British shipping, and also

for operations in the Mediterranean against the Italian Navy.

Anglo-US talks on this question were started on July 23,

1940 and ended on September 2 with an agreement under

which in exchange for the 50 American destroyers the USA

was given a 99-year lease for the maintenance of naval and

air bases on Newfoundland, the Bermudas, Jamaica, Santa

Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, the Bahamas and British Guiana.

In addition, the British Government pledged in writing that

in the event Britain was occupied by the Germans the British

Navy would be neither surrendered nor scuttled but would

be sent to protect other parts of the British Empire. This

agreement contributed towards the conduct of the war

against nazi Germany, but its undertone was that the US

imperialists were out to make use of Britain’s difficulties in

1940 to obtain concessions, which would in the end weaken

her position in the Western Hemisphere.

The transfer of the American destroyers to Britain marked

a further departure by the USA from its policy of neu¬

trality and another step towards US involvement in the war

on Britain’s side. Woodward writes that the transfer of the

destroyers was an act of war.* That was exactly what

Churchill was after, but it was still not a direct military

collision between the USA and Germany, which he wanted

and which Hitler was making every effort to postpone until he

could strike at the USA under more favourable conditions.

Talks between the General Staffs of the USA and Britain

began in Washington in January 1941 and two months later

(on March 27, 1941) they led to an agreement envisaging

“full-fledged war co-operation when and if Axis aggression

forced the United States into war”.**

At the close of 1940 the question of funds to pay for the

armaments purchased by Britain in the USA acquired

special importance in Anglo-US relations. When the 1940

US presidential elections ended Roosevelt announced that

Britain and Canada would be allowed to purchase half of

the American war output. This satisfied the British Govern-

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 86.

** S. E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May

1943, Boston, 1947, p. 46.

118

ment but, at the same time, it began to press for a change

in the existing system of payment for US supplies.

The cash and carry principle did not suit Britain be¬

cause to pay for American supplies she had to realise her

foreign investments and thus damage her post-war economic

position. In London the utmost effort was made to safeguard

every possible foreign investment. On December 8, 1940

Churchill wrote to Roosevelt: “The moment approaches

when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping

and other supplies.... I believe you will agree that it would

be wrong in principle . .. after the victory was won with our

blood ... and the time gained for the United States to be

fully armed ... we should stand stripped to the bone.”*

In reply to those in the USA who wanted to make Britain

use all her foreign investments to pay for American sup¬

plies, some people in Britain said fairly loudly if it would

not be better to make peace with Germany before the Amer¬

icans took away their “last shirt”. This forced the US Gov¬

ernment attentively to study Churchill’s appeal of December 8.

F. Davis and E. K. Lindley write that in Britain feeling

in favour of peace might easily have been promoted “if the

price of American help were to be the gradual transfer of

the British financial empire overseas into American hands.

In the vital interest of the security of the United States, the

President could not risk a policy which might sap the British

will to resist and so open the way for negotiated peace.”**

The Lend Lease Act, which enabled Britain to receive

American supplies without having to pay cash for them was

passed in the USA on March 11, 1941. Supplies under Lend

Lease were paid by the US Government from the State

Budget. The architects of Lend Lease believed this act would

subsequently enable the USA to secure economic and polit¬

ical concessions from Britain. In other words, in rendering

Britain aid, the US ruling circles had the twofold objective

of weakening Germany as a dangerous rival and of weaken¬

ing and subordinating their Ally, Britain. This was where

the sharp contradictions between Britain and the USA

manifested themselves. In a speech at the American Bankers

Association at the close of December 1940, Virgil Jordan,

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 500-01.

** F. Davis and E. K. Lindley, How War Came, New York, 1942,

pp. 113-14.

119

President of the National Industrial Conference Board, said

that as a result of the war Britain “will be so impoverished

economically and crippled in prestige that it is improbable

she will be able to resume or maintain the dominant posi¬

tion in world affairs which she has occupied so long. At

best, England will become a junior partner in a new Anglo-

Saxon imperialism, in which the economic resources and the

military and naval strength of the United States will be the

centre of gravity ... in modern terms of economic power as

well as political prestige the sceptre passes to the United

States.”* **

This was understood in Britain. In October 1940 the

magazine Economist wrote of the prospects of Anglo-US co¬

operation in the following terms: “The question of leader¬

ship need hardly arise. If any permanently closer associa¬

tion of the two nations is achieved, an island people of fifty

millions cannot expect to be the senior partner. The centre

of gravity and the ultimate decision must increasingly lie

with America. We cannot resent this historical develop-

ment.

Nonetheless, this was resented by the British ruling

circles. They pressed for equality in their relations with the

USA and clung tenaciously to their imperialist interests. At

the moment, however, they refrained from intensifying the

struggle in this sphere; first and foremost, they and the

Americans had to concentrate on the struggle against the

common adversary, which they did. Anglo-US co-operation

continued to broaden out after the adoption of the Lend

Lease Act.

American officers arrived in Britain in March 1941 to

prepare bases for US troops. In April 1941 Roosevelt an¬

nounced that the Western Hemisphere’s “defence zone” was

being extended to 25° West longitude. Beginning on April

24, US naval and air units escorted merchant ships side by

side with British naval units. That gave the convoys more

security for it became increasingly more difficult for Ger¬

man U-boats and raiders to sink ships carrying supplies to

Britain. The participation of US Armed Forces in these con¬

voys meant that a collision with German naval units became

* The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, New York, December

21, 1940, p. 3613.

** The Economist, Oct. 19, 1940.

120

very probable if such units were encountered in the area

patrolled by the Americans. Indeed, the US destroyer

Niblack clashed with a German U-boat off Iceland on April

10, 1941.

In May 1941 the US Government announced that US

Armed Forces were helping to ensure Britain with supplies

by sea and that the USA would employ every means at its

disposal to continue ensuring the delivery of these supplies

to Britain. The President proclaimed a state of emergency.

The United States was drawing closer to war. Yet the deci¬

sion to go to war was taken by America not in connection

with the situation in Europe but in connection with the

situation which took shape in the Far East at the close of 1941.

Emergency Measures

by the Churchill Government.

Britain Gears Her Economy

to War-Time Requirements

After the German offensive in Europe was launched and

it became obvious that France would fall, the British Gov¬

ernment launched a series of emergency measures designed

to repulse a German invasion of the British Isles. The Home

Guard began to be formed as early as May 14. It consisted

of people between the ages of 17 and 65 working in the day¬

time and undergoing military training in the evenings. The

British people became increasingly more aware of the mortal

danger threatening their country. They considered the strug¬

gle against nazism as a just one and willingly joined

the Home Guard, whose strength reached 1,600,000 in June

1941.*

On May 22 Parliament passed the Emergency Powers

Act, which gave the Government the authority to mobilise

any person for any military or civilian assignment required

by the country’s interests and place under supervision any

property and requisition any industrial or transport enter¬

prise and direct its activities.**

These steps were justified in view of the life and death

struggle which Britain now had to wage. Yet the Govern-

* Statistical Digest of the War, p. 13.

** G. D. H. Cole, Op. cit., p. 384.

121

ment and the bourgeoisie took advantage of the situation to

consolidate and broaden their dictatorship over the working

class, whom their experience and the consequences of the First

World War made them fear mortally. In accordance with

the Emergency Powers Act, the Government issued a series

of orders, among which Order 18B permitted the authorities

to take any person into custody without making a charge or

without trial, and Order 2D gave the authorities the power

to suppress any newspaper at their own discretion. Order

1305 issued by the Labour Minister Ernest Bevin qualified

participation in a strike as a crime punishable by a fine or

by imprisonment for a term of up to six months. These

measures, which were supplemented and enlarged in the

course of the war, concentrated unlimited power in the hands

of the War Cabinet and turned its leader, Churchill, as his

American biographer Virginia Cowles notes, into a “virtual

dictator”."'

Energetically and, this time, in earnest, for now it had

become a matter of life and death, the Churchill Govern¬

ment began to switch Britain’s economy to a war-time foot¬

ing, and build up powerful Armed Forces, with emphasis

on restoring and enlarging the land army.

Results soon became evident. War industry output grew

rapidly. The strength of the British Armed Forces reached

3,290,000 in 1941.** These results would have been even

more striking if the country’s mobilisation for the conduct

of the war had not been obstructed by the Munichites, who

were well-entrenched in the economy, and also by the mer¬

cenary interests of the monopolies, which regarded the war

primarily as a means of obtaining bigger profits by intensi¬

fying the exploitation of the working class.

The Home Situation

and the Class Struggle

Churchill told the nation that for the immediate future he

had nothing to offer but “blood, toil, tears and sweat”. These

words were borrowed from Garibaldi’s speech to his com¬

rades after the fall of Rome in 1849. Indeed, the war de¬

manded sacrifice, but this sacrifice had to be borne by the

* Virginia Cowles, Winston Churchill, London, 1953, p. 318.

’*'* Annual Abstract of Statistics, No. 84, p. 101.

122

working people because the bourgeoisie used its privileged

status in the capitalist state to reduce its burden and to grow

rich on the war. The toil and sweat that Churchill de¬

manded of the working people multiplied the revenues of

the British monopolies. Working conditions deteriorated.

Legislation covering these conditions was annulled for the

period of the war. In 1941 real wages were 11 per cent

below the pre-war level.

Monopoly profits, official statistics reveal, rose from

£1,368 million in 1938 to £2,190 million in 1941.* These are

clearly understated figures; they do not mirror a consider¬

able portion of the profits because under war-time con¬

ditions the bourgeoisie took pains to conceal and mask its

revenues. A law imposing a 100 per cent tax on war super¬

profits was passed by the Churchill Government. However,

this law only camouflaged the war profits of the bourgeoisie.

Firstly, it covered only that part of the profit which exceeded

the average profits in 1936-38, i.e., when as a result of Brit¬

ain’s rearmament on the eve of the Second World War the

profits of the capitalists soared. Secondly, the wording of the

law enabled the bourgeoisie to conceal any profits exceeding

the 1936-38 level. These profits were used for the purchase

of new enterprises, the enlargement of old enterprises or the

formation of reserve funds, thereby creating secret profit

reserves which the working people knew nothing about. The

purpose of all this was to remove, as far as possible, all

causes that might aggravate the class struggle, which the

bourgeoisie feared very much under war-time conditions.

This showed the British bourgeoisie’s class sagacity which

sprang from long experience.

However, even the experienced British bourgeoisie could

not accomplish the impossible, namely establish complete

class peace for the duration of the war. During the Second

World War, in contrast to the period 1914-18, the class

struggle in Britain immediately acquired, on the whole, a

political nature. In the initial stage of the war the British

working people, mainly the working class, vigorously de¬

manded that the war be turned into a just, anti-fascist strug¬

gle and called for clearing the Government’s foreign and

war policy of reactionary trends, most convincingly demon¬

strated by the Chamberlain Government’s desire to terminate

* Ibid., p. 229.

123

the war against Germany, make a deal with her and jointly

attack the Soviet Union.

A determined drive was started with the object of remov¬

ing the Munichites from the Government. This, progressive

and realistically-minded people believed, was vital if the

war against nazism was to be conducted actively. The British

Communists and their newspaper the Daily Worker were

in the forefront of those who took action under the slogan

“The Munichites Must Go”. This slogan was energetically

supported by many trade unions, the British co-operative

movement and the finest section of the British intelligentsia.

A People’s Convention was held in London on January

12, 1941, the 2,234 delegates representing 239 industrial

enterprises, many trade unions, trade union councils, and

co-operative, political, youth and other organisations. It

charged the ruling classes of Britain with plunging the coun¬

try into war, with conducting the war in pursuance of their

reactionary class interests and with shifting the burden of

war and the sacrifices it entailed onto the shoulders of the

working people. It declared that these ruling classes were

“promoting hostility to the Soviet Union and generally

pursuing policies which are leading the people to ca¬

tastrophe”.*

The programme adopted by the Convention stated that

its participants were determined to set up a people’s govern¬

ment that really represented the working class and was

capable of winning the trust of working people throughout

the world. The Convention countered the attempts of the

reactionaries to direct the war against the Soviet Union with

a demand for friendship with the USSR. It called upon the

working people of Britain to unite in the struggle for these

aims and compel the ruling classes to accept them.**

The overwhelming majority of the delegates to the Con¬

vention were not Communists, although the Communist

Party of Great Britain played a prominent part in conven¬

ing it. The popular nature of the Convention alarmed the

Government, which saw that the people were entirely dis¬

satisfied with its war, foreign and home policies and were

determined to secure a change.

The Communist Party of Great Britain consistently de-

* Labour Monthly , February '941, p. 93.

** Ibid., p. 94.

124

manded a change in the Government’s policy and the

removal of the men of Munich. This enhanced its prestige in

the nation. On the day after the Convention opened the

newspaper Daily Mirror wrote that the people “expected

the Labour Ministers in the Government to be their champi¬

ons. They are disappointed in them. Labour Ministers be¬

have like pale imitations of Tory Ministers. So the peo¬

ple ... are beginning to turn to the Communist Party.’”''

The Government was aware that the people were rapidly

veering to the Left, and it intensified its persecution of pro¬

gressive elements, the Communist Party in particular. On

January 21, 1941, Labour Home Secretary Herbert Morri¬

son ordered the closure of the communist newspaper the

Daily Worker. This made British people deeply indignant.

Protests against this action came from many trade unions,

co-operative societies and intellectuals. Bernard Shaw de¬

clared that the Daily Worker was suppressed because it

advocated friendship with the USSR and realised that a

war between Britain and the USSR “would make every in¬

telligent Briton a defeatist”.* **

The economic struggle of the British working people did

not play such a substantial role in 1939-41 as in 1914-18,

but it was pronounced particularly during the initial period

of the war. Strikes flared up from time to time, but most of

them were of short duration. The workers used this means

to safeguard their living standard. The strike movement

would have been much larger if the workers had not been

aware that strikes crippled the war effort against nazism.

The more the war acquired the nature of a liberative, anti¬

fascist struggle the more restraint and patience were dis¬

played by the British working class.

British Attempts to Create an Allied Front

in the Balkans

After Germany abandoned her intention of invading the

British Isles, hostilities moved to the Mediterranean and

North Africa. Italian troops seized British Somaliland and

invaded Kenya, Sudan and Egypt. This Italian activity

alarmed London. Britain’s efforts to safeguard her colonial

* Daily Mirror, January 13, 1941.

** W. Rust, The Story of the “Daily Worker", London, 1949, p. 87.

125

possessions during the Second World War were as energetic

as in 1914-18. She sent military reinforcements to the

Middle East at great risk to the security of the British Isles.

At the close of the summer of 1940, when the threat of a

German invasion hung over Britain, the Government sent

to Egypt half of the available tanks (of which there were

only 500).* With these tanks British troops drove the Ital¬

ians out of Egypt and the whole of Cyrenaica. Towards the

spring of 1941 the Italians were ousted from British Somali¬

land, Kenya, Sudan and their own colonies—Somali, Eritrea

and Abyssinia.

The military successes in North Africa enabled Britain

to activate her foreign policy in the Balkans. Another factor

facilitating this was that at the close of 1940 and beginning

of 1941 German expansion was concentrated in Southeast

Europe where the nazis were preparing a springboard

against the Soviet Union from the right flank, enslaving the

Balkan peninsula and hoping to carve a road to the British

and French possessions in the Middle East.

The abandonment by Britain and France of their Allies

to the tender mercies of Germany, their reluctance or inabil¬

ity to defend Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the

Netherlands and, lastly, the fall of France herself caused

Britain’s international prestige to fall catastrophically. The

Balkan countries had learned the worth of British “guaran¬

tees” and in face of the German threat they took the road

of surrender without even trying to obtain British assistance.

This smoothed the way to German aggression in the Balkans.

German diplomacy secured the alignment of Rumania,

Hungary and Bulgaria with the Axis bloc. In October 1940

German troops occupied Rumania. Mussolini felt he had to

get a share of the Balkan pie and on October 28 attacked

Greece. Unexpectedly for the invaders the Greek Army put

up a strong resistance and the Italians had to go over to

the defensive. Britain had given Greece guarantees in 1939

and now she invoked them to land troops on the Greek

islands of Crete and Lemnos.

Greek resistance to the Italian invasion meant that if

Germany came to her ally’s assistance Greece would have

to fight against Germany as weli. The British Government

could not make up its mind as to what stand to adopt with

Michael Foot, Op. cit., p. 144.

regard to the fighting in Greece. True, on September 5, 1940

Lord Halifax told the House of Lords that Britain would

honour her commitments to Greece, but this statement

was made before the need to fulfil the commitments arose.*

Finally, in February 1941, it was decided to send Foreign

Secretary Anthony Eden, who had taken the place of Hali¬

fax, and Chief of the Imperial General Staff General John

Dill to the Middle East to study the situation on the spot

and prepare recommendations for the War Cabinet.

In the Balkans the British emissaries tried to form a bloc

consisting of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia under Britain’s

leadership. After Italy entered the war, Turkey renounced

her 1939 mutual assistance pact with Britain and France

and proclaimed herself a non-belligerent. Following the fall

of France she adopted a wait and see attitude and on the

pretext that she was unprepared for war denied Britain even

political assistance. The British had to rest content with

Turkish neutrality. Besides, they were not at all sure that

Turkey’s entry into the war against Germany would not

speed up the German break-through to the Middle East. In

Yugoslavia a sharp struggle was being waged between ad¬

vocates of a German orientation and those urging resistance

to the German invasion of the Balkans. Britain counted on

the support of the latter forces to bring Yugoslavia over to

her side. These circumstances brought the British Govern¬

ment round to the idea of forming a bloc of four countries.

On March 27, 1941 Churchill wrote to the Turkish President

that “now is the time to make a common front” for “pre¬

venting the German invasion of the Balkan peninsula”. The

proposed bloc, Churchill explained to Eden, would operate

as follows: “Together Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and our¬

selves have seventy divisions mobilised in this theatre. The

Germans have not yet got more than thirty. Therefore, the

seventy could say to the thirty, ‘If you attack any of us you

will be at war with all.’ ”** This was an unrealistic project,

and it was soon abandoned.

Early in March the British Government decided to send

troops to Greece in order to stimulate the formation of a

four-power bloc. Moreover, the promise given to Greece had

to be made good. Britain could not afford a repetition of

* Parliamentary Debates. House of Lords, Vol. 117, col. 368-69.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 149.

127

the “Polish variant”; she feverishly looked for new allies

and was compelled to demonstrate that she could keep her

word. Woodward observes that the risk of sending troops

“had to be taken for moral reasons—our guarantee to

Greece ... the discredit which would come to us if once again

we failed to honour a guarantee with direct help”."'

The first contingents of British troops landed in Greece

on March 7. They totalled 57,000 men, and comprised a

British tank brigade, two Australian divisions, one New

Zealand division and a Polish brigade. On April 6 Germany

attacked Yugoslavia and Greece, and the British troops were

evacuated at the close of the same month. Though the troops,

now numbering 43,000 effectives, were evacuated, all the

heavy armaments and equipment were left behind as at

Dunkirk.' 1 '* **

A period of trial now awaited Britain. The German Air

Force pounded the British troops out of Crete. In North

Africa German and Italian troops under General Erwin

Rommel took the offensive. At the end of March a coup

brought the pro-German Government of Rashid Ali al-

Qilani to power in Iraq. At the same time, the Germans

energetically penetrated Syria, which was under the suze¬

rainty of the Vichy Government. Britain faced serious

danger in the Middle East.

While proposing the formation of an Allied front in the

Balkans Churchill could not count on stopping the Germans

there. He hoped such a front would turn the German offen¬

sive from the Middle East toward the Soviet Union. On

March 28, 1941 he wrote to Eden: “Is it not possible that if

a united front were formed in the Balkan peninsula Germany

might think it better business to take it out of Russia?”***

Germany turned against the USSR on her own initiative

after conquering the Balkans. That, too, saved the British

positions in the Middle East.

Economic Warfare at a New Stage

A new stage of the economic war, which had started

twelve months previously, set in in the spring of 1940. The

months preceding the fall of France had shown that the

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 132.

** J. F. C. Fuller, Op. cit., d. 107.

*** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 151.

128

British Government had not been justified in pinning its

hopes on an economic war, for it had not prevented Ger¬

many from crushing the Allies. Nonetheless, in the spring

of 1940, the economic blockade continued to occupy an im¬

portant place in Britain’s strategy.

A Committee set up on May 19 by the Chiefs of Staff to

work out strategy in the event France fell raised before the

Ministry of Economic Warfare the question whether there

was “any strategic advantage in continuing economic war¬

fare” if France were conquered and Italy entered the war.

The Ministry replied in the affirmative but made a number

of reservations/ Soon afterwards Britain’s military and

civilian leadership adopted a plan for the further conduct

of the war in which economic pressure remained one of the

principal means by which it was hoped to defeat Germany.

The accompanying report from the Chiefs of Staff stated that

“upon the economic factor depends our only hope of bring¬

ing about the downfall of Germany”.**

A curious situation arose. The Ministry of Economic War¬

fare considered that the economic war could only be success¬

ful if it were accompanied by military action, while the

military leaders pinned all their hopes on an economic

blockade. This sprang not only from the inability of the

British military leaders to foresee the further course of the

war but also from the fact that in the second half of 1940

Britain had no other effective means of fighting the war. The

role which British strategists accorded to economic warfare

in the period from June 1940 to June 1941 in a way mirrored

Britain’s extreme military weakness. Flence “some incli¬

nation to look afresh for miracles in the economic field of

warfare”.***

The Ministry of Economic Warfare had to determine how

far Germany’s economic potential had changed following

the battles in the West and what concrete effect economic

warfare would have on her. The Ministry’s deductions did

not say that Germany was succumbing to the blows of the

blockade, but maintained that as early as the spring of 1941

she would have the same difficulties as, it was believed, she

had experienced in the spring of 1940. These assessments

* W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., p. 60.

*■'' Ibid., p. 421.

*** Ibid., p. 415.

8-1561

129

suffered from a surfeit of optimism. W. K. Hancock and

M. M. Gowing, authors of one of the volumes of the official

British history of the war, note that “Germany’s economy

was immeasurably strengthened by her conquests and the

Ministry of Economic Warfare’s forecasts were sheer illu¬

sion. But ... one of two illusions may possibly have done

less harm than an overdose of the harsh truth would have

done.”* Medlicott writes that the chief value of that Min¬

istry’s forecasts was that they were “a stimulus to the morale

of the fighting Services”.**

The new situation in Europe in mid-1940 required a

change of the methods of enforcing an economic blockade.

Even before the fall of France, the sea blockade of Ger¬

many and the part of Europe occupied by her was never air¬

tight, but after the Germans seized the entire northern and

western coast of Europe and Italy entered the war this be¬

came a hopeless task. As a result, the Ministry of Economic

Warfare had to switch from “control on the seas to control

on the quays”, i.e., from the naval blockade—the actual in¬

terception of blockade runners by ships of the Royal Navy—

to export control in all overseas territories from which con¬

traband supplies could reach Europe.*** Britain took steps

to control the sources of export to countries dominated by

Germany and the world maritime transport. Three methods

were used to achieve this purpose: special passes for freight

and ships, special ships’ passports, and export quotas for

neutral countries. In addition, the state commercial corpo¬

ration which purchased in neutral countries commodities that

might be needed by Germany stepped up its activities. This

body of measures was launched in the winter of 1940/41,

and was implemented without essential changes throughout

the war.

This pressure, whose aim was to damage Germany’s

economy, had to be maintained consistently. However, it

evoked widespread dissatisfaction in a number of neutral

countries. Fearing that a tight blockade would push these

countries into the enemy’s camp, the British Foreign

Office demanded exemption for them and this undermined the

* W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, British War Economy, Lon¬

don, 1949, p. 100.

** W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., p. 420.

*** Ibid., p. 417.

130

blockade as a whole. Foreign policy aims thus clashed with

the objectives of the economic war.

On the whole, as in the period of the phoney war, this

economic warfare was unsuccessful in the period from the

fall of France to Germany’s attack on the USSR. “During

the second phase, from July 1940 to June 1941,” Medlicott

writes, “there was still, in spite of disappointments, a

tendency to exaggerate the possibilities of the economic

blockade.”*

The Soviet Union’s entry into the war marked a turning

point in the economic blockade, for it gave Britain, espe¬

cially after the USA became involved in hostilities, the pos¬

sibility of planning and enforcing an economic blockade on

a global scale. The “economic campaign, although it was

being waged with increasing efficiency”, Medlicott says,

“nevertheless ceased to be regarded as one of the main

instruments of victory”. After the USSR and the USA en¬

tered the war, he points out, “the high strategy of the Allies

turned more and more to the preparation and launching of

great military offensives”.**

British Far Eastern Policy

The defeat suffered by the Allies in Europe opened the

door wide to Japanese aggression in the Far East. Here

were vast colonial possessions of Germany’s victims—the

Netherlands (Indonesia) and France (Indochina)—and of

Britain (Malaya, Burma, India and so on), whose position

was desperate. Because of these colonies’ geographical situa¬

tion the Germans could not even try to lay their hands on

them. Japan, however, was in a position to make such an

attempt. In the obtaining situation Britain could not seri¬

ously prevent Japan from completing her conquest of China.

That induced the Japanese to speed up their expansion in

the summer of 1940. They felt, the chief of the Japanese

military intelligence told the British Military Attache in

Tokyo, that their descendants would damn them if they

failed to take the opportunity that was falling into their

hands.

Real resistance could be offered to Japanese aggression

by China and the USA. The Chinese people were fighting

* Ibid., p. 43.

** Ibid.

»•

131

for independence against enslavement by Japan. The USA

planned to further its expansion in the territories Japan was

interested in, chiefly China. Even before France fell Britain

did not have the necessary forces in the Far East to wage

an independent struggle against Japanese claims, and she

was much less in a position to wage such a struggle single-

handed after her troops had been driven out of the European

continent, and the British Isles and the British Middle

Eastern possessions were threatened by Germany and Italy.

Developments showed that in the Far East only China and

the USA could be Britain’s allies.

Britain was one of the imperialist exploiters of China and

a rabid enemy of the Chinese revolution. She “protected”

China against Japan only so that the Japanese would not

oust British business, which was deriving enormous profits.

During the 1930s and in the course of the phoney war, this

“protection” was implemented through an arrangement with

Japan at the expense of the Chinese people.

The United States was penetrating China and the Far

East generally so energetically that its clash with Japan had

long ago brought these two countries to the brink of war.

In the Far East the USA was, naturally, pursuing its own

interests, and at the close of May 1940 it was naive on the

part of the British War Cabinet to believe that in the Far

East British interests would be protected by the United

States."'

In the summer of 1940 Japan demanded that Britain

close the frontier between Hongkong and China and halt

traffic along the Burma Road to China. Essentially, this was

a demand to participate in the blockade of China and

thereby help Japan crush Chinese resistance. On June 27 the

British made it plain to Washington that if the USA did not

declare its determination to oppose any change of the status

quo in the Far East and the Pacific, major concessions would

have to be made to Japan. In effect, this was a British de¬

mand for an American ultimatum to Japan, the conse¬

quences of which could only be war. This suited Churchill

because if Britain and the USA became allies in the Far

East they would, in view of the nature of the relations be¬

tween Japan, Germany and Italy, inevitably be allies in

Europe. Churchill was prepared to risk war in the Far East

* J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 828.

132

if it would compel the USA to enter the war in Europe. This

was appreciated in Washington and the reply was that the

USA could not risk war with Japan * At the time the British

hardly expected any other reply. All they needed was justi¬

fication for a policy of appeasing Japan, which they in¬

tended to continue. In regard to Germany Churchill pursued

a policy of armed struggle, but in regard to Japan he was

prepared to follow the line of appeasement initiated by his

predecessor Chamberlain. The Chiefs of Staff, J. R. M. But¬

ler writes, felt “we should rather seek a general settlement

with Japan”.**

In accordance with this line the British Government closed

the Burma Road on July 18, 1940. Twelve days before

that happened the British Ambassador in Japan Sir Robert

Craigie was instructed to explain to the Japanese “that we

could not close the Burma Road to legitimate trade without

departing from neutrality [in the war between Japan and

China.— V. T.] and discriminating against China”.*** Thus

appeasement was implemented at China’s expense. But that

was not all. As Lord Lothian told Sumner Welles, the Brit¬

ish Government was prepared to buy off Japan by letting

her have Indochina.*) However, the Japanese felt they

could grab more than the British were prepared to give

them.

Early in September 1940 Japan entered into a compact

with the Vichy Government on the occupation of Indochina

by Japanese forces. The signing of the Tripartite Pact

between Japan, Germany and Italy was announced on

September 27. The signatories of this pact agreed on the

creation of a “new order” in Europe and of a “Greater East-

Asia Co-prosperity Sphere”, and pledged each other politi¬

cal, economic and military assistance in the event of hostili¬

ties, with any power at present not involved in the European

and the Sino-Japanese wars. This was the reply of the fascist

powers to the gradually shaping Anglo-US bloc. Its conse¬

quences were that Britain saw Japan’s unwillingness to come

to terms and gave up her efforts to appease the Japanese,

and it drew Britain and the USA closer together on issues

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 166.

** J. R. M. Butler, Op. cit., p. 329.

*** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 166.

*) Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. IV, 1940, p. 375.

133

of Far Eastern policy. Churchill told Parliament that “the

Japanese Government have entered into a Three-Power

Pact ... which binds Japan to attack the United States

should the United States intervene in the war now proceed¬

ing between Great Britain and the two European dicta¬

tors”.* In the given case, however, something else was much

more important to him, namely, that if war broke out be¬

tween Japan and the USA Germany would have to declare

war on America. Thus, US involvement in the war in the

Far East automatically committed it to enter the war in

Europe.

This explains why in October 1940 the British Govern¬

ment reopened the Burma Road and urged the USA to

adopt a firmer stand towards Japan. The Anglo-US talks at

the end of 1940 and beginning of 1941 were marked by

British efforts to secure from the USA a declaration stating

that any Japanese attack on British or Dutch possessions in

the Far East would be tantamount to a declaration of war

on the USA. This the USA declined to do. In April 1941

when Japanese pressure increased in the South Seas, partic¬

ularly in Indonesia, Britain once again raised the question

of such a declaration by the USA, Britain and the Nether¬

lands. But, as Woodward notes, the “United States and the

Netherlands governments still thought that a public decla¬

ration would be too provocative”.**

In May 1941 the British Government was alarmed by a

communication from Halifax in Washington, in which the

Ambassador said the US Secretary of State Cordell Hull

had informed him of the arrival in the USA of the Japanese

emissary, Saburo Kurusu, to negotiate a settlement of the

China problem on terms acceptable to both the USA and

Japan. It would seem that this possibility of averting war

in the Far East should have been received as good news by

the British Government. It had, it will be recalled, spent

the summer of 1940 trying to reach agreement with the

Japanese. However, the reverse happened. The US-Japa-

nese talks and, consequently, the possibility of averting war

caused great dissatisfaction in London. On May 21 Halifax

was instructed to “expose” Japan’s designs in these negotia¬

tions and persuade the US Government to refrain from

* Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, Vol. 365, col. 301.

** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 172.

134

reaching agreement with Japan. This high-handedness in¬

furiated Hull, who declared that he was not going to be

lectured by the British. But at the same time he said he did

not expect the talks with the Japanese to be successful. This

somewhat calmed the British and they renewed their efforts

to persuade the USA to issue a declaration demanding that

Japan leave the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) in peace.

Anglo-Soviet Relations

After the Phoney War

The period from April 1940 to June 1941 witnessed a

sharp struggle among the British ruling circles on the ques¬

tion of Anglo-Soviet relations. The appeals of the more

sober-minded politicians who realised that better relations

with the USSR would strengthen Britain’s position were met

with rabid hostility by the Munichites, whom blind hatred of

the socialist state prevented from assessing the situation real¬

istically. At the time the Soviet Union was a neutral coun¬

try, whose relations with Germany were governed by a

non-aggression treaty. This could not serve as an obstacle

to normal relations with Britain. During the phoney war the

Soviet Union repeatedly attempted to improve relations with

Britain, but these efforts broke down in face of British

hostility.

The situation somewhat changed in May 1940. Until then

the Soviet proposals for a trade agreement found no under¬

standing in the British Government, but, writes Llewellyn

Woodward, by the middle of May in “view of the military

situation it was most desirable to avoid protracted negotia¬

tions and delays for which the Soviet Government would

hold us responsible”.* The War Cabinet therefore decided,

on May 20, to send Sir Stafford Cripps on a special “explora¬

tory” mission to Moscow. This provided evidence of the

British ruling circles’ dual attitude to Anglo-Soviet rela¬

tions. The Cripps mission to Moscow was designed to satisfy

those who were beginning seriously to ponder over the im¬

portance of relations with the Soviet Union to Britain’s

future.

Cripps and those who sent him had far-reaching aims.

He considered quite rightly that the British Government

* Ibid., p. 140.

135

“had mishandled the negotiations” with the USSR, but, on

the other hand, much too optimistically felt he could get

a trade and also a political agreement with the Soviet Gov¬

ernment.^ His self-delusion probably sprang from the fact

that his explanation for the “mishandling of the negotia¬

tions” was that those who had conducted them had not dis¬

played sufficient ingenuity and perseverance and had failed

to take into consideration that influential forces were oper¬

ating in London whose intrigues rendered the negotiations

futile. These same forces continued to operate while Cripps

himself conducted the negotiations, with the result that until

the German attack on the Soviet Union he failed to sign a

trade agreement despite the Soviet Government’s efforts to

normalise relations with Britain.

This happened because the British Government wanted

not so much normal relations with the USSR as a deteriora¬

tion of Soviet-German relations. Throughout the Anglo-

Soviet negotiations in the second half of 1940 and the first

half of 1941 the British side underscored the point that if

the USSR wanted normal relations with Britain it would

have to act against Germany in the growing world conflict.

The ultimate British objective was to compel the USSR to

renounce its neutrality, scrap its non-aggression treaty with

Germany and enter the war against her. If one does not bear

this objective in mind one will not understand the Soviet

attitude towards Britain at the time.

Sir Stafford Cripps took with him to Moscow a personal

message from Churchill to J. V. Stalin. This was a powerful

means, for nothing of the kind had ever taken place before

in Anglo-Soviet relations. The purpose of the message was

to make it easier for Cripps to establish contact with Soviet

leaders and explain to the latter that the proposals which

Cripps would put forward came directly from the British

leaders. “In the past—indeed in the recent past—our rela¬

tions have, it must be acknowledged, been hampered by

mutual suspicions,” Churchill wrote and, referring to the

Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty, added: “But since

then a new factor has arisen which I venture to think makes

it desirable that both our countries should re-establish our

previous contact.. . . Germany’s present bid for the hegemo¬

ny of Europe threatens the interests” of Britain and the

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 140.

136

USSR* This message was written on June 25, three days

after France signed the act of surrender, and consequently

it was clear what “new factor” Churchill had in mind. The

French surrender had changed the power balance in Europe

to Britain’s detriment, and it was solely Churchill’s realisa¬

tion that Britain could not survive without Soviet support

that forced him to send that message.

British Foreign Office documents of the period convinc¬

ingly show that in Anglo-Soviet relations the principal

objective of British policy of that period was to bring the

USSR into the war against Germany. The British Govern¬

ment pursued this objective although it knew quite well that

the Soviet Union was inadequately prepared for such a war

because in the summer of 1940 Germany, through British

connivance, had seized Western Europe and had an incom¬

parably larger military-strategic potential than a year ear¬

lier, when the Soviet Union had been willing jointly with

Britain and France to throw its might against nazi aggres¬

sion. This the Chamberlain Government had rejected. “Sir

Stafford Cripps’ instructions,” Medlicott writes, “show that

there was no serious belief in the Foreign Office that the

Soviet Government could be induced to reverse its present

position and side with the Allies against Germany.” It was

assumed that the Soviet Government’s “aims were first to

avoid hostilities with any Great Power.... In the military

sphere Russia was not sufficiently well prepared to under¬

take, or even to risk, actual hostilities.”**

On July 1 Cripps met with Soviet leaders for nearly three

hours, discussing the situation in Europe and the political

and economic relations between Britain and the Soviet Union.

Cripps gave the Soviet leaders to understand that Britain

desired to restore the “old equilibrium” in Europe. Inas¬

much as in the British view this implied re-establishing

British domination in Europe it did not get a positive

response from the Soviet side.

From the British version of this talk we learn that Cripps

raised the question of Anglo-Soviet trade essentially with

the purpose of ascertaining the state of trade between the

USSR and Germany. He “asked whether Anglo-Soviet re¬

lations were sufficiently good and friendly to ensure that

Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 119-20.

** W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., p. 635.

137

there was no danger that any goods, supplied by Britain for

Russia’s internal economy, would pass to the enemy’". The

reply received by him “seemed not unfavourable to business

with England”. Moreover, the nature of Soviet-German

economic relations was explained to the British Ambassador.

He was told that the Soviet Union was selling Germany

surplus products and not goods which the USSR was itself

compelled to import. In return the USSR was receiving

machinery and some artillery, aircraft and lorries; the USSR

had received from Germany an unfinished cruiser. To

enable Germany to fulfil these deliveries the Soviet Union

was letting her have part of its imported non-ferrous metals.

Cripps agreed that this was not an “overriding difficulty”

in the way of Anglo-Soviet trade negotiations.*

That acknowledgement was significant, its implication

being that the British Ambassador essentially recognised the

justness of the Soviet position in regard to economic relations

with Germany. “The talk,” Medlicott points out, “though

frank, had been friendly enough.”** This is an admission

that the Soviet Government was prepared to give its attention

to any step taken by the British Government which might be

construed as a desire for normal relations with the USSR.

However, it is noteworthy that Churchill thought it better

to conceal the truth about the Soviet Government’s reaction

to his overture. He confined himself to publishing in his

memoirs the message of June 25, adding that “Sir Stafford

Cripps reached Moscow safely, and even had an interview

of a formal and frigid character with Stalin”.*** This was

said deliberately, for if Churchill had told the truth about

Cripps’ meeting with Soviet leaders it would have uncovered

one of the biggest lies about Soviet foreign policy during

the first phase of the world war. Beginning with Churchill

the whole of British bourgeois official and unofficial histori¬

ography doggedly, in spite of the truth, maintains that dur¬

ing the first phase of the Second World War the Soviet

Union was an “ally” of Germany,*' that a military

alliance had already existed between them,**' that the

* W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., p. 639.

** Ibid., p. 640.

*** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 120.

*1 The Initial Triumph of the Axis, dust cover.

**) James Leasor, Rudolf Hess. The Uninvited Envoy, London, 1962,

USSR actively aided “by supplies and facilities the develop¬

ment of Hitler’s power”,* and so on and so forth. Here

reference is usually made firstly to the political and, secondly,

to the economic co-operation between the USSR and Ger¬

many. Both references are clearly untenable.

The political relations between the USSR and Germany

were governed by the fact that the USSR had proclaimed and

observed neutrality in the war and by the Soviet-German

Treaty of Non-Aggression of August 23, 1939. Even bour¬

geois authors, who clearly cannot be suspected of sympathy

with the Soviet Union, admit that the USSR was strictly

neutral in 1939-41. One of them, George Ginsburg of the

University of California writes that following the outbreak

of the Second World War and for nearly two years there¬

after the USSR was “in the position of an official neutral,

in which status it was confirmed by the international com¬

munity”. It, he notes, maintained that status “from the time of

the German attack on Poland which marked the outbreak

of the Second World War to the date of the German attack

on the Soviet Union”.** As regards the non-aggression treaty

with Germany, the USSR had every intention of strictly

abiding by it, although there was no guarantee that Germany

would not scrap it whenever she felt it was to her advantage

to do so. This was the main reason why, foreseeing a pos¬

sible German attack, the USSR took a series of steps in

Eastern Europe to strengthen its strategic position with a view

to safeguarding its security and furthering the general strug¬

gle of the peoples against nazism.

Ill-wishers fabricate grounds for accusing the Soviet Union

of political co-operation with Germany in 1939-41, alleging

that the non-aggression treaty was an alliance, in spite of

the fact that the text of the treaty was published in Britain,

the USA and many other countries. The methods employed by

them are primitive, to say the least: they begin by mention¬

ing the non-aggression treaty and then go on to speak

of an alliance between Germany and the USSR with total

disregard of the colossal difference between the two

concepts.

Other fabrications are concocted. One of them concerns

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 496.

** George Ginsburg, “The Soviet Union as a Neutral, 1939-1941”,

Soviet Studies, Oxford, Vol. X, July 1958, No. 1, pp. 12-13.

139

the talks in Berlin on November 12 and 13, 1940 between

the German leaders and the Soviet People’s Commissar for

Foreign Affairs. At these talks the Germans sought Soviet

co-operation in aggression, offering in return a division of

spheres of influence with the countries south of the Caspian

as the Soviet Union’s share. Ideological and political enemies

of the USSR allege that the Soviet Union accepted the

bargain. In 1948, when the US State Department published

tendentiously selected materials from the nazi archives and

published them in a volume titled Nazi-Soviet Relations,

1939-1941, the American newspaper New York Herald Trib¬

une headlined its news story: US Reveals Documents of a

Stalin-Hitler Pact to Divide Up the World.* The November

talks and this book of documents are discussed from the same

angle in the British bourgeois press and historiography.

And this in spite of the fact that even the above-mentioned

volume contains evidence that a pact of this nature was

never concluded, neither in Berlin nor anywhere else. The

testimony of documents** is that when the nazi leaders offered

the Soviet Union Iran, Afghanistan and even India, the

People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs turned the talk to

German policy in the Balkans, making it clear that the USSR

was opposed to nazi expansion in that area. A book about the

British intelligence centre in New York during the Second

World War quotes an interesting statement by the German

Consul-General in San Francisco Fritz Weidemann, who in

November 1940 was in contact with William Wiseman, a

British Government representative, with whom he had talks

on a possible peace between Germany and Britain. At these

talks, the book says, Weidemann told Wiseman that “the

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov’s recent visit to Berlin when

he met Hitler had been a failure. In Weidemann’s opinion,

Molotov had been given instructions by Stalin to discuss

everything and agree to nothing.”*** The American John

L. Snell writes that in crucial conferences with Molotov Hitler

“was unable to buy him off”.*> Comparable assessments were

* D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 106.

** Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941. Documents from the Archives of

the German Foreign Office , Washington, 1948.

H. Montgomery Hyde, Room 3603. The Story of the British In¬

telligence Centre in New York During World War II, New York, 1963,

pp. 77-78.

*) John L. Snell, Op. cit., p. 62.

140

given by many other well-known bourgeois historians and

it is significant that their conclusions are based on the afore¬

mentioned collection of documents from the German Foreign

Ministry published by the US State Department. The Soviet

Union’s rejection of the deal proposed by the nazis greatly

aggravated Soviet-German relations and unquestionably ac¬

celerated the German invasion of the Soviet Union. This is

admitted even by Hitler.*

On this point Medlicott says: “Sir Stafford Cripps report¬

ed ... the Molotov visit to Berlin did not appear to have pro¬

duced any strengthening of Soviet-German political ties.”**

George F. Kennan, the American diplomat and historian,

states the following about the results of that visit: “These

questions led Ribbentrop to probe the possibility of bringing

Russia, too, into the Three-Power Pact. The idea was not

to induce her to fight on Germany’s side, but to bind her not

to go over to the other one.... What was at stake could not

have been more serious. This was, in fact, the real turning

point of World War II.” The Soviet demand that Germany

leave the Balkans in peace “conflicted flatly with Germany’s

military interests. And this stiff position was reaffirmed,

two weeks later, on November 26, 1940, in a diplomatic note

to the German Government.... Less than a month after the

receipt of this note ... Hitler issued orders for the prepara¬

tion of the so-called Operation Barbarossa, designed—as was

stated in the first sentence of the order—to crush Soviet

Russia in a quick campaign.”*** Incidentally, Kennan arrived

at this conclusion after analysing the book Nazi-Soviet

Relations, 1939-1941. Thus, indisputable facts make it plain

that in Soviet foreign policy there was not a hint of a striving

to form an alliance with Germany or to appease her.*>

This is equally true of Soviet-German economic relations.

The Soviet Union maintained trade relations with Germany

for which, from the standpoint of international norms and

customs as a neutral power, it had every legal and moral

* The Testament of Adolf Hitler , p. 65.

** W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., p. 647.

*** George F. Kennan, Op. cit., pp. 342-44.

*) Sir Stafford Cripps, it is interesting to note, regarded the Soviet-

Japanese Non-Aggression Treaty of April 13, 1941 “as anti-German

since its only object can be to protect the Russian Eastern frontiers in

the event of an attack on the West by Germany” (Eric Estorick, Op.

cit., p. 240).

141

right. The Soviet-German Trade Agreement of August 19,

1939, notes the American bourgeois author David J. Dallin,

“by no means represented a revolutionary shift in Russo-

German trade relations. On the contrary ... its provisions

were modest.’”*' On this score George Ginsburg declares that

“the existence and successful execution of the commercial

pact did not serve to modify Soviet neutrality. Neither in this

agreement, nor in the various other economic arrangements

which followed, did the USSR undertake to trade only with

Germany, nor were its obligations under them such as effec¬

tively to bar commercial exchanges with the opposite

camp.”**

The Soviet Union sold Germany food and raw materials,

which were of definite value to Germany. But these deliv¬

eries were made only because in exchange Germany supplied

machines and armaments that were vital to the Soviet

Union’s defence and industry. “The treaty of August 19,

1939,” writes Mueller-Hillebrand, “was used as the basis for

signing a commercial treaty with the Soviet Union under

which the USSR pledged to supply foodstuffs and raw mate¬

rials in exchange for German machinery, naval equipment,

armaments, and licenses for the production of militarily im¬

portant products... . Thus, the heavy cruiser Lutzow, which

was at the stage of being fitted out, naval armaments,

samples of heavy artillery and tanks, and also important

licenses were turned over against reciprocal deliveries.

Hitler ordered priority for these deliveries, but in view of

armaments shortages some forms of armaments were not

supplied with due energy.”*** John L. Snell notes that in

return for its deliveries “the USSR received coal, military

weapons, and naval equipment from Germany”.** There can,

consequently, be no question of Soviet appeasement of Ger¬

many in this case. The USSR exercised its indisputable right

to trade with a foreign country, and used this commerce to

strengthen its defence potential.

Many bourgeois historians forget that in the situation

obtaining at the time a strengthening of the Soviet Union’s

* David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy, 1939-1942, New

Haven, 1944, pp. 57-58.

** George Ginsburg, Op. cit., p. 16.

B. Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945, Band II, Frankfurt,

1956, pp. 52-53.

*) John L. Snell, Op. cit., p. 63.

142

strategic positions conformed to British interests, because

when subsequently the USSR became Britain’s Ally it was

able the better to fulfil its Allied commitments. Moreover,

the build-up of Soviet defence capability diverted German

forces to the East at a time when the Soviet Union was not

involved in the war. Arthur Woodburn, a British MP, said

in 1941: “Little did any of us realise that even by keeping

out of the war Russia’s great strength was a leaden ball on

Hitler’s foot which prevented him jumping on us.”*

One cannot help getting the impression that some authors

unfoundedly accuse the USSR of appeasing Germany not

because they do not know the facts but because they seek

to absolve Britain of responsibility for her appeasement of

Hitler in the period from January 1933 to April 1940 and

diminish the British people’s dissatisfaction with the circles

who pursued that policy. Hence the fabrication that some

other country acted in the same manner.

References to Soviet deliveries to Germany with no men¬

tion of what the USSR received from Germany in return**

are made to conceal the fact that the German military ma¬

chine, which crashed down on many European countries,

including Britain, during the Second World War, was built

up by the nazis largely on British credits and British raw

materials. In this connection it would be useful to recall a

statement in the Stock Exchange Gazette on May 3, 1935:

“Who finances Germany? Without this country as a clearing

house for payments ... Germany could not have pursued

her plans.... The provisioning of the opposing force has been

financed in London.” Another British newspaper, Financial

News, had this to say: “There can be no doubt that practi¬

cally the whole of the free exchange available to Germany

for the purchase of raw materials was supplied directly or

indirectly by Great Britain. If the day of reckon¬

ing ever comes, the liberal attitude of the British Govern¬

ment in this matter may well be responsible for the lives of

British soldiers and civilians. War materiel, which will

eventually be used against this country could never have been

produced but for the generosity with which Great Britain

* Labour Monthly, October 1941, p. 434.

** Even W. N. Medlicott, a serious historian judging by his book on

the British economic blockade of nazi Germany, gives a detailed list of

Soviet supplies to Germany but omits a comparable list of German de¬

liveries to the USSR.

143

is giving her enemy free exchange for the purchase of raw

materials.”* In 1938 Germany received from the British and

French empires 26 per cent of her supplies of iron ore,

33 per cent of lead, 50 per cent of chromium, 62 per cent of

copper, 61 per cent of manganese, 94 per cent of nickel, 60

per cent of zinc and 52 per cent of rubber. In the very last

month before the war the London market worked overtime

. to supply Germany with strategic raw materials. The British

News Chronicle reported on August 19, 1939: “Huge German

orders for rubber and copper were executed in London yes¬

terday regardless of cost. The buying of nearly 3,000 tons

of copper sent the price rocketing.... Already Germany has

bought over 10,000 tons this month in London alone. The

London Rubber Exchange enjoyed almost a record turn¬

over owing to a German order for 4,000 tons.. .. Germany is

reported to have bought 17,000 tons already this month—two

months’ normal consumption.”**

When Britain found herself at war with Germany, the

British ruling circles went to all ends to remove all memory

of their aid in arming Germany. One of the means by which

this was done was to accuse the Soviet Union of what Britain

herself was guilty. This distortion of facts was adopted by

bourgeois historiography, which zealously continues to spread

it to this day.

For some circles it is vital to portray the USSR as an

“ally” of Hitler in order to justify British and French policy

vis-a-vis the Soviet Union during the phoney war and their

intention to attack the Soviet Union in 1940 from the north

and south.

No radical change for the better took place in Anglo-

Soviet relations despite the fact that Soviet-German relations

were not an insuperable obstacle to normalisation and the

Soviet Government, as evidenced by Sir Stafford Cripps’

talk with J. V. Stalin, was prepared to facilitate such normal¬

isation. The explanation for this is that either Churchill

himself was not very consistent in steering towards better

relations or his efforts in that direction were violently opposed

by influential circles, which even in the latter half of 1940

were unable to overcome their hatred of the Soviet Union

and correctly assess the significance to Britain of friendly

* Labour Monthly , October 1939, pp. 586-87.

** Ibid.

144

relations with the great socialist power. It is most likely that

both these factors were at work.

Sir Stafford Cripps’ efforts to hold trade talks in Moscow

were, in effect, disrupted by the British Government’s actions

after the Baltic republics acceded to the USSR. The decision

of the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, over whom

hung the menace of nazi enslavement, to re-unite with the

peoples of the Soviet Union infuriated the London politi¬

cians. This was not surprising, for as Churchill himself had

noted, when these countries had bourgeois regimes they were

“the outpost of Europe against Bolshevism”.* Now all that

was changed.

In retaliation for the Baltic republics’ accession to the

USSR, the British Government froze their assets in British

banks and seized their merchant vessels that were in British

ports at the time. The Soviet Government naturally could

not regard these as friendly acts. The Times wrote that “the

Soviet Government feel they have received a new cause of

annoyance through the British blocking of the gold and

credits of the Baltic states”.** On top of a cause of annoyance

this gave the Soviet Government proof of the insincerity of

the British Government, which had officially proclaimed its

desire to improve relations with the USSR.

Eric Estorick informs us that in mid-October 1940 Cripps

wrote optimistically about the trade talks he had initiated

with the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade. However,

Estorick says, “hardly had he presented his proposals to the

Soviet Government than the British seized thirteen more

ships which had previously formed part of the Baltic

merchant fleet. It appeared to the Soviet Government that

the voice of Cripps in Moscow was completely out of tune

with that of his Government in London.”*** The trade nego¬

tiations in Moscow between Cripps and the Soviet Govern¬

ment were conducted in secret to prevent them from being

obstructed by those who did not desire an improvement of

Anglo-Soviet relations. However, the British Government

leaked reports about these talks over the radio. It seemed to

Cripps, Estorick writes, “that every step he made in Moscow

to create better relations with the Soviet Government was

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, Boston, 1950, p. 615.

** The Times, Aug. 3, 1940, p. 4.

*** Eric Estorick, Op. cit., p. 236.

10-1561

145

followed promptly by some stupid counteraction on the part

of the Government at home.... He thought the British Gov¬

ernment had played straight into the hands of the

Germans.’” 5 '

Today we know that Cripps felt it was necessary (in this,

too, he did not see eye to eye with the Foreign Office) to

accept the Soviet demands regarding the transfer of the

Baltic republics’ frozen gold and ships to the Soviet author¬

ities."'"' The British Government, however, took no notice of

its Ambassador’s opinion. W. P. and Zelda K. Coates are

therefore quite right when they point out: “The only thing

which prevented the conclusion of an Anglo-Soviet trading

agreement and the establishment of friendly relations was

the persistent unwillingness on the part of the British Govern¬

ment and influential circles in Britain to look realities in the

face and to treat the USSR as a powerful neutral country. It

was as if they said to themselves—‘The USSR? After all she

is only a workers’ country—she can’t expect from us the

respect, tolerance, understanding and friendship we have

consistently shown towards Turkey, Spain, Japan and even

Italy, before she entered the war.’

The British working people thought differently. Although

the British people had won the Battle of Britain in the sum¬

mer of 1940, they saw nazi aggression spreading in South¬

eastern Europe and North Africa and realised that co¬

operation with the Soviet Union was what could save them.

At trade union conferences more and more speakers

demanded friendly relations with the USSR; they voiced the

mood of the people. The general tone of the press in rela¬

tion to the USSR began slowly to change. From time to time,

alongside slander and angry attacks, British newspapers

began to print sober contentions regarding Anglo-Soviet

relations. Many publicists urged Anglo-Soviet rapproche¬

ment and the sending to Moscow of an influential repre¬

sentative for talks on this question.

The Right-wing leadership of the Labour Party and the

trade unions continued to back the anti-Soviet policy of the

most reactionary section of the ruling circles, but the mood

of the rank and file was already powerfully influencing the

* Eric Estorick, Op. cit., p. 239.

** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 143.

*** W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, Op. cit., pp. 655-56.

146

middle echelon of the Labour leadership. This found expres¬

sion in the increasing number of questions that Labour MPs

began to ask in Parliament regarding the attainment of

understanding with the USSR. Speaking in County Durham

in mid-October 1940, Labour MP Emmanuel Shinwell

declared: “I am convinced, because of what I know, that the

Russian Government is anxious for a friendly understanding

with this country. If we had as Foreign Minister, instead of

Lord Halifax, someone who would set aside all the errors of

the past and seek to reach a friendly understanding with

Soviet Russia, there would be a response that would gratify

those throughout the world who desire to preserve our free¬

dom.”"' - Even bourgeois circles began to think aloud of the

desirability of an understanding with the Soviet Union. This

was shown by the Liberal newspaper News Chronicle, which

pointed out: “Unless, sooner or later, we work with Moscow

there will never be any peace worth having.” At the same

time, regret was expressed over the failure of the Anglo-

French-Soviet talks of 1939.* **

The demand for Anglo-Soviet co-operation was most

insistent at the People’s Convention in London in January

1941. Trade union leader Harry Adams, who attended the

Convention, writes that at the Convention it was possible

“to see how clearly and steadily the British people felt the

need for unity with Soviet Russia, and how deep was their

anger against all those who, openly or by dark intrigue, were

keeping us and Soviet Russia apart”.***

In the spring of 1941 Germany completed her conquest

of the Balkan peninsula, and made an attempt to instal a

puppet regime in Iraq. This left London in no doubt as to

the terrible menace hanging over the Middle East—one of

the key centres of the British Empire. The events of the

spring of 1941 made it glaringly clear how much Britain

needed an alliance with the USSR in order to carry on her

struggle against Germany.

The possibility of a German attack on the Soviet Union

began to be weighed seriously by the British Government

as early as February 1941. It shaped its relations with the

* Ibid., p. 647.

** Ibid., pp. 647-48.

** Harry Adams, The People’s Convention Fights for British-Soviet

Unity , London, p. 7.

10 *

147

USSR in accordance with its objectives and with this

possibility. “It must be remembered,” writes Medlicott, “that

throughout these early months of 1941 the British Govern¬

ment never lost sight of the possibility of eventual Anglo-

Russian collaboration against Germany.”' 1 '

Yet the actions taken by the British Government at the

time plainly show that it never planned to give the Soviet

Union equality in such co-operation or to take its legiti¬

mate interests into account. The approved British history of

the Second World War contains the astonishing information

that Britain felt it was necessary to apply “various economic-

warfare pressures” on the Soviet Government in order

to create the conditions for co-operation with the USSR. The

British exercised “all possible pressure on the Soviet Govern¬

ment” to come to some trade agreement.* ** These tactics could

not but have harmed Anglo-Soviet relations. The Soviet

Government saw through them and as the representative of

a Great Power it reacted negatively to the British efforts to

give it an unequal status.

With the purpose of applying pressure on the USSR,

Britain persisted in maintaining her unjustifiable stand to¬

wards the accession of the Baltic republics to the Soviet Union.

She went out of her way to disrupt the Soviet Union’s foreign

trade, withdrawing her own proposals of October 1940 on

the question of Anglo-Soviet trade. This idea was advanced

in November by Cripps. The Foreign Office hesitated to act

on it, but in December after Halifax became the British

Ambassador in the USA and Anthony Eden took over the

Foreign Office, Cripps received the latter’s authorisation to

withdraw the proposals. Eden sent Cripps a personal message

in which he said he would not wish to start his tenure of

office as Foreign Secretary “by taking a line which might

lead to a quarrel with the Soviet Government, and one which

might in the circumstances look like a new policy towards

the Soviet Union”.*** The Ambassador agreed and waited

several weeks—until February 21, 1941—before he withdrew

his trade proposals of October 1940. Notwithstanding these

actions by Britain, the Soviet Union made every effort to

avoid an aggravation of its relations with Britain and dem-

* W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., p. 654.

** Ibid.

*** Ibid., pp. 647-48.

148

onstrated, as Cripps reported to London at the close of

March 1941, a “desire to prepare the ground for the possi¬

bility of a rapprochement with us”.*

Foreboding gripped the British Government when intelli¬

gence was received of the concentration of German troops

along the Soviet frontier. Although British Intelligence had

discovered that nazi armies were concentrating in Eastern

Europe it could not say exactly if the USSR would be at¬

tacked. At the end of March 1941 it reported to the Govern¬

ment: “We have no grounds for believing an attack on Russia

is imminent.”** Analogous reports were sent in in April

through May and were confirmed by official communications

from the Polish emigre Government. Soviet resistance to

German diplomatic pressure, blackmail or military attack

was in Britain’s interest, and throughout the spring of 1941

the British Government sought to goad the USSR into a

conflict with Germany.

On April 3, on the basis of information obtained by the

British Foreign Office and Military Intelligence, Churchill

sent Stalin a message warning him of a possible German

invasion. Concerning this message, Cripps reported to Lon¬

don that he feared the Soviet Government might “interpret

it as an attempt by us to make trouble between Russia and

Germany”.***

However, after stating these fears, Cripps himself took

the opposite course. On the night of April 12-13 he wrote to

the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister declaring that “unless

they [the Soviet Government.— V. T.] decided on immediate

co-operation with the countries still opposing the Axis in

the Balkans, the Russians would miss the last chance of

defending their frontier with others”.** This was, in effect, a

proposal that the Soviet Union should immediately scrap the

non-aggression treaty with Germany and act against that

country. This move by Cripps hamstrung Churchill’s calmer

overture and made the Soviet Union doubt the British Prime

Minister’s motives.

For the sake of the truth it must be noted that while goad¬

ing the Soviet Union into action against Germany, the British

* Ibid., p. 656.

** History of the Second World War. Grand Strategy , Vol. Ill, June

1941-August 1942. Ed. by J. R. M. Butler, London, 1964, p. 82.

*** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 148.

*> Ibid., p. 149.

149

Government was, at the same time, urging Germany to attack

the USSR. Moves such as these are made in secret, and those

who make them do not desire them to be divulged. However,

as time passes, much comes to light. Churchill had long ago

told of his warning to Stalin about a possible German attack

on the USSR. But he did not mention that in the spring of

1941 the British Intelligence Centre in New York, acting in

close co-operation with the American FBI, slipped the

German Embassy in Washington a document, which stated:

“From highly reliable sources it is learned USSR intend

further military aggression instant Germany is embroiled in

major operations.” This, according to British Intelligence

officers, was “strategic deception material”. The fact that its

strategic aim was to push Germany into invading the USSR

is unquestionable. This was made public by H. Montgomery

Hyde, a former officer of the British Intelligence Centre in

New York, in a book which he wrote on the basis of the

archives of Sir William Stephenson, the Centre’s chief, and

his own reminiscences."'

It is worth noting that on April 22, 1941, with regard to

one of Cripps’ telegrams about the messages of warning sent

to the Soviet Government, Churchill commented: “They

[the Soviet Government— V. T.] know perfectly well their

danger and also that we need their aid.”* ** [my italics.—

V. T.\. The British Government’s awareness that Soviet aid

was indispensable to it determined its attitude in an event

many of whose aspects are still shrouded in mystery.

The Hess Mission.

Britain Makes Her Choice

Rudolf Hess, the No. 2 in the nazi hierarchy, flew to

Britain from Germany and landed in Scotland by parachute

on May 10, 1941. He arrived to propose peace on certain

conditions and British participation in a war against the

Soviet Union. Although the British Government has not

published any materials on its talks with Hess, nobody is in

any doubt about the substance of the proposals brought by him.

Much has been written about the Hess mission, and the

point most discussed is whether he made the proposals to

* H. Montgomery Hyde, Op. cit., p. 58.

** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 149.

150

the British Government on his own initiative or on Hitler’s

behalf. Hess claimed (possibly to clear Hitler in the event

his mission failed) that he had undertaken the journey on his

own initiative. Today, as James Leasor points out, “it seems

certain that the only important fact about Hess’ mission

with which Hitler was not cognisant was the actual date of

his departure”."' “Those closest to Hitler realised that Hess

had carried out what the Fuehrer wanted—and with Hitler’s

knowledge [my italics.— V. T.} except for the actual time

and date of his flight, for this was largely dependent on the

weather.’” - '"' In the light of what we know about the relations

between Hitler and his minions, we can, without stretching

the point, consider that “with Hitler’s knowledge” ought to

be read “on his orders”.

In this question we must not ignore the testimony of Hitler

himself. In his 7 estament he dwells at length on the subject

of peace with Britain in the spring of 1941. Why did Ger¬

many need this peace? “Peace then, however,” Hitler wrote,

“would have allowed us to prevent the Americans from med¬

dling in European affairs.... And lastly, Germany, her rear

secure, could have thrown herself heart and soul into her

essential task, the ambition of my life and the raison d’etre

of National-Socialism—the destruction of Bolshevism. This

would have entailed the conquest of wide spaces in the

East.”*** Hitler emphasised that in the spring of 1941, i.e.,

when Hess went to Britain, Germany wanted a peace arrange¬

ment. “Had she so wished, Britain could have put an end

to the war at the beginning of 1941. In the skies over London

she had demonstrated to all the world her will to resist, and

on her credit side she had the humiliating defeats which she

had inflicted on the Italians in North Africa.”* ** He went on

to say: “At the beginning of 1941, after her successes in

North Africa had re-established her prestige, she had an

even more favourable opportunity of withdrawing from the

game and concluding a negotiated peace with us.”***

The nazi Fuehrer railed at Britain for not having come

to terms with him in 1941 and called down on her misfortune

and calamities of all sorts. “Whatever the outcome of this

* James Leasor, Op. cit., p. 174.

** Ibid., p. 122.

*** The T estament of Adolf Hitler, pp. 33-34.

*) Ibid., p. 33.

**) Ibid., p. 35.

151

war,” he said, “the future of the British people is to die of

hunger and tuberculosis in their cursed island.”* He had

good reason for being furious. He had paid much too high a

price for the failure of the Hess mission and for miscalculat¬

ing Britain’s reaction to the German invasion of the USSR.

What made Germany offer peace to Britain? The answer

is only too obvious. She feared a war on two fronts. The

authors of a book commissioned by the British Royal Insti¬

tute of International Affairs are quite correct when they

write “that Hitler might be playing with the idea of patching

up a settlement with Britain in order to free his hands for

a single-front war in the East”.** “In principle,” they say,

“he was against Germany’s embarking on wars on two

fronts. This had always been one of the main counts in his

indictment of Kaiser Wilhelm II for having lost the First

World War for Germany.”*** Hitler himself spoke in this

spirit time and again. On November 23, 1939 he told top

German military leaders: “We can oppose Russia only when

we are free in the West.”**

It cannot be said that on Hitler’s part this bid for peace

and alliance with Britain against the USSR in the spring of

1941 was totally an adventure. He had good reason for ex¬

pecting his overtures to be accepted. Indeed, was it not the

British Government which in the course of seven pre-war

years had given Germany every facility for preparing for

war in the belief that it would be a war against the USSR?

Had not the British Government during the phoney war

explored the possibility of an arrangement with Germany

through various nazi emissaries? Had not the British Govern¬

ment, in January-March 1940, endeavoured to “switch” the

war to the USSR and expressed its willingness to join

Germany in an attack on the USSR? Lastly, were not the

same people who had organised Munich and were thirsting

to help Germany smash the Soviet Union occupying influen¬

tial positions under Churchill’s Government? These were

firm grounds for offering Britain peace and an alliance in a

war against the USSR.

* The Testament of Adolf Hitler, p. 34.

** The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 403.

*** Ibid., p. 96.

*) Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Vol.

VIII, p. 442.

152

However, Hitler failed to take into consideration the

important circumstance that the war had opened the eyes of

the British people and the more far-sighted of the ruling cir¬

cles. Churchill and his associates feared Britain’s fate would

be sealed if Hitler conquered the Soviet Union and seized

its resources. Once that happened it would be impossible to

oppose the enemy and Britain would become a German

satellite. If Churchill had any doubts on this point they were

soon dispersed by Hess, whose very first demands were

Churchill’s resignation and the formation of a pro-nazi

Government. And this even before Germany attacked the

USSR! “Churchill,” James Leasor writes, “had no intention

of negotiating any peace treaty with Germany which he was

convinced would leave Britain in a position of accepting

German suzerainty.”*

Churchill proved to be right, displaying considerable fore¬

sight. When it was a foregone conclusion that Germany

would lose the war Hitler told in his Testament of the terms

on which he intended to sign a peace treaty with Britain in

1941. “Under the guidance of the Reich,” he wrote, “Europe

would speedily have become unified.” This must be taken to

mean the establishment of unchallenged German hegemony

in Europe. What was to be the fate of Britain and other

European Great Powers? France and Italy “would have had

to renounce their inappropriate aspirations to greatness....

As for Britain, relieved of all European cares, she could have

devoted herself to the well-being of her Empire.... We

ought to have been able to make them [the British.— V. T.)

realise that the acceptance by them of the German hegemony

established in Europe, a state of affairs to the implementa¬

tion of which they had always been opposed ... would

bring them inestimable advantage.”** In Britain many people

knew the worth of these “advantages” and feared them mor¬

tally. Churchill quite rightly believed that when Germany

was firmly entrenched as the dominating power in Europe she

would without question desire to relieve Britain of her cares

of the welfare of the British Empire. Consequently, the pro¬

posals brought by Hess were not accepted. As far as can be

ascertained, Hitler learned of this rejection only at 21:00

hours on June 22, 1941, from a speech broadcast by Chur-

* James Leasor, Op. cit., p. 174.

** The Testament of Adolf Hitler, pp. 33-34, 97.

153

chill. That is the only explanation why alter Hess departed

for talks with the British Government the German invasion

of the USSR was neither cancelled nor postponed.

This gives rise to the legitimate question: If Hitler knew

for certain that Britain would turn down the peace offers and

Germany would have to fight on two fronts, would he have

started a war against the USSR? All his previous statements

and views expressed to the German military leaders on this

point indicate that he would not have embarked on that war.

Yet it is known that the attack on the USSR was not held

up because of any uncertainty regarding Britain’s stand, and

that prior to June 22 this stand was not even discussed by the

German leaders. The only explanation for this is Hitler

was sure the attack on the USSR would not lead to war on

two fronts and that if Britain did not help Germany against

the Soviet Union she would at any rate place no obstacles to

the war against the socialist state. There was one more aspect

to this question. The British Government ardently desired

that Germany should commit an error in this issue, for

this error would mean Britain’s salvation. That much is as

clear as day. Consequently, there can be no doubt that the

British Government used the Hess mission to lure Hitler into

a trap.

In May-June the British Government’s reaction to the

Hess mission was such as to fortify Hitler in his view that an

arrangement could be reached if developments were given a

“push” by an attack on the USSR. The British Munichites

regarded Hitler as a traitor when in 1939 instead of attack¬

ing the Soviet Union he signed a non-aggression treaty with

it. Chamberlain’s announcement in Parliament that Britain

had declared war on Germany and some of his subsequent

speeches contained the accusation that Hitler had broken the

promise he had given him (Chamberlain). Consequently, to

ensure an arrangement with Britain Hitler had to “redeem

his treachery” and prove he was prepared to keep his word.

“Why Churchill and the authorities deliberately chose to

maintain a mysterious silence over Hess, when in fact the

proposals had been turned down, remains officially unex¬

plained,” Labour Monthly wrote in 1941. “Was this silence,

with its suggestion of some possible complicity, a trap to lure

Hitler forward on his desperate enterprise [i.e., the attack

on the USSR.— V. T.] with the hope of some possible

eventual support, only to turn on him with the most positive

154

counterthrust so soon as he had embarked on it? Had some

bright wit of British diplomacy devised the scheme to use

Hess as a boomerang and to catch Hitler with his own anti-

Soviet bait with which he had so often in the past gulled

the British ruling class? Only future records will reveal the

details of this episode.”* However, such records have not yet

appeared. The British Government continues to maintain its

silence, which, in our opinion, speaks in favour of the argu¬

ment put forward by Labour Monthly. British bourgeois

historiography likewise passes this episode over in silence,

and in cases where it has to speak it confines itself to

recounting known facts.

Having allowed Hitler to imagine his hands would be free

for a war against the Soviet Union, the British Government

decided that if Germany attacked the USSR it would act

jointly with the Soviet Union against the Germans. As

June 22, 1941 drew nearer, more and more attention was

given to this question by the British Government and by the

British military leaders. General Ismay, one of Churchill’s

closest war-time associates, wrote “that there was obviously

no alternative”.**

This decision of the British Government found expres¬

sion in the tone adopted by the British press and in Anthony

Eden’s confidential statements to the Soviet Ambassador. The

Conservative press, which clearly mirrored the views of the

Government, became unrecognisable in many of its pro¬

nouncements regarding the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union,

the Daily Mail wrote on June 13, 1941, entered the war,

would it be able to hold Hitler in check until the winter,

which would halt military operations? If that should happen

it would change the whole course of the war. Britain would

be much stronger when spring came. The newspaper went

on to express the hope that the British Government would

give Sir Stafford Cripps a free hand in his talks in Moscow,

saying no interests should be allowed to obstruct a possible

agreement. Another Conservative newspaper, Evening Star,

pointed out on June 19, 1941 that during the war there were

moments when “Moscow believed that Britain had ambitions

against her, or at least that we would relax our war effort

against Germany if the Germans went Eastward. In the

* Labour Monthly , August 1941, p. 345.

** The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay, p. 225.

155

past, we must admit, there had been some ground for this

belief. Just over a year ago most newspapers in this country

were clamouring for war against Russia. Can such illusions

be removed? This much at least might be publicly stated:

Even if Hitler moves Eastward Britain’s war against Ger¬

many will be maintained with mounting ferocity.’” 5 '

Statements in the same vein were made by Anthony Eden

to the Soviet Ambassador I. M. Maisky. On June 10 he

referred to the German military concentrations against the

USSR and said that “in the event of a Russo-German war,

we should do everything in our power to attack by air

German-occupied territory in the West”.* ** On June 13 he

declared that “after consultation with the Prime Minister, and

in view of the reports received within the previous forty-

eight hours, he wanted to tell I. Maisky that, if the Germans

attacked the USSR, we should be willing to send a mission

to Russia representing the three fighting services ... we

should also give urgent consideration to Russian economic

needs”.*** The decision which Churchill spoke of in his

broadcast in the evening of June 22, 1941 had thus been

arrived at by the British Government earlier, after it had

weighed the situation and even consulted with the USA.

By devious ways the British ruling classes thus came round

to seeing the need for fighting, jointly with the USSR, the

nazi threat menacing the two countries and the world as a

whole. This was due not only to the logic of world develop¬

ments but also to the wise foreign policy pursued by the

Soviet Union. A vital positive role was played in this by the

non-aggression treaty which the Soviet Union had signed

with Germany in 1939. Had that pact not been concluded

the USSR would most certainly have had to stand alone

against Germany, which would probably have been assisted,

in one way or another, by Britain and other imperialist

powers. Such a situation would have been fraught with

horrible danger not only to the USSR, the cause of socialism

and the freedom of nations, but also to the interests of

Britain, which if Germany won the war would have been

quickly reduced from the status of an ally to that of a vassal.

Unquestionably, that was how the wind was blowing in 1939.

* W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, Op. cit., p. 673.

** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 150.

*** Ibid.

156

The non-aggression treaty changed the course of events and

created conditions for an alliance between Britain and the

Soviet Union against nazi Germany. Within the framework

of a great coalition of freedom-loving nations, this alliance

played an outstanding role in ensuring the defeat of Ger¬

many and other aggressive powers.

The period of Britain’s isolation, which started with the

fall of France, ended in June 1941. British historians speak

of this period in such a way as to emphasise and considerably

exaggerate Britain’s role in the Second World War, saying

that at one stage she fought singlehanded, and in an under¬

hand way or openly hurl the accusation at the Soviet Union

that from June 1940 to June 1941 its actions left Britain

alone in face of the enemy. On this point D. N. Pritt, the

well-known British lawyer and civic figure, justifiably

writes: “It was often made a boast that Britain ‘stood alone’

for so long in the war; we may justly be proud that, when

the people had to stand alone, they stood resolutely; but it

is a black mark for our ruling class that, in a world in which

most nations hated fascism and wanted an end of it, they

had so conducted the affairs of their country that for the

moment no state in the world was prepared to stand with

them!”* Soviet foreign policy and the mortal threat from

nazi Germany finally led Britain to an alliance with the

USSR.

* The Autobiography of D. N. Pritt, Part One, From Right to Left,

London, 1965, pp. 240-41.

Chapter Three

BRITISH POLICY

IN THE PERIOD

OF THE FORMATION

OF THE GRAND

ALLIANCE

(June 1941-December 1941)

Anglo-Soviet Agreement of July 12, 1941

An important phase of the Second World War came to

an end in the summer of 1941. By that time world develop¬

ments and Soviet foreign policy had created the requisites

for the emergence of an anti-fascist coalition. This policy

had prevented the enemies of the USSR from welding togeth¬

er a united anti-Soviet imperialist front. Moreover, Britain

and later the USA were left with no other choice, if they

were not prepared sooner or later to surrender to Germany,

than to enter into an alliance with the USSR against Ger¬

many and her satellites. By force of circumstances both

Churchill and Roosevelt found there was only one logical

and reasonable move they could make. And they made that

move.

When Germany perfidiously attacked the Soviet Union

early in the morning of June 22, 1941, she obviously counted

on support in one form or another from a number of imperi¬

alist powers. That was why the invasion of the USSR was

proclaimed a struggle in defence of capitalism against the

socialist revolution. After launching its attack on the USSR,

the German Government declared that its objective was to

save world civilisation from the mortal menace of Bolshevism.*

This was an old, tested piece of bait, but this time it failed

to lure the British Government. It had no doubts about the

stand it had to take in the new war—everything was clear.

* Archiv der Gegenwart, Berlin, 1941, S. 5079.

158

On Friday, June 20, 1941, Churchill left to spend the

week-end at Chequers. Despite the war, the Prime Minister

maintained his routine, which called for a week-end rest.

But this time he did not intend to rest. He was greatly excited

by the intelligence that Germany might attack the USSR any

day. He made notes for a radio broadcast which he planned

to make on this question. With him at Chequers were

Anthony Eden, the British Ambassador in the USSR Sir

Stafford Cripps, who had been summoned from Moscow on

June 11, Lord Beaverbrook, and the American Ambassador

John G. Winant, who had just returned from the USA with

Roosevelt’s approval of Churchill’s plans regarding a

German-Soviet war.

At eight o’clock in the morning of June 22, Churchill’s

private secretary John Rupert Colville brought him a com¬

munication from London stating that several hours previously

Germany had attacked the USSR. Churchill said he would

speak on the radio at 9 p. m. He was immensely pleased.

Until the morning of June 22 the British Government had

been tormented by apprehensions that the USSR would give

way to Germany without war. Therefore, when war broke

out, Churchill’s bodyguard Inspector Thompson writes, “the

implications of this were indeed most joyous to us all”.*

Conveying the atmosphere reigning at Chequers on that day

he says it “was difficult ... to understand the exquisite relief,

the sudden release from pressure”. This came from the con¬

sciousness of the British that “we are no longer alone”.**

In a radio broadcast that same evening Churchill declared:

“We have but one aim and one single, irrevocable purpose.

We are resolved to destroy Hitler.... Any man or state who

fight on against Nazidom will have our aid.... That is our

policy and that is our declaration. It follows, therefore, that

we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian

people.” He explained that in helping the Soviet Union

Britain would save herself. “Hitler,” he continued, “wishes

to destroy the Russian power because he hopes that if he

succeeds in this, he will be able to bring back the main

strength of his Army and Air Force from the East and hurl

it upon this island.... His invasion of Russia is no more than

a prelude to an attempted invasion of the British Isles. He

* Walter H. Thompson, Op. cit., p. 215.

** Ibid.

159

hopes, no doubt, that all this may be accomplished before

the winter comes, and that he can overwhelm Great Britain

before the Fleet and air-power of the United States may

intervene. He hopes that he may once again repeat, upon a

greater scale than ever before, that process of destroying his

enemies one by one, by which he has so long thrived and

prospered.... The Russian danger is therefore our danger,

and the danger of the United States, just as the cause of any

Russian fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of

free men and free peoples in every quarter of the globe.”*

Thus, Churchill declared that Britain would fight on the

side of the Soviet Union and showed why she had to do it.

There was no other choice. For Britain the issue was:

either alliance with the USSR or destruction in an unequal

struggle with Germany and her allies. This is so obvious that

it is widely admitted even in literature clearly hostile to the

Soviet Union. General Ismay says “that there was obviously

no alternative to the Prime Minister’s policy”.** Arthur

Bryant, the British historian, publicist and author of a book

about Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, war-time Chief of the

Imperial General Staff, writes: “Until the Germans struck

at Russia in the summer of 1941 Brooke’s first concern was

the defence of Britain against invasion. Even after Hitler’s

attack on Russia, the thought of it was never far from his

mind, for, if the USSR went the way of France ... a far more

formidable attempt on the British Isles was certain.”*** This

is an admission that Britain’s fate was being decided on the

Soviet-German Front. Also being decided there was not only

whether Britain would survive but whether she would be

among the victors. Michael Foot, a member of the Labour

Party Left wing, writes that the outbreak of war between

Germany and the Soviet Union changed the course of the

Second World War. “Churchill,” he remarks, “might speak

bravely about victory through bombing raids, Mediterra¬

nean campaigns and the eventual rising of the European

peoples against their nazi overlords. But these vague and

distant prospects were now dramatically transformed.” For

Britain, Foot goes on to say, “before June 22, 1941, victory

* Winston S. Churchill, Great War Speeches, London, 1957,

pp. 138-39, 140.

** The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay, p. 225.

*** Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, 1939-1943, London, 1957,

p. 240.

160

had been an elusive dream; thereafter it was brought within

the range of practical calculation”.* American historiography

treats the British position much in the same vein. Herbert

Feis, for example, writes: “Military necessity was uppermost

in the situation. If Russia gave up, while the United States

was still wavering, the British Empire could hardly hope to

hold out_To Britain this had been an act of self-preserva¬

tion.”** George F. Kennan says: “The outbreak of war be¬

tween Germany and Russia was the first ray of hope English¬

men had seen in this war.... Western statesmen considered

that the entire fate of the war depended on the readiness

and ability of Russia to stand up to the German attack.”***

The statesmen Kennan had in mind included both Chur¬

chill and Roosevelt. On June 15, 1941 Churchill had in¬

formed Roosevelt that he had intelligence from reliable

sources that the Germans would attack the Soviet Union in

the immediate future. “Should this new war break out,” he

wrote, “we shall of course give all encouragement and any

help we can spare to the Russians, following the principle that

Hitler is the foe we have to beat.”** Winant brought Roose¬

velt’s reply in which the US President promised that should

the Germans attack Russia he would immediately support

publicly “any announcement that the Prime Minister might

make welcoming Russia as an Ally”.**' Harry Hopkins, who

was one of Roosevelt’s trusted advisers, said in a conversa¬

tion with Stalin that “Roosevelt decided to render aid to the

Soviet Union because he regarded Hitler as an enemy not

only of the Soviet Union and Britain but of the United States

as well”.***' He appreciated the nazi threat to the United

States and was aware that the war against Germany could

not be won with Allies like British politicians who preferred

to have others fight for them; and he did not for a moment

doubt that eventually the USA would have to fight Germany.

Roosevelt considered it was in the USA’s interest to support

Britain, but inasmuch as the struggle of the Soviet Union

* Michael Foot, Aneurin Bevan. A Biography, Vol. I, London, 1962,

p. 335.

** Herbert Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin. The War They Waged

and the Peace They Sought, Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 6, 8-9.

*** George F. Kennan, Op. cit., p. 354.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 330.

**) Ibid.

***) International Affairs, No. 3, 1961, p. 70.

11-1561

161

against the German hordes was the best support, he felt it

was wise to assist the Soviet Union. Lastly, he foresaw that

in addition to fighting in Europe, the USA would have to

fight a war against Japan. It was useless hoping for effective

British aid in that war. In view of Japan’s extreme hostility

for the USSR, he did not rule out the possibility of the USA

receiving Soviet help in the Far East at some future date.

The British Government’s statement on support of the

USSR in the war against Germany was made by force of

necessity. It did not in any way imply that the Churchill

Government intended fundamentally to change the policy

pursued vis-a-vis the Soviet Union by the preceding British

governments. The British ruling classes meant to help the

USSR in the war because this conformed to their interest,

but they continued to nurse their animosity for the USSR as

for a socialist country. This animosity was a manifestation

of class antagonism, which neither disappeared nor could

disappear when the two countries with different socio¬

economic systems became Allies. This was underscored by

none other than Churchill in his speech of June 22. “No one,”

he said, “has been a more consistent opponent of communism

than I have for the last twenty-five years. I will unsay no

word that I have spoken about it.”* He adopted a similar

stand in confidential talks with his closest associates. On

June 22 when he told his private secretary John Rupert Col¬

ville that Britain would support the USSR, the latter asked

whether this would not be a retreat in principle for him, one

of the most bitter enemies of the Communists. To this Chur¬

chill replied: “Not at all. I have only one purpose, the de¬

struction of Hitler, and my life is much simplified thereby.

If Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least a favourable

reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.”** Chur¬

chill thus never departed from his principles nor retracted

anything he had said against communism. This implied that

the Churchill Government meant to get only what it wanted

from its alliance with the USSR, i.e., use it in the war against

Germany, and did not plan to break with the traditional

hostility of British governments for the socialist state. Natu¬

rally, this complicated and hindered Allied relations between

Britain and the USSR.

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, pp. 331-32.

** Ibid., p. 331.

162

The first complication stemming from this hostility arose

immediately after Churchill’s speech. The British Govern¬

ment did not properly assess the prospects of the struggle

on the Soviet-German Front or the Soviet Union’s possibili¬

ties in the war against Germany. This was true of Churchill

as well. Britain’s leaders believed the Soviet Union would be

crushed in several weeks and only optimists measured the

duration of the Soviet-German war in terms of months.

“Cripps, now our Ambassador in Moscow, was in London

when the Germans attacked the Russians,” Hugh Dalton

writes in his memoirs. “He came to see me on June 23rd,

and again next day. He did not think the Russians could hold

out, in organised resistance to the Germans, for more than

a few weeks. This was, at that time, official British military

opinion.”"' This opinion was voiced by the British press.

The greatest inability to assess the Soviet Union’s pos¬

sibilities was displayed by British military leaders. General

John Dill, Chief of the General Staff, believed the “Ger¬

mans could go through them (i.e., the Soviet Union.— V. T.)

like a hot knife through butter”."'* General John Kennedy,

Director of Military Operations, later admitted he never

thought “the Russians would stand up for long”.*** Chur¬

chill writes: “Almost all responsible military opinion held

that the Russian armies would soon be defeated and

largely destroyed.”** True, he maintains that he had always

assessed the ability of the Russians to resist more optimisti¬

cally than his military advisers. But this is not borne out by

facts.

Churchill’s actions in the summer of 1941 tend to indicate

that his views about the Soviet Union’s potential did not

differ from those of his military advisers. Michael Foot as¬

serts that Churchill’s efforts, in his memoirs, to dissociate

himself from these views are thoroughly unconvincing for

he offers no proof, which as far as Churchill is concerned is

“a most uncharacteristic oversight”.***

The reasons lie chiefly in the traditional hostility of the

British ruling circles for the Soviet Union, in their class

prejudice towards the Soviet state. For a quarter of a century

* Hugh Dalton, Op. cit., p. 365.

** The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay, p. 225.

*** John N. Kennedy, Op. cit., p. 147.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, pp. 350-51.

**) Michael Foot, Op. cit., p. 340.

ll*

163

they had been exaggerating its difficulties and belittling

or ignoring its achievements. In the end they fell victim

to their own propaganda, and miscalculated the Soviet

Union’s power and vitality. “But, above all, a dislike of

communism had led the West to deceive itself,” D. F. Flem¬

ing observes.* The course of the war in the West likewise

contributed to this self-deception. Poland, whom Chamber-

lain regarded as a stronger and more valuable Ally than the

Soviet Union, had been crushed by the Germans in two

weeks. France, whose army London believed to be the strong¬

est in the world, had been defeated almost as quickly as

Poland.

The important thing, however, was not so much the rea¬

sons for the British miscalculations of the Soviet potential

for resistance as the fact that the British Government found¬

ed its relations with the USSR on these miscalculations. Its

reasoning was as follows: the Soviet resistance to the Ger¬

mans had to be prolonged as far as possible, but inasmuch

as Russia would be defeated anyway, no military supplies

should be sent to her because they would either not reach

her in time or, if they were delivered, they would fall into

the hands of the Germans. In this connection General Ismay

wrote that “if this forecast was correct, Hitler, so far from

being weakened by his attack on Russia, would in the long

run be incomparably stronger. The help given to Stalin ...

would have been wasted, and we ourselves would be in

greater danger than ever.”** Hence the conclusion: material

aid should be promised but Britain should not go farther

than to extend moral and political support. Under these

conditions there, naturally, could be no question of military

assistance. Consequently, in the summer of 1941 the destiny

of the Anglo-Soviet alliance depended on the turn that the

Soviet-German confrontation would take.

On June 27 Cripps returned to Moscow with a British

military commission headed by Major-General Mason-Mac-

farlane. Parliament was informed that the mission was being

sent “to co-ordinate our efforts in what is now, beyond doubt,

a common task—the defeat of Germany”.*** General John

Kennedy provides some illuminating information about the

* D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., p. 137.

** The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay , p. 225.

*** Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, Vol. 372, col. 974.

164

purposes of the Macfarlane mission. He spoke to Eden about

the mission and the latter told him: “There would be little

or nothing that we could do, for some little time, in the way

of sending in supplies; but a mission might be useful if it

could have some influence on Russian strategy, or if it were

to be allowed to do something towards keeping the war

going in Russia.’” 1 ' In line with this course, Kennedy in¬

structed Macfarlane: “We don’t think this is anything more

than an off-chance. But we can’t afford to miss even a poor

chance like this. Your job will be to do what you can to help

to keep the Russian war going, and so exhaust the Boche.

Even if we only manage to keep it going in Siberia, as we

did with the White Russians after the last war, that will be

something. Another job will be to do what you can to ensure

that demolitions are carried out by the Russians as they go

back—it would be especially important to demolish the

Caucasus oilfields if they have to be given up. Another job,

of course, will be to send us intelligence reports and let us

know what is happening.”* **

In the June 22 speech Churchill said Britain would help

the Soviet Union but he did not specify what kind of help

it would be or how the relations between the countries would

shape out. He spoke of giving “whatever help we can to

Russia and the Russian people” and added, “we have offered

the Government of Soviet Russia any technical or economic

assistance which is in our power, and which is likely to be

of service to them”.*** In a personal message to Stalin on

July 8, he wrote: “We shall do everything to help you that

time, geography and our growing resources allow.”** In

view of the nature of the problem, this was a very vague

statement which gave the British Government complete

freedom of action. Aneurin Bevan, Labour MP, stated in

Parliament that Churchill’s speech contained “an understa¬

tement which might be misunderstood in some quarters”.***

* John N. Kennedy, Op. cit., p. 147.

** Ibid., p. 148.

*** Winston S. Churchill, Great War Speeches, London, 1957, p. 139.

*) Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers

of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers

of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, Vol. I,

Moscow, 1957, p. 11. «

**) Michael Foot, Op. cit., p. 336.

165.

In Moscow Cripps was asked to explain the British offer,

specify the nature of the proposed co-operation and say if

the British Government had political co-operation in mind

and would sign an agreement defining the basis on which

such co-operation would develop. On June 30 the Soviet

Ambassador in London asked Anthony Eden if the British

Government had in mind only military or military and

economic or military, economic and political co-operation.

Eden replied that military and economic co-operation was

meant; political co-operation was a much more difficult

matter.

On July 8 Cripps was received by Stalin, to whom he

handed a message from Churchill. Like previous British

statements, this message spoke vaguely about assistance.

Stalin proposed that the two countries sign an agreement on

mutual assistance, without specifying its volume and nature,

and undertake a commitment not to conclude a separate

peace with Germany. The point on assistance was loosely

worded to take into account the British Government’s reluc¬

tance to specify its stand on this question.

A scrutiny of this proposal by the British Government

revealed why Eden had spoken of difficulties in promoting

political co-operation between Britain and the Soviet Union.

On July 9, Churchill sent Eden the draft of a positive reply

to the Soviet proposal. This draft included a paragraph to

the effect that frontier issues would have to be settled at a

peace conference “in which the United States would certain¬

ly be a leading party” and that on this question Britain

would proceed from provisions she would lay down herself.*

This paragraph directly affected the Soviet Union, and its

inclusion was tantamount to telling the Soviet Union: we

shall undertake to help you, but in return you must agree

to a revision of your frontiers. In other words, it meant the

wresting away from the USSR of all or most of the territo¬

ries that had acceded to it after the outbreak of the Second

World War (the Baltic Republics, Western Byelorussia,

Western Ukraine, Bukovina and Bessarabia). The reference

to the USA in this paragraph was not accidental. The British

had discussed this question with the Americans and had

agreed with them on the attitude to be taken to the German

attack on the USSR. The US Ambassador in Moscow

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 152.

166

Laurence Steinhardt, whose stand was approved by the State

Department, insisted on a “firm” line being taken towards

the USSR. In his opinion the “Soviet leaders were ... ap¬

parently quite prepared to sacrifice future for immediate

gains”/ 1 ' The words “sacrifice future” implied post-war So¬

viet frontiers. The British Government was, at the time, in

full agreement with the American position.

Britain had no intention of helping the Soviet Union

without receiving territorial concessions in return. In Eden’s

opinion, equitable and just relations with the Soviet Union,

to whom Britain was offering support and co-operation,

would be tantamount to “appeasement”. So that there should

be no “appeasement”, in exchange for the promise of aid the

Soviet Union had to agree to a revision of its frontier, i.e.,

to the eventual loss of territory after final victory had been

won at the cost mainly of its blood. Ultimately the British

War Cabinet deleted the paragraph on the territorial ques¬

tion from its reply to the Soviet Government, for it was felt

that it might complicate negotiations between the Soviet

Government and the Polish emigre Government in London.

However, much was foreshadowed by the fact that Chur¬

chill, on his own initiative, formulated that paragraph as

early as July 9, 1941 (no mention at all was made of fron¬

tiers in the talk Cripps had with Stalin on July 8). This cir¬

cumstance, which accompanied the emergence of the Anglo-

Soviet alliance, made itself felt throughout the war—first as

an issue over the recognition of Soviet frontiers and then in

the form of the Polish problem. This showed the contradic¬

tory nature of the British position with regard to the Soviet

Union.

The Soviet proposal was accepted. An agreement on joint

action by the Soviet Union and Britain in the war against

Germany was signed in Moscow on July 12. Under this

agreement, which came into force as soon as it was signed, for

it was not subject to ratification, the two countries pledged

to assist each other in the war and not to conduct negotia¬

tions or sign a separate armistice or peace with Germany.* **

* William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War,

1940-1941, New York, 1953, p. 530.

** Uneshnaya politika Sovietskogo Soyuza v period olechestvennoi

voiny, Dokumenty i materialy (Soviet Foreign Policy in the Period of

the Great Patriotic War, Documents and Materials), Vol. I, Moscow,

1944, p. 116.

167

Although Germany’s satellites—Rumania, Finland, Slovakia

and Hungary—had also attacked the USSR, the

agreement spoke only of assistance in the war with Ger¬

many, for at the time Britain refrained from declaring war

on Germany’s Eastern satellites.

The formula “assistance and support of all kind” was not

concrete enough. It could mean very much or very little.

Everything depended on how it was interpreted by the

signatories.

Despite the British Government’s discordant considera¬

tions in signing the agreement of July 12 and despite its in¬

sufficiently concrete wording, it was of major importance to

Anglo-Soviet relations and to the conduct of the war. It laid

the beginning for a powerful coalition, which four years

later crushed Germany and her allies. The combined resources

of the Soviet Union and Britain, and later of the USA,

which declared its intention of assisting the USSR in the

war against Germany, greatly exceeded those of the enemy.

Victory now depended on how quickly these resources could

be mobilised.

The Anglo-Soviet agreement put paid to the long-cherished

imperialist plans of isolating the Soviet Union and creat¬

ing a British imperialist-led united front of bourgeois states

against it. The USSR gained an important Ally in Britain,

which meant it was no longer alone. This had a powerful

moral and psychological impact on the Soviet people during

the initial period of the war. British material and military

assistance, though it came later, was likewise important.

Germany, which had dreaded a war on the two fronts, now

had such a war on her hands. Hitler’s calculations that his

attack on the USSR would end the war between Germany

and Britain, and induce Britain to support him against the

Soviet Union were not justified. Earlier, in August 1939, the

British ruling circles had accused Hitler of “signal treach¬

ery” when he signed a treaty of non-aggression with the

USSR, but now, after the signing of the Anglo-Soviet agree¬

ment of July 12 Hitler accused Britain of betraying the

struggle against communism.’ 5 ' The world power balance

underwent a change. A socialist country had joined with

bourgeois-democratic countries in an alliance against nazi

aggression.

* Labour Monthly, August 1943, p. 345.

168

An alliance with Britain to curb nazi aggression in Europe

was what the Soviet Government had perseveringly worked

for in the 1930s and what the peoples of Britain and the

Soviet Union wanted. The summer of 1941, therefore, wit¬

nessed the birth of something more than an alliance of two

states: a union of two peoples. That made the alliance so

strong that it withstood all the trials of the Second World

War. “At last,” Labour Monthly wrote, “that alliance of the

British and Soviet peoples, backing the peoples of Europe in

the struggle for liberation against fascist aggression and

enslavement; that alliance for which the working class and

democratic movement in this country, in unity with the So¬

viet people, strove so many years in vain against the con¬

spirators of world reaction; that alliance which could have

prevented the present war.”*

The will of the British people was one of the key factors

making the British Government enter into an alliance with

the Soviet Union. During the first half of 1941, when Ger¬

man aggression mounted, the people of Britain saw that the

threat to their country was steadily growing while the Gov¬

ernment was unable to offer a satisfactory way out of the

situation. The prestige of Churchill’s Government was fall¬

ing steadily; it was criticised in Parliament and began to lose

popular support. This was convincingly expressed in the

People’s Convention movement. Mindful of the political

situation in Britain Churchill urged assistance to the Soviet

Union, and in signing the alliance with the USSR he did

what the people wanted him to do and thereby considerably

strengthened the position of his Government.

Unlike their Government, the British people entered into

the alliance with the USSR with open hearts and intended

honestly to bear their share of the burden of the struggle

against the common enemy. They demanded a formal alli¬

ance with the Soviet Union as soon as it was attacked by

Germany. The British Communist Party was the first to

make this demand. Unlike the ruling classes, the British

working people felt the USSR was a reliable and powerful

Ally and believed in its ability to stand up to the enemy.

Michael Foot says that in Britain in those days there “was

a deep sense of relief about the war itself and Britain’s

* Labour Monthly, August 1941, p. 343,

169

chance of survival”.* He points out that the response of the

British people to the German invasion of the USSR reflect¬

ed the profound instinct of all the most politically active

sections of the British working class that if Russia were

allowed to be destroyed all else and all hope of victory

would go down in her defeat”.** Fleming writes that the

people in the streets wore “an expression of almost incredu¬

lous relief”. A large banner appeared in London saying:

“Quiet Nights, Thanks to Russia.”*** As the gigantic

battle unfolded on the Soviet-German Front the British

people saw with increasing clarity how immensely important

the alliance with the USSR was to Britain. “Russia’s tough¬

ness,” Eric Estorick writes, “had been a tonic to the British

people after the long series of defeats which they had....

Against the background of unrelieved disaster, the tremen¬

dous defence of the Soviet Union lit the sky with splendour

and hope of victories to come.”** In this situation, at

the signing of the agreement with the Soviet Union the

Churchill Government obviously could not put forward

the above-mentioned terms. Had it done so it would have

had to contend with enormous difficulties in its own

country.

The British people desired a lasting and honest alliance

with the USSR and were prepared to do much to give their

Ally effective assistance. Aneurin Bevan wrote in the news¬

paper Tribune: “There is only one question for us in these

swift days: what can we do to help ourselves by coming to

the aid of the Soviet armies?”*** The British workers sub¬

stantially stepped up output, feeling that this was a key con¬

tribution to the joint struggle against the nazis. Thanks to

these efforts tank production went up 50 per cent in the

course of a week.**** The British started collections for a fund

to assist the USSR. By mid-October 1941 this fund rose to

£250,000, which were used for the purchase of medical

equipment for the USSR. Existing organisations promoting

friendship between Britain and the USSR were enlarged and

new ones sprang into being.

* Michael Foot, Op. cit., p. 335.

** Ibid., p. 337.

*** D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., p. 136.

*) Eric Estorick, Op. cit., p. 261.

**) Michael Foot, Op. cit., p. 336.

**■*) Eric Estorick, Op. cit., p. 255.

170

These organisations helped to disseminate truthful infor¬

mation about the Soviet Union. In its turn, this led to a

growth of the popularity of socialist ideas and to the devel¬

opment of Left sentiments among the British people. The

British workers’ awareness of the advantages of the socialist

system greatly worried the ruling classes.

Political apathy, a product of the phoney war days, dis¬

appeared in Britain in the summer of 1941. The popular

movement for a closer alliance with the USSR influenced the

Right-wing trade union and Labour leaders as well. The

people who had early in 1940 zealously helped Chamberlain

in his efforts to “switch” the war from Germany to the So¬

viet Union now found themselves compelled to contribute

towards strengthening the alliance with the USSR. The

TUC passed a decision to form an Anglo-Soviet Trade

Union Committee as a body directing co-operation between

British and Soviet trade unions with the purpose of mobilis¬

ing the effort of the working people to secure a speedy

victory over the common enemy. During the early phase of its

activities this committee fruitfully helped to combine the

military effort of the working people of the two countries.

The Question of the Second Front in 1941

The Anglo-Soviet Agreement of July 12, 1941 called for

joint actions of the two countries in the war against Ger¬

many. First and foremost, these had to be military actions

inasmuch as it was a question of actions under definite con¬

ditions—in war. There are indisputable facts to show that

the subject of the talks in June and July 1941 and of the

agreement signed as a result of these talks covered such

actions and not only economic and material assistance. On

June 30 Eden declared co-operation was also considered in

military questions.* Then followed the exchange of military

missions,** whose purpose, the British Government said, was

to co-ordinate efforts in order to ensure the defeat of Ger¬

many***; this was likewise a step taken to show Britain’s

commitments to render the Soviet Union military assistance.

This brought two questions to the fore: what this assist-

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 152.

** A Soviet military mission led by General F. I. Golikov arrived in

London on July 8.

*** Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, Vol. 372, col. 974.

171

ance was to be like and what its time-limits would be? The

experience of history prompted that this assistance had to

take the shape of a Second Front, i.e., an attack by the

British Armed Forces on German-occupied territory in

Western Europe to divert part of the German forces from

the Soviet-German Front. In the First World War victory

was won by forcing Germany to divide her forces. The nazi

bloc owed its successes in Europe primarily to the fact that

it dealt with its victims one by one, operating on one front.

T he Times wrote in September 1941 that “full Western

co-operation in the Russian resistance is his [Hitler’s.—

V. T.J greatest fear, for that would upset his process of deal¬

ing with his enemies one by one”.* It was vitally impor¬

tant to deprive the aggressors of the possibility of continuing

to operate by that method. For this there was only one

means—a Second Front in Western Europe.

It was absolutely plain when that front had to be opened

—immediately, in 1941. Firstly, the outcome of the fighting

on the Soviet-German Front during the first few months of

1941 would decide whether Germany would succeed in

conducting a lightning war in the USSR. Secondly, the Brit¬

ish Government was certain that the USSR would hold out

for only a few months and, consequently, if any British

military assistance was forthcoming it had to be rendered

when it could be useful. “The view taken by military author¬

ities in Britain and in the United States was that the

German Wehrmacht’s Russian campaign would be a matter

of a minimum of one month and a possible maximum of

three months. But at least it diverted the immediate threat

from Britain; and Churchill and Roosevelt proceeded to

promise help to Russian resistance.”** Thus, by virtue of this

consideration, Churchill should have opened a Second Front

in the course of these three months if he had any intention

of honouring the commitment formally made by him to

the Soviet Union on behalf of Britain.

In full conformity with these indisputable conditions the

Soviet Government raised the question of a Second Front.

In personal messages to Churchill on July 18 and Septem¬

ber 3, Stalin requested a front against Hitler in the West

which could “divert 30-40 German divisions from the East-

* The 'Times, Sept. 5, 1941, p. 4.

*■* The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 428.

172

ern Front”.* In these messages Stalin justifiably pointed out

that a Second Front was needed “not only for the sake of

our common cause, but also in Britain’s own interest”,**

because the absence of such a front might cause the USSR to

suffer defeat or to become weakened to such an extent as to

lose for a long time its ability to help Britain in the war

against Germany and her allies.***

The British public was well aware of the consequences of

such a development and demanded the opening of a Second

Front before this question was raised by the Soviet Union.

In Parliament as early as June 24 Aneurin Bevan urged

the Government to open a Second Front without delay.

Similar statements were made in Parliament from time to

time throughout the second half of 1941. MP Clement Davies

said on September 9 that the British people were worried

by the question: “When is the war to begin on the Second

Front?”**** As the situation on the Eastern Front grew

more and more tense, the British people became increasingly

insistent in demanding a Second Front. This was demanded

not only by the Communist Party, but also by the trade

unions, the Co-operative Party, various public organisations,

young people, the military and other sections of the popu¬

lation. In communications from Moscow Sir Stafford Cripps

also urged his Government to open a Second Front if it did

not wish to “lose the whole value of any Russian front, at

any rate for a long time, and possibly for good”.** “The

Soviet appeal,” Churchill says, “was very naturally support¬

ed by our Ambassador in Moscow in the strongest terms.”***

It was also supported by Lord Beaverbrook, Minister for

Aircraft Production, member of the War Cabinet and a close

friend of Churchill’s. “There is today,” he said, “only one

military problem—how to help Russia ... the attack on Rus¬

sia has brought us a new peril as well as a new opportunity.

If we do not help them now the Russians may collapse. And,

freed at last from anxiety about the East, Hitler will con¬

centrate all his forces against us in the West.”****

* Correspondence. .., Vol. I, p. 21.

** Ibid., p. 13.

*** Ibid., p. 21.

**** Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 374, col. 139.

*) Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 154.

**) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 409.

***) Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., pp. 393-94.

173

However, Churchill thought differently about the need

to fulfil the commitment to the USSR and about the expe¬

diency of a Second Front. He turned down the appeals of

the Soviet Government. Lack of scruples in the attitude

towards the USSR was shown not only in the refusal to

keep the promise of assistance but also in the motivation

for the refusal. Churchill deliberately understated the

strength of the British Armed Forces and the potential of the

British war industry and overstated the strength of the

German defences on the coast of Western Europe. Trumbull

Higgins, the American historian, says in this connection:

“Here the Prime Minister was on weak ground; German

fortifications along most of the extended coasts of France

were in their commander’s own words, in large measure, a

‘Propaganda Wall’ conjured up by the nazis to deceive the

German people as well as the Allies.’” 5 ' Michael Foot says:

“Hitler’s Europe at that time was not fortified as strongly

as Churchill claimed in his notes to Stalin.”* ** Churchill had

to persuade not only the Soviet Government but also his

own Ambassador in Moscow that Britain was unable to open

a Second Front. He failed in both cases, and small wonder,

because his arguments belied the facts.

Actually, in 1941 Britain’s material and physical possibi¬

lities gave her a reasonable chance of successfully landing

troops on the West European coast. She had sufficient troops

for such an operation. On September 22, 1941, in a directive

to the British delegation that was setting out for an Anglo-

Soviet-US conference, which was drawn up to persuade the

USSR that Britain was in no position to open a Second

Front, Churchill wrote that on the British Isles there was an

Army of over 2,000,000 effectives and a Home Guard of

1,500,000 men. The Army consisted of 20 mobile infantry

divisions, nine semi-mobile divisions, six armoured divisions

and five armoured brigades, not counting air and other

units.*** Britain had the necessary air strength to support an

invasion. “The British Air Force,” Churchill wrote on Octo¬

ber 25, 1941, “is already stronger than his [Hitler’s.—U.7.],

and, with American aid, increasing more rapidly.”** As

* Trumbull Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front, 1940-

1943, New York, 1957, p. 72.

** Michael Foot, Op. cit., p. 339.

*** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, pp. 765-66.

*) Ibid., p. 486.

174

regards the naval forces needed to cover a landing, Britain

had overwhelming superiority over the enemy. At the time

of their invasion of the USSR, the Germans had in Europe

46 divisions, of which eight were soon afterwards dispatched

to the Eastern Front. Lord Beaverbrook was right when in

the autumn of 1941 he said: “It is nonsense to say that we

can do nothing for Russia. We can as soon as we decide to

sacrifice long-term projects and a general view of the war

which, though still cherished, became completely obsolete

on the day when Russia was attacked.”' 1 '

Britain had the physical possibility for opening a Second

Front in 1941 and, as an Ally of the USSR, it was her duty

to have effected a landing in Western Europe. Why had she

failed to do so? There are several reasons. In the course of

many decades the British imperialists had evolved a tradition,

advantageous to them and disadvantageous to their Allies,

of making others fight for them. In the given case the desire

to shift the burden of sacrifice and suffering onto the shoul¬

ders of their Ally was heightened by the British bourgeois

ruling classes’ hatred of the socialist state. The British Gov¬

ernment entered into an alliance with the Soviet Union not

only to enable Britain to survive but also to use the rights

and possibilities of an Ally to compel the Soviet Union to

fight until it was exhausted. This, it believed, would greatly

weaken Germany and lead to the collapse or at least the

crippling of the socialist system in the USSR.

Churchill’s Government took a great risk to achieve that

purpose—it denied the USSR aid in the initial period of the

war, fully conscious that this might force the socialist state

out of the war and mortally endanger Britain. This was only

one of many cases when class hatred and prejudice made

the British ruling circles risk the vital interests of the nation.

The colonial nature of British imperialism explains the

Government’s morbidly heightened interest in the Mediterra¬

nean theatre of hostilities. Large numbers of troops and

great quantities of military supplies were sent to the Middle

East, with the result that the attention and efforts of the

British political and military leaders turned from the

struggle against Germany in Europe to the struggle against

Germany and Italy in the Middle East. Churchill’s passion

for the Middle East reached such a high pitch that frequent-

* Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 394.

175

ly his military advisers insisted on reducing the troop and

supply movements to that region to avoid weakening the

defences of Britain herself. Another factor was the lack of

faith in the strength of the Soviet Union. This gave rise to

the conviction that since the USSR was doomed anyway,

any British troops landed in the European continent would

find themselves in difficulties should the Soviet Union cease

fighting. Lastly, there was the deep-rooted strategic concept

which demanded that Britain fight on the continent not with

her land armies but by creating and financing a coalition,

whose members would provide the necessary land forces;

Britain would contribute naval and air units.

Thus, had Britain fulfilled her Allied obligations to the

letter, she would have effected a landing in Europe in 1941.

However, in line with her traditional policy, she shifted the

main burden of the war onto the shoulders of her Ally.

Anti-Soviet Forces in Britain

An event that had resounding repercussions took place

in Britain on September 2, 1941. On that day the British

Trades Union Congress passed a resolution to establish an

Anglo-Russian Trade Union Council. Jack Tanner, Presi¬

dent of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, in supporting

the resolution, among other things said: “There is a point

of view held in certain quarters which may result in a

nullification of the whole war effort. There are people in

high places who declare that they hope the Russian and

German armies will exterminate each other, and while this

is taking place we, the British Commonwealth of Nations,

will so develop our Air Force and other armed forces that,

if Russia and Germany do destroy each other, we shall

have the dominating power in Europe. That point of view

has been expressed quite recently by a Cabinet Minister—

a member of the present Government—a gentleman who

holds a very important position—none other than the Minis¬

ter for Aircraft Production, Colonel Moore-Brabazon. I

think every one will agree that such an attitude is a terrible

danger, and it is a crime against the people of this country

and the people of Russia.”*

Walter Citrine, a Right-wing trade union leader well-

* W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, Op. cit., pp. 684-85.

176

known for his anti-Soviet views, wh<? presided at the Con¬

gress, tried to mitigate the impression made by Tanner’s

statement. He declared he had not heard anything of the

kind from anybody and cast doubt on what Tanner said. But

it was hopeless trying to shield Moore-Brabazon, for he had

in fact made the statement in question at a luncheon given

by John Simon, a well-known Munichite, at the Central

Hotel in Manchester. Although a very select group was

present, there were among them two officials of the Amal¬

gamated Engineering Union who told Tanner what Moore-

Brabazon said.

Normally, after a statement like that had become public

property, Moore-Brabazon might have been expected to

resign his Cabinet post. But nothing of the kind took place.

Churchill publicly took him under his wing, doing it in a

heavy-footed way. It was announced that his real views

were not what he had said in Manchester but what he had

expressed in his public speeches.

The Coates tell us that soon after the Moore-Brabazon

scandal, a group of officers attended a reception where one

of them, scion of a prominent Tory family, remarked: “We

are all Moore-Brabazons here but he was a fool to blurt it

out.” 3 '' This remark met with universal approval from the

officers present.

Moore-Brabazon remained in the Government for another

six months through the efforts of Churchill and those whose

views he had voiced. He finally turned in his resignation

on February 21, 1942. He gives the reasons leading up to

his resignation in his memoirs: “From that day [September

2, 1941.— V.T.) there was organised opposition in every

works I visited, and people hooted and shouted and booed

wherever I went. .. . Consequently, instead of being a help

to the Prime Minister I was a definite drag on him.”**

The Moore-Brabazon statement outlined the strategic

political concept to which most of the British ruling circles

adhered during the Second World War. They were, for the

most part, Right-wing, rabidly reactionary political leaders—

from out and out pro-nazis to Munichites of various hues.

Their desire to see the Soviet Union and Germany become

utterly exhausted in the war was shared by imperialist

* Ibid., Vol. II, p. 7.

** Ibid.

12-1501

177

circles, who considered that in order to gain supremacy in

Europe and preserve the British Empire war with Germany

was necessary. These circles were wholeheartedly behind

Churchill. Consequently, the Moore-Brabazon statement

reflected the Government’s real policy, which was not

publicised. The Coates point out that these views were “held

very widely in influential circles in Great Britain at the

time. Perhaps more important still, similar views were held

by Prime Minister Churchill.”' 1 ' This unanimity of the British

ruling classes derived from their class attitude towards the

USSR. The Munichites and Churchill’s supporters alike

would have been glad to see the USSR destroyed or

weakened.

In the period the anti-fascist coalition was in existence,

anti-Soviet forces in Britain exerted considerable influence

on state policy. The reason for this was that the switch from

a search for agreement with nazi Germany to an armed

struggle against her—the switch from Chamberlain to

Churchill—was accomplished without an upheaval thanks

to the political adroitness and experience of the British

bourgeoisie. The Munichites took back seats, yielding some

of the leading posts in the Government, including the post

of Prime Minister, to Churchill and his supporters without

a struggle that might have rocked the country. However,

they retained their posts in the state apparatus and in in¬

dustry, and only in deference to the changed situation they

refrained from publicly stating their views, fearing to call

down upon themselves the wrath of the people. Though they

lost direct control of the Government, their indirect influ¬

ence on British policy remained substantial.

The British working people suspected that this injurious

activity was being promoted. At a conference of shop

stewards on October 19, 1941 Walter Swanson declared:

“We are sure that we all feel and share the great and

justifiable alarm felt by the workers in every factory that

the Government is not pulling its weight alongside Russia.

It needs to be publicly stated that the factories are seething

with suspicion, that ‘the Government is letting Russia down’,

or that ‘the presence of the Halifaxes, Moore-Brabazons and

Margessons is the reason why there is no Second Front’. We

warn the Government, the workers will never allow them

* W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, Op. cit., p. 7.

178

to let Russia down, for they know it means we go down as

well.”"' Combined with the Soviet successes against the nazi

invasion and with Soviet policy aimed at strengthening the

anti-nazi coalition, the vigilance of the British working

people and their struggle for an honest and effective alliance

with the USSR played a key role in developing Allied rela¬

tions between the two countries. The Churchill Government

desired an alliance with the USSR in order to ensure victory

over Germany, but it acted inconsistently and frequently

jeopardised Allied relations with the USSR. In this situa¬

tion the stand of the British people was of immense impor¬

tance, and it increasingly determined the actions of the

British Government as a member of the Grand Coalition.

A negative factor in the relations between Britain and

the USSR was unquestionably that people hostile to the

Soviet Union held influential positions in the leadership of

the British Armed Forces and the Foreign Office, i.e., in

those links of the British state apparatus on which depended

Britain’s practical fulfilment of her Allied obligations to the

USSR. General John Kennedy writes that in June 1941,

Field-Marshal John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General

Staff, told him that “he regarded the Russians as so foul

that he hated the idea of any close association with them”

and that he had forced himself to be friendly to the Soviet

Military Mission “out of a sense of duty”.* ** General Ismay,

member of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee and a close asso¬

ciate of Churchill’s, writes in his memoirs: “It must be

admitted that the prospect of being Allies with the Bolshe¬

viks was repugnant.”***

Sentiments of this kind predominated among British

diplomats as well, among whom Cripps was obviously an

exception. That was undoubtedly why Churchill replaced

him as Ambassador to Moscow in January 1942 by Sir

Archibald Clark Kerr, a career diplomat. Cripps’ biogra¬

pher, Eric Estorick, says that when the Ambassador arrived

in Moscow in 1940 he found an atmosphere of hate and

ignorance of the Soviet Union prevalent among British

diplomats, whose express job was to maintain relations be¬

tween Britain and the USSR. Three months after taking up

* Labour Monthly, November 1941, p. 457.

** John N. Kennedy, Op. cit., pp. 147, 149.

*** The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay, pp. 223-24.

iz*

179

his duties in Moscow Cripps wrote in a letter: “The univer¬

sal hymn of hate whenever a few Englishmen meet together

against the Russians makes me rather depressed and cross. . . .

The whole tradition and bias of the Foreign Office and

diplomatic service is violently and unreasoningly anti-Rus¬

sian. ... It is this atmosphere which has made it impossible

ever to have any reasonable agreement between a Conserv¬

ative Government in Great Britain and Russia.”* Natu¬

rally, with these sentiments pervading the British Foreign

Office it was extremely difficult to regulate the alliance

between Britain and the USSR.

Anglo-US Relations. Argentia Meeting

Throughout the second half of 1941 the USA moved

steadily towards physical involvement in the war. It had not

yet completed its preparations for war and elements oppos¬

ing its involvement were still generally influential in the

country. These two factors held the USA back from declar¬

ing war on Germany. However, the flow of armaments to

Britain and the provision of US naval escorts for British

convoys across the Atlantic from the USA to Iceland meant

that until December 1941 “the United States was in reality

engaged in an undeclared war in the Atlantic”.** The USA

had gone so far to assist Britain not from a desire to help

a country close to it in language, traditions and culture but

from considerations of its own interests. It was a struggle

between leading imperialist powers for world domination.

“In 1941,” writes the American historian William Hardy

McNeill, “the prospect that Britain and her Allies might be

unable to prevent a victorious Germany from dominating

Europe (and from Europe, perhaps, the world) brought the

United States into war at Britain’s side. . . . But the fear of

a new and ruthless German world-master was surely the

more potent motive.”*** This was precisely what determined

US policy when President Roosevelt declared US support

for the Soviet Union against Germany.

Although both Britain and the USA were objectively

interested in assisting the Soviet Union, there was consider-

* Eric Estorick, Op. cit., p. 231.

< ' s ' William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain and Russia. Their Co¬

operation and Conflict, 1941-1946, London, 1953, p. 7.

*** Ibid., p. 6.

180

able friction between them on this question. Each wanted

a larger share of the benefit from the alliance with the USSR.

They kept a watchful eye on each other. In June 1941

Churchill took the initiative and proposed that the US

Government support the USSR in the event it was attacked

by Germany. The realisation of this proposal would inevi¬

tably have brought about the establishment of Allied rela¬

tions between Britain and the USSR, which would have

meant a substantial slackening of British dependence on US

aid inasmuch as in the Soviet Union Britain would have had

a reliable bastion. “The Anglo-Soviet Alliance strengthens

the position of the British ruling class in relation to the

American ruling class,” Labour Monthly wrote in August

1941.* This was appreciated in Washington and, therefore,

while consenting to the alliance the USA decided to keep

Britain’s actions in this sphere under strict surveillance.

Firstly, Washington demanded that Britain adopt a “tough”

line towards the USSR; this harmonised with the anti-Soviet

feelings of the American ruling circles and would not

facilitate a rapprochement between Britain and the USSR.

Secondly, the USA was categorically opposed to British

recognition of the Soviet 1941 frontiers.** This greatly

complicated Anglo-Soviet relations and in subsequent years

seriously hindered the strengthening of the Anglo-Soviet

alliance. Thirdly, the USA demanded that in all matters

pertaining to the USSR Britain should agree her actions

with the US Government and that there should be no se¬

crecy around these actions.*** US interference reached even

details such as whether the document recording Allied rela¬

tions between Britain and the Soviet Union should take the

form of a treaty or an agreement. The Americans favoured

the agreement variant.*'

The Soviet Union’s entry into the war radically changed

the entire situation in the world. Beginning in June 1941 all

basic questions of Anglo-US war-time relations were de¬

cided with an eye to developments on the Eastern Front

and to Anglo-Soviet and US-Soviet relations. The change

in the balance of strength between the belligerents in June

made it imperative for the governments of the USA and

* Labour Monthly , August 1941, p. 355.

** Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. I, pp. 760-61.

*** Ibid., p. 182.

*) Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 152.

181

Britain to discuss their plans for the future and co-ordinate

their policies. Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s personal envoy,

arrived in London in mid-July 1941 to prepare a conference

to examine the situation. However, English sources say that

“conferences in London were obviously incomplete until

there was a much fuller Anglo-American understanding of

the situation in Russia, her requirements, and the prospects

of her survival”.* The latter aspect was what interested

the English and the Americans most. A month had passed

since the German attack, i.e., the minimum time given by

British and American strategists for the Soviet Union’s col¬

lapse, yet heavy fighting continued to rage in the East with

no sign of the Soviet Union being on the verge of knuckling

under. It was necessary to puzzle out what was happening

in that enigmatic Russia. Churchill decided to use Harry

Hopkins for the purpose. With Roosevelt’s consent Hopkins

went to Moscow.

On July 30 and 31 he had talks with the Soviet leaders,

telling them that “our Government and the British Govern¬

ment (Churchill having authorised me to say this) were

willing to do everything that they possibly could during

the succeeding weeks to send materiel to Russia”.** Hopkins

made this statement after he became convinced that the

Soviet Union had no thought of surrender, that it was deter¬

mined to continue the war. He was given an exhaustive

report on the Soviet Armed Forces and Soviet war industry

and economy. As a matter of fact, this gives the lie to the

fabrications of bourgeois historians that the Soviet Union

was not frank with its Allies.

However, it would be wrong to accept the above-men¬

tioned statement by Hopkins at its face value. The words

“during the succeeding weeks” are of particular interest.

They must be interpreted to mean that in Moscow Hopkins

saw that the Soviet Union needed immediate assistance and

that it was the duty of the USA and Britain to extend that

assistance without delay. Regrettably, neither Britain nor

the USA had any intention of sending armaments and stra¬

tegic materials to the Soviet Union “during the succeeding

weeks”, i.e., in August and September. Heavy fighting was

in progress on Soviet soil, but Churchill and Roosevelt

* The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 429.

** Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 341.

182

meant to delay settling the question of assistance to the

Soviet Union until the outcome of the German offensive of

the summer of 1941 became known. It was planned to hold

an Anglo-Soviet-American conference in Moscow to dis¬

cuss the question of aid. Hopkins wrote in his report: “I was

mindful of the importance that no conference be held in

Moscow until we knew the outcome of the battles now in

progress. I felt it very unwise to hold a conference while

this battle was in the balance. Hence my suggestion to hold

a conference at as late a date as was possible. Then we

would know whether or not there was to be a front.”*

The outcome of the summer battles on the Eastern Front

was thus to decide the question of assistance. Consequently,

for the time being the Soviet Union’s alliance with Britain

and the USA was only of moral and political value; as for

material assistance, it had yet to be won. Nonetheless, the

Hopkins mission to Moscow had its positive aspects. To some

extent it helped to elucidate the position and intentions of

the Western Allies, strengthened the relations between the

leading members of the anti-nazi coalition and enhanced

the Soviet Union’s prestige.

Churchill and Roosevelt met in Argentia Bay, Newfound¬

land, on August 9, 1941, and in their talks they took Hop¬

kins’s report into account. Roosevelt assessed the report

more correctly than his partner. Evidently he was inclined

to believe the Soviet Union would withstand the German

onslaught and, therefore, displayed more readiness to send

it armaments and strategic materials. Churchill, on the other

hand, was still sceptical about the Soviet Union’s ability to

go on fighting in 1942.** This was one of the reasons why

he insisted on America giving the maximum quantity of

armaments to Britain and as little as possible to the USSR.***

In Moscow Hopkins had reached agreement that Chur¬

chill and Roosevelt would send Stalin a message from Ar¬

gentia. The draft of this message was written by Cripps,

and Hopkins took it with him when he left Moscow. The

message was received in Moscow on August 15. It stated

that Churchill and Roosevelt had consulted together “as to

how best our two countries can help your country in the

* Ibid.

** Trumbull Higgins, Op. cit., p. 63.

*** D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., p. 140.

183

splendid defence that you are putting up against the nazi

attack”.* They suggested calling a conference in Moscow

to examine this question, thereby postponing effective as¬

sistance to some future date. However, the very fact of the

Anglo-US statement in support of the USSR—the text of

the message from Roosevelt and Churchill was published—

and the prospect of concrete discussion (regrettably, only dis¬

cussion) were of positive value. It showed that the three

Great Powers were steadily drawing closer together.

Churchill and Roosevelt scrutinised the further strategy

to be employed in the war. The British spoke, while the

Americans, being formally not involved in the war, listened

in order to ascertain what their partner’s real intentions

were. British strategy envisaged the eventual defeat of

Germany through the undermining of German economy and

the morale of the German people by means of a blockade,

bombing raids, subversive activity and propaganda. British

military leaders believed Germany could be smashed by

heavy air strikes, and an invasion of the continent by land

forces would be required solely to occupy the territory of

the defeated enemy. They, therefore, put in a request for

the latest types of American heavy bombers, planning to

start an air offensive on Germany.** In line with their

strategy the British military leaders declared: “We do not

foresee vast armies of infantry as in 1914-18. The forces

we employ will be armoured divisions with the most mod¬

ern equipment. To supplement their operations the local

patriots must be secretly armed and equipped so that at the

right moment they may rise in revolt.”***

A major element of the British plan was that it paid

special attention to the Middle East and Africa. The British

sought to persuade the Americans that no means should be

spared to keep a grip on Singapore and British Middle East

positions and to seize the North African coast and a num¬

ber of islands in the Atlantic.

A feature of the strategy proposed by the British was

that for the first time in talks at the level of military leaders

they openly raised the question of the US coming into the war.

* Correspondence..., Vol. I, p. 17.

** William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., pp. 665-66.

*** Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coa¬

lition Warfare, 1941-1942, Washington, 1953, p. 55.

184

Britain’s reluctance to mobilise a large army and invade

the continent was extremely noteworthy. In view of the fact

that Germany’s principal strength lay in her land forces,

the means by which British military leaders planned to

defeat her were naive. But this was by no means naivete on

the part of the British Government. It was a calculated line

of shifting the main burden of the war and human sacrifice

onto the shoulders of its Allies. Land forces were needed

to crush the German land forces, and these had to be sup¬

plied by the Soviet Union. The British military did not speak

openly of this but they obviously had it in mind, for that

alone provided the key to the link between the strategy

proposed by Churchill and his promise, given jointly with

Roosevelt, of assisting the Soviet Union. “The most impor¬

tant of these morale-cracking forces was probably the Red

Army, although wisely, the Prime Minister did not frankly

discuss it as such,” Higgins writes, and points out that “at

that stage, and in its British version, Round-Up [i.e., imple¬

mentation of the British strategy.— V. T.) was clearly desig¬

nated not to create, but to take advantage of a German col¬

lapse.’” 1 '

The strategy outlined by the British meant they intended

to stick to the strategy of indirect action, of avoiding deci¬

sive battles in the main theatre of the war, of securing the

enemy’s exhaustion by means other than direct confronta¬

tion with his main forces, fighting in secondary theatres and

getting their Allies to shoulder the main burden of the

struggle. The British Government’s unwillingness to muster

large armies of the type that operated in 1914-18 for an

invasion of the continent meant it did not plan a Second

Front in the sense it was envisaged by the Soviet Union.

Naturally, not a word of this was said to the Soviet Govern¬

ment. On the contrary, efforts were made to convince it

that in the long run, after she had completed the necessary

preparations, Britain would invade Western Europe.

As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, the British in¬

tention of concentrating their own and the American effort

in the Middle East and North African theatres did not hold

out the promise of anything good either. Their proposals

on this question charted the course for the military effort

* Trumbull Higgins, Op. cit., pp. 67, 66.

185

of Britain and the USA, which for a long time evaded the

issue of a Second Front in Europe.

The American military leaders did not subscribe to the

British strategy. At the conference they did not give a

definite reply to the British proposals, stating their consid¬

erations to the British later. They rightly felt Germany could

not be defeated by the means suggested by the British, that

powerful armies had to be used to smash her. This was not

the only point on which Churchill and Roosevelt disagreed

at the Atlantic Conference.

One of the reasons inducing the British and American

leaders to meet in early August 1941 was the need to pro¬

claim the official aims of the two countries in the war. Being

de jure a non-belligerent, the USA could afford to take its

time in proclaiming its objectives. However, Britain was in

a different position. British public opinion had repeatedly

voiced its dissatisfaction over the Government’s silence on

this matter. This was not an accidental silence. Chamber-

lain and then Churchill deliberately evaded proclaiming

their war objectives, firstly because they could not state

their true aims openly, for they were imperialist aims, and,

secondly, because they desired to keep their hands free;

there was no telling how the war would go and with whom

and on what terms Britain would have to reach agreement.

The situation changed fundamentally after the Soviet

Union, early in July 1941, declared that its aims in the

war were to eradicate the menace hanging over it and help

the European peoples win liberation from nazi slavery. The

Soviet Union’s aims of liberation were reinforced by the

heroic struggle of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces

against the German invaders. That steadily made the USSR

the moral and political leader of the liberation struggle of

the peoples against fascism. In London and Washington it

was seen that mankind’s hopes and sympathies were with

the Soviet Union, and that something had to be done to

counter this mood.

There was more to this than having to offer something

that would outweigh the objectives proclaimed by the

Soviet Union. It was necessary to proclaim aims which

would conform to the interests of the peoples and win their

support for the military effort of Britain and the USA. Inas¬

much as the USA was not yet officially involved, while

Britain was already fighting and losing the war, the British,

186

more than the Americans, desired to enlist the support of

the peoples. Subsequently, at the beginning of 1945, when

Roosevelt returned from the Yalta Conference, he remarked

to correspondents: “The Atlantic Charter is a beautiful

idea. When it was drawn up, the situation was that England

was about to lose the war. They needed hope, and it gave

it to them.”*

That document, stating the official aims of Britain and

the USA, consists essentially of two parts. One reflected

the real aims of the USA and Britain, and the other, wholly

propagandistic, contained provisions whose purpose was to

persuade the peoples that the USA and Britain were pursu¬

ing just aims in the war.

When the first part of the Charter was examined it was

found that there were points on which Britain and the USA

were united and also those on which they did not see eye to

eye. The two countries stated that their purpose was to

stamp out nazi tyranny, because nazi Germany was a threat

to both Britain and the USA. As far as the anti-fascist coa¬

lition was concerned this was the most important provision.

Further, the Charter envisaged that when peace was won

all countries would have equal access to trade and world

raw material sources, as well as to the free and unhindered

use of seas and oceans. These provisions were included in

the Charter in face of dogged resistance from Churchill

because they were directed against Britain’s old claims to

a special status on the high seas and against the system of

preferential customs tariffs protecting the British Empire

from an influx of goods from other countries. The Ameri¬

cans were determined to break down the preferential tariffs

barrier in order to enable US foreign trade to expand in

countries of the British Empire. During the discussion of the

draft Charter Churchill nervously asked the Americans if

their demand for equal access to trade was directed against

the 1932 Ottawa Agreements on preferential tariffs and

received a pointedly positive reply. All his efforts to block

the inclusion of this provision in the Charter came to nothing.

He had to give Roosevelt the firm assurance that Britain

had neither previously nor would in future sign secret

treaties with other countries relative to the post-war arrange-

* The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-

1945, New York, 1950, p. 564.

187

--*

ment. The Americans put the question like this: since we

are helping you and taking part in winning the war, we are

resolved to have a share in victory’s fruits, i.e., in the

establishment of the post-war international order. They

made it plain they did not want a repetition of the World

War I experience, when the USA helped Britain to victory

and at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 was unexpectedly

confronted with a system of secret treaties signed by Britain

regarding the future peace, with the result that Wilson found

himself in a very difficult position.* **

Such was the US response to the British request for more

armaments and for “a definite American commitment to

enter the war”. Churchill now saw that Britain would have

to pay a high price for US assistance and support. This was

felt by many people in Britain. The British press responded

irritably to the Atlantic Charter, arguing that the United

States could not “hope to shape the future peace without

first taking part in the war”. w

Among the Atlantic Charter’s propagandistic provisions,

which subsequently were not applied in the policies of its

architects but which unquestionably had a positive response,

were that Britain and the USA sought no aggrandisement,

territorial or other, that they desired to see no territorial

changes that did not accord with the freely expressed wishes

of the peoples concerned, and that they respected the right

of all peoples to choose the form of government under

which they will live. The Charter spoke of the need to give

all nations social security and a higher standard of living

and deliver them from fear and want. It called for the

abandonment of the use of force in the maintenance of

peace, the establishment of a reliable system of general se¬

curity, the disarmament of nations that threatened, or might

threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, and the

deliverance of the peoples from the burden of armament.

On September 24, 1941, in view of the objectively positive

nature of these provisions, the Soviet Government announced

its agreement with the basic principles of the Atlantic Char¬

ter, making the reservation, however, that in some cases

the wording might be interpreted in various ways and used,

at will, to the detriment of the Soviet Union’s legitimate

* William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 681.

** Ibid., pp. 691-92.

188

interests. Developments showed that the Soviet Government

was right.

Although the Atlantic Charter proclaimed that Britain

and the USA desired a just democratic peace, the leaders

of these countries had no intention of carrying out the pro¬

visions of the Charter. Churchill himself provides evidence

of the insincerity of the Charter authors. After agreeing the

text of the Charter with Roosevelt, he informed the War

Cabinet that the Charter was only “an interim and partial

statement of war aims designed to assure all countries of

our righteous purpose, and not the complete structure which

we should build after victory”.*

Thus not a word was said in the Charter about Britain’s

real war aims, yet they were very simple—the establishment

of Anglo-US hegemony in the post-war world. In each of

these countries the imperialist circles would have preferred,

naturally, to dominate the world without sharing power

with their Ally. However, the world power balance was

such that even the USA, the strongest imperialist country,

could not count on undivided domination. A kind of condo¬

minium had to be planned, in which Britain was accorded

a clearly subordinate role, in conformity with her strength,

but out of diplomatic courtesy nothing was said of this.

The British ruling circles adopted Anglo-US world dom¬

ination as their main war aim when they lost France as

an Ally and steered towards an alliance with the United

States. In December 1940, speaking as British Ambassador

in the USA for the last time, Lord Lothian said the United

States and Britain would achieve a post-war arrangement

to their liking only if they had more aircraft, warships and

“key positions of world power than any possible totali¬

tarian rival”.**

A frank exchange on this subject took place at the

Atlantic Conference when Churchill suggested including in

the Charter a point about the creation of an international

organisation of the League of Nations type. Roosevelt raised

an objection to this and stated what he thought the post¬

war arrangement should be like. He said the creation of a

* Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter. The

Role of the United States, 1940-1945, Washington, 1958, p. 40.

** The American Speeches of Lord Lothian, July 1939 to December

1940, London, 1941, p. 143.

189

new League of Nations should be preceded by a period in

which an international police force composed of the United

States and Britain had had an opportunity of functioning.

In reply Churchill remarked that of course he was whole¬

heartedly in favour of it and shared the President’s view."'

These designs were linked up with the Charter’s provi¬

sion stating the resolve of the USA and Britain to secure

the disarmament of aggressor states. At first glance no

exception could be taken to this point, provided the mean¬

ing which the authors of the Charter had put into it was not

taken into consideration. In a telegram to London from

Argentia on August II Churchill defined this point as “most

remarkable for its realism. The President undoubtedly con¬

templates the disarmament of the guilty nations, coupled

with the maintenance of strong united British and Ameri¬

can armaments both by sea and air for a long indefinite pe¬

riod.^”* ** Two days later he jubilantly cabled London that

the “Joint Declaration proposing final destruction of nazi

power and disarmament of aggressive nations while Britain

and the United States remain armed is an event of first

magnitude”.*** One may legitimately ask why Britain and

the USA should remain armed after the aggressive nations

had been disarmed and, consequently, the danger of war

had been eliminated? They needed armaments for interna¬

tional police functions as stated above, i.e, for the establish¬

ment and maintenance of Anglo-US supremacy in the post¬

war world. There is no other answer.

While these plans were being hatched, the Soviet Union

was fighting Germany and her satellites and doing more

than anybody else to destroy the might of the nazis. What

role were the participants in the Atlantic Conference pre¬

pared to accord to the Soviet Union in a post-war world

directed by Anglo-US police? The American historian

William A. Williams writes that “Roosevelt’s extension of

Lend Lease to Russia did not signify any fundamental

awareness of Moscow’s important role in any plans for the

future. The character of the Atlantic Conference between

Churchill and Roosevelt in August 1941 bears strong witness

to that fact. For implicit in the Atlantic Charter—drafted

* William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 685.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 391.

*** Ibid., p. 398.

190

by Churchill and Roosevelt before the entrance of the United

States into the war but after the nazi attack on Russia—

was the assumption that Britain and the United States would

make the post-war settlement for ‘all men in all lands’.”*

The Soviet Union’s future place and role in the post-war

world was thus to depend on Britain and the USA. In token

of special gratitude for the blood shed by the Soviet people

in defeating Germany and her satellites, Britain and the

USA possibly meant to disarm the USSR, like the defeated

fascist powers. This was what was meant when at the

Atlantic Conference US Under-Secretary of State Sumner

Welles told Roosevelt that it might be a matter of com¬

mitment on the part of the United States and, consequent¬

ly, of Britain “to disarm not only Germany but possibly

also Japan and at least theoretically the Soviet Union”.**

The only reason these imperialist plans were not destined

to be fulfilled was that when the war ended the strength of

the Soviet Union was such that in both theory and practice

the politicians in London and Washington had to relin¬

quish their designs and recognise its legitimate rights and

role in the post-war settlement.

The Atlantic Charter

and the Colonial Peoples

In the Atlantic Charter the USA and Britain declared

they desired to restore the sovereign rights and self-govern¬

ment of the nations that had been deprived of them by

force. For the governments of Britain and the USA the

inclusion of these and other provisions in the Charter was

nothing more than a piece of propaganda. They had no

intention at all of renouncing their plan of preserving,

strengthening and enlarging their colonial positions. The

following facts are evidence that the peoples of the colonies

and dependent countries could not count on receiving free¬

dom from the British and American imperialists after the

defeat of the nazi bloc. On September 9, 1941 Churchill

published an official declaration excluding “India, Burma

and other parts of the British Empire” from the sphere

* William A. Williams, American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947,

New York, 1952, p. 262.

** William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 686.

191

embraced by the Atlantic Charter. This declaration said

that at “the Atlantic meeting, we had in mind, primarily,

the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and na¬

tional life of the states and nations of Europe now under the

nazi yoke”.* The British Government thus officially stated

that despite the Atlantic Charter it would continue to deny

freedom and national independence to the many peoples in

the British Empire.

The British limited interpretation of the Charter was not

accepted in the USA. On February 22, 1942 Roosevelt re¬

jected Churchill’s interpretation, saying “the Atlantic Char¬

ter applies not only to the parts of the world that border

the Atlantic but to the whole world”.** This did not imply

that the USA was championing the freedom of enslaved

nations. US imperialism was out to undermine the British

Empire and use the slogan of “granting independence” to

take over some of the British colonial possessions by eco¬

nomic penetration. US policy was hostile not only to the

British colonialists but also to the peoples of all colonial

and dependent countries, for its aim was to replace British,

French, Dutch and Belgian rule by if not open then at least

disguised American domination.

In the colonial question Britain’s policy was clear-cut—

she was determined to retain her grip on all the colonies

and dependent territories in the British Empire. Her un¬

compromising stand on this question was expressed by

Churchill in the well-known words: “I have not become

the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liqui¬

dation of the British Empire.”*** But in order to create the

impression that in London they were thinking of bettering

the lot of the colonial peoples the British Government now

and then made vague statements on the colonial question.

In early 1943 Colonel Oliver Stanley, Secretary of State

for the Colonies, publicly explained British policy as being

“animated by three general principles: the establishment of

the rule of law, the provision of incorruptible administra¬

tion, and the prevention of exploitation”. The administra¬

tion of British colonies would remain the sole responsibility

of the British Government. This fully dovetailed with

* Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, Vol. 374, col. 69.

** R. Palme Dutt, The Crisis of Britain and the British Empire,

London, 1957, p. 92.

*** The Times , Nov. II, 1942.

Churchill’s views and with the views of the Conservative

Party, which he headed. The stand of the Liberal Party was

somewhat different. It suggested that all dependent areas

should come under the supervision of an international body,

whose guiding principles would be the well-being of colo¬

nial peoples, the “open door”, and the training of natives

in the development of free institutions so they could pro¬

gressively manage their own affairs. The Labour Party advo¬

cated a generalised system of international administration

based on the extension of the mandates system to all colo¬

nial territories.* Liberal and Labour opinion had no practi¬

cal significance because the policy of the Churchill Govern¬

ment was laid down by the Tories. Nonetheless, it reflected

the British people’s growing awareness of the need for a

change in the colonial empire in accordance with the chang¬

ing world situation. Neither the Liberals nor the Labour

men, it should be noted, urged the restoration to the

colonial peoples of the freedom of which they had been

dispossessed by the colonialists, thereby demonstrating no

essential disagreement with Tory policy.

A fundamentally different attitude was adopted by the

Soviet Union to the Atlantic Charter’s proclamation that

all nations should have the right to arrange their life in

their own way. In September 1941 the Soviet Government

stated its agreement with the basic provisions of the Charter,

giving them a broader interpretation. It declared that the

Second World War was deciding the destiny not only of

Europe but of all mankind for many decades to come and

that after victory was won the foundations had to be laid

for international co-operation and friendship which would

mirror the desires and ideals of freedom-loving nations.

“In its foreign policy,” the Soviet declaration pointed out,

“the Soviet Union has unswervingly implemented the lofty

principle of respect of the sovereign rights of nations. It

has been guided by the principle of the self-determination

of nations. In its nationalities policy, which underlies the

Soviet state system, the Soviet Union proceeds from this

principle, which is founded on the recognition of the sover¬

eignty and equality of nations. In line with this principle,

the Soviet Union champions the right of every nation to

state independence and territorial inviolability, and its

* Ruth B. Russell, Op. cit., pp. 86-87.

13-1561

193

right to establish a social system and choose the form of ad¬

ministration which it feels is most expedient and necessary

for its country’s economic and cultural advancement.’” 1 '

Thus, with regard to the Atlantic Charter the Soviet stand

wholly and completely conformed to the interests of the

peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This blunted the

colonial aspirations of the USA and Britain and helped to

activate the national liberation struggle, especially as the

Soviet Government unequivocally stated its support for that

struggle. Nicholas Mansergh writes that “by reason of doc¬

trine” the Soviet Union was “anti-colonial in principle”,

that it held the “conviction that the ending of colonialism

was something to be desired and to be hastened”.* **

The colonial people’s rejection of the British interpre¬

tation of the Charter was due largely to the Soviet state¬

ment. Neither in Asia, “nor indeed in many parts of the

Commonwealth,” Mansergh points out, “was this restricted

interpretation of the Atlantic Charter accepted or welcomed

... in practice Mr. Churchill’s assertions paid too little

regard to the experience of the war and the climate of

world opinion.”*** The colonial peoples became more and

more determined to see the fulfilment of the promises in the

Charter.

The Main Front of the War

Shifts to the East

It would seem that today, after the publication of

numerous documents, memoirs and researches, nobody would

dispute the Soviet Union’s decisive role in the war and in

saving Britain from defeat. Yet that is not the case. It can

be traced to Churchill himself, who knew the truth; he

wrote: “The entry of Russia into the war was welcome but

not immediately helpful to us.”**

Churchill was a past master at evading the truth and

spreading concepts that were a far cry from reality, particu¬

larly where it concerned the USSR. In his war memoirs

misrepresentation gets along very well with accuracy. Truth

* Vneshnaya politika Sovietskogo Soyuza ..., Vol. I, p. 146.

** N. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, London,

1958, pp. 191-92.

*** Ibid., p. 193.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 350.

194

is used to convince the reader of the author’s objectivity and

make him believe what Churchill wants him to believe, in the

given case the spurious version that during the second half

of 1941 the struggle waged by the USSR was of little impor¬

tance to Britain.

The fact that the German invasion of the USSR removed

the threat of an invasion of the British Isles does not re¬

quire proof. Nobody disclaims it. Yet, according to Chur¬

chill, the Soviet Union’s entry into the war was not imme¬

diately helpful to Britain.

The real state of affairs was that since the British no lon¬

ger had to prepare to fight back German invasion forces,

they were able to concentrate their effort in the Atlantic,

the Mediterranean and North Africa.

What was the situation in these theatres?

In the fighting for sea communications in the Atlantic

the situation changed in Britain’s favour in mid-1941. This

was due not to any radical change achieved by Britain

by military force but to the transfer to the East of the

German bombers that had been sinking British merchant

and naval vessels in the Atlantic and striking at wharves

in Britain. Now these bombers were used to attack Soviet

towns, and the British could, with little hindrance, build

new ships to replace losses and transfer many naval vessels

from shore patrol to convoy escort duty. The results made

themselves felt at once. In April 1941 the Germans sank

154 merchant ships (Allied and neutral) aggregating 653,960

tons; in July these losses dropped to 43 vessels (120,975

tons) and in November to 34 vessels (104,212 tons). True,

in December 1941 the losses grew, but this was due to the

fact that the Japanese began sinking British ships in the

Far East.*

Similarly, the Eastern Front influenced the situation in

the Mediterranean. The Germans withdrew their aircraft

from that area and threw them against the USSR. That

gave the British the possibility of strengthening their posi¬

tions in the Mediterranean and almost completely cut the

enemy’s lines of communication between Italy and the Ger¬

man and Italian troops operating in North Africa. The

Germans were compelled to return part of their air strength

from the East and bring some of their submarines into the

* Ibid., p. 697.

13*

195

Mediterranean from the Atlantic. In November and De¬

cember the British naval forces were seriously weakened by

a series of heavy attacks against the British fleet and naval

bases in the Mediterranean.

The land fighting in that area proceeded with variable

success. “The campaign [in the East],” J. F. C. Fuller says,

“gave Britain the breathing space she required, both at home

and in the Middle East, wherein to set her military house in

order. Egypt was relieved from the threat of war on two

fronts.... Hitler and his Staff looked upon the Libyan war

as a sideshow, and of so little consequence that it did not

warrant a diversion of forces which might possibly be of

use in Russia.”"' In the autumn of 1941 there were 10 German

and Italian divisions (about 100,000 effectives) in North

Africa, and of these only three were German divisions. The

British had the 8th Army (150,000 men) in that area.""' On

November 18, 1941, after building up numerical superi¬

ority, the British Command ordered the 8th Army to take

the offensive. Churchill portrayed this offensive, which was

insignificant in scale, as a major battle. “The Desert Army,”

he said in a message to all ranks, “may add a page in his¬

tory which may well rank with Blenheim and Waterloo.”

This “heroic passage”, which roused “optimism to boiling

point”, is regarded as “unfortunate” by Fuller."'** *** With

their numerical superiority the British made some headway,

pushing to Cyrenaica. But in January 1942 the German and

Italian troops, which were commanded by General Erwin

Rommel, counter-attacked and forced the 8th Army to fall

back. “Thus,” Fuller sums up, “instead of the Fourth Libyan

Campaign adding a page to history ranking with Blenheim

and Waterloo, its postscript added one more British disaster

to the many at this time tumbling in from the Far East.”*)

These setbacks only stressed that victory over Germany

was being moulded not in North Africa or the Mediterra¬

nean but on the Eastern Front. On that front the Soviet

Army was faced with a formidable array of 190 fully com¬

plemented, excellently equipped and well-trained German

* J. F. C. Fuller, Op. cit., pp. 125, 155.

** Vtoraya mirovaya voina 1939-1945. Voyenno-istorichesky ocherk

(Second World War 1939-1945. A Military-Historical Outline), Ed. by

S. P. Platonov and others, Moscow, 1958, pp. 344-45.

*** J. F. G. Fuller, Op. cit., p. 157.

*) Ibid., p. 163.

196

and satellite divisions armed with many thousands of field

guns, aircraft and tanks.*

Incredibly heavy fighting raged on the Eastern Front

where the adversaries were suffering huge losses in men and

materiel. By virtue of their numerical and armaments supe¬

riority the enemy forced the Soviet troops to retreat. In the

course of the summer and autumn the Red Army, fighting

defensive actions, retreated to Leningrad, Moscow and

Rostov-on-Don. Mortal danger loomed over the Soviet

Union. But the greater this danger became the firmer grew

the Soviet people’s determination to defeat the enemy.

The Eastern Front steadily drained the German reserves,

manpower and materiel, which were being ground to dust

in the battles against the Soviet Army. Correspondingly,

there was a diminution of the forces which maintained

German rule in the conquered territories. This opened the

door to a liberation struggle by the enslaved peoples and to

military action against Germany in the West. The world

was beginning to realise that the centre of the struggle had

shifted to the East and that the outcome of the Second

World War was being decided on the Eastern Front.

The Soviet Union was, singlehanded, engaged in titanic

combat with Germany. Its Allies were giving it moral and

political support, nothing more. Eric Estorick says the fol¬

lowing of that terrible summer: “Kiev fell and the Russian

line had to bend again. Throughout this tremendous drama,

in which the Russians were being strained to the limit of

endurance, and in which more of them were slaughtered

than their Allies lost in six years of war, no relief action

came from the Allies.”** The Allies were waiting for the

outcome of the summer campaign. Evidence of this is to be

found in the books of British publicists and historians and in

the statements of those who were at the helm of the British

Government in those days. Cripps and General Macfarlane

complained to London of the “inadequate co-operation”

they were getting in Moscow. On one of these complaints,

Anthony Eden remarked: “I am doubtful if we ought to

make too much fuss. We are not giving all that amount of

help.”***

* Istoria Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny ..., Vol. II, p. 9.

** Eric Estorick, Op. cit., p. 255.

*** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 153.

197

Churchill and some British historians chafe at the re¬

strained replies he (Churchill* received to his loquacious and

frequently totally abstract messages to Moscow in the sum¬

mer and autumn of 1941. Behind this “displeasure” is the

irritation caused by the knowledge that these verbose mes¬

sages failed to delude the Soviet Government about the

reasons the British Government was reluctant to provide

the Soviet Union with effective assistance during those

difficult summer months of 1941. Touching on the events

of September 1941, Churchill says: “I was well aware that

in the early days of our alliance there was little we could do,

and I tried to fill the void by civilities.”* The fact that Sta¬

lin did not go into raptures over this method of honouring

Allied commitments is regarded as gross ingratitude.

Anglo-Soviet-US Conference in Moscow

At the Atlantic Conference Churchill and Roosevelt decid¬

ed to convene a conference in Moscow to settle the question

of British and US armaments deliveries to the Soviet Union.

As week followed week, the firing lines drew ever closer to

Moscow, but still no date was set for the conference. In

September, it was decided in London and Washington that

“Hitler seemed unlikely to attain his objectives by October”

and “the chances of continued Soviet resistance were suffi¬

ciently good to warrant a commitment to provide large-scale

aid over a long term”.**

The Soviet Government took steps to hurry its sluggish

Allies. In a message of September 3, Stalin pointed out that

the loss of a number of industrial areas as a result of the

German summer offensive had brought the Soviet Union

face to face with mortal danger. This was the stern truth.

The message stated that Britain could help by opening a

Second Front and by supplying aluminium, tanks and air¬

craft.***

While rejecting the idea of a Second Front, the British

Government agreed to help with supplies. By now it had

become more optimistic about the possibility of continued

Soviet resistance to the German onslaught. Cripps was

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 345.

** William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., pp. 788-89.

*** Correspondence ..., Vol. I, p. 21.

198

confident the Soviet Union would withstand the onslaught

provided it received assistance. But this optimism of the

British Government did not go very far. Although it decided

that “the game was worth the candle” it was not very sure

that the Soviet Union would stand the strain. Therefore, as

Churchill put it, in regard to supplies it was decided: “If

they keep fighting it is worth it; if they don’t we don’t have

to send it.”*

Stalin’s message had an effect. Churchill discussed it with

his War Cabinet and cabled Roosevelt, suggesting an early

date for the conference in Moscow. The Americans appre¬

ciated the significance of the Soviet military effort more than

the British. Roosevelt adopted a more definite and clear¬

headed stand with regard to material assistance to the

USSR, saying he deemed “it to be of paramount importance

for the safety and security of America that all reasonable

munitions help be provided for Russia”.**

The British delegation to the Moscow Conference was led

by Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Supply, and the American

delegation was headed by Averell Harriman, who was

directing Lend Lease aid to Britain. The departure of the

delegations to Moscow was preceded by talks in London,

where the British and Americans agreed on a common line

at the conference. It laid the beginning for the tradition of

separate Anglo-US meetings before important negotiations

with the USSR.

The conference was in session from September 29 to

October 1 , 1941. Churchill instructed his delegation to

discuss with the Soviet Government the question of supplies

and military strategy.

The question of supplies was settled quite easily and

quickly. A protocol was signed under which Britain and the

USA undertook to supply the Soviet Union with a definite

quantity of tanks, aircraft, aluminium, lead, tin and other

armaments and strategic raw materials every month in the

period from October 10, 1941 to June 1942. For its part the

Soviet Government pledged to study British and American

requirements with the view to supplying them with various

materials from the USSR.***

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 438

** William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 792.

*** Soviet Supply Protocol, Washington, pp. 3-8.

199

Though falling short of what the Soviet Government had

requested and of what the Soviet Union actually needed,

this was a massive programme of material aid to the Soviet

Union. It substantially strengthened the nascent anti-fascist

coalition and the relations between the principal members

of that coalition—the USSR, Britain and the USA—and

placed the question of material aid to the Soviet Union on

a practical footing. This was the key achievement of the

Moscow Conference.

Beaverbrook was very favourably inclined to meet Soviet

requirements where supplies were concerned. To some

extent this pliability was due to his realistic assessment of

the significance of the Soviet war effort to Britain’s destiny

and to the fact that the supplies were to come mainly from

American and not British resources. “For the moment Britain

could do little from her own resources, at any rate until the

middle or end of 1942.’”*' Therefore, Beaverbrook, writes

Estorick, made “the maximum of promises, much in the

spirit of Father Christmas”.** Less than half of these prom¬

ises were kept. In 1941 Britain and the USA sent the USSR

750 aircraft (of which only five were bombers), 501 tanks

and eight anti-aircraft guns. Under the First Supply Pro¬

tocol, in the period October-December 1941 they had to

send the USSR 1,200 aircraft (including 300 bombers), 1,500

tanks and roughly 50 anti-aircraft guns.***

The protocol stipulated that the supplies would “be made

available at British and United States centres of production”

and “an undertaking was given that we would help in their

transportation to Russia”.** This was an unreasonable

provision, to say the least. The British and Americans knew

that the USSR did not have the merchant or naval vessels

to transport the stipulated supplies of armaments and raw

materials from the USA and Britain. If the means of trans¬

portation were not provided there was no sense in making the

supplies available at the centres of production; the Soviet

Union simply had no facilities for getting them. In the

obtaining situation the inclusion of this point in the protocol

* The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 431.

** Eric Estorick, Op. cit., pp. 255-56.

»*» p ]sj Pospelov, Istoricheskiye itogi i uroki Velikoi otechestvennoi

voiny (Historical Results and Lessons of the Great Patriotic War),

Moscow, 1965, p. 11.

*) The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay, p. 232.

200

could only have meant that the Western Allies undertook to

provide the means of transportation and that the Soviet

Union would help as far as it was physically able to do so.

In a message to Stalin on October 6 Churchill recorded his

delight over the success of the conference and added: “We

intend to run a continuous cycle of convoys leaving every

ten days.”*

One may legitimately ask why the protocol did not specify

what the conference participants had in mind, what the

Allies really promised and what Churchill wrote about in

his message of October 6. The answer is that by giving an

ambiguous meaning to the point on transportation, the Brit¬

ish provided themselves with a loophole to halt supplies on

the pretext that they had promised the supplies but had not

definitely committed themselves to transporting them. To

some extent this method was used in the wording of the

Anglo-Soviet Agreement of July 12, 1941, and was strik¬

ingly manifested in 1942 in the documents on the Second

Front. In the case of the supplies the real meaning of the

vague wording was revealed in 1942 when Britain halted

supplies, giving transportation difficulties as the excuse.

Lord Ismay, who participated in the 1941 Moscow Con¬

ference, observes in his memoirs: “Here was the chance for

the Prime Minister to point out very forcibly that our con¬

tract was limited to helping with the transport of supplies

to Russia.”** Ismay labours under a delusion if he imagines

his statement justifies the action of his Government. It only

underscores the ambiguous stand which the British Govern¬

ment adopted on this question at the Moscow Conference.

Churchill’s directive to Beaverbrook contained instruc¬

tions to examine military problems with Soviet representa¬

tives. General Ismay was included in the British delegation

expressly for that purpose. However, this part of the

directive remained essentially unfulfilled. The memoirs of

Churchill and Ismay are replete with obviously unfounded

charges that the Soviet Government showed no inclination

to discuss military problems with Ismay.

The Soviet stand on this question was rational and

reasonable. There would have been sense in discussing

military matters with Ismay if the British Government had

* Correspondence. .., Vol. I, p. 30.

** The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay, p. 233.

201

been prepared to co-operate in that sphere, i.e., open a

Second Front. But from Churchill’s messages to Stalin it was

clear that Britain was not planning a Second Front. This

was confirmed in a conversation which Beaverbrook had

with Stalin on September 28. In that conversation he said

that General Ismay was prepared to hold “strategic discus¬

sions”.^ From this conversation it became obvious that no

Second Front would be opened in the immediate future.

True, Beaverbrook mentioned that in Iran Britain was build¬

ing up forces and would be prepared to send them to the

Caucasus, but he was told that the war was raging not in

the Caucasus but in the Ukraine and in the North. He did

not subscribe to the idea of sending British troops to those

areas. This left the Soviet Government in no doubt that

the purpose of these “strategic discussions” was to persuade

it that Britain was in no position to help the Soviet Union

militarily. In the directive to the Beaverbrook delegation

Churchill wrote: “All ideas of twenty or thirty divisions

being launched by Great Britain against the western

shores of the Continent or sent round by sea for

service in Russia have no foundation of reality on which to

rest. This should be made clear.”** Ismay’s job was thus to

make the Soviet Government see that Britain could not open

a Second Front until 1942. It is important to bear this in

mind when the Anglo-Soviet talks on a Second Front in

1942 are discussed. The directive said: “We have every

intention of intervening on land next spring, if it can be

done. All the possibilities are being studied.”*** Here we find

another example of Churchill’s manner of making ambigu¬

ous statements on crucial matters. In the given case the

promise to open the Second Front “next spring” was de¬

signed to satisfy the Soviet Government. The “if” allowed

Britain to break her promise. Double-dealing policy gave

birth to ambiguous wordings.

Joint Anglo-Soviet Action in Iran

Beaverbrook did not accidentally mention Iran as the

place from where the British Government was prepared to

move troops to the Caucasus despite the fact that there was

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 156.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 766.

*** Ibid.

202

no direct threat to the Caucasus. In Iran at the time there

were British (in the south) and Soviet (in the north) troops.

German capital had been penetrating Iran over a period

of many years. In 1939 Iranian trade with Germany was

heavier than with any other country. Some 2,000 Germans

in the guise of technical advisers and tourists were working

to turn Iran into a springboard for an attack on the USSR

from the south and to undermine British positions in the

Middle East.

In February 1941 Britain warned Iran about the anti-

British activities of the Germans in that country. She was

worried about the security of the Anglo-Iranian Oil

Company’s oilfields and refineries in the south of Iran which

were supplying fuel for the British fleet in the Mediterranean

and the Indian Ocean as well as for the British Army in the

Middle East. The Iranian Government ignored the British

warning.

British apprehensions were seriously aroused in the spring

of 1941 when a nationalistic, pro-German coup took place

in Iraq. True, the coup was crushed by military force, but

there was no guarantee that the Iraq developments would

not be repeated in Iran with far more dangerous conse¬

quences to Britain. On July 10, 1941 General Archibald

Wavell, British Commander-in-Chief in India, warned his

Government of the German threat in Iran, saying “it is

essential we should join hands with Russia through Iran”."'

On July 16 the USSR and Britain requested the Iranian

Government to expel the German agents from Iran. This

request was ignored, and the two countries were compelled

to examine the question of using force to break up the nazi

intrigues in Iran.

On August 8 the British informed the Americans of the

Anglo-Soviet talks on this question. The Americans were

asked to pressure the Shah of Iran to heed the British and

Soviet representations. Ambassador Winant’s telegram

informing Washington of this request came “as a distinct

shock to the State Department”.* ** It put the Americans on

their guard. They feared Britain was out to gain additional

privileges in Iran and would conclude an independent agree¬

ment on Iran with the Soviet Union. There could, therefore,

* Ibid., p. 424.

** William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 803.

203

be no question of US pressure on the Shah in the sense pro¬

posed by the British.

The problem was resolved on August 25 when Soviet

troops moved into the northern provinces of Iran and 19,000

British troops entered the southern provinces. The German

agents were rendered harmless and the Allies obtained the

use of the railways and motor roads for the transportation

of supplies to the USSR. On January 29, 1942 the USSR,

Britain and Iran signed a treaty of alliance, which permitted

Britain and the Soviet Union to use Iran’s communications

and guaranteed Iran’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and

political independence.* The joint Anglo-Soviet action in

Iran was evidence of the fruitful Allied relations between

the two countries, and showed that these relations con¬

formed to the interests of the peoples, to the interests of the

struggle against fascism.

British Far Eastern Policy

The German attack on the Soviet Union changed the

situation in the Far East as well, but this change did not

manifest itself as quickly as the British Government believed

it would. In London it was felt the German attack on the

USSR would relieve the pressure on Britain not only in

Europe and the Middle East but also in the Far East. Most

British and American political and military leaders believed

this would stop Japan, for a time at any rate, from moving

southwards. They were certain she would attack the Soviet

Union. There was much in favour of this assumption. For

many decades Japan had had her eye on the Russian Far

East. She meant to seize large territories in that area and

in the 1930s had unleashed hostilities time and again to

achieve that objective. It would seem that now, with the

main Soviet forces engaged against Germany, Japan would

not miss the opportunity to carry out her plans with regard

to the Soviet Union. One of the objectives of the Axis, it

will be recalled, was joint action against the USSR. Besides,

the German leaders were beginning to see that their east¬

ward drive was not the picnic they had believed it would

be, and they brought increasing pressure to bear on their

Japanese ally to attack the USSR. However, like the Ger¬

mans, the British and Americans erred in their surmises.

* Vneshnaya politika Sovietskogo Soyuza ..., Vol. I, pp. 190-97.

When war broke out between the Soviet Union and Ger¬

many, the Japanese ruling circles made up their minds to

direct their aggression southwards, even if it meant risking

war with Britain and the United States. As regards the

USSR, they decided to refrain from attacking it for the time

being but to build up their forces in the north in order to

come in for the kill and seize Soviet territory right up to the

Urals when Germany defeated the Soviet Union. This deci¬

sion was adopted by the Imperial Council on July 2, 1941.*

In reply to the numerous proddings from Germany, the

Japanese Ambassador in Berlin Oshima was instructed to

tell the German Government: “By moving southwards at

present we do not intend by any means to relax our pressure

on the Soviet Union. However, we feel that the present

moment is most propitious for an advance to the south, and

for a time we have decided to refrain from a direct advance

to the north.”** Indeed, the strength of the Japanese

Kwantung Army, poised on the Soviet frontier, was at first

increased from 300,000 to 600,000 men, and by 1942 it rose

to 1,100,000 effectives.*** In building up these forces, Japan

prepared for the future, but in the meantime she moved

southwards.

There were a number of considerations which impelled

Japanese aggression in that direction. Her ultimate plan was

to seize vast territories in Asia along a line running, as the

Japanese newspaper Nippon kogno wrote on July 9, 1941,

from the Kara Sea along the Urals to the Caspian, the

Caucasus, the Kurdistan Mountains and the Persian Gulf,

and then across Saudi Arabia to the south to Aden.** With

respect to Siberia the German claims were not dangerous to

Japan, but this was not the case as regards the Middle East,

the region of the Persian Gulf and farther in Southeast Asia,

areas which Germany was obviously out to seize. The two

predators, who were out to win as much as possible, would

have inevitably clashed in the latter regions. Japan was

* Istoriya voiny na Jikhom okeane (A History of the Pacific War),

Vol. Ill, Moscow, 1957, pp. 379-81.

** D. I. Goldberg, Vneshnaya politika Yaponii (Japanese Foreign

Policy), September 1939-December 1941, Moscow, 1959, p. 173.

*** S. A. Golunsky, Sud nad glavnymi yaponskimi voyennymi pre-

stupnikami (Trial of the Major Japanese War Criminals), Moscow,

1947, p. 22.

*) V. N. Yegorov, Politika Anglii na Dalnem Vostoke (British Fat

Eastern Policy), September 1939-October 1941, Moscow, 1960, p. 160.

205

determined to occupy these territories before they could be

reached by the Germans and she therefore continued her

southward expansion. Besides, with France and the Nether¬

lands knocked out of the war and with Britain struggling to

keep her head above water, real resistance in these areas

could be expected only from the United States. Japan felt

she might never again have such a favourable opportunity for

the conquest of Southeast Asia. Her motive for starting a

war “was as much to forestall possible German encroach¬

ments in Eastern Asia as to eradicate American and British

influence there”."' Naturally, in the situation obtaining in

1941 top priority in Japan’s plans was given to the removal

of Britain and the USA from East Asia. The Germans were

geographically far from that region and it was not yet clear

if they would ever get to it.

On July 24, 1941 the Japanese occupied South Indochina

with the “agreement” of the Vichy Government. A similar

fate was overtaking Siam. It became obvious that Japan had

every intention of continuing her southward expansion.

This intensified old British fears. What if the Japanese

decided to seize French, Dutch and then British possessions

in Southeast Asia one by one, without provoking the United

States? Would the US strike at Japan in that case? Every¬

thing depended on this, for Britain did not have the

necessary strength to defend her colonial possessions against

the Japanese with any hope of success. She could not count

on the United States going to war against Japan to defend

the British, French and Dutch Far Eastern colonies. True,

Japan’s growing strength might alarm the Americans and

compel them to go to war against the Japanese before they

seized British and Dutch possessions. With this in mind the

British sought American assurances that they would support

Britain if Japan attacked her possessions. However, these

efforts bore no fruit. In reply to the overtures of the British

Government, which acted under pressure also from Aus¬

tralia and New Zealand, who were extremely worried about

their own security, the Americans replied that they could

not give any preliminary pledges to support Britain in the

Far East and would act in accordance with the situation.

British and American military leaders failed to work out a

* The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 440.

206

mutually acceptable plan of military operations against

Japan in the event of war with her.

In retaliation for the Japanese occupation of South

Indochina, the USA froze Japanese assets and reduced trade

with Japan. Britain, the British Dominions and the

Netherlands took similar action. It is interesting to note that

when the USA showed some firmness, the London politicians

wavered. They followed the USA’s example reluctantly,

feeling, as Bryant points out, “bound” to join in the embar¬

go.* The reason for the wavering was that Britain was still

hoping Japan would attack the Soviet Union and did not

desire to place any obstacle in her path by aggravating

relations with her.

When Churchill set out for Argentia in early August 1941

to confer with Roosevelt, he was determined to obtain from

him a firm assurance that the USA would declare war on

Japan in the event of a Japanese attack on British or Dutch

possessions. Later he wrote that in Argentia he discussed

with Roosevelt the probability “that the United States, even

if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far

East”.** In a conversation with US Under-Secretary of State

Sumner Welles at this conference, British Permanent Under¬

secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Alexander Cadogan

said that what Churchill wanted was a pledge from Roose¬

velt that if Japan attacked the Dutch East Indies and Britain

went to its assistance, he would request the US Congress

to endorse military assistance to Britain, the British Do¬

minions and the Dutch East Indies against Japanese aggres¬

sion.*** Welles’ reaction to this was plainly negative.

As a result, in the talks with Roosevelt, Churchill advanced

a somewhat different idea. He suggested that the USA,

Britain and the Soviet Union send Japan an ultimatum stat¬

ing that if she advanced into Malaya or the Dutch East

Indies, the three powers would employ such means as were

necessary to force her to withdraw.*) This, like many other

actions of the British Government, was designed to hasten

a clash between Japan and the USA. But there was much

more to this than bringing the United States immediately

* Arthur Bryant, Op. cit., p. 273.

** Winston S. Churchill, War Speeches. The End of the Beginning ,

Boston, 1943, p. 33.

*** William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 673.

*> Ibid.

207

into the defence of British colonies and Dominions in the

Far East and Asia. Japan was an ally of Germany and Italy,

and the outbreak of war between Japan and the USA would

automatically be followed by German and Italian declara¬

tions of war on the United States. Thereby, the British would

achieve their cherished goal of having the United States as

a military ally.

But Roosevelt was in no hurry. He knew that war with

Japan was inevitable and wanted to win at least another

month for the further build up of his armed forces. He

realised that Britain could not pursue an independent policy

in the Far East and would co-operate fully with the United

States. Moreover, he wished to avoid giving anybody

grounds for accusing him of having provoked a conflict.

This was important for considerations of domestic politics.

He therefore did not go further than promising to speak

firmly with the Japanese Ambassador in Washington Kichi-

saburo Nomura. Churchill obligingly drew up a statement

of two points which Roosevelt would make to Nomura, but

he laboured in vain. At the Atlantic Conference the USA

did not undertake any commitments in the Far East, while

Roosevelt’s actual statement to the Japanese Ambassador

was “less forceful and explicit than Mr. Churchill had

proposed”.”'

After the setback in Argentia the British Government

decided that its only alternative was to follow in the wake

of American policy. Naturally, it realised that US intracta¬

bility was due to Britain’s weakness. “There was no means,”

Bryant says, “by which a solitary Britain, her hands already

full in Europe, could afford naval protection to the British

and Dutch East Indies.”* **' In order to increase her strength

in the Far East, at least symbolically, Britain sent to Singa¬

pore her latest fast battleship Prince of Wales, on which

Churchill had gone to Argentia for his talks with Roosevelt,

and also the heavy cruiser Repulse and an aircraft-carrier. It

was calculated that this gesture would impress both the

Japanese and the Americans, and what allowed Britain to

make it was that the transfer of German troops to the

Eastern Front had relaxed the threat in the Atlantic.

In addition, the British Government made a number of

* William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Op. cit., p. 677.

** Arthur Bryant, Op. cit., p. 274.

208

public statements to the effect that “Great Britain would be

at America’s side if she became involved in a war with

Japan”. These words were spoken by Churchill in a broad¬

cast on August 24, 1941A On November 10, 1941 he

declared publicly that “should the United States become

involved in war with Japan, the British declaration will

follow within the hour”.** The purpose of these statements

was somehow to bind the USA, morally at least, in the event

Japan attacked British possessions and not the United States.

In the meantime the US Government was negotiating

with Japan, causing nerve-racking anxiety in London. If a

Far Eastern Munich was agreed on, Britain herself would

be the victim, and in that case US involvement in the war in

Europe would be less probable. In this period of despondent

brooding the British Government went on hoping Japan

would stop her southward expansion after all and attack

the USSR. At the end of October 1941 Churchill telegraphed

the prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand: “I am

still inclined to think that Japan will not run into war with

ABCD (American-British-Chinese-Dutch) Powers unless or

until Russia is decisively broken.”***

Meanwhile, at a meeting of the Japanese Imperial

Council as early as September 6, 1941, it was determined

that “in case there is no prospect of attaining our purpose

in the diplomatic negotiations by the early part of October,

we will decide to open hostilities against the United States,

Great Britain and the Netherlands”.** The final decision to

attack these countries was taken by the Imperial Council on

December 1.

In the night of December 7-8, 1941, Japan attacked the

British in Malaya and bombed Singapore. At the same time

Japanese aircraft bombed US naval units at the Pearl Har¬

bour base in Hawaii. As soon as Churchill heard the news

over the radio he telephoned Roosevelt to check if it was

true. “It is quite true,” the US President replied. “They have

attacked us at Pearl Harbour. We are all in the same boat

now.”***

* S. Woodburn Kirby, Op. cit., p. 73.

** Winston S. Churchill, The Unrelenting Struggle, Boston, 1942,

p. 297.

*** Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. Ill, p. 525.

*) Masuo Kato, The Lost War, New York, 1946, p. 48.

*"') Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 538.

14-1581

209

-1

The British Government was jubilant, but for the sake of

propriety it forebore showing its feelings to the Americans.

Developments had taken a turn the British Government

could only have dreamt of. Churchill told his senior military

officers that now they could drop their caution in their

dealings with the Americans, that Britain would now talk

to them “quite differently”.* This exaggeration of Britain’s

potentialities was a typical trait of Churchill’s, and it

betrayed his feelings. US Senator Gerald P. Nye described

Pearl Harbour on December 7 as “just what Britain had

planned for us”.** On December 8 both Houses of the Brit¬

ish Parliament voted in favour of declaring war on Japan.

On December 11 Germany and Italy declared war on the

United States.

The creation of the anti-fascist coalition was completed

with the USA’s entry into the war. The USSR, Britain and

the USA became Allies in the struggle against nazi Ger¬

many and her satellites in Europe.

* Arthur Bryant, Op. cit., p. 282.

** William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 7.

Chapter Four

THE TURNING POINT

(.December 1941-February 1943)

The Battle for Moscow

Churchill and Roosevelt delayed the three-power confer¬

ence in Moscow on supplies to the Soviet Union until the

situation on the Eastern Front cleared up. However, the

fighting continued, and the conference had to be convened

without waiting for the front to become stabilised. At this

very moment the Germans began an offensive spearheaded

directly at Moscow. Most of the British leaders believed the

Germans would capture the Soviet capital. Lord Ismay says

Churchill even wagered that Moscow would fall* Indeed,

the situation was extremely grave. In November along

some sectors of the front the Germans got to within 25-30

kilometres of Moscow.

The Germans made deep inroads into Soviet territory in

the summer and autumn of 1941, but the war did not turn

out to be the blitzkrieg called for by Operation Barbarossa,

the directive for which stated: “The German Armed Forces

must be prepared ... to crush Soviet Russia in a rapid

campaign.”** The Soviet Army had blunted the edge of

their assault and Germany now faced the prospect of a long

war for which she was not prepared. The German Command

was determined to capture Moscow before the winter set in,

counting that this would force the Soviet Union to surren¬

der. Its calculations were that since Moscow was the capital

of the USSR and its largest industrial centre and railway

* The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay, London, 1960, p. 235.

** Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945, London, 1964, p. 49.

14 *

211

junction the Soviet Army would defend it at all costs, and

therefore the seizure of Moscow would be accompanied by

the smashing of the Soviet Army’s main forces.

However, the German offensive against Moscow was

brought to a standstill at the close of November, and on

December 6 the Soviet Army launched a counter-offensive,

pushing the German troops back 400 kilometres and inflict¬

ing huge losses on them. The German general Gunther Blu-

mentritt writes that “Moscow marked the first great German

reversal, both in the political and in the military fields”.*

The failure of the blitzkrieg and the defeat suffered by the

Germans at Moscow caused the first cracks to appear in the

nazi coalition of aggressor states, aggravating the contradic¬

tions operating within that coalition. Japan postponed her

attack on the Soviet Union. “Neutral” Turkey likewise

refrained from any action against the USSR. The resistance

movement in the countries occupied by Germany and Italy

was activated.

The victory at Moscow and the Soviet Army’s successful

counter-offensive in January-April 1942 strengthened the

Soviet Union’s international position and enhanced its

importance as the leading force of the anti-fascist coalition.

This was the first turning point in the Second World War

and it created realistic prerequisites for basically reversing

the tide of the war. It “was the first visible turning in the

war; and as a matter of fact it was decisive, although its

decisiveness was not apparent at the time”.**

In Britain there was mixed reaction to the battle for

Moscow. When the fighting was at its bitterest the British

people were wholeheartedly behind the Soviet people, wish¬

ing them victory and eager to help them. The Soviet mili¬

tary success greatly fortified the British people’s faith that

the nazis would eventually be defeated.

Among the ruling circles the reaction was different.

Naturally, they realised that the German defeat was in

Britain’s interests and improved her position in the struggle

against Germany. However, their anti-Soviet prejudices

prevented them from appreciating the full significance of

the victory at Moscow. Even after this victory they still

believed that in the long run the Soviet Union would be

* The Fatal Decisions, New York, 1956, p. 82.

** The Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 431.

212

defeated. 1 ' They spread the story, given prominence in the

works of bourgeois historians to this day, that at Moscow

the Germans were beaten not so much in battle with Soviet

troops as by the Russian frosts.

The section of the ruling circles which saw in the battle

for Moscow evidence of the Soviet Union’s ability to with¬

stand in the struggle against Germany were filled with

gloomy forebodings. What would the defeat of Germany by

the Soviet Union mean to the capitalist system? However,

in those days it was obvious to everybody that victory over

Germany was still a matter of the distant future, while the

battle raging on Soviet soil convincingly showed the colossal

might of Germany and her satellites and how important it

was for Britain to have the Soviet Union as an Ally.

Eden’s Talks in Moscow

In the late autumn of 1941 the enemy was at the gates

of Moscow and, naturally, this compelled the Soviet Gov¬

ernment to ponder over its relations with Britain. She had

promised armaments assistance not at once but in future

months; no other military aid was pledged. The Atlantic

Conference had shown that Britain was discussing problems

of a post-war arrangement with a non-belligerent, America,

and had no desire to conduct talks on that subject with the

USSR, which was her Ally. This could only mean one thing,

namely, that the British Government was hatching plans for

a post-war settlement which would in one way or another

be directed against the interests of the Soviet Union. Lastly,

for several months the Soviet Union had been fighting

Germany’s satellites, while its Ally, Britain, was not even

inclined to declare war on them. It was an abnormal

situation.

When Beaverbrook came to Moscow in September 1941

he was asked whether it would not be expedient to extend

the Anglo-Soviet Agreement of July 12 and turn it into a

political agreement that would embrace the post-war period

as well. He agreed with this idea and said he would discuss

it with other members of the British Government when he

returned to London.** This idea was energetically backed by

* The Economist, Dec. 27, 1941, p. 764.

** Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. Ill, Europe,

pp. 305-06.

213

Sir Stafford Cripps, who recognised it as a legitimate desire

of the Soviet Union and as an important factor that would

enable Britain to maintain normal Allied relations with the

USSR. The British Foreign Office adopted a negative atti¬

tude to the Soviet proposal and maintained a silence in the

course of October and November. Woodward says that “Sir

Stafford Cripps repeated his intention to resign if we did

not agree to discuss with Stalin questions of post-war col¬

laboration and planning”.''’ 1 '

While avoiding a discussion of cardinal problems of its

relations with the USSR, the British Government did its

utmost to impose on the Soviet Government talks with British

military leaders with the aim of convincing the Soviet

leaders that Britain was unable to provide the USSR with

military assistance and, at the same time, obtaining infor¬

mation on the state of the Soviet Armed Forces. After

Ismay had failed to achieve his objective in Moscow, Chur¬

chill sent the Soviet Government a message on November 4,

in which he suggested sending General Wavell, Commander-

in-Chief in India, Persia and Iraq, and General Paget,

Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, to Moscow “to clear

things up”.* ** The reply to this proposal stated that if the

generals were sent to Moscow to sign an agreement on the

basic questions of Anglo-Soviet relations the Soviet Govern¬

ment would be prepared to negotiate with them, but if they

had only secondary business it would be better for them to

remain at their posts.*** The substance of the British pro¬

posal had been correctly assessed in Moscow. The generals

never went to Moscow, for which Churchill and British

historians bear a grudge. It is an unfounded grudge. Even

Woodward agrees that the talks would have been fruitless

and to back up this conclusion he quotes a letter from

Churchill to Eden, in which it is stated that “these conver¬

sations .. . would have made no difference in fact, since

there was at present no practical step of any serious impor¬

tance open to us”.** The grudge was thus incurred because

the Soviet Government did not desire to be occupied with

futile and clearly insincere talks while the great battle for

Moscow was being fought.

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 158.

s ' ,, ' Correspondence ..., Vol. 1, p. 31.

*** Ibid.

*) Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 159.

214

In all probability it did not know what Churchill and

Roosevelt discussed at the Atlantic Conference, when they

planned how Britain and the USA would devise the post¬

war settlement without Soviet participation and to the

detriment of Soviet interests. This was suggested by the very

fact that the USSR was not invited to the conference.

Besides, these plans were not only mooted at a closed

conference, they were spoken of openly. The Canadian Prime

Minister McKenzie King, for instance, publicly declared on

September 4, 1941 that “a new world order .. . can only be

effective through the leadership of the British Common¬

wealth of Nations and the United States of America”.*

The implication was that after the war Britain and the USA

intended to act without taking the interests of the Soviet

Union into account.

The Soviet Government did not know that when the

agreement of July 12 was at the stage of discussion Chur¬

chill intended to raise the question of wresting some western

territories away from the USSR. As we have already stated,

he went so far as to suggest including this point in the draft

message to the Soviet Government but the War Cabinet did

not feel it was expedient to raise this question.

However, some other actions by Britain, which were

undoubtedly known to the Soviet Government, indicated

that plans were afoot to implement the post-war settlement

at the expense of the USSR. Evidence of these plans lay in

the British stand during the Soviet-Polish talks in July 1941.

The British favourable attitude to the anti-Soviet claims of

the Polish reactionaries showed that given the chance the

British Government would not hesitate to support these

claims and pressure the USSR with the purpose of depriving

it of a number of territories (Western Byelorussia and

Western Ukraine). It was no secret to the Soviet Govern¬

ment that on that issue the USA supported the British stand.

The situation was that after a terrible life-and-death struggle

with Germany the Soviet Union would, by the will of its

Allies, face the prospect of losing some of its territories.

Naturally, during the difficult autumn of 1941 this induced

the Soviet Government to pay attention to questions of the

post-war settlement.

All these issues, which threw Anglo-Soviet relations out

* Labour Monthly, July 1942, p. 204.

215

of gear and, consequently, adversely affected the common

struggle against nazi Germany, could only be settled by an

appropriate treaty between the USSR and Britain. The

Soviet Government therefore made an official representa¬

tion to the British Government in November 1941, in which

it once again raised the question of the state of the relations

between the two countries. “We need clarity,” Stalin wrote

to Churchill on November 8, 1941, “which at the moment

is lacking in relations between the USSR and Great Britain.

The unclarity is due to two circumstances: first, there is no

definite understanding between our two countries concern¬

ing war aims and plans for the post-war organisation of

peace; secondly, there is no treaty between the USSR and

Great Britain on mutual military aid in Europe against

Hitler. Until understanding is reached on these two main

points, not only will there be no clarity in Anglo-Soviet

relations, but, if we are to speak frankly, there will be no

mutual trust.”* At the same time it was stated that Britain

had created an intolerable situation relative to a declaration

of war on Finland, Hungary and Rumania.

The British Government was greatly alarmed by this

formulation of the question, especially as the Soviet Govern¬

ment’s dissatisfaction over the obtaining situation was

wholly and completely well-founded. In London it was

realised that the Soviet Government suspected what its

Allies’ real relations were to it. Woodward tells us the

“Foreign Office considered that Stalin’s proposal was due

to his fear that ... we and the Americans now wanted to

make an Anglo-American peace from which the USSR—

exhausted by the war—would be excluded”.** Moreover,

the British Government was disturbed by the British people’s

mounting discontent with its ineffective aid to its Ally and

the absence of sufficiently energetic steps to improve and

strengthen relations with the USSR. It therefore decided to

satisfy the Soviet Union’s demand for a declaration of war on

Germany’s satellites and sent Eden for talks in Moscow.***

* Correspondence ..., Vol. I, p. 33.

** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 160.

*** A declaration of war on Germany’s satellites in the war against

the USSR was demanded not only by the Soviet Government but also by

progressive opinion in Britain. Britain declared war on Finland, Hun¬

gary and Rumania on December 6, 1941. “I was most reluctant,” Chur¬

chill writes, “to be forced into this position” (The Second World War ,

Vol. Ill, London, 1950, p. 473).

216

In January 1943, Winant reported to the US Secretary of

State: “I personally believe Eden’s trip was necessary be¬

cause strained relations had been building up between the

British and the Soviets. While at the same time there has

been growing popular appreciation here because of Russian

war efforts .. . and respect for a power that had been

underrated and was meeting the test of stopping the German

war machine.”* Eden, as he informed the US Ambassador

in London, intended “to smooth out relations in general, to

explore the possibility of some kind of political agreement

and to discuss certain post-war problems”.**

The situation at the front was extremely tense for the

Soviet Union and Churchill feared that this in combination

with the absence of Allied assistance might knock the USSR

out of the war and turn the German hordes against the

British Isles. These apprehensions may be appreciated

because in the situation obtaining at the time no other

country was in a position to continue the struggle. This is

pointed out by Churchill himself, who later wrote: “Thus

in the six months’ campaign the Germans had achieved

formidable results and had inflicted losses on their enemy

which no other nation could have survived.*** He cannot

be blamed for his inability in the autumn of 1941 to see the

strength of the socialist state and the determination of the

Soviet people, and for applying his own yardstick to the

Soviet Union.

In this light one can appreciate why Churchill felt it was

necessary to placate the Soviet Government, especially as it

was expected that the Japanese would start a war against

Britain and the USA at any time and Soviet assistance

might prove to be vital to Britain. On this score we have,

among other things, the evidence of Herbert Feis, who wrote:

“Churchill and the British Cabinet had known, as they

were considering how far they might go to satisfy Russia,

that war might come in the Pacific any day.”**

By sending Eden to Moscow, the British Government acted

insincerely. On the eve of his departure for the USSR, Eden

told the US Ambassador in London that the purpose of

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. Ill, Washing¬

ton, 1961, p. 494.

** Ibid., p. 506.

*** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 476.

*) Herbert Feis, Op cit., pp. 24-25.

217

his visit “would be to dispel Soviet distrust and, without

entering upon definite commitments, to give Stalin maximum

satisfaction”.* For this very same reason Churchill wrote

in a message to Stalin on November 22: . . When the war

is won, as I am sure it will be, we expect that Soviet Russia,

Great Britain and the USA will meet at the council table

of victory as the three principal partners and as the agencies

by which nazism will have been destroyed.”** In reality,

however, as mentioned above, he calculated that the war

would exhaust the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxon part¬

ners would force their own peace terms on it. On January

8, 1942, in a telegram to Eden commenting on the report of

the latter’s mission to Moscow, he wrote: “No one can fore¬

see how the balance of power will lie or where the winning

armies will stand at the end of the war. It seems probable,

however, that the United States and the British Empire, far

from being exhausted, will be the most powerfully armed

and economic bloc the world has ever seen, and that the

Soviet Union will need our aid for reconstruction far more

than we shall then need theirs.”*** In other words, Churchill

was still clinging to the line laid down at the Atlantic

Conference, and his message of November 22 to Stalin was

meant to calm the Soviet Government with deliberately

insincere assurances. This objective predetermined the out¬

come of the Eden mission.

He had talks with the Soviet Government in Moscow in

December 1941, submitting a vaguely worded draft for an

Anglo-Soviet agreement. Its provisions were that the two

governments would reiterate their endorsement of the

Atlantic Charter and undertake “to collaborate in every

possible way until the German military power has been so

broken as to render it incapable of further threatening the

peace of the world”; Britain and the USSR would undertake

not to sign peace with any government of Germany that did

not unequivocally renounce all aggressive designs; the two

countries would co-operate after the war in restoring peace

and making it impossible for Germany ever again to violate

peace; the two countries would co-operate in the post-war

reconstruction of Europe and would refrain from signing

* Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 25.

** Correspondence. .., Vol. I, p. 35.

Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 616.

218

secret treaties on this question with third powers: there would

be reciprocal economic aid after the war and the two coun¬

tries would recognise that as in the period of the war co¬

operation between them after the war would be useful not

only to their peoples but to the future of the whole world;

territorial questions would be settled in accordance with the

Atlantic Charter.*

The vague wording of the British draft was not its only

drawback. The British people and the Soviet Government

wanted a formal treaty of alliance between the two countries,

but the Eden draft only provided for an agreement, contain¬

ing no word about an alliance. It left open the question of

the nature and time-limit of the assistance which Britain

would render the USSR. The wording on this point did not

go beyond the agreement of July 12, 1941 and left the

specific decision of the question wholly to the discretion of

the British Government. This was particularly significant

because for a long time the Soviet Government and British

public opinion had been insisting on a Second Front

in Europe. In one sense the draft was even a step

back compared with the agreement of July 12; it did not

envisage the commitment to refrain from signing a separate

peace. It referred territorial questions to the Atlantic Char¬

ter, i.e., left these questions open and, essentially, subject

to a decision by Britain and the USA, the architects and,

consequently, interpreters of the Charter.

Instead of an agreement the Soviet Government pro¬

posed a formal treaty of alliance and mutual military

assistance in the war against Germany. The Soviet draft

contained the provision that for victory over Germany it was

necessary to form an alliance between the USSR and Britain,

who would assist each other. Accordingly, the draft stated:

“An alliance is formed between the Soviet Union and Great

Britain, and both Allied Powers mutually undertake to

afford one another military assistance and support of all

kinds in the war”, and the two Governments pledged not

to enter into separate negotiations or conclude any armistice

or peace treaty with Germany and not to enter into allian¬

ces or participate in coalitions directed against the other

signatory of the treaty.**

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. Ill, pp. 496-98.

** Ibid., pp. 497-98.

219

The second Soviet draft provided for the signing of a

treaty which would create “mutual understanding between

the Soviet Union and Great Britain in regard to the solution

of post-war questions”. In the solution of these questions

both countries would “act by mutual agreement” and after

the war they would take steps to make it impossible for

Germany to violate the peace again.* Eden declined to

accept the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a treaty

instead of an agreement, giving as his excuse that approval

of the Dominions would be required. His reluctance to

obtain this approval without delay made it plain that the

British Government did not desire a treaty of alliance with

the Soviet Union.

The sharpest arguments revolved around the Soviet

Union’s 1941 frontiers. Eden was asked what guarantees

the British Government could give that in the post-war

settlement it would support the Soviet Union’s demand for

recognition of its 1941 frontiers. The discussion showed that

the Soviet Government had every ground for alarm and

that it had opportunely raised this question before the Brit¬

ish Government. Eden declared he could not give the Soviet

Union the necessary assurances and referred to the Atlantic

Charter. He later telegraphed Halifax in Washington: “I

used the Atlantic Charter as an argument against him”

[Stalin.— V. T.].** This argument brought to light the mon¬

strous fact that Churchill and Roosevelt had worded the

Atlantic Charter in such a way as to be officially directed

against the Axis powers and, in some measure, against the

Soviet Union as well.

This caused Stalin to remark: “I thought that the Atlantic

Charter was directed against those people who were trying

to establish world dominion. It now looks as if the Atlantic

Charter was directed against the USSR.”*** Eden tried to

wriggle out of the difficulty by stating that this was not the

case. Then he was asked: “Why does the restoration of our

frontiers come into conflict with the Atlantic Charter?” To

which he replied: “I never said that it did.”*> The esteemed

Minister was driven into a corner and he deliberately

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. Ill, p. 498.

** Ibid., p. 515.

*** Ibid., p. 502.

*> Ibid.

220

did not tell the truth, testimony of which is to be found in

the above-mentioned telegram to Halifax.

Stalin told him: “All we ask for is to restore our country

to its former frontiers. We must have these for our security

and safety. ... I want to emphasise the point that if you

decline to do this, it looks as if you were creating a possi¬

bility for the dismemberment of the Soviet Union,” and

stated he was “surprised and amazed at Mr. Churchill’s

Government taking up this position. It is practically the

same as that of the Chamberlain Government.”*

Eden pleaded that without the agreement of the US

Government and the governments of the British Dominions

he could not enter into any commitments on this question,

and promised to put it before the governments concerned

and his own Government.

The Moscow talks yielded nothing. It could not have been

otherwise, for the stand of the British Government ran

counter to the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union.

The British magazine Nineteenth Century and After

wrote at the time: “It is particularly important that Great

Britain make no concessions, that are not essential to victory

over the Germans, in Eastern Europe. This is true even of

the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. ...

No one can tell what frontiers .. . will be in the interests of

England and most favourable to the balance of power,

because the condition of Eastern Europe as it will be at the

end of the war is unpredictable. ”** The striving of the

British ruling circles to compel the Soviet Union to accept

frontiers benefiting Britain meant that after the war they

proposed to deprive it of part of its territory, place it in a

difficult strategic position and restrict its future defence

capability. They completely ignored the will of the popu¬

lation of the territories in question which had voted for

accession to the Soviet Union. It is not surprising, therefore,

that the Soviet Government was concerned over the post¬

war settlement.

In this issue the British had the wholehearted backing of

the US Government. Before Eden set out for Moscow he

was informed by the US Secretary of State Cordell Hull

through the American Ambassador in London that the

* Ibid.

** Labour Monthly, July 1942, p. 211.

221

United States was categorically opposed to accepting the

Soviet proposals and concluding a treaty on this question

with the Soviet Union/'"

The British were aware that this attitude would seriously

strain Anglo-Soviet relations, and inasmuch as an alliance

with the USSR was vital to Britain Eden tried to alleviate

the situation by promising to discuss the question with the

governments concerned. But he was only playing for time.

Whenever the British Government wanted to evade an

issue it said it had to consult with the Dominions. Eden

recalls in his Memoirs an evening during the Teheran Con¬

ference in 1943 when in a restricted circle of the leaders of

the three countries Harry Hopkins teased Churchill and

him about British constitutional practices. “ ‘We have a

little more experience of the British than you have, Marshal

Stalin,’ Hopkins remarked. ‘Would you like to know how

the constitution works?’ ‘I would,’ said Stalin. ‘It depends,’

said Hopkins, ‘rather on the result that they want to get. If

the British want to agree quickly, they manage it all right.

If, however, they are not so sure, or they want a delay, they

will tell you they have to consult the Dominions and that

until they have the answers from all of them they cannot

give you a clear reply.’ ”* ** That was the line taken by the

British Government in the negotiations with the USSR at

the close of 1941. However, the issue was much too impor¬

tant to be brushed aside so easily. After Eden’s departure

the talks on the conclusion of a treaty continued in London

between the British Government and the Soviet Embassy in

Britain.

Although the Eden mission in Moscow did not result in

a settlement of outstanding issues, it was, nevertheless, useful

as a further step towards a rapprochement between the

USSR and Britain. The talks with him enabled the Soviet

Government to specify its insight into the British position

on a number of important questions. These talks were evi¬

dently an inevitable stage in the preparations for the Anglo-

Soviet treaty of alliance, which was signed in the following

spring. At the same time, the Eden mission showed the

complex conditions under which the anti-fascist coalition

* Cordell Hull, Memoirs, Vol. II, New York, 1948, pp. 1165-66.

** The Memoirs of Anthony Eden. Full Circle, Boston, 1960, p. 372.

222

was taking shape and what enormous difficulties Soviet

foreign policy had to surmount in order to establish a united

front of states and peoples.

Churchill-Roosevelt Conference,

December 1941-January 1942

Though they were attended by difficulties, Allied relations

between Britain and the USA emerged with less trouble than

the Anglo-Soviet alliance. This was due to the absence of

class contradictions between them; instead there were impe¬

rialist contradictions, but these were not so pronounced. The

Arcadia Conference, held from December 22 to January 14

in Washington, was an important landmark in the formation

of the Anglo-American alliance. Some bourgeois authors

have dubbed it the Arcadian idyll, but that was far from

being the case.* At the conference there was a sharp strug¬

gle over all the discussed issues.

As soon as the USA entered the war Churchill proposed

a meeting with Roosevelt so that they “could review the

whole war plan”.** He was in a hurry because he wanted

a conference with Roosevelt before the Americans completed

their own plans and thus made it impossible for him to

influence American strategic planning. Roosevelt did not

respond very enthusiastically to Churchill’s haste, but agreed

to a meeting. En route to the USA in the latest British

battleship, Duke of York, Churchill and his military and

political advisers, in the established British tradition of

securing the adoption of a British document as the basis for

discussion, drew up a large number of memoranda on ques¬

tions of strategy and the distribution of armaments. These

questions were of particular interest to him, but in the

beginning he found he had to occupy himself with other

matters.

When the United States entered the war it at once put

in a claim to political leadership of its Allies. Roosevelt

proposed that the countries in a state of war with Germany,

Italy and Japan should sign a declaration prepared before¬

hand by the State Department. The Soviet Union was

represented in the discussions by its Ambassador in Wash-

* Trumbull Higgins, Op. cit., p. 81.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 541.

223

ington M. M. Litvinov. The Declaration was signed on

January 1, 1942 by representatives of the USA, Britain, the

USSR and China and then, in alphabetic order, by 22 other

countries. The USSR’s growing role in the coalition was the

result of the Soviet Army’s victory at Moscow.

The signatories pledged to use all their resources against

those members of the Tripartite Pact and countries alligned

with it with whom they were in a state of war and to

refrain from concluding a separate armistice or peace treaty

with the enemy."' This declaration subsequently became

known as the Declaration of the United Nations (the name

was proposed by Roosevelt). It was the equivalent of a

military-political alliance and consummated the anti-fascist

coalition. It was coldly received by the British, either be¬

cause it contained a reference to the Atlantic Charter or

because it was an American initiative. Churchill signed it,

but subsequently snorted: “The Declaration could not by

itself win battles.”* **

Questions of strategy worried him most of all. He feared

that as a result of the Japanese attack, the USA would con¬

centrate all its attention in the Far East. He need not have

had these fears for the USA was steering towards world

domination and could not therefore afford to underrate

Europe. Another thought tormenting Churchill was that the

USA, whose territory was not directly menaced, would adopt

a wait-and-see attitude and calmly build up its armed forces,

while Britain and the USSR did the actual fighting, in

other words, he feared the USA would adopt the same

position with regard to Britain as Britain had adopted with

regard to the Soviet Union.*** But here, too, his apprehen¬

sions were groundless. The USA had considerable forces

and was determined to use them so that later it would

have more grounds for dictating the terms of the post-war

settlement.

The strategic decisions taken by Churchill and Roosevelt

met with the desires of the British Government. It was de¬

cided to regard Germany as enemy No. 1 and concentrate

the main effort in the war against her and Italy. As regards

Japan it was agreed that for the time being the strategy

* Vneshnaya politika Sovietskogo Soyuza ..., Vol. I, pp. 170-71.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 605.

*** Ibid., p. 581.

224

against her would be a defensive one. The USA agreed to

begin active operations in Europe without delay, and sent

troops to Northern Ireland. This enabled Britain to dispatch

part of her forces to the Middle East without fearing for

her own security. Churchill was particularly delighted that

the Americans had consented to study plans for an Anglo-

American invasion of French North Africa. Thus, instead

of thinking of a landing in Western Europe (i.e., a Second

Front to assist the Soviet Union) they decided to direct their

military effort towards the colonial outskirts. McNeill

says the Americans agreed to start an African campaign

because “Roosevelt was personally attracted to the North

Africa scheme”.' 1 ' The implication is that colonialist

motives were behind not only British but also American

policy.

Although the Americans quickly fell in with the British

on questions of strategy, Churchill and his advisers were

seriously alarmed when the discussion turned to how the

leadership of the joint military operations would be imple¬

mented. The US Chief-of-Staff General George C. Marshall

demanded that in each theatre there should be one comman-

der-in-chief and that all forces regardless of nationality

should be subordinated to him. This obviously did not suit

the British. They wanted to preserve individual national

commands even in an operation like the invasion of the

European continent. Churchill justifiably feared that the

American principle would adversely affect the unity of the

British Empire and the British influence in the Far East. On

this point McNeill says: “Combined staffs and unified com¬

mand over British, American and other Allied contingents

would at the least blur British control in such areas, and

might lead to the substitution of American for British in¬

fluence in important and extensive regions of the world.

Churchill raised objections but in the end was forced to meet

the demand of the US Chief-of-Staff, who was supported by

Roosevelt.

A Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee consisting of repre¬

sentatives of the armed forces of Britain and the USA with

headquarters in Washington was set up as the supreme body

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 104

** Ibid., p. 107.

15-1561

225

directing military operations. The US contribution in troops

and armaments would be much larger than the British, hence

the headquarters in Washington. Subsequently, this circum¬

stance determined the choice of the commanders-in-chief for

various theatres and major operations. Churchill was greatly

worried but could do nothing. Need had made him helpless.

Britain was growing increasingly dependent on American

supplies of armaments and on US strategic plans.

The problem of distributing the armaments produced in

the USA and Britain provoked a heated argument. The

Americans wanted a single distribution centre for the two

countries, which would use their resources in accordance

with the plans of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Taking into consideration the fact of the Committee’s loca¬

tion in the USA and that America was producing by far

the larger share of armaments, such a centre would give

the Americans the decisive say in military planning in any

part of the world. The British raised categorical objections

with the result that two centres were set up—one for the USA

and the other for Britain. The Americans at once stated they

would consider their distribution centre as a subcommittee

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, thus greatly

enhancing the role of their centre.

The British had good reason for congratulating them¬

selves on the results of the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting in

Washington. They had obtained the assurance that Ameri¬

can forces would be used first and foremost against Germany

and that the flow of American supplies to Britain would

continue. On the other hand, the conference had set up a

mechanism of joint command in which the decisive role was

accorded to the United States. “The Combined Chiefs being

located in America undoubtedly weighed heavily in favour

of American policy,” says Air Vice-Marshal Kingston-

McCloughry.* The Arcadia Conference ended with the

establishment of the Anglo-US alliance, which the British

Government had been seeking. At the same time, it showed

that in this alliance Britain was in no position to pursue a

really independent policy. The power balance was plainly

not in her favour.

* E. J. Kingston-McCloughry, The Direction of War, New York,

1955, p. 109.

226

Transitional Stage of the Economic War

At the Arcadia Conference Roosevelt and Churchill dis¬

cussed possible plans for winning the war. In the various

war theatres, particularly in the Far East, the situation was

growing more and more dismal. The British Government’s

bleak assessment of immediate prospects is shown in its

plans of economic warfare.

In early 1942 the British Ministry of Economic Warfare

was assailed by gloomy apprehensions over the possibility

that further military successes by Germany, Italy and Japan

would enable these countries to establish direct contact. It

was felt that such contact would be established if German

and Italian troops reached the Middle East and Japanese

troops approached this region from Southeast Asia via India.

The cause of these apprehensions, Medlicott says, was that

in the opinion of the British leaders “in March 1942 a Rus¬

sian collapse and an extension of Japanese conquest were

possibilities still”.* “The extent of this danger,” he writes,

“had been brought home to everyone in the spring of 1942”,

which must be taken to mean that both the Ministry of

Economic Warfare and the Government saw eye to eye on

the immediate prospects of the war.**

On March 21, 1942, Lord Selborne, who had replaced Hugh

Dalton as Minister of Economic Warfare, submitted to the

Government a memorandum on the immediate aims and

problems of Anglo-US strategy in the economic war. It

pointed out that the former objective of depriving the

enemy of access to the resources of neutral countries had

been superseded by the objective of preventing one enemy

gaining access to supplies in the territory held by another

enemy. This task had to be assigned mainly to the naval

forces.

Selborne suggested that the strategy of the economic war

should have six main objectives: preventing the enemies

from establishing an exchange of resources in the territories

under their control; increasing pressure on neutral countries

adjoining Germany and on the French colonies administered

by the Vichy Government with the purpose of obtaining

certain supplies from them and preventing these supplies

* W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 14.

** Ibid., p. 12.

15 *

227

from reaching the Germans; sustaining in enemy-held ter¬

ritory passive and active resistance to the economic meas¬

ures taken there: undermining the German potential by air

raids; carrying out combined operations against key eco¬

nomic and transport targets in enemy-occupied territory;

and protecting important sources of supply and access to

them, including Latin America.”*

The Selborne memorandum was testimony that although

the British Government had heaved a sigh of relief when it

obtained such powerful Allies as the USSR and the USA,

it still feared the Axis powers would achieve major suc¬

cesses before the Allied forces attained their full strength.

Moreover, it showed that the economic war still figured

prominently in British overall strategic planning.

From the standpoint of the British economic war, the

positive aspect of the Soviet Union’s involvement in the war

was that it cut short economic relations between the USSR

and Germany and, consequently, the British no longer had

to worry about blockading the Germans in the East. In addi¬

tion, the five remaining de jure neutral countries in Europe

—Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Portugal and Spain—had

become more tractable in relation to Britain. Formerly, their

actions had been largely motivated by fear of the powerful

German military machine. Now, although that machine still

existed it was fettered on the Eastern Front, and for that

reason Germany was careful not to provoke a deterioration

of her relations with the neutral countries. This gave Britain

more scope in her dealings with neutrals.

In the Far East Britain and the US had begun to co¬

operate in bringing economic pressure to bear on Japan long

before war with that country broke out. The object of this

pressure, to which the Dutch Government contributed, was

to induce Japan to come to terms with the Western Allies.

The situation was radically changed by the Japanese attack

on the USA and Britain. Following this attack the two

Western Allies worked hand in glove in the conduct of the

economic war against the common enemy. This collaboration

was cemented in the course of 1942 when the Western Allies

suffered a series of painful setbacks. However, after 1942,

when the war began to go against the Axis powers it became

possible to hit Japan’s trade with neutral countries with

* Ibid., p. 15.

228

telling effect. But as long as the Japanese Armed Forces

were making headway the Allied economic blockade was

limited mainly to hindering Japan’s trade with Latin Amer¬

ica and running down blockade-runners carrying supplies

from the European Axis powers to their Far Eastern part¬

ner. This was a difficult task and the Ministry of Economic

Warfare could do nothing save hope that Japan’s shortage

of tonnage would not permit her to build up considerable

reserves.

When the United States entered the war the American

Government, much to the satisfaction of the British, accepted

their blockade system, only modifying it slightly to meet

the changed situation. The American point of departure

was that the British had vast experience in this field and

knew how to enforce a blockade better than anybody else.

That was indeed the case. Hence the American willingness

to let the British continue directing the blockade. The term

“British blockade” is used by the American historian William

L. Langer, who expounds the views of the US State Depart¬

ment in his review of the period beginning eight months

after Pearl Harbour.’ 1, The system of special licenses for the

transportation of freight to neutral states from the USA,

introduced into that country by the British with the consent

of the American authorities, was changed by mutual agree¬

ment in the spring of 1942. As of April 1 the British licenses

were replaced by American export licenses.

However, the Anglo-US partnership in the economic war

was not free of considerable friction. Some American busi¬

ness circles felt, probably not without good reason, that in

playing the main role in imposing the blockade the British

were using it not only against the enemy but also to provide

British businessmen with certain foreign trade privileges,

while denying these privileges to American business.

The United States wanted a more stringent and consistent

blockade of the European neutrals. The Americans were on

the whole justified in maintaining that the relaxations per¬

mitted by Britain ultimately benefited only Germany and

Italy. The British Government used the blockade to deprive

its adversary of sources of supply and to influence the poli¬

cies of neutral countries both during and after the war. The

Americans did not have such firm ties with Europe or such

* William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, New York, 1947, p. 266.

229

ramified and far-reaching European plans as the British and

were annoyed by the British intrigues. One of the causes of

this annoyance was the consciousness that in relation to

Europe Britain was laying her plans with an eye to ensuring

her own predominance there.

The official motives given by the British for their milder

treatment of the European neutrals was that Britain needed

certain materials which they could supply. Moreover, Brit¬

ish Intelligence was very active in these countries. Another

argument was that harder pressure on the neutrals with the

purpose of forcing them to break off their economic rela¬

tions with Germany was fraught with the danger of Ger¬

man occupation, which would only harm Allied interests. It

was said that “the British Government had committed itself

to certain longer-term and more constructive policies than

those of the war trade agreements and compulsory ration¬

ing”. Spain was the most conspicuous example of this

“longer-term” policy, which, Medlicott says, was “not easy to

reconcile with sudden demands from Washington for British

acquiescence in an embargo on oil or hides or wheat”. 51 '

Among the pretexts offered by the British were their trea¬

ties of alliance with Portugal and Turkey and Switzerland’s

commitment to protect British interests in territory admin¬

istered by Germany and Italy.

In Latin America the roles were reversed. There the

Americans urged a milder economic blockade in order to ex¬

tend and strengthen their influence on neutral countries. The

British, on the other hand, insisted on more resolute and

definite measures which would ensure a complete rupture

of economic relations between Latin America and the enemy.

However, as in the preceding periods, the results of the

economic war during the transition period were, on the

whole, insignificant.

Anglo-Soviet Relations

in the First Half of 1942.

The Second Front Issue

The course of hostilities was still giving the Allies little

comfort. The turning point had yet to be reached.

* W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 23.

230

The year 1942 brought the Allies severe trials. Robert

Sherwood calls the first months of that year “a winter of

disasters” for the USA and Britain. The British, he says,

were compelled to bear “some of the most humiliating and

inexplicable disasters in their entire history”.* Churchill

subsequently noted that Britain entered 1942 in a new situa¬

tion, with “two mighty Allies”—the USSR and the USA—

at her side. “This combination,” he wrote, “made final vic¬

tory certain unless it broke in pieces under the strain.”**

The anti-fascist coalition stood the test of 1942 and did not

break in pieces, mainly because the Soviet Union bore the

brunt of these trials and coped with them, thereby rendering

its Allies inestimable assistance in the struggle against the

common enemy. The sound foreign policy pursued by the

Soviet Union and the determination of the peoples of the

Allied countries to defeat the enemy contributed towards

the strengthening of this coalition.

The reverses suffered in Libya and the Far East alarmed

Washington and London. Assessing the strategic situation

of those days, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt on March 5,

1942: “The whole of the Levant-Caspian front now depends

entirely upon the success of the Russian Armies.”*** In these

months of the close of 1941 and the beginning of 1942, Rob¬

ert Sherwood says, “the only source of good news was the

Russian Front”.**

These appraisals of the Soviet Union’s effort against nazi

Germany and her accomplices provides additional evidence

of the fact that the principal battles of the war were fought

on the Eastern Front. On the basis of this estimation, which

is the only correct one, of the general picture of the war, it

must be recognised that towards the spring the military and

political situation was, in the main, favourable to the USA

and Britain. The nazi armies had suffered crushing defeats

in the Soviet Union and the nazi command had been com¬

pelled to transfer an additional large number of combat¬

worthy troops from Western Europe to the Eastern Front.

This had greatly weakened German military strength in

Western Europe. Another factor which must be borne in

mind is that in the course of the first year of the Soviet

* Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 490.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 3.

*** Ibid., p. 191.

*) Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 495.

231

Union’s Great Patriotic War Britain and the USA had the

possibility of organising the mass production of armaments

and mobilising and training their armed forces. The weak¬

ening of the German bloc and the growing might of the anti¬

fascist coalition combined with the activation of the anti-

nazi liberation movement in enemy-occupied territories were

factors which created the possibility of bringing the war to

an early victorious end. To realise this possibility Britain and

the USA had to begin active military operations against

Germany in Europe, i.e., open a Second Front.

This was what the Soviet Union continued to insist upon,

and in this it was supported by the peoples of Britain and

the United States. This support mirrored the desire of these

peoples to hasten the end of the war and help the heroic

struggle of the Soviet people.

Some sections of the British ruling class likewise insisted

on a Second Front. These sections soberly assessed the situa¬

tion and correctly understood the vital interests of their

country. Among them were the former Prime Minister David

Lloyd George, Lord Beaverbrook and the British Ambas¬

sador in the USSR Sir Stafford Cripps.

Had Lord Beaverbrook’s views been shared by the ruling

circles of Britain as a whole the Second Front would probably

have been opened in time. But this was far from being the

case. The Government with Churchill at its head was against

opening the Second Front opportunely, desiring others to

fight the war and bear the losses. These politicians counted

on the Soviet Union and Germany exhausting each other

and thereby allowing British imperialism to maintain the

much-coveted “equilibrium” in Europe.

In the United States, too, considerable influence was

wielded by circles opposed to opening a Second Front in

Europe in 1942. Some American adversaries of the Second

Front desired to avert or, at least, delay the defeat of nazi

Germany, considering that her forces had to be preserved in

order to combat the revolutionary movement in Europe.

Others argued that Japan was the chief enemy of the United

States, that all American forces should be thrown against

her and that the conduct of the war in Europe should be

left to the Russians and the British. Both these groups

actively opposed Roosevelt, who considered Germany as the

principal enemy of the United States. However, they did

not have as much influence as Roosevelt’s supporters, and

232

that explains why the US Government and military leaders

displayed greater readiness to open a Second Front in

Europe than Churchill, who gave priority to the struggle

for the preservation of the British colonies and dependent

countries, hoping that the most difficult task, that of smash¬

ing the German military machine, would be carried out for

Britain by her Allies.

All these factors affected the attitude which the govern¬

ments of Churchill and Roosevelt adopted towards the

question of the Second Front in 1942.

In reply to a message from Stalin, Churchill wrote in

September 1941: “Whether British armies will be strong

enough to invade the mainland of Europe during 1942 must

depend on unforeseeable events.”"' It was believed these

words would sustain the Soviet Government’s expectation

that the Second Front would be opened in 1942. But as

early as December 1941—at the Arcadia Conference—Chur¬

chill handed Roosevelt a memorandum on Anglo-US strat¬

egy, which envisaged “the mass invasion of the continent

of Europe as the goal for 1943”.** That betrayed the duplic¬

ity of Churchill’s deliberately vague message, from which

the Soviet Government might have concluded that the British

Premier had not ruled out the possibility of the Second Front

being opened in 1942. However, even the plan for an inva¬

sion of the European continent in 1943 was wrapped up in

so many reservations that it, too, became extremely

problematical.

In effect, the British strategic plan thus ignored the de¬

mand of the Soviet Union and the British people that

Britain go over to decisive military action in Europe. In

Washington it was believed that this would be much too

hazardous, and the American strategic plan, completed early

in 1942, differed somewhat from its English counterpart.

Like Churchill, the authors of that plan felt the invasion of

Western Europe—Operation Round-Up—should be under¬

taken by the Anglo-American forces not earlier than 1943.

However, unlike the British Premier, they envisaged a

limited operation—Sledgehammer—in 1942 (approximately

September 15), which, the plan stated, “would be justified

only in case (1) the situation on the Russian Front becomes

desperate, i.e., the success of German arms becomes so

* Correspondence. .Vol. I, p. 23.

** Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Op. cit., p. 100.

233

complete as to threaten the imminent collapse of Russian

resistance ... (2) the German situation in Eastern Europe

becomes critically weakened”.*

Obviously this was a plan to wait until Germany and the

Soviet Union exhausted one another or to help the USSR

only, to use the wording of the American document, when

“the situation on the Russian Front becomes desperate”. “The

desirability of meeting the Russian demands for a Second

Front was the last in the priority list of arguments in favour

of the proposal,” writes Robert Sherwood.** As regards the

second condition, the purpose of an Anglo-US landing, as

was demonstrated in 1944, was not to help the Soviet Union

but to occupy Western Europe before it could be reached

by the Soviet Army.

In declaring their stand on the question of assistance to

the Soviet Union, the Americans had in mind chiefly their

own interests. In the US Army’s Operations Department

it was considered: “We’ve got to keep Russia in the

war.... Then we can get ready to crack Germany through

England.”***

Before the Germans launched their campaign in the spring

of 1942 on the Eastern Front, Roosevelt felt it was necessary

to give the Soviet Union a definite assurance that it could

count on military assistance from the Western Allies as early

as 1942. This, he calculated, would calm not only the Soviet

Union but also public opinion, which was demanding a

Second Front.

On April 1, 1942, Roosevelt approved the American

strategic plan and at once sent Hopkins and Marshall to

London to co-ordinate it with the British, and telegraphed

Churchill: “When I have heard from you after your talks

with Harry [Hopkins] and Marshall, I propose to ask Stalin

to send immediately two special representatives. It is my

hope that the Russians will greet these plans with enthu¬

siasm. ... They can be worked out in full accord with the

trends of British and American public opinion.”**

Hopkins and Marshall arrived in London on April 8, and

their talks with the British ended on April 14. At a meeting

* Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 520.

** Ibid.

***■ Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Op. cit., p. 157.

*) Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., pp. 534-35.

234

of the Operations Department of the War Cabinet’s De¬

fence Committee with the participation of the two American

envoys and leading members of the British Government,

Churchill formally endorsed the American plan calling for

Operation Round-Up in 1943 and Operation Sledgehammer

in 1942. It would seem that the decision had been taken and

that the approved plans would be carried out. Hopkins sent

Roosevelt a jubilantly worded telegram.

The decisions of the London Conference, even if they had

been carried out, made no provision for what the Soviet

Government desired and what Britain and the United States

had to do to help their Ally. With all the main German

forces concentrated on the Eastern Front in 1942, the Soviet

Union needed immediate military assistance. But its Allies

decided to extend that assistance only in 1943; the landing

of five or six divisions in 1942 (Sledgehammer) would only

have amounted to symbolic assistance. However, the Soviet

Union received neither symbolic assistance in 1942 nor real

assistance in 1943.

Had Hopkins and Marshall had a better understanding

of the British Government’s policies they would have been

more sceptical about the results of their mission. Their ap¬

prehensions should have been aroused when, in supporting

the American proposal, Churchill spoke at length of the

“ominous threat” to the Allies in the Middle East, India,

Burma, Ceylon and the Indian Ocean and of the need to

use their resources in those areas.* Other British leaders

spoke in the same vein. Robert E. Sherwood says “the dis¬

cussions at this meeting produced the contradictory circum¬

stance of the American representatives constantly sticking

to the main topic of the war against Germany while the

British representatives were repeatedly bringing up remind¬

ers of the war against Japan.”**

From Churchill’s memoirs and other sources we now

know that his approval on April 14, 1942 of Round-Up and

Sledgehammer was insincere and that he had had no intention

of carrying out the adopted decision. He writes that he “by

no means rejected the idea at the outset, but there were

other alternatives which lay in my mind. The first was the

descent on French Northwest Africa.... I had a second

* Ibid., pp. 534-35.

** Ibid., p. 536.

235

alternative plan... . This was Jupiter, namely, the liberation

of Northern Norway.... If it had been in my power to

give orders I would have settled upon Torch and Jupiter”

(i.e., the landing in Africa and Norway.— V.T.).* Asked

why he had not insisted on his alternatives, he replied: “I

had to work by influence and diplomacy in order to secure

agreed and harmonious action with our cherished Ally.... I

did not therefore open any of these alternatives at our

meeting on the 14th.”**

How did Churchill hope to evade fulfilling the decision

adopted on April 14? “I was however very ready,” he said,

“to give Sledgehammer, as the Cherbourg assault was called,

a fair run with other suggestions before -the Planning Com¬

mittees. I was almost certain the more it was looked at the

less it would be liked. ... But I had little doubt myself that

study of details—landing-craft and all that—and also

reflection on the main strategy of the war, would rule out

Sledgehammer .”***

Churchill and the British military leaders thus played a

double game at the talks with the Americans in April 1942.

This is admitted by General Ismay, a man who knew a great

deal because he was Churchill’s Chief-of-Staff and a mem¬

ber of his inner circle. Regarding the talks with Marshall

and Hopkins in April 1942, Ismay notes: “Everyone at the

meeting was enthusiastic.. . . Everyone agreed that the death¬

blow to Germany must be delivered across the Channel. In

fact everyone seemed to agree with the American proposals

in their entirety. No doubts were expressed; no discordant

note struck. ... Our American friends went happily

homewards under the mistaken impression that we had com¬

mitted ourselves to both Round-Up and Sledgehammer.”*

The impression Marshall and Hopkins took away with them

was not the result of some unfortunate misunderstanding,

of one side not understanding the other. It was a deliberate

deception on the part of Churchill and his associates. This

also is admitted by Ismay. He says that when subsequently

the British opposed Sledgehammer the Americans “felt we

had broken faith with them. Worse still, they got it into

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol IV, p. 289.

** Ibid., pp. 289-90.

*** Ibid.

*) 7 he Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay, pp. 249-50.

236

their heads that our opposition to Sledgehammer would

later extend to Round-Up as well”.' 5 '

That, of course, is exactly what transpired. Ismay notes

that the Americans would not have felt Churchill was

perfidious “if the British had expressed their views more

frankly” at the April talks.* ** This is an admission of the

duplicity practised by the Churchill Government in the talks

with the Americans over the opening of a Second Front. As

far as we are concerned this episode is important not only

because it illustrates the foreign policy methods of the

British ruling circles but also because it gives a deeper

insight into the perfidy of the British representatives in the

talks on a Second Front with the Soviet Union in May 1942

in London.

At the April conference Churchill acted the hypocrite

because he feared a change in American plans would draw

most of the US war effort to the Far East. After a conver¬

sation with General George Marshall at the time of the

April conference, the British Field-Marshal Alan Brooke

made the following entry in his diary: “He [Marshall] has

found that King, the American Naval Chief-of-Staff, is

proving more and more of a drain on his military resources,

continually calling for land forces to capture and hold

land-bases in the Pacific_MacArthur in Australia con¬

stitutes another thfeat by asking for forces to develop an

offensive from Australia. To counter these moves Marshall

has started the European offensive plan and is going one

hundred per cent all out on it. It is a clever move which

fits in with present political opinion and the desire to help

Russia.”*** Explaining his stand at the conference, Churchill

remarks: “We might so easily ... have been confronted with

American plans to assign the major priority to helping

China and crushing Japan.”** The preservation of Ameri¬

can priority for the European theatre strengthened the

military position of the British Isles, for it signified that large

numbers of American troops and great quantities of US

war supplies would arrive in England. This allowed Britain

to fight a war for colonies in the Middle and Far East, a war

* Ibid., p. 250.

** Ibid., p. 249.

*** Arthur Bryant, Op. cit., p. 358.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 290.

237

so dear to the hearts of the British imperialists, without

fearing for the safety of London. Moreover, it gave the

British the hope that the Americans would move their troops

to Africa and the Middle East and thereby still further

extend the struggle for the protection of the British colonial

possessions against Hitler and Mussolini. Churchill remem¬

bered the interest Roosevelt had shown at the Arcadia Con¬

ference in Operation Gymnast, which envisaged a campaign

in North Africa. Lastly, the American presence in Europe

was regarded by Churchill as a vital guarantee in the event

the German successes on the Eastern Front exceeded what

he felt was useful and safe for Britain and gave Hitler the

possibility to turn westwards again and bring to life his Sea

Lion plan. It must be borne in mind that in April 1942

Churchill was as yet unable to foresee clearly which way

the fighting on the Eastern Front would swing.

On April 12, without waiting for the London Confer¬

ence’s decision, Roosevelt sent the Soviet Government a

message requesting the presence as soon as possible in Wash¬

ington of the Soviet Foreign Minister and a senior military

officer. “I have in mind,” he wrote, “a very important mili¬

tary proposal involving the utilisation of our armed forces

in a manner to relieve your critical Western Front.”*

On April 20 the Soviet Government replied it would send

its Foreign Minister to Washington for an exchange of

views with the President “on the question of organising a

Second Front in Europe in the immediate future”.** Roose¬

velt was informed that the Soviet Foreign Minister would

stop over in London, where he would have talks with the

British Government.

The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molo¬

tov arrived in London in May 1942. In his talks there he

asked the British Government how it regarded the prospect

of diverting at least 40 German divisions from the Eastern

Front in 1942. In reply Churchill and Eden enlarged on

the conditions of a landing in Western Europe, said that it

was expedient to carry out such a landing in the region of

Pas-de-Calais, Cherbourg and Brest and spoke of control

of the high seas and of the importance of aircraft in a land¬

ing operation, but doggedly evaded concrete commitments

* Correspondence _Vol. II, p. 23.

** Ibid.

238

regarding the time and scale of a landing. At these talks

(May 21-26), the American historian Herbert Feis points

out, “Churchill was cautiously indefinite. He refrained from

direct and positive answers to Molotov’s urgent inquiries as

to whether and when the United States and Britain would

start an operation against Germany in the West.”* He did

not tell Molotov the truth, which was that the British Gov¬

ernment had no intention of opening a Second Front in

1942. He knew Molotov was on his way to Washington and

suggested that he stop in London on his return journey,

promising that “a more concrete reply could be rendered in

the light of the Washington discussions”.**

On May 28 Churchill sent a telegram to Roosevelt in

which he informed the US President of his talks with the

Soviet Foreign Minister and said his representative Admiral

Mountbatten would soon go to Washington to inform the

President and the Chiefs-of-Staff of the difficulties that had

arisen in planning Round-Up and Sledgehammer and make

a new proposal regarding Operation Jupiter, the landing in

Northern Norway. This signified that the British meant to

repudiate the agreement reached in London in April 1942

and, correspondingly, influence Roosevelt’s stand in the

talks with Molotov.

On May 30 Molotov raised before Roosevelt, Hopkins,

Marshall and King the question of a Second Front in 1942.

“The President,” say the notes of Samuel H. Cross, Profes¬

sor of Slavic Languages and Literature at Harvard Univer¬

sity, who acted as interpreter at the talks, “then put to

General Marshall the query whether developments were

clear enough so that we could say to Mr. Stalin that we are

preparing a Second Front. ‘Yes,’ replied the General. The

President then authorised Mr. Molotov to inform Mr. Stalin

that we expect the formation of a Second Front this

year.”*** In the course of further negotiations with the

Americans and, later, with the British, agreement was

reached on the text of a communique stating that the USA

and Britain would open the Second Front in Europe in 1942.

The fact that such was the outcome of the May 1942 talks

in Washington is not called in question even by approved

* Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 51.

** Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. Ill, p. 567.

*** Ibid., p. 577.

239

American histories of the Second World War. Maurice Mat-

loff and Edwin M. Snell write that the Soviet Union was

given a strong pledge that a Second Front would be opened

in 1942.“' Explaining to Churchill why he gave that pledge,

Roosevelt said he wanted Molotov to return home with tan¬

gible results and give Stalin a favourable report.** The mo¬

tives behind this are made clear in another telegram from

Roosevelt to Churchill on June 6, in which he said: “I con¬

fess that I view with great concern the Russian Front.”***

Churchill, too, followed the titanic battle on the Eastern

Front with anxiety, hence his decision to “help” the Soviet

Union with a spurious promise of military assistance in 1942.

When Molotov stopped over at London on his way home

from Washington, the British Government agreed to open

the Second Front in 1942. This was confirmed in the Anglo-

Soviet communique, which stated that “complete agreement

was reached on the urgent task of opening a Second Front

in Europe in 1942”.*! The Soviet-US communique con¬

tained a similar phrase. Both communiques were published

on June 11, 1942, after Molotov returned to Moscow. The

USA and Britain thus entered into a clear and definite

commitment to open the Second Front in 1942, giving this

commitment broad publicity.

That Churchill had no intention of honouring the pledge

he had given on behalf of Britain is borne out by the fact

that when the Anglo-Soviet communique was being drawn

up he handed Molotov a memorandum, which was later

widely used to justify the British Government’s unscrupu¬

lous attitude to its commitments regarding the Second Front.

This document left it a loophole. It stated: “We are making

preparations for a landing on the continent in August or

September 1942.... It is impossible to say in advance whether

the situation will be such as to make this operation feasible

when the time comes. We can therefore give no promise in

the matter, but provided that it appears sound and sensible

we shall not hesitate to put our plans into effect.”***

These words could only be understood literally: the

British Government was making preparations—it was not

* Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Op. cit., p. 270.

** Ibid., p. 189.

*** Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. Ill, p. 590.

*1 History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1945, Moscow, 1969, p. 439.

**) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 342.

240

merely promising to take steps to open a Second Front or

studying the possibilities for such an operation, or intending

to plan it; it was making preparations for an invasion of

the European continent provided no unforeseen circum¬

stances (hence the words “impossible to say in advance”)

hampered that invasion. The words “we can therefore give

no promise in the matter” referred to circumstances which

might arise in August and September 1942 and which,

naturally, did not depend on the British Government. In the

event they were such as could be foreseen when this memo¬

randum was submitted (as was the case), the British Govern¬

ment would “not hesitate to put our plans into effect”.

When Churchill handed the memorandum to Molotov he

indisputably knew that in August and September 1942 cir¬

cumstances would make it possible to open a Second Front.

Firstly, had he thought otherwise he would have said so

openly and definitely in the memorandum and, secondly,

he would not have prepared for an operation that was not

“sound and sensible”; from the memorandum it appears that

such preparations were being made. Consequently, Chur¬

chill’s reservation that “we can therefore give no promise”

to open the Second Front if circumstances make such an

operation useless and unfeasible was a statement of fact and

could not mean that the British Government did not under¬

take to open the Second Front in 1942. This wording might

have had the significance Churchill sought belatedly to

attribute to it if it alone had existed in the memorandum. But

the memorandum begins with the phrase: “We are making

preparations for a landing on the continent in August or

September 1942”, and ends with the words: “we shall not

hesitate to put our plans into effect.” In this context, Chur¬

chill’s reservation cannot be accepted as grounds for releasing

the British Government from its commitment, and the entire

memorandum must be regarded as a document confirming

this commitment, which was formulated in the communique

and in the memorandum itself. The American historian

William L. Neumann, for instance, says: “The British had

given Molotov a memorandum stating that preparations

were being made for a landing on the continent of Europe

in August or September 1942.”*

* William L. Neumann, Making the Peace, 1941-1945, Washington,

1950, pp. 35-36.

16-1561

241

The Churchill memorandum cannot be considered in iso¬

lation from the other documents agreed on and signed by

representatives of the USSR and Britain. In interpreting it

one must take into account not only the Anglo-Soviet com¬

munique envisaging a Second Front in 1942, but also the

Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance. Neither must it be con¬

sidered in isolation from the Soviet-US communique or

from what the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Af¬

fairs was told in Washington, for Churchill himself had

suggested giving the Soviet Government a final reply on the

Second Front after the American Government had stated its

position on that issue. What Churchill said amounted to:

“We shall do as the Americans do.” The Americans had

without any reservations declared and recorded in the com¬

munique that the Second Front would be opened in 1942.

After receiving these assurances, the Soviet People’s Com¬

missar for Foreign Affairs went to London where he raised

the question: What will now be your last word about the

Second Front? In reply the British Government agreed to

the publication of a communique on the Second Front, con¬

taining the same words as the Soviet-US communique. This

meant that both the British and US governments had equally

committed themselves to opening a Second Front. This,

stated in more definite terms, is to be found in the Churchill

memorandum: “We are making preparations for a landing

on the continent in August or September 1942.... We shall

not hesitate to put our plans into effect.” The reservations

in the memorandum are thus reduced to nothing. It should

be borne in mind that when Churchill and his defenders

refer to the reservation in the memorandum they completely

ignore the above two phrases, which reiterate the British

Government’s commitment to open the Second Front in

1942.

Inasmuch as Churchill and the historians who shield him

single out as important in this document only the reserva¬

tion and regard the part reiterating the commitment to

open a Second Front as having no significance, the only

conclusion one can draw is that the memorandum was de¬

liberately worded in such a way as to justify breaking the

pledge given in the Anglo-Soviet communique. In other

words, the British Government adopted an unprincipled stand

on the question of the Second Front, in both May and

June 1942.

242

Lenin had noted that the British imperialists “have broken

all records not only in the number of colonies they have

grabbed, but also in the subtlety of their disgusting hypoc¬

risy”.This feature of British policy was particularly con¬

spicuous in the talks on the Second Front. The US General

Albert C. Wedemeyer, who with Hopkins and Marshall

took part in the April 1942 talks on the Second Front, writes:

“The British were masters in negotiations—particularly

were they adept in the use of phrases or words which were

capable of more than one meaning or interpretation. Here

was the setting, with all the trappings of a classical Machia¬

vellian scene. I am not suggesting that the will to deceive

was a personal characteristic of any of the participants. But

when matters of state were involved, our British opposite

numbers had elastic scruples. ... What I witnessed was the

British power of diplomatic finesse in its finest hour, a

power that had been developed over centuries of successful

international intrigue, cajollery, and tacit compulsions.”**

One can understand the meaning of the Churchill memo¬

randum and the further use of that document by Churchill

and other British leaders only when one bears in mind the

“elastic scruples” mentioned by Wedemeyer. That is pre¬

cisely why serious American and British historians disre¬

gard Churchill’s subterfuge with the memorandum and con¬

sider that in the spring of 1942 Britain and the USA had

pledged to open a Second Front that same year. Neumann

says the Soviet Union had been promised that a Second

Front “could be expected in 1942”.*** Feis writes that Chur¬

chill had given Molotov the impression that a landing across

the English Channel would be undertaken possibly even in

1942 and handed him the above-mentioned memorandum to

confirm that impression.*) Medlicott gives the same assess¬

ment of the pledge made to the USSR by Britain and the

United States in the spring of 1942. In the journal Interna¬

tional Affairs he wrote of “the Second Front that had been

promised to the Russians in 1942”.**) In April 1959, in the

same journal, he pointed out that in 1942 there was “the

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works , Vol. 28, p. 64.

** Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, New York, 1958,

pp. 105-06.

*** William L. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 35.

*) Herbert Feis, Op. cit., pp. 51-52.

**) International Affairs, October 1958, Vol. 34, No. 4, p. 509.

16 *

243

obvious, immediate, and imperative need, on which both

Churchill and Roosevelt were agreed, for a Second Front”.*

Despite the British Government’s insincerity on the ques¬

tion of the Second Front in 1942 the agreement was of great

significance. It contributed towards the further strengthening

of the anti-fascist coalition. This was a major achievement

of Soviet foreign policy, which with the support of the

British and American peoples secured from the governments

of Britain and the USA formal agreement to active military

operations against nazi Germany in the European continent.

This agreement gave impetus to the struggle of the peoples

against the nazis and fortified their confidence that the in¬

vaders would ultimately be beaten.

The struggle of the Soviet and all other freedom-loving

peoples for a Second Front entered a new phase following

the publication of the Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-US commu¬

niques on that issue. Henceforth it was a struggle against the

efforts of the British Government to evade the precise and

timely fulfilment of its commitments.

Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance

When Roosevelt sent his invitation to the Soviet People’s

Commissar for Foreign Affairs, he wanted him to come to

Washington first and to go to London from there. The So¬

viet Government, however, decided otherwise. Its motive

for sending the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs

first to London was that a Second Front could be opened

only from Britain and with the active participation of the

British Armed Forces. It felt the stand of the British Gov¬

ernment on this question had to be clarified before the talks

in Washington were started. Moreover, it was important to

consummate, as quickly as possible, the protracted negotia¬

tions on the conclusion of an Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance.

The most disputed point in these negotiations was that

of the Soviet Union’s western frontiers. When Eden was

in Moscow he said both Britain and the USA considered

the question of frontiers, including the Soviet Union’s

western frontiers, should be settled at the future peace

conference. In seeking to persuade the Soviet Government to

postpone the issue until the peace conference, Churchill

* International Affairs, April 1959, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 279-80.

calculated that the USSR would come to that conference in a

state of exhaustion enabling Britain and the USA to impose

anything they wished on it, including frontiers that met

with their interests. In a book published under the auspices

of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Ameri¬

can historian William Hardy McNeill notes that Churchill

and “some British officials” desired to put off the question

of the Soviet western frontiers “to some future peace con¬

ference, when the constellation of military and economic

power emerging from the war might be expected to favour

the Anglo-Americans as against the Russians”. In Chur¬

chill’s “advocacy of postponement he was vigorously sup¬

ported by the United States. At least some of the Poles

(i.e., members of the emigre Government.— V. T.] too, were

well content to leave the boundary questions to the future,

when, they imagined, a war-weakened or defeated Russia

would be unable to oppose the materialisation of at least a

part of Polish ambitions”.* That, in fact, was how the

British ruling circles planned to take Soviet interests “into

consideration” at the future peace conference.

However, in the spring of 1942 the military and political

situation compelled Britain to think of modifying her atti¬

tudes. She began to realise that the Allied victory depended

on the successes of the Soviet Union. The setbacks of the

British Armed Forces were so catastrophic that even the

very restrained British journal The Economist found it

necessary, on February 21, 1942, to give the following

appraisal of Britain’s military position: “The British people

have been wonderfully patient under the long string of dis¬

asters and disappointments. But they are getting very tired

of always losing—and usually losing so badly. In the whole

history of the war, the British Army has not a single success

of any importance to its credit—unless it be the very Pyrrhic

triumph of Dunkirk or the very temporary gains in Libya. . . .

For at the moment, Britain is losing the war. Hitler may be

losing it too, Russia may be winning it and America may be

preparing to win it—but Britain is losing it.”**

This fitted in with the estimate of the situation by British

and American military leaders. The words “together we

shall win final victory over our common enemy” in the

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., pp. 47-48.

** The Economist, Feb. 21, 1942, p. 242.

245

message of greeting sent on Red Army Day in February

1942 by Chief of the Imperial General Staff Alan Brooke

and Air Marshal Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff, to

Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov, Chief of the Red Army’s

General Staff, were not a piece of formal, protocol courtesy.

They reflected the realistic thinking of British political and

military leaders in 1942. On that day, February 23, a tele¬

gram was received in Moscow from General Douglas

MacArthur in the Pacific. It stated in part: “The hopes of

civilisation rest on the worthy banners of the courageous

Russian Army.... The scale and grandeur of this effort [the

Battle of Moscow.— V.T.) marks it as the greatest military

achievement in all history.”*' Objectively estimating the

situation, they drew the correct conclusion that their coun¬

tries could not afford to ignore the Soviet efforts to improve

Anglo-Soviet relations and thereby strengthen the anti¬

fascist coalition.

That made Churchill doubt the worth of clinging to the

objective of revising the Soviet western frontiers which the

British Government had adopted at the time of Eden’s visit

to Moscow in December 1941 and later. “But now, three

months later,” he writes, “under the pressure of events, I did

not feel that this moral position could be physically main¬

tained. In a deadly struggle it is not right to assume more

burdens than those who are fighting for a great cause can

bear. My opinions about the Baltic states were, and are,

unaltered, but I felt that I could not carry them farther

forward at this time.”*'*'

On March 7, 1942, in a message to Roosevelt on this

question, he wrote: “If Winant is with you now, he will no

doubt explain the Foreign Office view about Russia. The

increasing gravity of the war has led me to feel that the

principles of the Atlantic Charter ought not to be construct¬

ed so as to deny Russia the frontiers she occupied when

Germany attacked her. This was the basis on which Russia

acceded to the Charter.”*** It took the “increasing gravity

of the war” to bring Churchill round to thinking of the need

to respect the legitimate interests of the Soviet people. He

asked the Americans for “a free hand” to sign a treaty with

* Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 497.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 327.

*** Ibid.

the Soviet Union, and then noted: “Everything portends an

immense renewal of the German invasion of Russia in the

spring, and there is very little we can do to help.”*

The documents covering the January-May 1942 talks on

this question between London and Washington, published

by the US State Department, provide evidence that the

British Government was in some measure inclined to meet

the legitimate demand of the Soviet Government. In London

it was appreciated that the Soviet demand regarding the

1941 frontiers was just. On January 10, 1942, Winant, who

saw Eden when the latter returned from Moscow, telegraphed

the State Department: “I think Eden was personally

impressed with the reasonableness of the Russian demand.”**

But it was certainly not because it was reasonable that the

British were inclined to satisfy it.

They gave the Americans four reasons: (a) relations had

to be strengthened with the USSR to ensure its effective

participation in the war against Germany and, later, possi¬

bly against Japan; (b) the USSR was justly dissatisfied with

the Allies’ reluctance to render it tangible assistance by

opening a Second Front and it had to be calmed; (c) Soviet

support had to be secured to contain Germany after the war;

and, lastly, (d) it was not possible to ignore the British

people’s resolute pressure for an immediate and radical

improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations.

In its talks with the US Government, the British Govern¬

ment offered arguments which showed that in general it

understood the Soviet position. On February 18 Lord

Halifax gave Sumner Welles a telegram from the Foreign

Office, which stated: “There is little doubt that the Soviet

Government is suspicious lest our policy of close collabora¬

tion with the United States Government will be pursued at

the expense of Russian interests and that we aim at an

Anglo-American peace and post-war world.”*** It was felt,

therefore, that the Soviet Government would regard the

British stand on the question of the Soviet frontiers as a

test of Anglo-American relations vis-a-vis the USSR.

Shortly afterwards, returning to this question, Halifax said

at the State Department that “one of the chief aims of Soviet

* Ibid.

*''■ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. Ill, p. 492.

*** Ibid., p. 518.

247

policy has been and no doubt still is to obtain the maximum

guarantees of Russia’s security so that the Soviet Govern¬

ment can work out their own social and economic experiment

without danger of foreign intervention or war”.* This was

a noteworthy admission of the peaceful nature of Soviet

foreign policy.

“We must face the fact that our present relations with

Russia are definitely unsatisfactory,”** Eden telegraphed

Halifax in March with instructions to convey this message

to the Americans. But in order to improve these relations

a favourable reply on the frontier question had to be given

to the Soviet Government. This step was necessary to induce

the USSR to take British and American opinion into account

in issues concerning the conduct of the war and to heed any

possible proposal for Soviet involvement in the war against

Japan.*** In a telegram on March 13 the US Charge d’Af¬

faires dotted his i’s. He reported that the British leadership

were apprehensive lest Britain’s behaviour at the 1939

negotiations and “the long-standing dislike of the British

ruling classes for all he [Stalin] has stood for” made the

Soviet Union revise its policy and conclude peace with Ger¬

many.*) Eden was aware that refusal to satisfy the Soviet

Union’s legitimate demand would confirm its suspicion that

it “can expect no real consideration for Russian interests

from ourselves or the United States; that we wish Russia to

continue fighting the war for British and American ends;

and that we would not mind seeing Russia and Germany

mutually exhaust each other”.**)

On March 30 Halifax took to Sumner Welles another

telegram from Eden offering additional arguments and con¬

siderations why Britain felt it was necessary to recognise

the 1940 Soviet frontiers, with the exception of the Soviet-

Polish frontier.***) “Under present conditions,” the telegram

stated, “Great Britain is unable to give military aid and

assistance to Stalin in the sense of a Second Front or even

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. Ill, pp. 524-25.

** Ibid., p. 532.

*** Ibid.

*) Ibid., p. 533.

**> Ibid., p. 532.

***) The question of the Soviet-Polish frontier was not raised before

Britain at the time. The Soviet Union meant to settle it by direct nego¬

tiations with the Polish Government.

248

in the sense of any considerable supply of materiel. .. . And

in view of the pressure of British public opinion, Great

Britain is forced to conclude this treaty with Stalin as a

political substitute for material military assistance ”* [my

italics.— V.T.].

The British Government repeatedly stated that relations

with the USSR had to be improved to ensure Soviet support

in the war with Germany and to utilise the Soviet Union

after the war as a counter-balance to Germany. “Continued

Russian co-operation with Great Britain in Europe and with

the United States after the war was over,” Halifax held, “was

necessary in order that a balance might be maintained as

a safeguard on the East against German activity.”** The

calculation behind this view was that the war might end not

in Germany’s total defeat but in some sort of compromise

that would leave Germany as a formidable force in Europe.

That would make Soviet assistance a restraining factor

against Germany.

The Foreign Office considered that while the USSR was

still in a difficult position militarily and its future foreign

policy potentialities were dependent on the further course

of the war and, therefore, still unclear, it was expedient to

establish “close relations with Russia ... in order to exercise

as much influence as possible on her future course of

action”.*** Here it was taken into account that the Soviet

Union would not be defeated or prostrated in the war as

the British Government believed it might be. An unmis¬

takable indication of this was the smashing defeat inflicted

on the Germans at Moscow. “We cannot be certain,” it was

felt at the Foreign Office, “that Germany’s defeat may not

be brought about in principle by Russian action before our

own and American war potentiality is fully developed.”*'

And further: “It would be unsafe to gamble on Russia

emerging so exhausted from the war that she will be forced

to collaborate with us without our having to make any con¬

cessions to her.”**' The fact that these considerations date

from February 1942 is evidence in favour of the foresight

of some of the people in the Foreign Office.

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. Ill, p. 537.

** Ibid., p. 513.

*** Ibid., p. 518.

*> Ibid., p. 517.

**) Ibid., p. 518.

249

Another powerful stimulus was British public opinion

which was categorically pressing for better relations with

the USSR, for a just and worthy attitude to Britain’s Ally.

On March 5 the US Charge d’Affaires in Britain asked

the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Alexander Cadogan what the reaction in Britain would be

if the Soviet Union’s wishes were met. Cadogan replied that

“soundings in the House of Commons indicated that senti¬

ment there would be largely favourable and that certainly

in the country’s present enthusiastically pro-Russia mood

acceptance would be welcomed by the public at large”.*

On February 18 Sir Stafford Cripps addressed an unofficial

conference attended by about 300 MPs representing all

political parties. He urged that Britain should meet Soviet

Union’s desires regarding its western frontiers and offered

mostly the same arguments which the British Government

had proffered at the talks with the USA. The Americans

were interested in this conference, and the Charge d’Affaires

requested Richard Law, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for

Foreign Affairs, for information on Cripps’s speech. At this

conversation Law said that as a whole the House of Com¬

mons favoured the acceptance of the Soviet proposals. As

for the public at large, Law said, he felt “that agreement

with Russia would be highly acceptable”.*

On March 30 Halifax informed Welles of the contents

of a telegram from Eden, who wrote that “British public

opinion must be considered”. If relations between the Soviet

Union and Britain became antagonistic and if it became

known that this had come about as a result of the British

Government’s obstinacy in refusing to recognise the Soviet

1940 frontiers, “the situation in Great Britain will be cata¬

strophic”. In explaining this statement by Eden, Halifax

remarked that if such a situation took shape, “Mr. Chur¬

chill’s Government would probably fall and, in that event,

Sir Stafford Cripps would replace him, with the probability

that under such a government a frankly Communist, pro-

Moscow policy would be pursued”.*** Although there was

an element of exaggeration in this Eden-Halifax assertion,

it convincingly showed two things: firstly, the British people

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. Ill, p. 528,

** Ibid., p. 531.

*** Ibid., pp. 537-38.

250

were firmly determined to secure better relations with the

USSR and, secondly, the Soviet Union’s demand regarding

its frontiers was reasonable and well-founded and British

public opinion would unanimously support an Anglo-Soviet

settlement of that issue.

American opposition to an Anglo-Soviet agreement on

this question alarmed the British Government, and on April

3 Adolf A. Berle, US Assistant Secretary of State, wrote “of

the almost frantic pressure by the British upon us to secure

our assent to this”.* London’s “frantic pressure” was easily

explained. The British were aware that the Americans did

not want a radical improvement of relations between Britain

and the USSR as that would have inevitably strengthened

Britain’s position with regard to the USA. The Americans

were determined to take an active part in the settlement of

questions of this kind and were set on preventing anything

that might strengthen the position of their British partners.

President Roosevelt made it plain that he was against an

Anglo-Soviet agreement on the frontier issue and informed

the British that he would personally discuss the question

with the head of the Soviet Government.** This seriously

perturbed the British, who were worried that once the

Americans took the settlement of the issue into their own

hands they would simply be pushed aside. Halifax at once

requested the President to keep the British informed of his

talks with Moscow on this issue and to give the British an

opportunity to state their considerations to the Americans.

He expressed the fear that if the President alone discussed

the issue with Stalin the latter would be led into the belief

that the British Government had no interest in it. He

declared that this was “an issue of equal interest to the

United States and ourselves, and therefore it would seem

that all three Powers should get together to discuss this

difficulty”.***

Britain informed the Soviet Union that like the USA she

preferred to put off the frontier question to the future peace

conference, at which the Soviet demand would be satisfied.

However, published diplomatic documents provide irrefu¬

table evidence that neither Britain nor the USA considered

* Ibid., p. 539.

** Ibid., p. 521.

*** Ibid., p. 526.

251

it necessary to satisfy the Soviet Union’s legitimate demand.'"'

They hoped they would be able to dodge the issue after

the war.

Such was the situation when the People’s Commissar for

Foreign Affairs arrived in London in May 1942 for talks

on the Second Front and a treaty of alliance. Naturally, the

talks on the treaty immediately reached a deadlock.

When on May 21 Cordell Hull received Eden’s message

on the British stand in the talks with the People’s Commissar

for Foreign Affairs he “seemed to spin with agitation”."'"'

The US Government took steps to block the conclusion

of an Anglo-Soviet treaty founded on unqualified respect

for Soviet rights and interests. It used the promise to open

a Second Front in 1942 to induce the Soviet Government

not to insist on the immediate settlement of the frontier

issue. As we have already noted, Roosevelt sent Stalin a

message inviting the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs

to Washington for talks on a Second Front before Hopkins

and Marshall had reached agreement on this question with

the British in London. “For this haste he had another major

reason,” writes Feis. “He had hoped that by giving the

Soviet Government satisfaction in this vital military matter,

he could cause it to desist in its efforts to have Soviet fron¬

tiers dealt with in the Treaty of Alliance with Britain.”*"'’*

When the Anglo-Soviet talks got under way in London,

the Americans sought to divert them by bringing into play

the promise of post-war economic aid to the Soviet Union.

Winant saw Molotov on the evening of May 24, Feis says,

and “after referring to the relief programme for Russia

which the American Government had in mind and to the

Second Front” he “emphasised how strongly Roosevelt and

Hull were opposed to introducing frontier problems at this

time”.** Winant, we learn from Cordell Hull, informed

Molotov “that we were preparing to discuss commercial

policy with the Russians and were also attempting to evolve

a relief programme including Russia. Winant expressed our

interest in a Second Front. ... He emphasised ... that the

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. Ill, pp. 511-12,

520, 541.

** Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 62.

Ibid., p. 58.

*) Ibid., p. 63.

252

President and I were both opposed to introducing frontier

problems at this time.”' 5 '

In the talks with the People’s Commissar for Foreign

Affairs the British Government adhered to the line laid

down by the Americans, deciding to evade the frontier

question by referring to US objections. It did not find this

difficult to do inasmuch as in principle it too had no desire

to satisfy the Soviet demand, having contemplated changing

its stand on this question (during the talks with the USA in

January-May) only as a result of pressure of circumstances.

This stand by the British and United States leaders placed

the Soviet Government in a dilemma: should it continue

to insist on its just demands and thereby jeopardise agree¬

ment on the Second Front and the immediate conclusion of

a treaty of alliance with Britain, or should it sign the

treaty and drop the frontier issue? It took the second course

in order to strengthen the anti-fascist coalition and consol¬

idate relations with Britain and the USA, thereby display¬

ing good will and a spirit of co-operation. This has always

been a feature of Soviet foreign policy. “In fact, on almost

every political problem,” writes Admiral William D. Leahy,

who accompanied Roosevelt to international conferences

during the war, “the Russians made sufficient concessions

for an agreement to be reached”.* ** Cordell Hull says it was

“a definite concession”*** on the part of the Soviet Union

when it agreed to drop the frontier question from the text

of the treaty with Britain.

The Treaty of Alliance in the War Against Hitlerite

Germany and Her Associates in Europe and of Collabora¬

tion and Mutual Assistance Thereafter was signed by the

Soviet Union and Britain at the British Foreign Office on

May 26. It consisted of two parts, the first recording the

commitment of the USSR and Britain to afford one another

military and other assistance and support of all kinds in

the war against Germany and her satellites. The signatories

undertook not to enter into any negotiations with the nazi

Government or any other government in Germany that did

not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to

negotiate or conclude except by mutual consent any armi-

* Cordell Hull, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1173.

** William D. Leahy, / Was There, New York, 1950, p. 318.

**» Cordell Hull, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1173.

253

stice or peace treaty with Germany or any other state asso¬

ciated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

The second part of the treaty defined the relations

between the two countries after the war. It provided for

post-war collaboration and mutual assistance and recorded

a pledge to co-operate with other countries in establishing

an international body with the purpose of strengthening

peace and averting aggression, and in the organisation of

security and economic prosperity in Europe. Britain and the

Soviet Union agreed that after the termination of hostilities

they would take all measures in their power to render im¬

possible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace

by Germany or any of the states associated with her in acts

of aggression in Europe. It was stated that should one of

the signatories during the post-war period become involved

in hostilities with Germany or any of her accomplices in

Europe the other signatory would at once give him all the

military and other support and assistance in his power. The

USSR and Britain undertook not to conclude any alliance

and not to take part in any coalition directed against each

other. The first part of the treaty was to remain in force until

peace with Germany and her satellites was re-established.

The second part was set to remain in force for a period

of twenty years.*'

While in the main repeating the contents of the Anglo-

Soviet Agreement of July 12, 1941, the first part of the

treaty specified an important point. While the 1941 agree¬

ment had spoken of mutual military and other assistance

only against Germany, the treaty spoke of a joint struggle

not only against Germany herself but also against her allies

in Europe. The second part of the treaty was totally new,

and was the first document laying down the basic principles

for friendly post-war relations between the USSR and

Britain and for co-operation with other members of the anti¬

fascist coalition in the future peace settlement.

Some Soviet proposals were not included in the treaty due

to British opposition, but in spite of that the treaty strength¬

ened relations between the USSR and Britain and helped

to consolidate the anti-fascist coalition. That is precisely

why it was met with enthusiastic approbation in the USSR,

Britain and other countries of the anti-fascist front. The

* Vneshnaya politika Sovietskogo Soyuza ..., Vol. I, pp. 270-73.

254

Munichites were dealt a crippling blow, for by signing this

treaty the British Government willy nilly recognised the

collapse of the Munich policy, a policy founded on a joint

struggle by Britain and Germany against the USSR.

Also extremely important was the fact that the treaty

obstructed a deal with Germany for those reactionary cir¬

cles in Britain who preferred peace with the nazis to war

with them.

In order to underscore the immense importance which the

Soviet Union attached to this treaty it was ratified not by

the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR but by

a specially convened session of the Supreme Soviet on June

18. It was ratified by Britain on June 24, 1942.

The British Government took the step of signing a treaty

of alliance with the USSR because by the spring of 1942 it

realised that without the Soviet Union Britain would not

win the war even with the USA on her side. In a radio

broadcast from New York on April 23 Lord Beaverbrook

declared: “Russia may win victory in 1942. .. . That is a

chance, an opportunity to bring war to an end here and

now. But if the Russians are defeated and driven out of the

war, never will such a chance come to us again.”* Later, on

June 21, 1942, speaking in Birmingham at a 30,000-strong

rally in support of the Anglo-Soviet alliance, he warned:

“The German Army would now be invading Britain if the

Russian Army had broken down last autumn. For the future

we must work together in the war and in the peace.”** These

were not idle words. Beaverbrook said what he really

thought, and in assessing the significance of his speeches it

must not be forgotten that he was one of the most influential

of the British capitalists.

By providing for a post-war alliance with the USSR, the

treaty secured Britain against a possible threat from Ger¬

many, as was clearly stated in the treaty, and gave her a

stronger hand in her dealings with the United States, on

whom to a certain extent she now found herself dependent.

It was already quite obvious that after the war Britain

would encounter a further powerful and decisive American

offensive against her interests.

Reports of the battles on the Eastern Front removed from

* W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, Op. cit., p. 709.

** Ibid., p. 721.

255

the eyes of the British people the web of lies and falsifica¬

tions that the reactionary circles had woven over long years

of anti-Soviet propaganda. By the time of Pearl Harbour,

McNeill writes, “the British people had almost forgotten

the hostility towards Russia” which had been planted

over a period of many years, and “in its place came

admiration”.*

However, there were people in Britain who did not

welcome this establishment of long-term Allied relations

with the USSR. They belonged to the section of the British

ruling class whose animosity towards the Soviet Union was

so overriding that in their indulgement of their hate they

were prepared to sacrifice the country’s national interests.

For the time being they were forced to melt into the back¬

ground, but their activities continued to be dangerous and

harmful with the end result that the Anglo-Soviet Treaty

of Alliance gave much less to the struggle for victory and

the post-war settlement than it otherwise might have done.

The Soviet-British-American agreement on the Second

Front and the Treaty of Alliance with Britain, both signed

in May 1942, were tokens of international recognition of

the strength and successes of the Soviet Army and the

Soviet people in the struggle against the common enemy of

all freedom-loving nations. It was an achievement of Soviet

foreign policy aimed at promoting and strengthening

friendly relations with the USA, Britain and other members

of the united front of nations in the armed struggle against

nazi aggression, a policy of peaceful coexistence of countries

with different socio-economic systems which made it possible

to establish military and political co-operation between the

Soviet Union, the United States of America and Britain

during the war.

Britain and the USA

Break Their Second Front Commitment

The agreement between the Soviet Union, Britain and

the United States on a Second Front in Europe in 1942

opened up tremendous potentialities for the anti-fascist

coalition. Had this agreement been fulfilled, the war might

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 51.

256

have ended much sooner and much of the sacrifice and

suffering might have been avoided.

The possibility for a successful landing existed. The Red

Army’s winter offensive had put the enemy armed forces in

an immensely difficult position. In the course of a year,

while the Red Army was bearing the entire burden of the

struggle against the nazi hordes, Britain and the USA had

built up the armed forces and technical means necessary for

an invasion of the European continent. The poor fortifica¬

tions in Western Europe were manned by second-rate Ger¬

man units. Lastly, the people of Western Europe were pre¬

pared to meet the Allied forces and join them in fighting

the German invaders. In April Admiral Leahy, US Ambas¬

sador to the Vichy Government, reported to his Government:

“We are given to understand that the majority of the

French people in the Occupied Zone are counting on this

possibility [i.e., an Allied invasion of Europe.— V. T.), and

from the Unoccupied Zone we receive a great number of

letters and expressions of opinion upholding this view. I

believe there is no doubt that in the French mind the feeling

exists that such a move is absolutely necessary and that it

must be undertaken at an early date.”*

However, the action taken by the governments of Britain

and the United States ran counter to the hopes of the peo¬

ples of Britain, the USA, the Soviet Union and the occupied

countries and to the formal pledges which the US and

British governments had given to the USSR.

Even before the Anglo-Soviet-US communique on the

British and American commitment to effect a landing in

Europe in 1942 was published, the British Government

embarked on a series of diplomatic manoeuvres to secure

US agreement to the non-fulfilment of that commitment.

Before the communique was published Churchill sent Admi¬

ral Lord Louis Mountbatten to Washington as his personal

envoy. General Wedemeyer describes Mountbatten as “by

all odds the most colourful on the British Chiefs of Staff

level. ... He was a cousin of the King and, no doubt about

it, a great favourite of the Prime Minister.”** Churchill’s

pet “presented to the President and Hopkins the British case

* Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., pp. 539-40.

Albert C. Wedemeyer, Op. cit., p. 108.

17-1561

257

against trying to gain a foothold across the English Channel

in 1942”.*

The communique was published on June 11, and eight

days later, on June 19, Churchill, accompanied by British

military leaders, arrived in the USA to discuss with Roose¬

velt how to evade landing troops in Europe in 1942. In a

memorandum to Roosevelt Churchill wrote that the British

Government did not approve this operation and that no

landing in France should be undertaken in 1942. But if

there would not be a Second Front, “what else are we going

to do? Can we afford to stand idle in the Atlantic theatre

during the whole of 1942? ... It is in this setting and on this

background that the French Northwest Africa operation

should be studied,” the memorandum said.** Churchill and

Roosevelt conferred at Hyde Park, the Roosevelt family

estate situated 200 kilometres away from New York, and at

the same time British military leaders had talks with their

American opposite numbers in Washington. “The President,”

American historians tell us, “responded as readily to the

approach of the Prime Minister as the American Staff in

Washington had to the approach of the British Chiefs of

Staff.”***

The news of the unexpected British surrender of the

strong fortress of Tobruk in Libya came while these talks

were in progress. “This,” Churchill writes, “was one of the

heaviest blows I can recall during the war. Not only were

its military effects grievous, but it had affected the reputa¬

tion of the British armies. At Singapore 85,000 men had

surrendered to inferior numbers of Japanese. Now in

Tobruk a garrison of ... 33,000 seasoned soldiers had laid

down their arms to perhaps one-half of their number.”* 1

The fall of Tobruk forced Churchill to cut short his talks

and urgently return to Britain. Although no final decision

for a Second Front in 1942 had been taken at the Churchill-

Roosevelt talks, the conviction spread in well-informed

circles after the Prime Minister’s return to London that no

invasion of France would be undertaken that year.

Churchill arrived in Britain to find a powerful wave of

indignation sweeping the country. A resolution stating “that

* Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Op. cit., p. 235.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 382.

*** Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Op. cit., p. 240.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 383.

258

this House, while paying tribute to the heroism and endur¬

ance of the Armed Forces of the Crown in circumstances

of exceptional difficulty, has no confidence in the central

direction of the war” was put on the agenda of the House

of Commons.* The possibility of a political crisis was

mooted in the press and in Parliament lobbies. In the

debate of a motion of no confidence in the Government, Lord

Winterton demanded that Churchill resign as Prime Minis¬

ter. One of the MPs suggested temporarily transferring the

command of the British troops to Czech, Polish and French

generals, who were in Britain at the time. He declared: “I

say that it is far better to win battles and save British

soldiers’ lives under the leadership of other members of the

United Nations than to lose them under our own inefficient

officers.”** On the whole Churchill weathered the parlia¬

mentary storm; the motion of no confidence gained only 25

votes and was not passed. However, this was a serious

demonstration of British public dissatisfaction with the

Government’s military leadership.

The parliamentary storm made Churchill realise that

something urgent had to be done to save the British troops

in Libya and restore the reputation of the British Army. An

Anglo-American landing in North Africa would serve the

purpose. At the same time, it would hold up the opening

of a Second Front in Europe, protract the Soviet Union’s

singlehanded confrontation with Germany and confuse

British public opinion, which was demanding the fulfilment

of the promises made to the Soviet Union. Churchill formu¬

lated his policy in this period as follows: “During the month

of July, when I was politically at my weakest and without

a gleam of military success, I had to procure from the United

States the decisions which ... dominated the next two

years of the war. This was the abandonment of all plans for

crossing the Channel in 1942 and the occupation of French

North Africa in the autumn or winter by a large Anglo-

American expedition.”*** It soon became evident that such

decisions were not difficult to procure.

Roosevelt was becoming more and more inclined towards

a landing in Africa, and the factors that finally, in July,

made him decide in favour of such an operation were pres-

* Ibid., pp. 392-93.

** Ibid., p. 400.

*** Ibid., pp. 432-33.

17 *

259

sure from the reactionaries in the US Government who

wanted to see the USSR exhausted in the war with Ger¬

many, the growing confidence that the Soviet Union would

withstand the campaign of the summer of 1942, and the

interest of the American monopolies in the French North

African colonies, which, it was felt, could be easily made

sure of provided the opportunity was not lost and the

British were prevented from getting there first.

First and foremost, it was necessary to end the languid

argument with the British over where the landing should

be made. For this purpose Roosevelt sent Hopkins and

Marshall post-haste to Britain. On the eve of their depar¬

ture, on July 15, Roosevelt discussed the pending London

talks with Hopkins. From the minutes of this conversation

it is evident that Roosevelt had made up his mind to go

ahead with the African operation in 1942. He said: “Even

though we must reluctantly agree to no Sledgehammer in

1942, I still think we should press forward vigorously for

the 1943 enterprise.... Gymnast has the great advantage

of being a purely American enterprise.”*

In a directive to Hopkins and Marshall, written on the

next day, Roosevelt gave them a week in which to reach

agreement with the British on joint operations in 1942 and

1943. He instructed them carefully to study the possibility

of carrying out Sledgehammer, which “would definitely

sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning point which

would save Russia this year.”** In the event this operation

was removed from the agenda, Hopkins and Marshall were

to “determine upon another place for US troops to fight in

1942”.*** Further, arguments were offered in favour of main¬

taining a strong hold on the Middle East. “In reality,”

Higgins says, “Sledgehammer was dead even before the

arrival of the second Hopkins-Marshall mission in Britain

on July 18.”*)

The main reason for the decision taken at the London

talks to postpone the Second Front was that both the British

and the Americans believed neither the Soviet Union nor

Germany would be defeated in 1942. The British stand at

* Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., pp. 602-03.

** Ibid., p. 604.

*** Ibid.

*) Trumbull Higgins, Op. cit., p. 142.

260

these talks was formulated by Churchill in the following

words: “We have hitherto discussed Sledgehammer on the

basis that Russia is either triumphant or crushed. It is more

probable that an intermediate situation will confront us.

The Russian battle may long hang in the balance; or, again,

the result may be indeterminate, and the Russian Front will

be maintained, though somewhat farther to the east.”*

Since that was the case, the participants in the talks argued,

let the Soviet Union and Germany bleed themselves white.

After a brief exchange of opinion, Hopkins and Marshall

informed Roosevelt of the British reluctance to open a

Second Front and requested instructions. Roosevelt had not

expected any other result, and in his reply, sent without

delay, he instructed his envoys to reach agreement on some

other operations as soon as possible. “This was the really

conclusive order from the Commander-in-Chief,” Robert

E. Sherwood notes.** Fearing that his envoys might not have

understood him properly Roosevelt sent another telegram

on the next day “repeating that he favoured the launching

of the North African operation in 1942”.*** Agreement was

reached without further procrastination. Higgins writes that

“by nightfall of the twenty-fifth Hopkins was able to send

the President a cable which may be cited as a model of

triumphant brevity. It consisted of the single word, ‘Africa’.

‘Thank God!’ was President Roosevelt’s scarcely more ver¬

bose reply”.**

Churchill, it goes without saying, was jubilant, and, quite

apparently, Roosevelt was pleased. The decision adopted in

London meant that an Anglo-American landing would be

launched in North Africa in 1942 instead of a Second Front

in Europe. But the London decision did not stop there.

Inasmuch as the African operation would absorb the men and

means lined up for an invasion of Europe, it was hardly likely

that a Second Front would be opened in 1943 either. This

was clear to the British and US governments. Field-Marshal

Sir John Dill, the British representative on the Joint Chiefs

of Staff Committee in Washington, wrote to Churchill on

August 1, 1942: “In the American mind, Round-Up [i.e.,

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 445.

Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 610.

*** Ibid., p. 611.

*) Trumbull Higgins, Op. cit., p. 147.

261

the invasion of Western Europe.— V. T.) in 1943 is excluded

by acceptance of Torch [the invasion of North Africa). We

need not argue about that.”* Such was the content of the

London decision, which was a flagrant violation of the

promise given to the Soviet Union two months earlier that

military assistance would be rendered in the shape of a

Second Front in Europe in 1942.

Intimation of the British and American intention to break

their promise was received by the Soviet Government as

early as mid-July. It lodged a strong protest. “As to open¬

ing a Second Front in Europe,” Stalin said in a message to

Churchill, “I fear the matter is taking an improper turn.

In view of the situation on the Soviet-German Front, I state

most emphatically that the Soviet Government cannot

tolerate the Second Front in Europe being postponed till

1943.”** ***

This protest was ignored in both London and Washington.

The British and American ruling circles thereby disregarded

the destiny of the Soviet Union and gambled with the

destinies of their own countries, because had the Soviet

Union not stood its ground it would have gone hard with

Britain and the USA. “Without a Second Front this year,”

Alexander Werth wrote, “it will depend entirely on Russian

guts, reserves and organisation, whether or not we lose this

Churchill’s First Visit to Moscow

After the British and Americans had broken their word

to the Soviet Union they began to think how to convey this

news to the Soviet Government. It was decided that this

would be done by Churchill, who undertook a trip to Mos¬

cow specifically for that purpose.

He arrived in Moscow on August 12, 1942, accompanied

by diplomatic advisers and senior military officers. Also with

him was Averell Harriman as President Roosevelt’s per¬

sonal representative. Churchill had requested Roosevelt to

send Harriman to make it clear to the Soviet Government

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 451.

** Correspondence ..., Vol. I, p. 56.

*** Alexander Werth, The Year of Stalingrad, London, 1946, p. 123.

that the British and Americans were acting in close co¬

operation.

Churchill had a difficult mission. He had to show he was

a conscientious and honest Ally of the USSR, a country he

implacably hated. In his memoirs he tells us that en route

to Moscow “I pondered on my mission to this sullen, sinister

Bolshevik State I had once tried so hard to strangle at its

birth, and which, until Hitler appeared, I had regarded as

the mortal foe of civilised freedom. What was it my duty

to say to them now? General Wavell ... summed it all up

in a poem.... There were several verses, and the last line

of each was, ‘No Second Front in nineteen forty-two’

The talks with Soviet leaders began on August 12.

Churchill informed them that no Second Front would be

opened in Europe in 1942 despite the promises that had been

made two and a half months earlier. On the next day Stalin

handed him a memorandum summing up the talks of the

previous day. It stated that Churchill considered it was

impossible to organise a Second Front in Europe in 1942

although the decision to open such a front “was reached and

found expression in the agreed Anglo-Soviet communique

released on June 12 last”. The purpose of the Second Front,

the memorandum pointed out, was to divert German forces

from the Eastern Front to the West and thus alleviate the

situation on that front in 1942. Naturally, the Soviet Com¬

mand had planned its operations for that year on the

assumption that the Allies would discharge their commit¬

ment. The refusal to open a Second Front was, therefore,

“a moral blow to Soviet public opinion, which had hoped

that the Second Front would be opened, complicates the

position of the Red Army at the Front and injures the plans

of the Soviet High Command”. In conclusion, the memo¬

randum said the Soviet Government believed “it is possible

and necessary to open a Second Front in Europe in 1942”.* **

In a memorandum to Stalin on the next day and in the

further talks with him Churchill sought to prove that by

refusing to open a Second Front the British Government

was not breaking its word. His only argument was his refer¬

ence to the memorandum handed to the Soviet Foreign

Minister in London. This reference showed, firstly, the aim

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 475.

** Correspondence ..., Vol. I, pp. 60-61.

263

of that double-bottomed document, which reaffirmed the

pledge to open a Second Front in 1942 and, at the same

time, provided grounds for an assertion that no pledge had

been made, and secondly, that as late as May and June

Churchill had made provision for the possibility of deceiv¬

ing the Soviet Government.

In the light of the documents published after the war

Soviet historians are not the only ones who do not question

the fact that the British Government had violated its com¬

mitment to the USSR. The American historian Trumbull

Higgins ridicules Churchill’s statement that “his conscience

is ‘clear’, since he did ‘not deceive or mislead Stalin’ ”, and

states plainly that Churchill “deliberately deceived his Rus¬

sian ally”.*

In order to soften the impression made by the decision

he had conveyed to the Soviet Union, Churchill declared

that the Second Front in Europe was being put off only

until 1943, that a “great operation” would be launched in

a year’s time, that already now the “British and American

governments . .. were preparing for a very great operation

in 1943. For this purpose a million American troops were

now scheduled to reach the United Kingdom at their point

of assembly in the spring of 1943, making an expeditionary

force of twenty-seven divisions, to which the British Gov¬

ernment were prepared to add twenty-one divisions. Nearly

half of this force would be armoured.”** This communica¬

tion, made by Churchill jointly with Harriman, meant that

Britain and the USA were giving the Soviet Union another

pledge to open a Second Front, this time in 1943. Later,

having this pledge in mind, Stalin wrote to Churchill: “You

told me that a large-scale invasion of Europe by Anglo-

American troops would be effected in 1943.”***

It will be recalled that this pledge was not honoured

either, despite the fact that the Allies had the means for

keeping their word. Moreover, doubts are raised about the

sincerity behind it. In August 1942 the British and Ameri¬

can leaders were aware that the landing in Africa in the

autumn of 1942 ruled out the invasion of Europe in 1943.

On this point Higgins says: “One can well understand the

* Trumbull Higgins, Op. cit., p. 173.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 478.

*** Correspondence ..., Vol. I, p. 136.

264

Prime Minister’s desire to minimise the shock of the loss of

Sledgehammer by not mentioning the possible loss of Round-

Up to boot.”*

Churchill informed the Soviet Government of the Anglo-

American decision to effect a landing in North Africa in

October 1942. The Soviet Government reacted favourably to

this decision, for an Allied action in Africa would to some

extent complicate matters for the common enemy.

One of the arguments Churchill used to prove that the

Allies could not invade Western Europe in 1942 was that

they were short of landing-craft and that strong German

forces were deployed in that theatre. This was obviously not

true. The landing in Africa required a larger number of

landing-craft, which, it will be recalled, were made available

in 1942. Consequently, the necessary landing-craft were on

hand and they should have been used in Europe instead of

in Africa. “During the war, as after it,” writes Higgins,

“the Prime Minister gave the shortage of landing-craft as

the primary reason for the impossibility of an invasion across

the Channel in 1942. This is, at best, no more than an

explanation why Sledgehammer was not carried out, and

hardly an explanation for its replacement by Torch.... At

the end of 1942, when landing-craft production was so dras¬

tically cut back, the shortage of such craft could hardly have

been employed as a serious argument against Round-Up.”**

Actually, had they wanted to open a Second Front in 1942

the Allies could have supplied themselves with all the land¬

ing-craft they needed. “In March 1942,” Sherwood says,

“landing-craft were tenth on the Navy’s shipbuilding Pre¬

cedence List. By October, just before the North African land¬

ings, they had gone up to second place, preceded only by

aircraft-carriers, but the next month they dropped to twelfth

place.”*** “The landing-craft shortage,” Higgins adds, “so

often to be represented as a cause for Mr. Churchill’s

strategy, was actually in large measure a reflection of it.”* 1

Churchill’s argument about the strength of the German

forces along the Atlantic seaboard was equally unfounded.

The Soviet memorandum to Churchill pointed out that in

the summer of 1942 “nearly all the German forces—and

* Trumbull Higgins, Op. cit., p. 160.

** Ibid., p. 155.

*** Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 554.

*) Trumbull Higgins, Op. cit., p. 166.

265

their crack troops, too—are tied down on the Eastern Front,

while only negligible forces, and the poorest, too, are left in

Europe”.* After the war this estimate was corroborated

by the German generals themselves. Lieutenant-General

Bodo Zimmermann writes that “by the summer of 1942 the

German setbacks in the war against Russia began to have

a very negative effect on the Western Army as well. A large

number of troops suitable for use on the Eastern Front was

‘combed’ out of second-echelon and reserve units.... Combat-

worthy formations were sent to the East, and the replace¬

ments were inferior troops. As soon as these troops became

fit for action they were likewise sent to Russia.”** For the

Anglo-American forces the system of fortifications in West¬

ern Europe, known as the Atlantic Wall, was not an insu¬

perable barrier either. Its construction was started only in

the spring of 1942. German generals admit that “the much-

publicised Atlantic Wall was more a product of Goeb-

bels’s bluff propaganda than a really unassailable fortifica¬

tion”.***

The British and American governments were apprehen¬

sive over the outcome of the Churchill mission. They feared

that inasmuch as Churchill had to inform the Soviet Gov¬

ernment that the Allies would not keep their promise of

assistance the Soviet Union, which was contending with

incredible difficulties, might decide that a compromise

peace with Germany would meet its interests more than a

continuation of the war. However, in Moscow Churchill

found no sign of an inclination to relax the struggle. “There

was never at any time,” he reported to the War Cabinet on

August 14, “the slightest suggestion of their not fighting

on.”*> King George VI sent Churchill a message of con¬

gratulations, in which he wrote: “As a bearer of unwelcome

news your task was a very disagreeable one, but I congrat¬

ulate you heartily on the skill with which you accomplished

it.” Having in mind the strain under which Churchill had

laboured on the eve of his visit to Moscow, the king noted:

* Correspondence ..., Vol I, p. 61.

** Vtoraya mirovaya voina 1939-1945 (The Second World War 1939-

1945), Moscow, 1958, p. 60.

*** Kurt von Tippelskirch, Geschichte des zweiten Weltkriegs, Athe-

naum-Verlag, Bonn, 1954, p. 412.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 489-90.

266

“You will be able to take things more easily now.”* Field-

Marshal Jan Smuts, Premier of the Union of South Africa,

telegraphed: “I congratulate you on a really great achieve¬

ment.”** These congratulations were unmerited.

By breaking their Second Front pledge the British and

US governments administered a vicious blow on their

Allied relations with the USSR and on the entire anti-fascist

coalition. Had any other country been in the position in

which the Soviet Union found itself in the summer of 1942

it would most probably have looked for a way out by sign¬

ing a separate peace with the enemy. But the nature and

might of the Soviet Union were such that it could not even

think of halting the war until final victory was won. The

Communist Party and the Soviet Government mobilised all

the strength of the Soviet people in order to liberate the

country and deliver all other nations from nazi slavery. In

so doing they discharged their sacred duty to their country

and fulfilled their internationalist duty to the working

people of the whole world and to the cause of socialism.

Despite the blow inflicted on the anti-fascist coalition in July-

August 1942 by London and Washington the Soviet Govern¬

ment was able to preserve that coalition. In this it displayed

restraint, calmness and unwavering faith in the justness of

its cause and in the strength of its people.

In contrast to Churchill’s insincerity at the talks in Mos¬

cow, the Soviet Government demonstrated a truly Allied

attitude to Britain. In Moscow Churchill was exhaustively

informed on the situation on the Eastern Front, the state of

the Red Army and, most important of all, on the Red Army’s

preparations for a counter-offensive, which led to the great

victory at Stalingrad and turned the tide in favour of the

anti-fascist coalition. On August 15 Churchill sent messages

to London and to Roosevelt stating: “In my private con¬

versation with Stalin he revealed to me ... a counter-offen¬

sive on a great scale.”*** On the next day he telegraphed that

he had received from the Soviet Government “a full account

of the Russian position”.** These telegrams give the lie to

Churchill’s subsequent allegations, repeated by not very

* Ibid., pp. 503-04.

** Ibid., p. 504.

*** Ibid., p. 495.

*) Ibid., p. 501.

2S7

scrupulous historians, that the Soviet Government had not

been very frank with its Allies and had not informed them

of the situation at the front.

Anglo-US Relations in 1942

The mechanism of Anglo-US military co-operation was

specified, improved and enlarged after the Arcadia Con¬

ference which had created it. The joint agencies set up by the

conference for the distribution of armaments and raw ma¬

terials and for the direction of merchant shipping were

supplemented on June 9, 1942 with joint bodies directing

production, resources and food supplies. The organisation

mechanism of the Anglo-US military alliance was finally

regulated by the close of 1942, and in this shape it existed

with slight modifications until the end of the war.

The combined Production and Resources Board headed

by a representative of the British Ministry of Supply and a

representative of the US Government was extremely active.

It estimated orders for raw materials, and planned the out¬

put and consumption of raw materials on territory admin¬

istered by the two governments. Raw materials were a

sphere where Britain enjoyed equality with her partner,

thanks to her huge reserves and sources of these materials.

The situation was different in other spheres, where the

British were the supplicants and the Americans the givers and

thus played first fiddle in the corresponding combined agen¬

cies. This was strikingly to be seen in the distribution of

armaments and merchant shipping.

A task of supreme importance was assigned to the Com¬

bined Production and Resources Board, that of combining

the production programmes of the United States and Britain

into a single integrated programme, geared to the strategic

requirements of the war, as indicated to the Board by the

Combined Chiefs of Staff.* But nothing came of this plan.

The Board’s activity was reduced to the collection of statis¬

tics and the surmounting of certain shortages. Generally

speaking, none of the combined agencies lived up to what

was expected of them. This is quite understandable, for it

is extremely difficult to plan and direct capitalist economy,

which is anarchic by nature. In the long run the final deci-

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 135.

268

sions on all key problems within the jurisdiction of the com¬

bined organs were taken by the governments.

The manner in which Britain received Lend Lease aid

underwent a drastic change in 1942. Immediately after the

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour the American authorities

held up the dispatch of Lend Lease supplies located on

American territory on the grounds that they might be needed

by the US Armed Forces. This shocked and angered the

British. Soon afterwards, however, the supplies were

resumed ,* ** but some of the stocks earmarked for Britain were

later used for the US Armed Forces.

On February 23, 1942, Britain and the USA signed an

agreement to cover Lend Lease supplies and payment for

them. This agreement substantially changed the very prin¬

ciple underlying Lend Lease. Before the USA entered the

war it was planned that Lend Lease would come solely from

the USA, but after the USA became a belligerent Lend

Lease turned into a bilateral project, in effect taking the

shape of multilateral assistance. The US troops in Britain,

Australia, New Zealand and India, for example, were sup¬

plied with uniforms and food from the local resources of the

British Empire. These same resources were drawn upon to

pay for the building of barracks, airfields and warehouses,

and for the transportation of US Armed Forces on the ter¬

ritory of Britain and the British Empire. The principle of

mutual assistance was formulated in the agreement of Feb¬

ruary 23 and then finally recorded in the Anglo-US Agree¬

ment of September 3, 1942, which also stipulated the types

of goods and services Britain had to provide the United

States. It is noteworthy that raw materials were left out, for

at the time American payment for raw materials originating

in the British Empire was the only important source of dol¬

lars available to Britain. These were needed to complete

payment on munitions which had been ordered before the

Lend Lease Act came into force."* One of the provisions of

the agreement of February 23 was that after the war Britain

had to return to the USA Lend Lease supplies that had not

been utilised or destroyed and which, in the opinion of the

US President, might be useful to the United States. In 1942

* Edward R. Stettinius, Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory, New York,

1944, p. 155.

** William Hardy McHeill, Op. cit., p. 142.

269

the British Empire received a total of 4,757 million dollars’

worth of US Lend Lease aid, or three times as much as in

1941*

The development of Lend Lease in 1942 mirrored not only

co-operation between Britain and the USA but also the

exacerbation of the contradictions between them. From the

very outbreak of the war the American ruling circles stead¬

fastly pursued a policy of using Britain’s dependence on

American supplies to force her to open the markets of the

British Empire to American goods and abolish preferential

customs tariffs. US Secretary of State Cordell Hull was the

most consistent exponent of this policy. He maintained that

in the talks with Britain on a bilateral agreement to cover

Lend Lease supplies she had to be made to yield on the

preferential tariffs issue. He raised this question in July

1941 and then at the Atlantic Conference, as a result of

which a compromise paragraph appeared in the Atlantic

Charter. The Arcadia idyll was broken by Hull’s return to

this question. Churchill was furious and declared he would

never agree to the abolition of the Imperial preference. Bad

blood came between Churchill and Hull, but in the end the

British had to give in.

The agreement of February 23, 1942 contained the prin¬

ciple under which the final account for Lend Lease would

be settled. In particular, Article 7 envisaged the removal of

all discrimination in international trade and the lowering

of tariffs and other barriers hindering trade. Although

Churchill agreed to this American demand he clearly had

no intention of fulfilling it. His reasoning was that at the

moment Britain needed American supplies, but when the

war ended they would find some way of wriggling out of

this commitment.

Hull knew that Churchill was only manoeuvring. In his

memoirs we find the words: “Thereafter, however, it fre¬

quently became apparent to me that Prime Minister Chur¬

chill, despite this pledge, was determined to hold on to

Imperial preference.”** The attacks of the US imperialists

against the British Empire during the war and their alliance

with Britain forced the British Government to resort to sub¬

terfuge and retreat.

* Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, London, 1946, Part III,

p. 250.

Cordell Hull, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1476.

270

The USA used the Lend Lease agreement also to reduce

British exports. Britain was not allowed to export goods

whose manufacture required more than 10 per cent of the

materials supplied by the USA under Lend Lease. The US

monopolies hoped that in this way they would expel Britain

from a number of foreign markets and substitute US for

British goods in these markets.

This sharp clash of British and American economic

interests was accompanied by a similarly sharp struggle on

colonial issues. During the war the situation was such that

the USA did not feel it was expedient to seize foreign colo¬

nial possessions openly. It used the striving of the enslaved

peoples for freedom and independence and demanded “self-

determination” for them. What this really meant was that

the USA wanted the British colonies to shake off British

colonial rule, after which, utilising the policy of “equal op¬

portunity” and depending on its economic might, the USA

would establish its own economic domination and political

influence over them.

India had a special attraction for the Americans. They

sought to weaken British rule in that country and increase

their own influence in it. They had mostly India in mind

when they spoke of the “self-determination” of peoples. For

Churchill the Arcadia idyll was spoilt when Roosevelt men¬

tioned India. Harry Hopkins, Robert E. Sherwood writes,

“did not think that any suggestions from the President to

the Prime Minister in the entire war were so wrathfully

received as those relating to the solution of the Indian prob¬

lem”/ 1 ' Ignoring Churchill’s wrath, the Americans persever-

ingly gave him “advice” on the Indian problem. Whether

it liked it or not the British Government was compelled to

heed this advice. On March 10, 1942 Churchill wrote to the

Viceroy of India when the Cripps mission was on its way to

that country: “It would be impossible, owing to unfortunate

rumours and publicity and the general American outlook,

to stand on a purely negative attitude.”** On April 12, 1942,

after the Cripps mission had ended in failure (as Churchill

had desired), Roosevelt once more stated to Churchill

his considerations on how the Indian problem should be

settled.

* Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 512.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 215.

271

The Anglo-US struggle over the colonial question was not

confined to the British Empire. Both Britain and the USA

had their eye on the colonial heritage of the European

powers defeated by Germany, i.e., France, Belgium and the

Netherlands. At the back of the heightened interest Chur¬

chill and Roosevelt showed for North Africa was the desire

of the British and American imperialists to take advantage

of France’s defeat and consequent inability to protect her

colonial interests, and to gain control of the French colonial

possessions.

A feature of Anglo-US relations in 1939-42 was the pre¬

dominance of contradictions in military strategy, economy

and on the issue of colonies. Political contradictions over

the post-war settlement came to the fore after 1942, when it

had become obvious that the Allies were going to win the war.

Problems of Home Policy

The year 1942 witnessed an activation of the patriotic,

progressive forces of the British people and a certain re¬

straint in the actions of the ruling classes, which tended to

bridle the liberative nature of the people’s anti-fascist war

and to cramp Britain’s Allied relations with the Soviet

Union.

In their desire to give all possible assistance to the Soviet

people and hasten the end of the war, the British workers

worked as they had never worked before. This labour

enthusiasm was engendered by proletarian internationalist

solidarity with the Soviet Union, which the British workers

associated with their patriotic duty.

They knew that by helping the Soviet Union they were

protecting their class interests and their motherland. And

they did their utmost to step up war production. They soon

discovered that lack of organisation and the inefficiency of

the management of many war plants and of the officials of

a number of government institutions were hindering the

further growth of output. In some cases this lack of organ¬

isation was not accidental; Munichites operating in British

industry deliberately did nothing to contribute to the defeat

of the nazis, whom they admired.

This obstruction angered the workers and they sent

numerous delegations of shop stewards to Lord Beaverbrook,

the Minister of Aviation, Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour

272

and National Service, and to their MPs. Ministers visited

factories and sometimes even investigated cases of inefficient

management, but this did not yield practical results. In this

situation aircraft industry workers proposed the setting up

at factories of combined production committees of workers

and management representatives, which would take steps to

remove everything that prevented increasing war production.

These production committees were organised at many war

industrial enterprises in 1942.

One of the highlights of 1942 was the struggle to lift the

ban on the communist newspaper Daily Worker. The

Government’s action in this question was regarded by the

British people as an encroachment on their democratic

rights, as a continuation of the intrigues of reactionary ele¬

ments who sought to obstruct the war against the nazi bloc.

That gave the struggle against the suppression of the Daily

Worker immense political significance.

The Government resisted as long as possible, and lifted

the ban on the Daily Worker only on August 26, 1942, after

a Labour Party Conference came out against the Govern¬

ment on this issue and it was found that similar action would

be taken by the pending Trades Union Congress. The

Government could not afford to risk antagonising the entire

organised working-class movement.

The desire for a radical change of the internal situation,

which mounted steadily as the war progressed, was one of

the most striking manifestations of the British people’s swing

to the Left. The slogan that there must be no return to pre¬

war days became immensely popular. The people’s desire

for change was so strong that the Government found it

necessary to demonstrate its agreement. It proposed to satisfy

this desire by reforms, a classical British method. As early

as January 1941 it announced the formation of a Labour

Party Post-war Reconstruction Committee under Arthur

Greenwood. Thus this activity was started much earlier than

in the period of the First World War. Besides, its scale was

much more ambitious.

Social problems were prominent in the reconstruction

programmes. A plan to reorganise the social insurance sys¬

tem in Britain was drawn up by the Liberal reformer Sir

William Henry Beveridge. This plan envisaged a consid¬

erable improvement of the system and was, for that reason,

supported by broad sections of the British people, including

18-1561

273

the Communist Party. The Government was displeased with

Beveridge’s “excessive radicalism” and somewhat trimmed

his suggestions, using them as the basis for its own plan of

reorganising the social insurance system. Reforms in the

health service and public education were planned at the

same time.

The British monopolies, too, gave serious thought to post¬

war problems. They were mainly worried by the post-war

prospect of narrower markets and smaller spheres of invest¬

ments due to American competition. As early as 1942 the

Federation of British Industries sent the Government a

carefully worded document under the heading Reconstruc¬

tion. This was a programme of action of the British monop¬

olies after the war. It was submitted to the Government

so that the monopolies’ intentions would be taken into con¬

sideration during the war and implemented in the future.

The monopolies wanted the state apparatus to be used more

fully in their interests and demanded greater assistance

from the Government for their struggle for world markets.

They did not conceal their intention of surmounting their

post-war difficulties at the expense of the workers, by in¬

tensifying exploitation of the workers. They pressed for a

reinforcement of state capitalism and the preservation of

limited state control over the country’s economy after the

war, demanding closer consultations with themselves on the

practical ways and means of implementing these measures.

They wanted the price control and tax system, established

during the war, to be revised in favour of the bourgeoisie,

arguing that this was necessary in order to allow for greater

profits, which they claimed had to be used to resolve Britain’s

post-war economic problems.

Britain and the Governments in Exile

The Soviet victory at Moscow and the Red Army’s success¬

ful counter-offensive in the winter of 1941-42 brought British

politicians round to the conclusion that the Soviet Union

would withstand and hurl back the German onslaught. True,

they could not as yet say definitely whether this would

happen, but being foresighted they began to prepare for the

eventuality that despite all their previous calculations the

Soviet Union would emerge victorious from the war. Serv¬

ants of their class, they did not plan for understanding and

274

co-operation with the USSR in a post-war world, where its

influence and role would undoubtedly be enhanced. Instead,

they took recourse to the old, tested and futile idea of creat¬

ing a cordon sanitaire along the Soviet western frontiers,

which would isolate the Soviet Union from Europe.

For this purpose they used the emigre governments of a

number of European countries conquered by the Germans.

McNeill writes that “the European governments in exile

were in much the same relationship to the British as were

the British to the Americans; indeed, their dependence on

British bounty was even greater”.* This dependence was

utilised to induce the governments in exile to take the slip¬

pery road of anti-Soviet intrigue. The efforts of the British

were facilitated by the fact that these governments (partic¬

ularly the Polish Government) consisted mainly of rabidly

reactionary politicians who were prepared to take part in

these intrigues.

The British Government got busy on plans of forming an

anti-Soviet bloc of East and Central European states

from the Baltic to the Black Sea and from the Aegean to

the Adriatic. In early 1942 it set up a special group headed

by experts G. H. N. Seton-Watson and Frederick White

to bring the governments in exile in London into these

plans.

These efforts resulted in the signing on January 15, 1942

of a Greek-Yugoslav Treaty of Alliance as a first step to¬

wards the formation of a Balkan Federation. A week later

an agreement was signed creating a Polish-Czechoslovak

Confederation, which, T he Economist pointed out, “goes a

little bit further than the Greek-Yugoslav pact”.** Under

this agreement the signatories pledged to act in unison in

the economic, political, social and military spheres. Military

co-operation was to be so close that provision was made for

a joint General Staff. It was noted that “Poland and Czech¬

oslovakia are anxious to include all European states with

which their ‘vital interests ... are linked up’ ”.*** In report¬

ing the formation of the Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation,

The Economist divulged its anti-Soviet orientation, writing:

“A great opportunity for practising the principles of the

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 115.

** The Economist, Jan. 31, 1942, p. 141.

*** Ibid.

18 *

275

agreement was missed when Poland and Czechoslovakia

chose to conduct separate negotiations with Russia.”*

Britain’s plans of forming alliances and federations in

Europe were directed not only against the USSR. On the

basis of these alliances she planned “creating an effective

European political unit which could hold a balance between

Russian and American power”.** This unit, naturally, was

to be headed by Britain.

The War in the Far East.

Sino-British Relations

The most disastrous setbacks were suffered by the USA

and Britain during the early months of 1942 in the Far

East, where the Japanese offensive, launched in December

1941, was making rapid headway. “Before May 1942, the

Allied resistance had been helpless.... Tokyo also was sur¬

prised by the ease with which the rich and strategic territo¬

ries of the Pacific basin had been conquered.*** During these

first months of 1942 Japan seized the islands in the Central

Pacific and her troops moved south up to Australia and west

up to the frontiers of India, occupying a territory with a

population totalling some 130 millions. In the first six

months of the war they occupied Thailand, British Malaya,

Singapore, the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), the Philip¬

pines, Burma and the Andaman Islands, and penetrated

Southeast China through Burma.

The fall of Singapore, a powerful fortress that had been

built in the course of two decades as the main British strong¬

hold in the Far East, was a painful military, political and

moral blow to Britain. It fell despite the numerical superi¬

ority of its defenders. Churchill regarded Singapore as “the

worst disaster and largest capitulation of British history”.**

Britain rocked with indignation. A week after the fall

of Singapore, The Economist, which was not given to nerv¬

ousness, wrote: “Now the accidents of war have produced

such a catalogue of catastrophes that the Prime Minister ...

* The Economist, Jan. 31, 1942, p. 142.

** William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 322.

H. F. Macnair and D. F. Lach, Modern Far Eastern International

Relations, New York, 1951, p. 551.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 92.

276

has to face something approaching a political crisis.” 5 '

This was not an accident such as might be encountered in

war, the journal said, but a disaster that occurred for a num¬

ber of objective reasons: incapacity and poor training of

the British troops, lack of resourcefulness and initiative on

the part of the officers, poor strategy, inefficient administra¬

tion, and indifference of the local population. “The faults

in the Malayan campaign,” The Economist said, “seem to

fall into two categories: the errors and mistakes of the civil¬

ian administration and the ineptitudes of the military.”"'"'

In Burma the situation was analogous. Field-Marshal

Harold Alexander, then commander of the British forces in

Burma, subsequently wrote: “The evacuation of Burma was a

complete military defeat—and we had been beaten in a

straightforward fight by an enemy who was not greatly

superior in numbers.”***

The British disasters in the Far East were thus due not

so much to enemy superiority as to poor training and inept

leadership, which was unable to make proper use of the

means at its disposal. This circumstance greatly in¬

creased the impact of the British defeats on the peoples of

Southeast Asia. Sherwood justifiably notes that these defeats

“were the first of a series of irreparable blows to British

imperial prestige in Asia”."'* ** Their effect was felt after the

Second World War, when the disintegration of the British

colonial empire began. The Americans likewise suffered

reverses in the Far East which hit them politically and

morally.

The Allied mechanism set up at the Arcadia Conference

to direct the war in the Far East crumbled under the assault

of the advancing Japanese. The Americans who had been

pressing for the adoption of an integrated command for each

theatre of the war, unexpectedly proposed that the supreme

command of the US, British, Dutch and Australian forces

operating in the Far East should be given to the British

General Archibald Wavell. It did not take the British Chiefs

of Staff long to see through this “courtesy”, and they decided

they could not accept it. Behind this “courtesy” was the cal-

* The Economist, Feb. 21, 1942, p. 241.

** Ibid., p. 247.

*** rj-fog Alexander Memoirs, p. 93.

*) Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 442.

277

culation that since in this theatre the balance of forces was

such that the Allies would at first inevitably suffer a series

of paralysing defeats, the blame for them would fall mainly

on Wavell and the British. Churchill, however, decided

otherwise, and Wavell accepted the post, taking over his

duties at Batavia, Java, on January 10, 1942.

This command was not destined to operate effectively.

The Dutch, with whom the question was not agreed on be¬

forehand, co-operated reluctantly. The Australians were

preoccupied with the defence of their own territory and

did not propose to be guided by the general tasks of the

struggle throughout the Far Eastern theatre, considering

the British officers inefficient and incompetent. “As a result,”

McNeill writes, “the Supreme Headquarters never worked

very well, especially after the fall of Singapore had seriously

discredited British military prestige and with it General

Wavell’s authority.”* The integrated command officially

ceased to exist on March 1.

The failure of the integrated command and the defeat of

British arms predetermined a change in the leadership of

the Allied military effort in the Far East. On March 9, 1942

Roosevelt proposed to Churchill that henceforth the entire

responsibility for the conduct of the war in the Pacific should

be borne by the Americans, and military operations should

be directed from Washington. The British would be respon¬

sible for the region west of Singapore, including India,

the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, Libya and the Medi¬

terranean. The British were thus, in effect, removed from

the direction of the war in the Pacific, and concern for their

possessions there, including the Dominions of Australia and

New Zealand, was taken over by the USA. The Australians

and New Zealanders raised no objections. Convinced of

Britain’s weakness, they now saw America as their only hope

of salvation from the Japanese threat. The British and the

Dutch were irritated, but there was nothing they could do

about it.

The fall of Singapore dealt a resounding blow to Britain’s

relations with her Pacific Dominions—Australia and New

Zealand. Until 1940 both Australia and New Zealand had

insignificant links with the USA; for their security they had

depended wholly and entirely on Britain and reckoned that

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 152.

278

in the event of war they would be reliably protected by the

British Armed Forces. But Britain’s crushing defeats during

the very first few weeks of the war in the Far East so

changed the situation that the Australian Prime Minister John

Curtin found it possible to write the following in an article

published on December 27, 1941: “Without any inhibitions

of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to

America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links with

the United Kingdom.”"' The changed balance of strength

made the Pacific Dominions shift their gaze from Britain to

the USA. “The realities of power,” says McNeill, “tended

to bring the Dominions into a new relationship with the

United States. After 1941 it was to the United States more

than to Britain that both Canada and the two Pacific Do¬

minions had to look for help as far as the immediate task of

self-defence was concerned.”**

Eventually four independent commands were set up in the

Far East and Asia: three American—the Pacific, the South¬

western Pacific and China-Burma-India; and one British—

India. The American principle of an integrated command

was thereby renounced. The new pattern of military lead¬

ership and the situation in the Far East did not foster better

Anglo-American co-operation in that area. Even in naval

matters, where it might have been expected, co-operation

between the two countries was to all intents and purposes

absent. The British Admiralty had no desire to help the

Americans, who gave it no voice in the planning of naval

operations, while the Americans, whose naval strength was

steadily growing, became less and less interested in British

assistance. Anglo-American friction complicated the Allied

war effort in the Far East, but this was not the only nega¬

tive political factor.

British colonial policy was a formidable obstacle to the

mobilisation of the Asian peoples for the struggle against

Japanese aggression. This was stated quite openly by the

British press. T he Economist , for instance, wrote that a key

factor contributing to the British defeat in Malaya was “the

indifference with which the native peoples watched the

struggle. Clearly the British colonial system of planters

and civil servants had struck no roots and roused no

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 8.

** William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit,, p. 39.

279

loyalty.... The Asiatics did not feel it was their war. Quite

apart from the depressing effect of this on morale, it had

serious economic consequences. The workers faded away

from the war zone. Soldiers had to be diverted from fighting

to do a labourer’s job.”*

Japan’s advance deep into Asia seriously weakened

Britain’s position in India. The Hindustan peninsula was

directly threatened. Besides, the Indian anti-British national

liberation movement became extremely active. In this situa¬

tion the British Government decided to reinforce its gar¬

risons in India against a possible uprising, and to send for

talks with the Indian political parties a mission headed by

Sir Stafford Cripps, who was known as a Left-wing politi¬

cian. Cripps had instructions to promise India Dominion

status as soon as the war ended. No agreement was or could

have been achieved between the British Government and

the leaders of the Indian political parties because even in

the critical year of 1942 British imperialism refused to make

concessions to the Indian people. The Cripps mission was

only a ruse. Churchill himself said that “the Cripps mission

is indispensable to prove our honesty of purpose and to

gain time for the necessary consultations”.** Naturally, no¬

body in India believed in the British Government’s “hon¬

esty of purpose”, for it was obviously only playing for

time. This greatly limited Britain’s possibilities of utilising

India’s resources for the war.

Anglo-American relations were strained by the Indian

problem. Roosevelt closely watched developments in India,

and the Cripps mission was followed to India by the US

President’s personal representative Louis Johnson. In India

Johnson, to Britain’s foaming indignation, made statements

in favour of granting India immediate self-administration

if even as a temporary measure. The British Government

regarded Johnson’s statements as testimony of the American

intention to torpedo British rule in India.

The situation in China and friction between Britain and

the USA over the Chinese issue were an important political

factor negatively affecting the Allied war effort in the Far

East. Chiang Kai-shek and his clique regarded the entry of

the USA and Britain into the war in the Pacific and the

* The Economist, Feb. 2, 1942, p. 247.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 215.

280

formation of the anti-fascist coalition as predetermining

Japan’s defeat. They therefore switched their effort, inade¬

quate as it was, from the struggle against Japan to a struggle

against the revolutionary movement and the Chinese Com¬

munist Party, i.e., against the only force that was really

fighting Japanese aggression. Moreover, the Chinese Govern¬

ment pressed Britain and the USA with greater urgency

than before for military supplies, which it intended to use

not for the war against Japan but for preparations for a

war against its own people, a war which was inevitable after

the Japanese were driven out.

Sino-British relations seriously deteriorated in 1942, and

the cause was not Chiang Kai-shek’s counter-revolutionary

designs but US policy of turning China into the principal

American bastion in the Far East. What the Americans had

in mind was that they would supply the weapons for the

war against Japan, and China would provide the man¬

power. American policy in the Far East, states a US Govern¬

ment document, had “but one immediate objective: the de¬

feat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least ex¬

penditure of American lives”.'’' After the war the Ameri¬

cans planned to accord China the role of the principal guard¬

ian of US interests in the Far East and the main force in

the struggle against the national liberation movement in

that area.

As soon as the USA entered the war it began to prepare

China for that double role, declaring that if she was not a

Great Power already, she would be one when the war ended.

That explained why along with the USA, the USSR and

Britain, China headed the list of signatories of the United

Nations Declaration on January 1, 1942. Walter Lippmann,

the noted US columnist, wrote that “the emergence of China

as a Great Power will change the whole order of power

within which lie the Philippines, the Indies, Australasia,

Malaya, and the immense and awakening sub-continent of

India”.* **

The British Government, naturally, recoiled from the

idea of China playing the second role in the Far East and

Britain being relegated to third place. It did its best to per-

* United, States Relations with China. With Special Reference to the

Period 1944-1949, Washington, 1949, p. 575.

** Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, Bos¬

ton, 1943, pp. 158-59.

281

suade its American partners that China would not be “an

effective Great Power in the near future”, that she was

hardly likely to “become a stabilising influence in Asia”,

warning them that the “chances were rather that the aggres¬

sive nationalism of Japan would be succeeded by an equally

aggressive nationalism on the part of the Chinese”.' 4, It

emphasised the corruption, incompetence and unpopularity

of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The British had good

grounds for stressing this point as well as for suspecting

possible Chinese expansion in the future.

They were greatly annoyed by Chiang Kai-shek’s inter¬

ference in Indian affairs. Feeling US support in the ques¬

tion of China’s Great Power status, Chiang Kai-shek decided

to consolidate his claims to that status by acting as mediator

between the British and the leaders of the political parties

in India. At the close of January 1942 he announced his in¬

tention of visiting India and Burma and meeting Mahatma

Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. This visit only aggravated

his relations with the British, who sought to persuade him

that the situation did not allow granting India self-admin¬

istration. He understood the game the British colonialists

were playing and, as Woodward points out, “remained

convinced that the responsibility for preventing a settlement

lay entirely with the British Government”.* ** He proposed to

Roosevelt that with the exception of Britain all the United

Nations should guarantee the fulfilment of the British

promises to India and thereby make possible a compromise

agreement during the war between the British Government

and the Indian National Congress. Moreover, Chiang Kai-

shek sent the US President a message denouncing the British

action of incarcerating the Congress leaders in prison.

Roosevelt showed this message to Churchill, obviously with

the aim of pressuring the British in the Indian problem. In a

sharply worded message to Chiang Kai-shek, Churchill told

him to keep out of British internal affairs.

In spite of everything the British Government did not

consider it possible to adopt a totally negative attitude

towards China. Such an attitude would have given the USA

complete control of China. Therefore, in December 1941

when China requested Britain and the USA to grant her a

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 420.

** Ibid., p. 421.

282

loan of £100,000,000 and $500,000,000 respectively, Britain

offered £50,000,000 on condition this money was used solely

for war requirements and spent in the sterling zone. The

Americans gave Chiang Kai-shek the full $500,000,000

without laying down any conditions.

While the talks on the loan were in progress, the British

Foreign Office mooted the question whether it would be

advisable for Britain to offer China a treaty under which

the British would renounce their extra-territorial rights in

China. This had been promised China as long ago as 1929.

The promise was repeated on July 18, 1940 by Churchill in

a speech in the House of Commons. On June 11 and July 4,

1941 a similar promise was made by Eden."' The more dif¬

ficult Britain’s position became the more promises she made.

The treaty was finally signed on January 11, 1943, simul¬

taneously with an identical Sino-US treaty. The Foreign

Office expected the Chinese to shower it with expressions

of gratitude for the return of some of the rights forcibly

wrested from them. Quite naturally the Chinese did not over¬

flow with gratitude. Instead, they raised the question of the

return of Kowloon, a peninsula adjoining Hongkong, which

Britain had seized under the guise of leasing it. This “in¬

gratitude” on the part of the Chinese infuriated Govern¬

ment circles in London.

Anglo-French Relations

Churchill greatly overestimated the operation of political

factors and underrated the importance of military ones in

crushing Germany, Japan and their allies. This was mirrored

in British strategy founded on the calculation that the peo¬

ples of the occupied countries would rise in rebellion and

cope with the invaders by themselves, with the British assist¬

ing only with air and tank strikes, and in their overestimation

of" the USA’s official entry into the war (it was hoped the

Germans would immediately sue for peace without starting

decisive battles). Also a reflection of this strategy were

Churchill’s vain calculations in relation to the Vichy Govern¬

ment. He believed the US entry into the war would bring

about “a change of mind—and heart—at Vichy”. With his

mind on the North African invasion, he was inclined to

* Ibid.

283

think “a sudden change of attitude” on the part of the Petain

Government “not wholly out of the question”. He felt this

change might be so radical “that the French fleet might sail

to Africa” from France and the Petain Government might

invite “British or French troops to enter French North Af¬

rica”. He seriously considered the Vichy Government might

“bring France actively in the war on our side”, for on this

depended “the lives as well as the interests of the Vichy

leaders”."'

This line of thinking made Churchill advocate courting

Petain with a softer policy. The Foreign Office, on the other

hand, felt there were no grounds for presuming that France

might be drawn into the war on Britain’s side, that the

weight of evidence was “against any sudden decisive action

by the Vichy Government to bring France actively in the

war on our side”.**

Nothing came of the argument between Churchill and

the Foreign Office, and Britain’s relations with Vichy under¬

went no change. No direct contact with the Vichy Govern¬

ment could be established. The Germans put every obstacle

they could in the way, and, besides, Laval, who was in

charge of affairs at Vichy, was counting on a German victory

and refused to establish relations with Britain in the spirit

proposed by Churchill. As a result, Woodward says, “we

could not go beyond our policy of agreeing that the

Americans should maintain contact with Vichy”.*** This sig¬

nificant statement upsets the attempts of some historians to

draw a distinction between the British attitude towards

Vichy and the American stand. “The difference between

British and American treatment of Vichy in 1942 was,”

Woodward points out, “mainly one of emphasis and ‘de¬

gree’ .”*) Neither the Americans nor the British wanted a

complete rupture with Vichy, because they felt that with

the Axis powers steadily losing the war the Vichy Govern¬

ment would become increasingly more complaisant; de

Gaulle, on the contrary, would defend the French colonial

empire against encroachment by his Allies with growing

determination.

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., pp. 111-14.

** Ibid., p. 113.

*** Ibid., p. 114.

*) Ibid., p. 112.

284

The moves of the British Government to reconsider its

policy towards Vichy in 1942 affected relations with de

Gaulle. By that time the British had finally realised that

their gamble on de Gaulle had failed. They had counted on

their support of the Free French Movement enabling them

to put their hands on the French colonies. But de Gaulle,

frequently disregarding the military situation, doggedly

opposed all the attempts of the British to entrench them¬

selves in the French possessions.

There was a notable contradiction in the British attitude

to the Free French Movement. Britain was willing to sup¬

port de Gaulle so long as his actions conformed to basic

British strategy and foreign policy. However, inasmuch as

the aim of this strategy and policy was not only to defeat

the Axis powers but also to seize the French heritage it

could not but clash with de Gaulle’s objectives and encoun¬

ter energetic opposition from him. It was this that lay at the

back of the strained relations between the Churchill Govern¬

ment and the movement headed by de Gaulle, and not the

Free French leader’s obduracy as Churchill and British his¬

torians would have us believe.

In 1942 the relations between de Gaulle and the British

Government deteriorated to the extent that the British be¬

gan to think of replacing him with some other, more pliable,

personality as the head of the Free French Movement.

Churchill suggested that de Gaulle was not contributing

much to the war effort, but when the British Government

looked about for a candidate to replace him it could find

none. This unquestionably induced Churchill to contemp¬

late the usefulness of contacts with the Vichy Govern¬

ment.

Unable to break with the Free French Movement without

completely exposing its real policy towards France, the

Churchill Government continued to make it difficult for de

Gaulle to establish control over the French colonial posses¬

sions and increase the armed forces at his disposal. It was

to foster this policy that in the spring of 1942 the British

and also the United States Government refused to recog¬

nise the French National Committee as the Provisional

Government of France. Matters went from bad to worse, so

much so that in the summer of 1942 it seemed as if there

would be a final rupture with the British Government, and

de Gaulle asked, in the event that happened, “if the Soviet

285

Government would give him and his troops asylum on its

territory”.*

This aggravation sprang from a clash over the British

landing in May 1942 on Madagascar, a French possession in

the Indian Ocean. The official motive was that this landing

was undertaken to prevent the Japanese from seizing the

island, but there was more to it than that. De Gaulle had

earlier suggested the occupation of the island by Free French

forces, but the British had raised objections. The British

operation on Madagascar was prepared and carried out

without de Gaulle’s knowledge and participation. On top of

that, the British had informed the island’s Vichy-appointed

governor that if he did not resist the landing he and his

staff would be permitted to remain in office and would not

be required to co-operate with the Free French. This was an

attempt by the British to reach agreement on co-operation

with local representatives of the Vichy Government. De

Gaulle had grounds for fearing similar steps by the Chur¬

chill Government in other French possessions in Africa.

Churchill’s excuse to de Gaulle was that the Free French

had not been asked to participate in the Madagascar landing

because it was felt that if the British acted alone there

would be less resistance from the Vichy administration. The

same excuse was offered on other occasions, and it showed

how far the attitude of the British Government had changed

towards de Gaulle in the course of two years. In 1940 it

had officially supported him to enable the Free French to

control French colonial possessions and thereby save Britain

from having to use military force to prevent the Germans

from using these possessions. Now, in 1942, the British kept

the Free French away from operations against the Vichy

forces in the French colonies and offered arguments which

clashed with what they had officially declared two years

before.

Matters reached a point where the British Government

simply refused to permit de Gaulle to leave London when

in the spring of 1942 he planned a tour of Syria and the

Lebanon, countries officially under his control. He managed

* Sovietsko-frantsuzskiye otnosheniya vo vremya Velikoi Otechestven-

noi voiny 1941-1945. Dokumenty i materialy (Soviet-French Relations

During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Documents and Mate¬

rials), Moscow, 1959, p. 82.

286

to go to the Middle East only at the end of July. Churchill

endeavoured to keep him in London, fearing that in Syria

and the Lebanon he would see for himself that the British

military presence in those countries was being used to oust

French influence. That is exactly what was happening there.

Particular zeal in this respect was displayed by General Sir

Edward Spears, Churchill’s personal representative and

official British envoy to the governments of Syria and the

Lebanon.

On August 14 de Gaulle sent Churchill a telegram from

Beirut stating that he regretted to note that Britain was not

fulfilling her pledge “not to pursue political objectives in

the Levant States or to infringe upon French interests in

this area”. He wrote of unceasing British interference in the

internal affairs of the Levant and in the relations between

the countries of that area and France. At the same time he

informed his representatives in London that “the complica¬

tions are due to the policy of the British Government itself”

and not to Spears’ personal qualities as was claimed by the

British Foreign Office.* Churchill sent de Gaulle a testy

answer written for form only, in which he claimed British

actions were motivated by military considerations.

De Gaulle’s presence in Syria and the Lebanon embar¬

rassed the British and an attempt was made to lure him to

Cairo on the pretext of inviting him to a conference in that

city. When de Gaulle refused to go to Egypt, Churchill sum¬

moned him to London. Prior to this summons de Gaulle had

told the US Consul-General in Beirut that if British agents

did not cease their anti-French activities in the Levant he

would demand a British withdrawal from that territory, and

if they refused he would throw them out by force. This

conversation reached the ears of the British and they dis¬

cussed the question of reducing their monthly subsidy of

£500,000-600,000 to de Gaulle for the upkeep of his admin¬

istration and troops in Syria and the Lebanon. This threat

was retracted when de Gaulle agreed to return to London.

He had a meeting with Churchill and Eden on September 30,

and both sides openly hurled accusations at each other. The

British told de Gaulle that if he continued to be obstinate

over Syria and the Lebanon he would be kept out of the

* Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre, L’Unite, 1942-1944,

Paris, 1956, pp. 354-55.

287

administration of Madagascar. “The meeting with General

de Gaulle,” Woodward writes, “ended in something near

to a breach of relations.”* ** But neither side could afford a

final rupture. De Gaulle could not exist without British sup¬

port, and Churchill could not turn away from de Gaulle in

face of the imminent clash with the Americans over North

Africa, a clash that was inevitable after the Anglo-Ameri¬

can landing in that region.

The War in the Middle East.

The Allied Landing in North Africa

At the beginning of 1942 the British suffered a series of

military reverses in North Africa. The British offensive

started in the second half of November 1941 with the ob¬

jective of clearing the German-Italian forces out of Libya

was brought to a halt in January. The German-Italian forces

mounted a counter-offensive on January 21 and moved

forward successfully until mid-February. “My hopes that

General Auchinleck would clear Libya in February 1942

were disappointed. He underwent a series of grievous re¬

verses,” Churchill subsequently wrote/''" 5 '

The defeats in Libya and the Far East seriously alarmed

London and Washington, where in those weeks some of the

leaders feared a German break-through to the Middle East

and a Japanese advance across India which would ulti¬

mately lead to a link-up between the German and Japanese

armed forces and resources.***

At the time of his meeting with Roosevelt in December

1941 Churchill was confident that the British forces ad¬

vancing in a westerly direction in Egypt would make con¬

siderable headway and facilitate the Allied landing in French

North Africa. However, it soon became evident that such

a landing was needed to save the British forces from total

annihilation.

In the second half of July 1942, after the British and

American governments had decided on the invasion of

North Africa in violation of their commitment to the Soviet

Union to undertake a landing in Europe, Roosevelt began

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 122.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 585.

*** Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., pp. 534-35.

288

to hurry the preparations for the North Africa operation,

insisting that it should begin not later than October 30.*

He had good reasons for this. The Congressional elections

were due in November and Roosevelt wanted to be able to

tell the American people on election day that his Democratic

Administration was energetically conducting the war against

the nazis and actively assisting the USSR. This, he knew,

would enable the Democratic Party to carry the elections.

However, arguments with the British over the place of the

landing and over the composition of the landing force pre¬

vented Roosevelt from carrying out this intention. Churchill

wanted the North Africa landing chiefly to alleviate the

position of Montgomery’s 8th Army, which was ineffectively

operating in Egypt against Rommel’s German-Italian forces,

and it was of prime importance to him .that the landing

should be effected as far east as possible on the Mediterra¬

nean coast of Africa. He insisted on a landing at Algiers,

which he called “the softest and most paying spot”.** The

Americans, on the other hand, feared that a landing on the

Mediterranean coast would endanger communications if

Gibraltar was closed by the Spaniards or by the Germans,

who in retaliation might occupy Spain. The dispute ended

in a compromise. It was agreed to land one task force on

the Atlantic coast of Africa, at Casablanca, and two

task forces on the Mediterranean coast, one of them at

Algiers.

The composition of the landing force was likewise the

subject of long argument. The Americans maintained their

troops would, unlike the British and Free French, encounter

no resistance from the French forces in North Africa, and

on these grounds insisted on making the first landings an

exclusively American operation. At this stage of the landing

the British would thus have had to rest content with partici¬

pating in the transportation of the landing forces and provid¬

ing air and naval support.

This was an obvious attempt to push the British into the

background and thereby establish American influence on

the territory that would be occupied. The British were aware

of this and doggedly opposed the American suggestions, and

at the close of August they went so far as to stop the move-

* Ibid., p. 491.

** Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 89.

19 - 15*1

289

ment of landing-craft to the assembly points. This held up

the preparations for the operation.

Agreement was finally reached on November 5. Ameri¬

can troops would form the vanguard of the force, consisting

mostly of British units, to be landed at Algiers. The troops

to be landed at Oran and Casablanca would be almost en¬

tirely American; at Oran they would be supported by British

naval and air forces. 51 ' General Dwight D. Eisenhower, ap¬

pointed Commander-in-Chief of the invasion of North Af¬

rica, was unable to name a date earlier than November 8

for the operation.

The Anglo-US plan for the operation was that the land¬

ing would be preceded by an offensive by the British 8th

Army from Egypt as far west as possible towards the land¬

ing points. At the close of October and the beginning of

November 1942 the 8th Army advanced successfully, driving

the German-Italian troops from Egypt and then from Cyre-

naica and Tripolitania.

On November 8, while the 8th Army was pursuing Rom¬

mel’s forces, seven Allied divisions (six American and one

British) began the landing at Algiers, Oran and Casablanca.

This was an army of 110,000 effectives for whose transpor¬

tation some 650 naval craft and large transports were used.

The Vichy troops in North Africa offered hardly any oppo¬

sition, and what resistance there was was halted on Novem¬

ber 11 on orders from Admiral Darlan, the French Comman-

der-in-Chief in North Africa, who was in Algiers at the

time. In the course of three weeks the Allies occupied

Morocco and Algeria and entered Tunisia. Rommel received

reinforcements from Western Europe. This and the hesita¬

tion of the Western Allied Command to start offensive

operation in Tunisia enabled the German-Italian forces to

hold out for several months. The fighting dragged out until

May 1943, when the whole of North Africa was cleared of

German-Italian troops.

The Germans responded to the Allied landing not only

by sending reinforcements to North Africa but also by oc¬

cupying the part of France which they had not occupied pre¬

viously. They were determined to seize the French naval

units at Toulon. The French sailors, however, were just as

determined not to surrender. Unable to take their warships

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., pp. 202-03.

290

out to sea, the French sailors scuttled or blew up three bat¬

tleships, an aircraft-carrier, four heavy cruisers, three light

cruisers, 25 destroyers, 26 submarines and a number of other

vessels. At the same time that the Germans marched into

Vichy-administered French territory, the Italians occupied

Nice, Savoy and the island of Corsica.

The invasion and occupation of North Africa was a victo¬

ry of the anti-fascist coalition. In this operation the Allies

destroyed several German and Italian divisions with the

result that the Germans and Italians lost their strongpoints

in North Africa and the possibility of obtaining strategic

and other raw materials from French African possessions.

The Allies substantially strengthened their position in Africa

and in the Mediterranean.

Despite its successful outcome, the African operation was

of little assistance to the Soviet Union for it was not the

“true Second Front of 1942” Churchill claimed it was."'

Moreover, it absorbed considerable Allied forces and means

and gave the British and Americans the pretext to evade

opening a Second Front in 1943. Medlicott is quite right in

saying that the North Africa landing “certainly delayed the

build-up of forces for the invasion of France”,** and his

American counterpart Trumbull Higgins says that “all the

Allied resources were henceforth so tied up in the Mediter¬

ranean that even a cross-Channel operation in 1944 was

becoming difficult to mount”.***

The invasion of North Africa did not compel the Germans

to relax their pressure on the Soviet Army. In fact, it con¬

vinced them that they were not threatened with a Second

Front and could calmly transfer divisions from Western

Europe to the Eastern Front. “Instead of pulling German

troops out of Russia,” Higgins writes, “the disclosure of the

Allied hand with Torch enabled the Germans to strengthen

their army in Russia. ... This fact,” he adds, “is contrary

to the constant claims in Britain to this day to the effect that

Torch was designed to bring aid to Russia.”"'* The same point

is stressed by General L. Koeltz, who commanded the French

19th Army Corps in the campaign against the German-

Italian forces in Tunisia in 1942-43. “Obsessed with the idea

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 434.

** International Affairs, April 1959, Vol. 35, No. 2, p. 280.

*** Ibid., p. 278.

*) Ibid., p. 279.

is*

291

of securing a decisive victory over the Soviet armies,” he

writes, “Hitler refused to give his attention to the Central

Mediterranean theatre.” As a result of Hitler’s obstinate

reluctance to send reinforcements to North Africa at the

expense of his forces on the Eastern Front, the Allied landing

in Africa “did not bring any relief to the Soviet Armies”.*

On American insistence, the French National Committee

headed by de Gaulle was given no advance notice of the

North Africa landing. The Americans brought to North

Africa the French General Flenri Giraud, regarding him

a more suitable figure for the post of head of the French

North Africa territories. However, after the landing it was

found that the Vichy troops and civilian administration in

North Africa were more inclined to accept the leadership of

Admiral Darlan, with whom likewise the Americans had

maintained preliminary contact. The Americans, through their

representative Clark, therefore signed an agreement with

Darlan on November 22, 1942, under which they recognised

Darlan’s authority in the French North African possessions,

while Darlan undertook to create for the US Command in

this territory the conditions for military operations against

the German-Italian forces and enable the USA to penetrate

the economy of North Africa.** US capital used this agree¬

ment to tighten its economic hold on North Africa, par¬

ticularly on Morocco.

As soon as the landing was effected, the US authorities

took steps to get a grip on the economy of that region, in¬

cluding the supply of vital necessities for the population,

the acquisition of strategic raw materials and control of the

financial system, transport, the health service and industry.***

Cordel Hull instructed his representatives in North Africa

to implement these steps in such a way as to leave the

responsibility in American hands, which meant ousting the

British from equal participation in the fulfilment of this

programme.

In addition to seizing strong economic positions in French

North Africa the Americans planned to build military bases

* L. Koeltz, Une campagne que nous avons gagnee. Tunisie, 1942-

1943, Paris, 1959, p. 383.

** Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. II, pp. 453-57.

*** Waverley Root, The Secret History of the War, Vol. Ill, New

York, 1946, p. 450.

292

there as springboards for US expansion in Africa, the

Mediterranean and the Middle East. In an analysis of the

North African situation prepared for Wendell Willkie, the

Republican presidential candidate, the American correspond¬

ent Waverley Root noted the strong trend in American

politics “in favour of obtaining bases” in North Africa and

also the desire, though not as strong, “of acquiring colonies”

in that region.*

Darlan was assassinated by a terrorist on December 24,

1942, and the Americans put Giraud in his place. De Gaulle

continued to be unacceptable to them because he considered

the French Empire had to be preserved in its entirety, was

to some extent linked with the British and was believed to

be more democratic than the Americans wanted. De Gaulle’s

democratism was, of course, magnified. The grounds for this

was that the movement headed by him enjoyed the support

of democratic forces in France, including the Communist

Party. Lastly, an important reason why the Americans de¬

sired to have nothing to do with de Gaulle was, as Root

points out, that he “has been on good terms with Russia.

Therefore, it is desired to put into power men who are dis¬

tinguished chiefly by an anti-Russian attitude.”**

Behind the British dissatisfaction with the American deal

with Darlan and with other American actions in North

Africa was the clash between their desire to gain control

over French possessions in Africa and the American desire to

consolidate their position in North Africa, i.e., on Britain’s

Mediterranean communications and in direct proximity to

her vital interests (Egypt and the Middle East).

Churchill opposed the deal with Darlan, maintaining that

the peoples of Europe would feel that “we are ready to make

terms with local Quislings”.*** The British Ambassador in

Washington was instructed to try to persuade the Americans

that “there is above all our own moral position. We are

fighting for international decency and Darlan is the

antithesis of this.”*> But morals had nothing to do with it.

Churchill had himself worked hard to reach agreement with

* Ibid., p. 192.

** Ibid., p. 193.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. II, p. 445.

*) Ibid., p. 446.

the Vichy leaders, and Darlan was neither the best nor the

worst of them. What really mattered was that the deal

benefited the USA instead of Britain. Darlan did not suit

the British because he was an American creature, and any

terms with him would threaten the British stake on de Gaulle.

The British had been prepared to give Darlan a “seat on

the band-wagon” provided he “could bring over the French

fleet from Toulon”.* At the close of December 1942 the

US Charge d’Affaires in London reported to the State De¬

partment that he had to listen to allusions to “ ‘the inex¬

perience of the State Department and of American generals’

in handling French affairs and of our lack of ‘real under¬

standing of the French state of mind’ ”. The reason for these

allusions, as the Charge d’Affaires correctly noted, was that

the Foreign Office was “unhappy at what they consider the

secondary role they have had to play in the North African

negotiations”.** The energy displayed by the Americans

made up for their lack of experience, and they clearly

pushed their British Allies away from North Africa. In order

to preserve Allied unity, both sides did their best to conceal

their annoyance over each other’s actions, but this did not

blunt the contradictions between them.

In addition to Darlan, the US Government accepted the

services of all more or less prominent Vichy leaders who

happened to be in North Africa and expressed their read¬

iness to co-operate with the American ruling circles. On

territory occupied by the Allies, the Americans preserved

the nazi laws introduced by the Vichy Government, and

progressive forces continued to be persecuted.

By enlisting the services of French reactionaries in North

Africa the Americans wanted more than to become en¬

trenched in the French African possessions. They preserved

the reactionary laws in French North Africa with the view

to enforcing them in France after she was liberated. This was

aimed against the French people and French national in¬

terests. In a conversation with the Soviet Deputy Foreign

Minister on February 1, 1943, head of the Free French Mis¬

sion to the USSR Garreau Roger said: “The impression one

gets is that the American Government is intent on preserving

in France the Vichy regime—the Petain regime ... its entire

administrative, military and propaganda machine, and turn

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 209.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. II, p. 496.

294

it over to Giraud, who with his army is supposed to spear¬

head the landing in France. With his assistance the USA

will seize the entire state apparatus in order to prevent the

French people from freely stating their will.”*

El Alamein-Stalingrad

Churchill must be given his due for having been able to

make a correct estimate of the situation at some of the im¬

portant stages of the war. That, incidentally, was the case

in August 1942, when in Moscow he was informed of the

imminent Soviet counter-offensive. Upon receipt of that in¬

formation he felt, long before the rout of the Germans at

Stalingrad, that Germany would lose the war. He was greatly

alarmed, and his apprehensions grew as the war developed.

In 1942 there were no longer any doubts in anybody’s

mind that the Eastern Front was the main theatre of the war.

What Churchill learned in Moscow meant that the turning

point in the war might likewise be achieved on that front.

This was a grave political threat to Britain’s ruling circles,

because once the peoples realised that the Soviet Union had

turned the tide of the war it would entirely discredit the

political and military strategists who had been telling the

world that the defeat of the Soviet Union was inevitable,

and moreover, it would foster a tremendous growth of sym¬

pathy for socialism. The peoples would see that it was only

the socialist state that had been able to save them from nazi

slavery. In its turn, this might have a far-reaching effect

on the revolutionary movement after the war and on the

peace settlement.

True, in August, September and October the Germans

were still advancing in the Soviet Union and the bleak pros¬

pect haunting Churchill was not very close at hand. None¬

theless he decided to take additional steps to make sure the

Soviet Union was sufficiently enfeebled by the war. The first

step was, in effect, to halt supplies of armaments to the USSR

(the Soviet Government had been officially informed that

there would be no Second Front in 1942). The second step

was to expel Rommel from Egypt.

Churchill needed a British victory, even a small one, before

the turning point was achieved on the Eastern Front. When

* Sovietsko-Franlsuzskiye otnosheniya ..., p. 108.

295

that victory, a secondary one, was won at El Alamein it was

hailed as the turning point of the war, while the great Soviet

victory at Stalingrad was relegated to the background. This

line is maintained in Churchill’s memoirs with amazing

insistence, and from these memoirs it migrated to British

and American bourgeois historiography where it burst into

gorgeous blossom.

What really happened at El Alamein? In October 1942

Rommel had eight infantry and four panzer divisions—alto¬

gether 96,000 men and 500-600 tanks.* He could not receive

■ reinforcements because the Eastern Front was swallowing all

the reserves of Germany and her satellites. Under General

Alexander, the British Middle East Commander-in-Chief,

and Field-Marshal Montgomery, British 8th Army com¬

mander, there were seven infantry divisions, three armoured

divisions and seven armoured brigades—altogether 150,000

men and 1,114 tanks.** With numerical and armaments

superiority on their side the British started an offensive on

October 23 and within several days put the German-Italian

army to flight. A total of 59,000 Germans and Italians were

killed, wounded or captured.*** The 8th Army offensive was

deliberately played up by Churchill long before it started.

On October 20 he wrote to General Alexander: “All our

hopes are centred upon the battle you and Montgomery are

going to fight. It may well be the key to the future.”**** On

October 28 he telegraphed the prime ministers of Canada,

New Zealand and Australia: “The great battle in Egypt has

opened.”** In a telegram to General Alexander on Novem¬

ber 4 he informed him that “it is evident that an event of

the first magnitude has occurred which will play its part

in the whole future course of the World War. ... I propose

to ring the bells all over Britain for the first time this

war.”*** Citing all these estimates in his memoirs, Chur¬

chill sums up that the Battle of El Alamein “marked in fact

the turning of the ‘Hinge of Fate’ ”.**** This was seized

upon by bourgeois historiography, which began to repeat

* J. F. C. Fuller, Op. cit., p. 234.

** Ibid.

*** Ibid., p. 238.

**** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 588.

*) Ibid., p. 595.

**) Ibid., p. 600.

***) Ibid., p. 603.

296

over and over again that El Alamein was “the most decisive

land battle yet won for the Allied cause”.*

The truth is stretched not only to belittle Soviet military

achievements but also to whitewash the British ruling circles

responsible for the Munich sell-out. To exaggerate the im¬

portance of El Alamein is tantamount to telling the world:

Yes, Britain had pursued the disgraceful Munich policy, a

policy of striking a bargain with Hitler, but the British

victory over the German and Italian forces had atoned for

and buried the past. In 1963 the English publicist John

Mander wrote that the feeling now about the appeasement

policy is: “Whatever unrealism Britain displayed in the

thirties, the British people made up for it by their stand

against Hitler. ... That is the official version. It is flatter¬

ing enough. It admits the stain of Munich. But it argues that

it was wiped out by the Battle of Britain and Alamein. Brit¬

ain has purged herself. Let foreigners divert their attention

from her hour of shame to her hour of glory.”**

British arms did not win any special glory at El Alamein.

General Albert C. Wedemeyer of the USA writes that

“Churchill grossly exaggerated the magnitude of the Allied

victory in Africa. Montgomery had an overwhelming force

—manpower, firepower, and air support—a marked advan¬

tage over Rommel. Nevertheless, the German Desert Fox

was able to outsmart the British for a considerable length

of time. His generalship was so outstanding that the British

troops who fought him carried pictures of Rommel in their

knapsacks.”***

Some British authors seek to equate El Alamein to the

Battle of Stalingrad. “Since Alamein and Stalingrad,” Bryant

says, “the Germans had stopped thinking in terms of 1940

and had begun to recall 1918.”*) There are no grounds what¬

ever for this assertion. Stalingrad was the culminating point

of the titanic battle fought on the Eastern Front in 1942. In

* J. F. G. Fuller, Op. cit., p. 238.

** John Mander, Great Britain or Little England ?, Boston, 1964,

p. 76.

*** Albert C. Wedemeyer, Op. cit., pp. 233-34. After the war Mont¬

gomery bought a suburban house and in the garden he set up the van

which he had used as headquarters during the war. A large portrait

of Rommel hung on the wall of the van (The Sunday Times, Dec. 14,

1958).

*) Arthur Bryant, Op. cit., p. 593.

297

November 1942 Germany had 3, 405, 000 effectives or 70 per

cent of her land forces on the Eastern Front. A total of 127.5

German and 72.5 satellite divisions operated on Soviet ter¬

ritory.^ Exclusive of the casualties suffered by the Germans

in their summer-autumn offensive on the Eastern Front, So¬

viet troops wiped out five enemy armies during their counter¬

offensive from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943. The

enemy lost 32 divisions and three brigades, and 16 of his

divisions were heavily mauled.”* **

The Soviet Union fought this colossal battle without

military (Second Front) and, essentially speaking, material

assistance from its Allies.

Until June 30, 1942 deliveries to the USSR were made

under the so-called First Russian Protocol signed in Moscow

in October 1941. The terms of this protocol were fulfilled

unsatisfactorily. When war broke out in the Pacific the ma¬

teriel and naval vessels earmarked for transfer to the USSR

were turned over to the US forces. President Roosevelt or¬

dered the deficit to be made good by April 1, 1942, but these

orders were not carried out and the supply of war equip¬

ment to the USSR continued to dwindle. “There was a small

increase in the tonnage shipped in January and February

1942,” write Matloff and Snell, “but shipments remained at

less than 100,000 long tons a month, instead of the 200,000

long tons required to meet commitments.”***

In March the deliveries from the USA to the USSR in¬

creased to 200,000 tons, and in April to nearly 450,000 tons,

“bringing the cumulative total to over 1,000,000 tons. This

was still only about half of what the United States had un¬

dertaken to export by the end of June.”** By that time

the USA and Britain had shipped only four-fifths of the

tonnage required by the Protocol, but much of that had failed

of delivery.***

Despite the delays and losses due to action by German

U-boats, the Soviet Union received tanks, aircraft and other

armaments as well as strategic raw materials, including

aluminium, nickel and rubber. Naturally this was a useful

addition to the armaments and supplies which the Soviet

* Vtoraya mirovaya voina ..., p. 378.

** Ibid., p. 401.

*** Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Op. cit., p. 205.

*) Ibid., p. 206.

**) William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 145.

people made available to their Armed Forces. However, it

was a very small addition, a fact which the Allies admitted

from time to time. In a radio broadcast on February 15,

Churchill said: “It is little enough we have done for Russia

considering all she had done to beat Hitler and for the

common cause.”*

In the summer of 1942 the German offensive put the

Soviet Armed Forces in a difficult position and, consequently,

greater importance was attached to Allied military supplies.

But that was precisely when Britain and the USA stopped

all deliveries. The excuse was that large losses had been

suffered by the PQ17 convoy that had set out for Archangel

from Iceland on June 27.

The convoy consisted of 34 freighters, most of them Amer¬

ican. It was protected by naval units under Rear-Admiral

Hamilton, and among them were cruisers, destroyers, sub¬

marines and other vessels. Cover was provided by battle¬

ships and aircraft carriers. When the convoy reached Me-

dvezhy Island the British Admiralty suddenly found it had

“grounds for presuming” that German naval vessels might

attack it, with the result that on July 4, Admiral Dudley

Pound, Chief of Naval Staff, instructed Admiral Hamilton

to withdraw the cruiser force to the westward at high speed

and to order the convoy to disperse and proceed singly to

Russian ports. The destroyers in the escort, Churchill says,

likewise withdrew.** As a result of this flight, caused not by

a German attack but by orders from London springing from

a presumption that the enemy might appear, the merchant

ships were left to the mercy of fate, without any protection.

German aircraft and U-boats operating from Norwegian

bases sank without hindrance all the ships they could find.

Twenty-three ships perished; the rest reached Archangel,

bringing 70,000 tons of the 200,000 tons of freight originally

sent.

German surface vessels never left their bases to inter¬

cept the convoy. Consequently, the presumption of the British

Admiralty had no foundation.*** The responsibility for the

PQ17 disaster quite obviously devolves on the British Ad¬

miralty. This was clear to the British Government, which

ordered an inquiry. Churchill says he “awaited the results

* W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, Op. cit., p. 700.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 263.

*** Ibid., p. 265.

299

of the inquiry into the conduct of those concerned. This took

a considerable time, and assigned no blame to anyone.”*

This was very surprising in view of what Churchill himself

says of the disaster.

It would seem that after a tragedy of this dimension those

responsible would be punished and steps taken to prevent a

repetition. But something very different happened. “In view

of the disaster to PQ17,” we read in Churchill’s memoirs,

“the Admiralty proposed to suspend the Arctic convoys.”**

The fact that the inquiry “assigned no blame to anyone”

and that the Admiralty, the agency directly responsible for

the loss of the convoy, made this proposal, brings one round

to the conclusion that somebody in Britain deliberately en¬

gineered the convoy’s destruction in order to fabricate an

excuse for putting a long halt to the delivery of armaments

to the Soviet Union.

On July 18 Churchill notified the Soviet Government of

the suspension of convoys to the USSR. Five days later a

strong Soviet protest was lodged with the British Government.

In a message to Churchill, Stalin pointed out that Soviet

naval experts considered as untenable the arguments of

British naval experts on the necessity of stopping the deliv¬

ery of war supplies to the Northern harbours of the USSR.

“They are convinced that, given goodwill and readiness to

honour obligations, steady deliveries could be effected, with

heavy loss to the Germans. The British Admiralty’s order

to the PQ17 convoy to abandon the supply ships and return

to Britain, and to the supply ships to disperse and make for

Soviet harbours singly, without escort, is, in the view of our

experts, puzzling and inexplicable.... I never imagined that

the British Government would deny us delivery of war ma¬

terials precisely now, when the Soviet Union is badly in need

of them in view of the grave situation on the Soviet-

German Front.”***

This denial of supplies during the crucial summer months

of 1942 without serious grounds must be regarded as a fla¬

grant violation of the Allied commitments to the USSR. “The

news that convoys to Russia would be suspended,” McNeill

writes, “must have come as a severe shock to Stalin. The

relentless German advance in the South was then in full

* Ibid., p. 266.

** Ibid.

*** Correspondence ..., Vol. I, p. 56.

300

swing, and Russian morale was already strained to the limit.

By mid-July hope of succour from the West was gone, at

least in any near future; and it now appeared that the

promised supplies and munitions would not be forthcoming on

schedule.”* Churchill admits that at the time “the Russian

armies were suffering fearfully and the campaign was at its

crisis”.** Without offering any objections to the arguments

in Stalin’s message Churchill informed the latter that the

British Government was “making preliminary arrangements

for another effort to run a large convoy through to Archan¬

gel in the first week of September”.*** This meant the Allies

intended to leave the Soviet Union without material

assistance during the critical summer months.

Material assistance was denied almost simultaneously with

the abandonment of the Second Front project, as a result of

which the situation was still further aggravated. To soften

the impression made by these unloyal actions of the Allies,

Churchill, with Roosevelt’s consent, said in Moscow on Au¬

gust 12 that the Allies proposed “placing an Anglo-Amer¬

ican Air Force on the southern flank of the Russian armies

in order to defend the Caspian and the Caucasian Moun¬

tains and generally to fight in this theatre”.** This met with

the approval of the Soviet Government, but since this was

only a proposal it had little effect in 1942 because before it

was put into practice, as Churchill declared, “we had to win

our battle in Egypt first”.*** The fulfilment of this promise

was thus postponed indefinitely.

After the summer interval, another convoy, PQ18, was

sent to the USSR. Of the 39 supply ships that set out for

the Soviet Union, 27 reached their destination safely. The

losses did not exceed the anticipated level. In fact, in send¬

ing convoys to Soviet northern ports the British made allow¬

ance for the loss of forty per cent of the supply ships. The

PQ18 was thus a successful operation and it would seem

the Soviet Union could now expect regular shipments of

supplies.

But that was not to be. The British and American govern¬

ments decided they needed the merchant ships for the North

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 190.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 272.

*** Correspondence ..., Vol. I, p. 57.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 483.

**> Ibid.

301

Africa landing and again suspended supplies to the USSR

via the northern route."' “Churchill,” writes the American

historian William L. Neumann, “late in September 1942,

suggested dropping the Murmansk convoy of Lend Lease aid

because it tied up too many ships in convoy duty. Roosevelt

agreed, but suggested keeping Stalin ignorant of this deci¬

sion as long as possible.”*"' As a result, the next convoy set

out for the USSR only at the close of December, reaching

Soviet ports with the loss of only one destroyer and with

light damage to one supply ship."'"'*

The Allied landing in North Africa deprived the Soviet

Union of supplies in October and November. Actually, as

McNeill points out, “it was not until the beginning of 1943

that regular convoys were resumed”.**** As a result of the

Allies not meeting their commitments “the rate of delivery

fell far behind the schedule of the Second Protocol”.* 1

The difficulties of transportation, though they were in¬

disputable, were not the main reason. In a war no operation

can be carried out without risk and losses. The losses sus¬

tained by the northern convoys were not greater, and in some

cases even less, than those suffered by the British convoys

in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. The main obstruction

to the shipment of supplies to the USSR was the hostility

of anti-Soviet circles, who did their utmost to hinder the

normal functioning of the anti-fascist coalition. In a speech

on June 21, 1942, Lord Beaverbrook said that in Britain

there was a small group “who opposed the shipment of

munitions to Russia”.*** This group included some military

leaders and statesmen. Michael Foot, for example, says

General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff,

maintained that the shipment of supplies to the Soviet Union

was “absolute madness”.**** The intrigues of that group,

which was evidently small but influential, were most likely

at the bottom of the British Admiralty’s puzzling behaviour

over the PQ17 convoy and the British Government’s failure

Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 611.

** William L. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 40.

*** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 275.

***«• William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 146.

*) Ibid.

**) The Times, June 22, 1942.

***) Michael Foot, Op. cit., p. 392.

302

to meet its obligations regarding the schedule and volume

of shipments.

Similar elements operated in the United States, and for

that reason more US assistance was sent to Britain, which

was doing little against the enemy in 1942, than to the USSR,

which was bearing the entire burden of the war.

All this, naturally, added to the strain to which the Soviet

Union was being subjected in 1942 when furious battles

raged on the Eastern Front. The British journalist Alexan¬

der Werth, who was in the Soviet Union at the time, asked

what the Allies were doing “to meet the insatiable appetite

of the war machine that was still fighting, almost alone on

land, against Hitler’s Europe? Stuff was coming in through

the North from England and America; but was it not a drop

in the bucket, compared with what the Red Army needed?”

That was indeed the case. Werth correctly says: “Until the

Battle of Stalingrad was already in full swing, lamentably

little was reaching Russia by the North during those critical

summer months of 1942.”* It was “the year in which the

Soviet Union, still insufficiently helped by her Allies, fought

her Battle of Survival, and won it”.**

El Alamein can in no way be compared with Stalingrad,

not only for the number of troops involved in the fighting.

These battles were poles asunder for the impact made by

them on the further course of the war. The Germans and

Italians easily recovered from the losses sustained by them

at El Alamein, but they never recouped their strength after

Stalingrad. The Red Army seized the strategic initiative

and never relinquished it until final victory was won. The

offensive started on the Volga was the beginning of the end

for the nazi Wehrmacht.

The losses sustained by Germany on the Eastern Front in

1942 undermined her military strength to the extent that

the course of the war changed irreversibly in favour of the

Allies. This is admitted by German authors and also by

those British and American historians who try to arrive even

approximately at a correct estimate of the turning point that

was reached in the war at the close of 1942 and beginning

of 1943. Walter Gorlitz writes that on the Volga the “Ger-

* Alexander Werth, Op. cit., pp. 79, 53.

** Ibid., p. 53.

303

man Army suffered its most overwhelming defeat in his¬

tory”. :i " H. S. Commager of the USA notes that “after

Stalingrad it was all ebb-tide for the Germans”A* A

publication sponsored by the Royal Institute of International

Affairs says that the autumn of 1942 “had seen the begin¬

ning of the end of Hitler’s Europe”.***

The enormous international significance of the Battle of

Stalingrad was that it radically changed the world situation.

The powers waiting for an opportune moment to join the

war on Germany’s side and attack the USSR (Turkey, Spain

and Japan), renounced their intentions, and the countries

allied with Germany (Italy, Rumania, Hungary and Fin¬

land) began to think of withdrawing from the war. The peo¬

ples of the countries occupied by Germany were given an¬

other powerful impetus—confidence in ultimate victory over

nazism—and activated their struggle against the invaders.

For Britain the Stalingrad victory signified a change in

the course of the war in favour of the Allies, and, conse¬

quently, of Britain. That was why the Soviet victory was

hailed with so much admiration by the British people. For

the British Government the question of how long the Soviet

Union would hold out was at last decided. It was obvious

that the USSR would fight to the finish. This led the British

Government to two conclusions. The first was that no Second

Front would have to be opened in 1943 despite the fact that

only in August Churchill had solemnly promised that such

a front would be opened. Britain could now continue the

advance eastwards from North Africa in the direction of

Italy and Southeast Europe. Alan Brooke wrote that early

in December 1942 “I was quite clear in my own mind that

the moment for the opening of a Western Front . .. would

not present itself during 1943. ... This plan, of course, de¬

pended on Russia holding on. Although in the early stages

of the war I had the most serious doubts whether she would

do so, by the end of 1942 ... it seemed a safe bet that she

would last out.”** The second conclusion was that insofar

* Walter Gorlitz. Der deutsche Generalstab, Frankfurt am Main,

1950, S. 610.

** The Story of the Second World War , Ed. by H. S. Commager,

Boston, 1945, p. 365.

*** T he Realignment of Europe, Ed. by Arnold and Veronica

M. Toynbee, London, 1955, p. 2.

*) Arthur Bryant, Op. cit., p. 530.

304

as it was now certain that Russia would hold out it was

necessary to tackle problems of the post-war arrangement so

that by the time the war ended the conditions would have

been created to make it possible to terminate the war

with benefit for Britain’s imperialist interests, prevent the

Soviet Union from taking advantage of victory won at the

cost mainly of its own blood, and restrict and hold back the

growth of the revolutionary movement which would inevi¬

tably acquire a large scale as a result of the defeat of fascism.

Chapter Five

FROM STALINGRAD

TO NORMANDY

(February 1943-June 1944)

More Commitments to the USSR

Are Not Honoured

On the eve of 1943 Churchill wrote to Stalin: “We are

deeply encouraged by the growing magnitude of your vic¬

tories in the South. They bear out all that you told me at

Moscow. The results may be very far-reaching indeed.’” 5 '

This was a significant message on two counts. It showed that

on August 1, 1942 when Churchill visited Moscow the Soviet

Government had exhaustively informed him of the planned

Soviet counter-offensive. Secondly, it was an indication

that the import of Stalingrad was appreciated in London.

The Soviet military successes at the close of 1942 and

beginning of 1943 radically changed the relations between

the leading members of the anti-fascist coalition. Previously

Britain and the USA were certain that the USSR would be

either crushed or weakened to the extent that they could

establish new frontiers for it and determine its place in the

post-war world. Stalingrad changed everything. It was now

obvious that the Soviet Union would emerge victorious from

the war. It suited the Allies to see the Soviet Union smash

the German military machine and win the war for them,

but now the post-war future and the political repercussions

of a Soviet victory in the war burdened them with torturing

anxiety. “By 1943,” writes Labour Monthly, “panic seized

the Western rulers at the prospect of the fall of fascism and

the victory of communism.

* Correspondence. .., Vol. I, p. 83.

** Labour Monthly, March 1963, p. 103.

306

Churchill was panic-stricken long before the outcome of

the great Battle of Stalingrad became known. In October

1942, two months before sending the above-mentioned mes¬

sage to Stalin, he wrote and circulated a memorandum

among the members of the War Cabinet. In that memoran¬

dum he pointed out: “My thoughts rest primarily in

Europe—the revival of the glory of Europe—the parent

continent of the modern nations and of civilisation. It would

be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarism overlaid the

culture and independence of the ancient states of Europe.

Hard as it is to say now I trust that the European family

may act unitedly as one under a Council of Europe.”* How

he must have hated the Soviet people and their country to

have written these words when the Battle of Stalingrad was

Being fought. They bring to mind other words, namely: “If

(Bolshevik] methods succeed ... European culture ... would

be superseded by the most frightful barbarism of all

times.”** Similar as they are they were written by different

people. The latter extract is from a statement made by Adolf

Hitler at the National-Socialist Party Congress in Nurem¬

berg in 1936.

The immense importance of this memorandum is that it

provided the pivot for British war-time and post-war

foreign policy. “I hope,” Churchill wrote, “to see a Council

consisting of perhaps ten units, including the former Great

Powers, Sweden, Norwegians, Danes, Dutchmen, Belgians,

Frenchmen, Spaniards, Poles, Czechs and Turks.”*** By “for¬

mer Great Powers” he meant an anti-Soviet European direc¬

torate which would include Germany and Italy. He excluded

France, giving the French special mention. Thus was laid

down British post-war foreign policy which aimed at an

alliance with Germany, Italy and a number of other countries

against the Soviet Union. This policy was charted long before

the Axis powers were smashed and forced to surrender. The

world first learned of the Churchill memorandum in 1949

from Harold Macmillan, but it is significant that to this day

British and other historiography make believe the memo¬

randum never existed. The reason for this is that British

* The Autobiography of D. N. Pritt.. London, 1965, p. 281.

** Ibid.

*** Ibid.

20 *

307

historians go out of their way to persuade the reader that

the Soviet Union was to blame for the crack-up of the anti¬

fascist coalition as soon as the war was over. However, their

long-winded “evidence” melts as soon as one reads only a

few lines of this document written by the then head of the

British Government.

In The Struggle for Europe, which caused a sensation in

the West, the Australian publicist Chester Wilmot writes:

“During 1943, although he was still primarily interested

in the problem of destroying Hitler’s power, Churchill

became increasingly concerned about the necessity of re¬

straining Stalin.... Accordingly, while continuing to put the

defeat of Hitler first, the Prime Minister sought to devise

a plan of campaign which would not only bring military

success, but would ensure that victory did not leave thj?

democratic [read capitalist. — V. 7.] cause politically weaker

in any vital sphere.’” 1 '

These considerations above all determined subsequent

British strategy and foreign policy. In the course of the war

the British Government could not afford to break with and

come out against the USSR in order to uphold capitalism

and preserve fascism (although an attempt in this direction

was made by Churchill in 1945) because it would have in¬

evitably brought about Britain’s defeat in the war with her

imperialist rivals. McNeill writes that by the beginning of

1943 “there could no longer be much doubt that victory

would rest with the Allies. Only the rupture of the Grand

Alliance could have seriously endangered its victory; and

the realisation of that fact both in Russia and in Britain and

America helped to keep Allied differences within manage¬

able proportions.”* **

Insofar as it was considered ill-advised to break the Al¬

liance, the British Government did its utmost firstly to shift

the burden of the war onto the USSR in order to weaken

it as much as possible and, secondly, to compel the Soviet

Union to subscribe to a post-war arrangement which would

not only satisfy Britain’s imperialist interests but also preserve

the positions of capitalism and undermine the revolutionary

movement in Europe. Prior to 1943 the British and Amer¬

icans had insisted on postponing the discussion of the post-war

* Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, London, 1953, p. 130.

** William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 216.

308

settlement to the end of the war, but now they attached spe¬

cial importance to this problem.

In military strategy, a result of the changed military and

political situation was that the British Government con¬

tinued, with greater doggedness than before, to evade ful¬

filling its commitment to open a Second Front. At the same

time, every effort was made to bring British and American

troops into Southeastern and Eastern Europe from the south,

via the Balkans, and thereby close the road to Europe for

the Soviet Army. Churchill and Britain’s military leaders

sought to achieve this object throughout the whole of 1943.

After the victory at Stalingrad, the Second Front issue lost

much of its importance to the Soviet Union. Until the close

of 1942 the Second Front could be regarded as aid to enable

the Soviet Union to fight Germany, but now, after it had

withstood the German onslaught unaided, the Second Front

could lighten the Soviet Union’s burden of the struggle

against the common enemy, hasten the end of the war and

reduce the sacrifices necessary to achieve victory. The Sec¬

ond Front was thus no longer a pressing problem for the

Soviet Union and, consequently, in its relations with its Al¬

lies it found itself in a much stronger position.

In 1943, with the strategic and political situation changing

swiftly, Churchill and Roosevelt met frequently to discuss

Allied strategy. The first of these meetings took place at

Casablanca on January 14-25. A decision to postpone the

invasion of Western Europe indefinitely and concentrate all

Allied forces in the Mediterranean would have suited the

British most. However, they could not say this openly for it

would have been tantamount to a formal invitation to the

Americans to fight for British colonial interests instead of

fighting the common enemy—Germany. Moreover, influential

forces in the USA, chiefly in naval circles, felt American

troops should be used in the Far East to achieve American

colonial objectives rather than to secure British colonial aims.

Churchill had, therefore, to pretend he was not against a

direct assault of Germany, i.e., a Second Front, but argued

that this should be preceded by a series of operations in the

Mediterranean where powerful Anglo-US forces were al¬

ready concentrated. This led to a compromise decision at

Casablanca.

It was agreed that after the fighting in Tunisia ended an

operation would be launched with the purpose of seizing

309

the Italian island of Sicily. This operation would be accom¬

panied by a determined hunt for German U-boats in the

Atlantic, the bombing of Germany and the drawing up of

plans for a landing in Western Europe “if Germany neared

collapse”."' The Mediterranean strategy was thus adopted

and the Second Front was made dependent on whether the

USSR would bring Germany to her knees. Wilmot writes it

“was not now a matter of making a desperate diversion to

relieve the Russians, but of landing in Northern France in

such strength that the invading armies could liberate West¬

ern Europe and strike on into the heart of Germany”.** “The

decision to invade Sicily,” writes General Wedemeyer, who

was present at the conference, . .inevitably sidetracked the

main Normandy commitment, the really decisive operation,

until 1944.”*** In practice the Casablanca decisions meant

“that the Soviet forces ... were going to have to continue

to bear the main brunt of the land fighting in Europe during

1943”.*)

In effect, by taking these decisions the Allies violated

their commitments to the USSR. That explains the vague

wording of the Churchill-Roosevelt message to the Soviet

Government on January 27 informing it of the Casablanca

conference.**) However, in Moscow they had learned to see

through courteous, veiled messages of this kind, and there¬

fore on January 30 in a message of reply Stalin wrote: “As¬

suming that your decisions on Germany are designed to de¬

feat her by opening a Second Front in Europe in 1943, I

should be grateful if you would inform me of the concrete

operations planned and of their timing.”***) Churchill had

to reply in more specific terms. On February 9 he wrote that

the Allies had in mind an operation for the seizure of Sicily

and the Dodecanese Islands and were preparing to cross the

English Channel in August provided the conditions were

favourable. This reservation was repeated by him on

March 11. He was quite obviously evading a direct reply

and wriggling out of the commitment he had made on behalf

of Britain.

* Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 106.

** Chester Wilmot, Op. cit., p. 117.

*** Albert C. Wedemeyer, Op. cit., p. 169.

*) Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 108.

**) Correspondence ..., Vol. I, pp. 84-86.

***> Ibid., p. 89.

310

Churchill’s promise of February 9 to cross the English

Channel in August 1943 was hollow through and through as

was shown by his next meeting with Roosevelt on May 12-

25 in Washington. At that meeting it was decided that the

invasion of Western Europe would be launched in 1944, and

even the date for it was named—May 1—but it was to be

preceded by operations against Italy.* However, even at this

stage the British did not regard the date for the invasion of

France as final. In other words, they planned to call off the

invasion in 1944 if they found it suited their purpose to do

so.

From a Roosevelt message of June 5 the Soviet Govern¬

ment learned the Second Front would not be opened in 1943.

In messages of June 11 and 24 it protested firstly against the

Anglo-American decision to postpone this operation without

any attempt to discuss this crucial question with the Soviet

Union and, secondly, against their violation of their definite

pledge to open a Second Front not later than in 1943. The

message of June 24 stated “that the point here is not just

the disappointment of the Soviet Government, but the preser¬

vation of its confidence in its Allies”.** Churchill realised

that the Soviet Government had seen through his double¬

dealing. He could only reply irritably with the threat that

he would present his “case to the British Parliament and the

nation”.***

Tension between the USSR and its Allies on the question

of a Second Front reached its highest point in June 1943 as

is shown by the exchange of messages. The Soviet Union’s

military position was still further strengthened and, cor¬

respondingly, the importance of a Second Front receded

after the Battle of Kursk (which began on July 5, 1943),

where a crushing defeat was inflicted on the German armies.

However, while the Soviet Union found itself requiring less

and less military aid from the Allies, the latter came to

regard a Second Front as an increasingly important means

of preserving reactionary regimes in Europe and strengthen¬

ing British and American influence there. This came to the

fore at the next Churchill-Roosevelt meeting on August 14-

24 in Quebec, Canada.

* Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 128.

** Correspondence ..., Vol. II, p. 76.

*** Ibid., Vol. I, p. 140.

311

At Quebec the Americans insisted on reaffirming the Wash¬

ington decision to effect a landing in Northern France on

May 1, 1944. It was settled that 29 divisions would take

part in the operation. Churchill had his eyes on the Balkans

and his agreement to this decision contained a number of

reservations concerning the situation that might arise in the

landing area in the spring of 1944.* The Americans were

aware that Churchill was again acting the hypocrite. Wede-

meyer, who was at the Quebec Conference, writes that when

Churchill gave his agreement to the landing in France

General Marshall told the British Prime Minister he “could

not agree to the past British position of supporting Bolero-

Overlord and at the same time taking major resources away

from it to undertake operations in the Mediterranean. That

has been our experience all the way through.”**

Nothing definite about the Quebec decision was commu¬

nicated to the Soviet Government. The Churchill-Roosevelt

message of August 26 spoke in general terms of the bombing

of Germany and the creation of a bridgehead on the con¬

tinent without giving the time-table for the operation or

stating the strength of the forces to be used.*** The Soviet

Government left this message without a reply, for the cor¬

respondence on the issue was becoming useless.

The decisions of the inter-Allied conferences in 1943 pro¬

vided testimony of some differences between Britain and

the USA on the question of a Second Front. While Churchill

doggedly opposed opening the Second Front at the stipulated

time, Roosevelt and his military advisers (mainly General

Marshall, Army Chief-of-Staff) insisted, without much spirit

it is true, on the invasion of Europe.

Behind the American stand there was more than President

Roosevelt’s greater sense of responsibility towards his Ally

than Churchill’s, although this undoubtedly played its role.

More important was the fact that the Americans believed

it was to their advantage to open the Second Front as soon

as possible. There were several reasons for this.

One was that the US Government wanted the earliest

possible termination of the war against Germany in order

to use all its forces against Japan. The only way to defeat

* Herbert Feis, Op. cit., pp. 149-50.

** Albert C. Wederaeyer, Op. cit., p. 244.

*** Correspondence ..VoL I, pp. 150-51.

312

Germany quickly was to launch an invasion of Western

Europe.

Another reason was that Roosevelt and his Administration

felt the USA had to make a tangible contribution towards

Germany’s defeat in order to have the moral and political

right to determine the post-war arrangement. In line with

this reasoning they held it was undesirable for the war to

be won by the Soviet Union alone. They were afraid the

Soviet Union would bring the European peoples liberation

from nazism with the result that socialism’s prestige would

be enhanced. Wedemeyer relates that in 1943 he told one

of his colleagues: “We should realise that the Russians

might soon be moving westward and could be well into

Western Europe and the Balkans before we could get there.

Even if Russia had not been able to hold out at Stalingrad,

it was militarily necessary and politically expedient for us

to get into the Continent while the bulk of the nazis were

tied down far to the East.”* Further, he explains that “in

relying upon the land forces of the Soviet Union to deliver

the knockout blow, we were storing up infinite trouble for

ourselves at the peace table. At the war’s end the Commu¬

nists would be in a favourable position to deliver mighty

blows in political, economic, and psychological fields against

their Allies.”**

Yet another reason, the Mediterranean strategy was not

attractive to the Americans because its purpose was to con¬

solidate the British Empire. The Americans wanted some¬

thing quite different. Wedemeyer tells us that in 1943 the

Americans felt the British were insisting on “periphery-

pecking operations in the Mediterranean to improve their

over-all Empire position”.*** He was of the opinion that at

“Casablanca and subsequently, we surrendered to British

demands which entailed the perversion of American strategy

for the sake of preserving British imperial interests”.*) For

similar reasons the Americans opposed Churchill’s Balkan

strategy. They had no desire to pull the chestnuts out of the

fire for Britain.

The official objective of the Balkan strategy was that

Eastern Europe would be occupied as soon as possible by

* Albert C. Wedemeyer, Op. cit., p. 211.

** Ibid., p. 241.

*** Ibid., p. 177.

*> Ibid., pp. 189-90.

313

British and United States forces who would, thereby, block

the Red Army’s road to the west. This fitted in with the

designs of the American leaders, but they considered firstly

that the adoption of this strategy would strengthen Britain’s

position in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle

East, which they felt was undesirable, and, secondly, that a

landing in the Balkans would not enable Anglo-US troops

to cut off the road of the Soviet Army in time and that this

would defeat the purpose of the operation. The rough, moun¬

tainous terrain in the Balkans coupled with the absence of

port installations would have held up the operation sug¬

gested by Churchill. “The terrain,” says Wedemeyer, “was

against it.’” 1 ' The Americans therefore did not support

Churchill’s plan of striking at the “soft underbelly of Eu¬

rope”, feeling that an invasion of Western Europe would

enable their troops to reach Central and perhaps even East¬

ern Europe earlier than the Soviet Army.

Anglo-French Relations

In 1943 contact between Britain and France was, for all

practical purposes, reduced to relations with the Gaullist

Free French Movement, but there were a number of com¬

plicating aspects. One cause of complication was the dif¬

ferences between Britain and the USA over the French issue;

moreover, on this issue Britain had to take the Soviet stand

into consideration.

The agreement signed by the US Government with Darlan

in North Africa was a clear indication that through a bar¬

gain with Vichy elements it sought to create for the liberated

French possessions an administration that would be an obe¬

dient tool in its hands and replace the British-backed

Gaullist authorities, and when France proper was liberated it

would serve as the nucleus for a future reactionary and pro-

American French Government. This was clearly understood

by Churchill and de Gaulle, and both were interested in

preventing the Americans from carrying out their designs.

Hence the solidarity between Churchill and de Gaulle on

this issue at the close of December 1942 and beginning of

January 1943.

Even before the assassination of Darlan, de Gaulle had

* Ibid., p. 229.

314

desired agreement with General Henri Giraud. He redoubled

his efforts in this direction after Giraud succeeded Darlan.

On December 25 he suggested that Giraud meet with him to

agree on setting up a single French administration which

would unite the apparatus created by de Gaulle and the

apparatus which the Americans were so energetically creat¬

ing in North Africa under Giraud. The British approved

this idea, but the Americans opposed it. They wanted to

consolidate the position of Giraud and his supporters and,

pleading military considerations (the passive fighting against

the remnants of German and Italian forces in North Africa),

denied de Gaulle entry into North Africa. Giraud, therefore,

declined the meeting suggested by de Gaulle.

At the same time, the British Foreign Office made every

effort to obtain US agreement to the establishment of a single

French authority based on the French National Committee

in London and General Giraud’s administration in Algiers.

On January 2, 1943 Eden instructed Halifax to negotiate

with the US Government in order to obtain its agreement to

the setting up in Algeria of a single administration to su¬

persede the London-based French National Committee and

General Giraud’s Algerian administration. It was not pro¬

posed that such an authority should be recognised as a de

facto government. It was to be treated as an Allied power,

as a member of the United Nations. The British considered

such an arrangement necessary in order to remove friction

between Britain and the USA over the French problem*

This idea was clearly not to the liking of the US State

Department, and in subsequent negotiations the British had

to prove that de Gaulle enjoyed the support of the Resist¬

ance in France herself and of world public opinion, which

considered he was making a useful contribution towards

victory and therefore could not be ignored. Hull, however,

was adamant and no decision was reached at the Churchill-

Roosevelt meeting in Casablanca.

Churchill realised he would not get US consent to the

establishment of a single French authority as defined in the

talks between the Foreign Office and the State Department.

He therefore decided to seek Roosevelt’s agreement to a

gradual solution of this problem. In line with British tradi¬

tion, Churchill displayed initiative in this issue, suggesting

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 215.

315

that de Gaulle should be invited to Casablanca to meet

Giraud, and drew up the terms for an Anglo-US agreement.

While taking Roosevelt’s stand into account these terms

made no provision for any immediate integration of the

French National Committee and the Giraud administration.

All they called for was the reorganisation of these bodies

so that each would include representatives of the other.

Moreover, it was suggested that British and American ob¬

servers should be appointed to both bodies.

Churchill was infuriated to learn that after he had se¬

cured this compromise de Gaulle refused to go to Casablan¬

ca. This was de Gaulle’s revenge for Giraud’s earlier refusal

to meet him. Churchill instructed Anthony Eden to tell de

Gaulle that if he did not go to Casablanca the British Gov¬

ernment would consider “his removal from the headship of

the Free French Movement is essential to the further support

of this movement by HMG”.* The unseemliness of this

flagrant pressure was felt by Harold Macmillan, the British

political representative at Eisenhower’s headquarters. On

two occasions he suggested that in reply to de Gaulle’s

earlier proposal Giraud should invite him to Casablanca.

But Churchill was determined to compel de Gaulle to toe

the line. This de Gaulle had to do, but all these circumstances

accompanying his arrival in Casablanca hardly improved

the relations between him and the British Government. Later

the Foreign Office considered that Churchill had made a

mistake by turning down Macmillan’s suggestion.**

De Gaulle’s meeting with Giraud and with Roosevelt at

Casablanca did not yield the results expected by Churchill.

The head of the Free French Mission in Moscow Roger

Garreau told the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister that Giraud

had refused to discuss the question of political co-operation

in spite of the fact that de Gaulle had offered him the su¬

preme command of the French Armed Forces.

All that was achieved was a temporary agreement on the

reciprocal appointment of liaison officers to co-ordinate

military and economic efforts.*** Giraud’s obstinacy was due

to the backing he was getting from the Americans. The Brit¬

ish tried to play the role of mediator, but so far they were

unsuccessful.

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 681.

Llewellyn Woodward, Op.cit., p. 217.

*** Sovietsko-frantsuzskiye otnosheniya ..., p. 107.

316

In a conversation with A. Y. Bogomolov, the Soviet Am¬

bassador to the Allied governments in exile in London, on

May 11, 1943 de Gaulle said: “My differences with Giraud

are differences between France and the United States.”

“What is the role of the British in these differences?” Bogo¬

molov asked. De Gaulle replied: “As you are aware, the

British treat me with a certain amount of distrust, but at the

same time they support me, hoping to gain something for

Britain in the event of my return to France.”*

Time, however, was working for de Gaulle and, conse¬

quently, to some extent for the British as well. Despite all-

out American backing, Giraud’s position in North Africa

grew steadily weaker in the next four months following the

Casablanca meeting. The reason for this was that Giraud

represented Vichy elements and Vichy policy, which was

founded on collaboration with the Germans. Necessity and

circumstances had compelled him to serve the Americans.

His star waned in proportion to the approach of the Allied

victory and the collapse of Vichy policy. He had no support

whatever in the Resistance movement in France and there

was no sympathy for him in Britain, least of all in the USSR.

On the other hand, de Gaulle’s position grew stronger. The

French people and the rest of the world saw that he was

working along correct lines and their sympathy was on his

side. The Soviet Government gave the French National Com¬

mittee every support. The Committee enjoyed the backing

of the French Resistance and the Communist Party of France.

This was one of the reasons for the hostility of the American

Government and for Churchill’s dissatisfaction with

de Gaulle.** “The support given to de Gaulle by the

British Foreign Office,” writes McNeill, “helped to counter¬

balance American support for Giraud.”*** When the French

National Committee’s influence in North Africa began to

grow, the Americans realised they had miscalculated by

staking on Giraud and that it would not be a simple matter

to ignore de Gaulle. This cleared the ground for agreement

between the two rival French authorities outside France.

De Gaulle arrived in Algiers on May 30, 1943, and on

June 3 reached agreement with Giraud on the formation of

* Ibid., p. 131.

** William D. Leahy, Op. cit., p. 175.

William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 259.

317

a French Committee of National Liberation in Algeria to

replace the French National Committee in London and the

military command and civil administration in Algeria. The

declaration announcing this agreement stated that as the

central French authority the Committee would implement

French sovereignty in all territories unoccupied by the enemy

and ensure leadership and protection of French interests

throughout the world. De Gaulle and Giraud were named as

co-chairmen of the Committee.*

Britain had to declare her attitude to the new Committee.

In Parliament on June 8 Churchill welcomed the agreement

but showed no enthusiasm over the establishment of the

Committee. “There is,” he said, “a further and larger ques¬

tion—namely, the degree of recognition of this Committee

as representative of France. This question requires consid¬

eration from the British and United States governments.”*”

This statement reveals not only the extremely cool atti¬

tude to the agreement reached in Algiers but also the inten¬

tion to ignore the Soviet Union in working out the Allied

attitude to the new Committee. This was evident in all the

Anglo-American talks on the French issue after the Allied

landing in North Africa. The Soviet Government was not

even informed of these talks. This disloyal attitude by

Britain towards the USSR must be borne in mind when we

come to the British Government’s arbitrary action in seeking

to interfere in the Soviet Union’s relations with the govern¬

ments of East European countries liberated from German

occupation by Soviet forces.

Although Churchill declared that Britain and the USA

had to formulate the Allied attitude towards the de Gaulle-

Giraud Committee, he was in the long run unable to elimi¬

nate the USSR from the decision on this issue. The Soviet

Union welcomed the new French Committee of National

Liberation, regarding it as a vehicle helping to unite the

forces capable of fighting the common enemy. The Soviet

Union could recognise the new Committee and thereby con¬

front Britain with difficulties in studying “the degree of re¬

cognition”. The Committee requested British recognition as

early as June 7. Therefore, in order to avoid finding itself

in difficulties, the British Government on June 15 requested

* Sovietsko-frantsuzskiye otnosheniya ..., p. 158.

The Times, June 9, 1943.

318

the Soviet Government to refrain from answering the Com¬

mittee on the question of recognition without consultations

with Britain.* The reply to this request stated that “the So¬

viet Government does not find it expedient to postpone

recognition of the Committee, for such postponement by no

means facilitates the unity of the anti-fascist French

forces”.** This was a just attitude, but it hobbled the British

who were hoping to get some concession from the Commit¬

tee in return for recognition.

On June 23 Churchill wrote to Stalin, saying that it was

not likely that the British Government would recognise the

Committee in the immediate future and requesting the So¬

viet Government to withhold recognition. In view of the fact

that in their juggling over the French issue Britain and the

USA had been ignoring the USSR, this was a strange re¬

quest, to say the least. However, Churchill was told that the

Soviet Government had no information corroborating the

British Government’s present attitude towards the French

Committee (which implied it did not consider this attitude

well-founded) but inasmuch as the British Government had

requested a postponement of Soviet recognition of the Com¬

mittee and had, through its Ambassador, assured the Soviet

Government it would take no decision on the French

problem without consultations with the Soviet Union, it was

prepared to meet the British request.***

The British Government, meanwhile, was making up its

mind whether or not to recognise the new Committee. This

was a tormenting problem for it. If recognition was to be

granted it had to decide on the terms and how to agree these

terms with the Americans. This compelled it to re-examine

American policy towards France and weigh de Gaulle’s “re¬

liability” from the standpoint of British interests. There was

a new factor to be considered: in London nobody now

doubted that the Soviet Union would win the war.

In a memorandum of July 13 Eden pointed out that the

USA did not desire a strong French Government or the in¬

tegrity of the French colonial empire. The US President had

unofficially advanced the idea that Indochina and some of

the French islands in the Pacific should come under the

* Sovietsko-frantsuzskiye otnosheniya. .., pp. 151-52.

** Ibid., p. 164.

Ibid., p. 173.

319

trusteeship of the United Nations, while Dakar and Bizerta

should be turned over to the USA and Britain respectively

as military bases. Eden wrote that this ran counter to Brit¬

ish interests, for Britain did not want any French territory

and did not approve of policies aimed at the disintegration

of colonial empires."' British policy thus underwent a met¬

amorphosis. Not long before the British had wanted to seize

some French possessions, but now, seeing they would get

little out of a division, they opposed the “disintegration of

colonial empires”. Moreover, by participating in the divi¬

sion of the French Empire they would have helped to create

a most dangerous precedent that might later be applied to

their own empire.

They adopted a somewhat modified attitude towards France

herself. The USSR had held out against Germany and

now Britain needed a strong France, which could oppose the

Soviet Union in Europe after the war. The Eden memoran¬

dum put this plainly, stating: “... We also needed a power¬

ful France in the West.”**

Woodward presents the Eden memorandum in such a way

as to make the reader believe Britain wanted a powerful

France as a counterbalance to Germany. This is, however,

calculated for naive minds only. McNeill correctly notes that

“British support for de Gaulle was motivated largely by the

wish to see a strong Government ready to take over the ad¬

ministration of France as soon as it was liberated from Ger¬

man control: a Government which might be expected to show

a modicum of gratitude to Great Britain and which might

help to provide a counterweight on the Continent to the Rus¬

sian colossus”.***

Churchill agreed with all this but was disquieted about

General de Gaulle’s future attitude towards Britain.*) But

the British Government had no choice in the matter and,

as Woodward points out, “force of circumstances” led it

towards recognition of the Committee.**) Key circumstances

were the stand of the Soviet Union and the attitude of the

French people to the Committee.

Allied recognition of the Committee was granted on

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 222.

** Ibid., pp. 222-23.

*** William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 316.

*1 Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 223.

**) Ibid., pp. 223-24.

320

August 26, 1943. The British failed to agree with the Amer¬

icans on an integral formula of recognition, and the two gov¬

ernments published different statements on this count. The

Soviet formula was the most brief and most fully satisfied

the Committee’s desires.

Churchill had sufficient ground for doubting de Gaulle’s

“tractability”. As soon as the Committee was recognised

there was another flare-up between the British and the

French, this time over Syria and the Lebanon. Through Brit¬

ish pressure, the long-delayed local parliamentary elections

in Syria were held in July, while in August 1943 the British

envoy to the Lebanon General Sir Edward Spears, with

Churchill’s approval, incited the local authorities to take

action against the French. The Foreign Office, it must be

pointed out, was not always pleased with this excessive and

clumsy activity.

In November 1943, when the Lebanese Government im¬

plemented a series of constitutional measures restricting

French rights and influence, the French arrested the Presi¬

dent and all the ministers they could lay their hands on.

The British lodged a protest with the French Committee,

demanding the release of the ministers and the automatic

reinstatement of the Lebanese Government. The French had

to yield.

Although the Committee had been set up under the dual

chairmanship of de Gaulle and Giraud in June 1943, this

dual power could not last long. De Gaulle wanted to rid

himself of his undesirable co-chairman, and developments

helped him to achieve this end. Giraud had to resign as

early as November 9, 1943, but he remained Commander-in-

Chief of the French Army. However, on April 9, 1944, he

had to relinquish this post as well.

Italy’s Unconditional Surrender

and Withdrawal from the War

At a press conference on January 24, 1943 Roosevelt

called Casablanca the “unconditional surrender” meeting.*

This was an allusion to his agreement with Churchill that

the war against Germany, Italy and Japan would end not in

* Chester Wilmot, Op. cit., p. 121.

21—1561

321

a compromise peace but in the unconditional surrender of

the Axis powers.*

Here Roosevelt had several objectives. First and foremost

he wanted himself or his successor to have freedom of ac¬

tion at the future peace conference. He was anxious to avoid

a situation, such as had taken shape after the First World

War, when the armistice with Germany was signed on the

basis of Wilson’s 14 points, and the Germans later kept ac¬

cusing the Allies that the Versailles Peace was a violation

of those points. In addition, the Roosevelt statement on un¬

conditional surrender was meant to show the Soviet Union

that although the USA and Britain had not honoured their

pledge of opening a Second Front they were determined to

fight the war, side by side with the USSR, until final victory

was won.

These considerations made the unconditional surrender of

the Axis powers acceptable to Churchill as well, but though

he had agreed with Roosevelt he was by no means delighted

over the principle proclaimed at Casablanca. He had no stom¬

ach for this principle for it presupposed the complete defeat

of Germany, Italy and Japan and, consequently, the down¬

fall of fascism in these countries. He feared the proletarian

revolution too much to strive for such an outcome. He would

very much have liked to see a considerable weakening of

Britain’s rivals as a result of which the present odious rulers

and governments would be replaced by other reactionary

governments, with which Britain could conclude peace

without fighting the war to the end. Higgins quite rightly

notes that “essentially the military doctrines of Winston

Churchill... made sense only in terms of a mediated

peace”.**

By force of these circumstances Churchill made haste to

appraise the principle of unconditional surrender negative¬

ly, maintaining that by proclaiming this principle the USA

and Britain compelled the German people to support Hitler

to the very end and fight to the last ditch, as a result of which

Soviet troops entered into the heart of Germany. “Roose¬

velt,” Walter Lippmann writes, “went over to unconditional

surrender, and thus not only prolonged the war but made

* War and Peace Aims of the United Nations, Vol. II, Washington,

1945, p. 2.

Trumbull Higgins, Op. cit., p. 194.

322

it insoluble by bringing the Russians into Europe.”* Wil-

mot points out that by “doing this, the Anglo-Saxon powers

denied themselves any freedom of diplomatic manoeuvre

and denied the German people any avenue of escape from

Hitler”.** These assertions contain an undertone of regret

that the war ended in Germany’s defeat and not in a com¬

promise peace with her, a peace which, these authors feel,

would have averted the growth of the proletarian revolution

in European countries.

The example of Italy provides convincing testimony that

the principle of unconditional surrender did not have the

consequences ascribed to it.

In the night of June 9-10, 1943 Anglo-American troops

landed in Sicily. Although they had numerical superiority

over the enemy, they made extremely slow progress. None¬

theless, Italy’s rulers realised that the war was lost. Properly

speaking, this had become evident after the rout of the Italian

troops on the Eastern Front in 1942. The Allied invasion

was only the coup de grace. The top echelon of the fascist

party and military and palace circles accomplished a

coup in Rome on July 25. Mussolini was stripped of power

and arrested. The new Government was formed by Marshal

Pietro Badoglio, a prominent fascist leader and commander

of Italian troops in the war against Abyssinia.

The developments in Rome forced the British and US

governments hastily to draw up the document for Italy’s

withdrawal from the war. Britain’s stand was formulated

quite clearly by Churchill in a speech in Parliament on July

27. “It would be a grave mistake,” he said, “for Britain and

the United States so to act as to break down the whole struc¬

ture and expression of the Italian State.”*** Italy had a

fascist state structure and, consequently, Churchill took care

to save as much of it as possible.

This stand was determined by the class interests of the

British bourgeoisie. The break-down of the fascist structure

would mean its replacement by some other system. Roosevelt

hoped it would be a bourgeois-democratic system of the

Anglo-Saxon type. Churchill was not so hopeful. He was

afraid that after their liberation from fascist tyranny the

* New York Herald Tribune, October 30, 1962.

** Chester Wilmot, Op. cit., p. 123.

*** Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, Vol. 391, col. 1399.

21 *

323

Italian people would turn their gaze to socialism. To prevent

this happening he was prepared to preserve the Italian

monarchy, which had co-operated with the fascists, keep the

Badoglio Government in power and sign an armistice with

it. He feared that “if the framework of monarchy and con¬

servatism, represented by men like Badoglio, once gave way,

Italy would soon turn towards communist revolution”.' 1 ' He

did not conceal these apprehensions. In a message to Roose¬

velt on July 31 he wrote he was “not in the least afraid . . .

to recognise the House of Savoy or Badoglio. . . for our war

purpose”, because this purpose “would certainly be hindered

by chaos, Bolshevisation, or civil war. We have no right to

lay undue burdens on our troops.”** The last sentence is

extremely significant. It shows that if necessary the British

Government would not have scrupled to use its troops in

liberated territories to prevent “Bolshevisation”, i.e., forcibly

to prevent the peoples from taking the road of socialism if

they so desired. Thus, among other things, British military

doctrine pursued counter-revolutionary objectives. In the

light of the above message one can clearly see Britain’s real

attitude to the Atlantic Charter provision about the right of

nations to choose their own form of government.

Badoglio was an Italian Darlan, and Churchill’s readi¬

ness to co-operate with him betrays the hypocrisy of the

arguments which nine months previously the British Govern¬

ment had proffered to show that the US deal with Darlan

was morally unacceptable. One of the reasons Churchill

was prepared to reach agreement with the Italian monar¬

chy and Badoglio was that at heart he was a monarchist

himself. Moreover, he felt that such an agreement would

open up additional possibilities for the military operations

he was so eager to start in the Aegean Sea and in the

Balkans.

As soon as Badoglio came to power he tried to persuade

the Germans that nothing had happened that would harm

them, that Italy was a true ally of Germany. At the same

time, he looked for channels through which to negotiate peace

with the Allies. He failed to deceive Hitler. The Germans

wasted no time in preparing to send fresh divisions to Italy

to prevent her from withdrawing from the war, or, if that

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 291.

Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. V, p. 59.

324

proved to be impossible, to occupy her. Mussolini’s removal

gave the Anglo-American Command an extremely favour¬

able opportunity for landing troops in Italy and occupying

most of that country without much difficulty before the Ger¬

mans could strengthen their position in the new situation. On

July 27, at a meeting with his military leaders called to dis¬

cuss measures to be taken in Italy, Hitler said “the English

won’t wait a week while we consider and prepare for action”.

However, as Shirer points out, the “Allies waited not a week,

but six weeks. By then Hitler had his plans and the forces

to carry them out ready.”'' Had the Allies taken advantage

of the situation they would not have found themselves bogged

down in Italy. Captain H. C. Butcher, Eisenhower’s naval

aide, subsequently wrote that at the time the British and

American military leadership were dissatisfied with Eisen¬

hower’s lack of energy and initiative in conducting the war

against Italy.* ** '' Initiative and energy were needed to prevent

the Germans from occupying Italy.

As regards Italy, the Badoglio Government entered into

negotiations with the British on a cease-fire at the very be¬

ginning of August. This was not a request for peace but a

proposal to strike a bargain which would turn Italy from an

enemy of the United Nations into an ally.*** The Italians

insisted that the Allies land more troops in Italy to protect

them from the wrath of the Germans. The drawn-out bar¬

gaining ended on September 3, when the Allies began land¬

ing troops on the tip of the Italian boot and the Italians

signed the armistice terms. This was not unconditional sur¬

render in the proper sense. At the same time, Italy’s with¬

drawal from the war showed that the proclamation of the

principle of unconditional surrender did not lengthen out

her resistance. This was equally true of Germany.

The coup in Italy and her withdrawal from the war fol¬

lowed on the heels of Germany’s abortive attempt to launch

an offensive on the Eastern Front in the summer of 1943, the

overwhelming defeat suffered by the German troops in the

Kursk Bulge, and the successful Soviet counter-offensive,

which irrevocably turned the war in favour of the United

Nations.

* William L. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 1000.

** H. C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, New York,

1946, pp. 407-25.

*** Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 162.

325

This Soviet military success still further enhanced the

USSR’s prestige and its role in the anti-fascist coalition. In

London they began to realise that the Soviet Union could

no longer be safely ignored in the decision of issues con¬

cerning the anti-fascist coalition as a whole. The days when

the Atlantic Charter was drawn up without Soviet partici¬

pation had receded into the past. The time was drawing

nearer when the Soviet Union would liberate European coun¬

tries from fascism.

That was why in the conversation which Eden had with

the American Ambassador in Britain Winant on July 28,

he stressed that the Soviet Union would have to be consulted

on the terms of the armistice with Italy. Reporting this con¬

versation to Washington Winant observed: “When the tide

turns and the Russian armies are able to advance we might

well want to influence their terms of capitulation and occu¬

pancy in Allied and enemy territory.’” 5 ' The role which the

USSR was playing in the struggle against the Axis com¬

pelled Britain and the USA to change their attitude to it,

for it was doing more than any other United Nation to de¬

feat the enemy. The Soviet Government correctly assessed

the situation and the Soviet Union’s moral rights, and drew

the corresponding conclusions. In a message to Churchill and

Roosevelt on August 22, Stalin wrote: “To date it has been

like this: the USA and Britain reach agreement between

themselves while the USSR is informed of the agreement

between the two Powers as a third party looking passively

on. I must say that this situation cannot be tolerated any

longer.”* **

This influenced the actions of the Allies. The terms of

Italy’s surrender were agreed upon with the Soviet Union

and signed by Eisenhower’s representative on behalf not

only of the USA and Britain but also of the USSR. This con¬

vincingly showed that formerly in the decision of such is¬

sues the USSR had not been treated justly by its Allies, and

that the question raised by Stalin in his message of August

22 on the need to co-ordinate Allied action was both legiti¬

mate and well-founded.

However, in the Italian issue the Allies did not manifest

absolute good-will towards the Soviet Union or a desire to

* Ibid., Op. cit., p. 167.

** Correspondence ..., Vol. I, p. 149.

326

co-operate fully with it. “Yet it was not a part of Churchill’s

plans for Italy,” writes McNeill, “to accord the Russians an

equal share with British and American officials in directing

Allied policy in that country.’”'' Naturally, under these con¬

ditions the Soviet suggestion to set up an agency to direct

Allied policy in Italy, an agency which along with US and

Britain representatives would have a Soviet representative,

was not very much fancied by Britain and the USA. It was

not openly rejected, but to emasculate it an Allied Control

Commission for Italy was set up with Soviet participation.

This Commission, however, did not play any substantial role.

The real power remained in the hands of the Anglo-Ameri¬

can Command.

By denying the USSR any practical participation in im¬

plementing Allied policy in Italy, Britain and the USA lost

all claim to participation in deciding issues relating to the

countries being liberated by the Soviet Army. This is noted

by the more unbiased historians. McNeill, for instance, writes:

“Having excluded Russia from any but nominal partici¬

pation in Italian affairs, the Western Powers prepared the

way for their own exclusion from any but a marginal share

in the affairs of Eastern Europe.”* **

By agreement between Churchill and Roosevelt the Brit¬

ish were accorded the leading role in Italian affairs, while

the Americans took over the main role in the affairs of

French North Africa. Correspondingly, a British general

headed the Allied Military Government of Occupied Terri¬

tory, which was the real master in Italy. On October 13,

1943 Italy declared war on Germany, and the governments

of the USSR, Britain and the USA granted her recognition

as a joint belligerent against Germany.*** Italy’s participa¬

tion in the war did not play any substantial role in defeat¬

ing Germany. Besides, her ruling circles did not aspire to

play such a role. All they wanted was Anglo-US support

against progressive forces in their own country in order, with

Anglo-US assistance, to preserve a reactionary regime

in Italy and, if possible, have more say at the future peace

conference.

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 308.

** Ibid., p. 310.

*** Vneshnaya politika Sovietskogo Soyuza ..., Vol. I, p. 353.

327

Britain Supports the Anti-Soviet Stand

of the Polish Reactionaries

Anglo-Polish relations underwent a decided change under

the impact of the developments on the Eastern Front. The

Polish Government in exile, formed after Poland’s defeat

in 1939, was set up in Paris, but after France’s fall in 1940

it moved to London. In it were extremely reactionary, chau¬

vinistic elements, who had brought about Poland’s downfall

in 1939 and were now nurturing plans of creating a Greater

Poland, pinning their hopes on the war weakening Germany

and the Soviet Union. Some of them regarded not only Ger¬

many but also the USSR as their enemy, others hated the

Soviet Union even more than they did nazi Germany. Al¬

though the USSR had established diplomatic relations with the

Polish emigre Government in 1941 the latter remained vicio¬

usly hostile. It steadfastly violated the agreement it had signed

y/ith the Soviet Union on co-operation and mutual assistance

in the war against Germany. The Polish Army formed on

Soviet territory refused to fight shoulder to shoulder with

Soviet troops against the Germans, and in the summer of

1942, when the German offensive against the USSR was in

full swing, it withdrew to the Middle East, where it was

placed under British command. McNeill writes that to the

Soviet people the Anders army, because of this action,

inevitably “looked like rats abandoning a sinking ship, for

the Battle of Stalingrad was then just beginning”.* As far

as the USSR was concerned, he adds, this army was “an

alien and potentially hostile military body”.**

The British Government exercised absolute control over

the Polish Government in exile, which subsisted on British

money. The British needed this Government not so much

as a means for utilising the Polish military units subordinated

to it in the war against Germany and Italy as a weapon for

pressuring the USSR and a guarantee that a reactionary

regime would be restored in Poland after she was liberated.

As we have already pointed out, the British Government

gave its wholehearted backing to the claims of the London-

based Poles to Soviet territory—Western Byelorussia and

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 211.

** Ibid.

328

Western Ukraine. The Polish Government’s unwillingness

to recognise the just return of these territories to the Soviet

Union, from which they had been forcibly wrested in 1920-21

by squire-ruled Poland, complicated matters in organising

a joint struggle of the Soviet and Polish peoples against Ger¬

many. To iron out these complications the USSR, beginning

in 1941, endeavoured to smooth out this issue. But nothing

came of this because the British and US governments flatly

refused to settle the frontier problem in a manner that would

take the legitimate rights of the USSR into consideration.

Officially they suggested postponing the issue until the peace

conference was convened, hoping that by then it would be

settled at the expense and against the USSR. This anti-Soviet

stand of the British and Americans, naturally, whetted the

appetites of the London-based Poles, who began to devise

megalomaniac plans.

General Sikorski, Prime Minister of the London-based

Polish Government, was a more realistic politician than

many of his colleagues, but nonetheless he was not averse

to associating himself with clearly unrealistic anti-Soviet

schemes. He visited the USA in January 1943 and during a

meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles

he expounded a plan of creating “an Eastern European

union running from Poland in the North down to Turkey in

the South” of which “Poland would be the anchor in the

North and Turkey the anchor in the South”.* This union

would be spearheaded against the USSR. Welles remarked

that it “could only be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a

cordon sanitaire of a purely military character directed

squarely against the Soviet Union”. In a record of this con¬

versation, made by Welles, it is stated: “General Sikorski

said that he was forced to agree with my point of view”,

i.e., with Welles’s assessment of the nature of the proposed

union.** During a visit to the USA in March 1943 Anthony

Eden told Roosevelt that the Polish Government in exile

“has very large ambitions after the war”. Privately the

London-based Poles, Eden declared, “say that Russia will be

so weakened and Germany crushed that Poland will emerge

as the most powerful state in that part of the world”. For a

start they demanded not only Western Byelorussia and

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. Ill, p. 317.

** Ibid., pp. 317-18.

329

Western Ukraine but also East Prussia.'" This was all a

result of Anglo-American backing and incitement. The anti-

Soviet claims were supplemented by an unbridled propagan¬

da campaign started in Britain by the British-financed Polish

press with British knowledge and permission. In February

1943 the US Charge d’Affaires in Britain reported to Wash¬

ington that even at the Foreign Office it was considered

that the “ ‘Polish opposition press’ in London would con¬

tinue to be a disturbing factor” in Soviet-Polish relations.**

This was happening in spite of the war-time press censor¬

ship and other measures taken by the Churchill Government

to control the press. It will be remembered that it closed the

Daily Worker in 1941 and threatened to do the same to The

Daily Mirror for demanding the removal of the Munichmen

from the Government. The only explanation for the British

Government’s failure to take similar measures against the

Polish press is that Churchill did not consider its line as

clashing with British policy.

In early 1943 the military situation changed, and this

forced the Churchill Government, as well as the US Govern¬

ment, somewhat to modify their attitude towards the Soviet

Union’s western frontiers. In both London and Washington

it was realised that the Soviet Union would liberate its ter¬

ritory and restore its frontiers unassisted. “The Foreign Of¬

fice therefore,” Woodward says, “had to consider whether,

in spite of our previous unwillingness to commit ourselves

to any territory changes during the war, it might not be wise

to try to get a general settlement of the Russian frontier.”***

After pondering the situation, Eden went to the USA in

March and found that President Roosevelt considered this

a wise move.*'

It would seem that now the British Government could be

expected to make the Polish Government see the necessity

for a just settlement of the Soviet Union’s western frontier

and that these two governments would jointly propose such

a settlement. But nothing of the kind happened. In April

1943, when for provocative purposes the nazis announced

that at Katyn, near Smolensk, they had discovered the

* Ibid., p. 15.

** Ibid., p. 335.

*** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 203.

*) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. Ill, pp. 14-15.

330

graves of several thousand captive Polish officers allegedly

killed by Soviet authorities, the Sikorski Government avidly

seized upon this provocation in order to pressure the Soviet

Government and force it to make concessions in the frontier

issue. In this it had the complete support of the British Gov¬

ernment. Churchill personally incited the Poles. On April

15, when Sikorski told him of the German Katyn announce¬

ment, Churchill’s comment was: “The facts are pretty grim.”*

Thus encouraged, the Polish Government published a com¬

munique two days later, in which it said it had requested

the International Red Cross in Geneva to conduct an in¬

vestigation. The British and Polish politicians tried to

use the nazi propaganda provocation to bring pressure to

bear on the USSR and inflict a moral and political blow on

it. They calculated that in this manner they would

make the USSR agree to unjust concessions in the frontier

issue.

To the great consternation of the British and Polish gov¬

ernments their provocation did not yield the results they

expected. On April 25 the Soviet Government severed rela¬

tions with the Polish Government in exile, declaring: “While

the peoples of the Soviet Union shed their blood in the bitter

struggle against nazi Germany and strain all their strength

to defeat the common enemy of the Russian and Polish peo¬

ples and of all freedom-loving democratic countries, the

Polish Government deals the Soviet Union a perfidious blow

to please the Hitler tyranny.”**

Churchill was thoroughly alarmed. At first he asked the

Soviet Government not to break off relations with the Polish

Government in London and then, on April 30, he sent a mes¬

sage stating that the “Cabinet here is determined to have

proper discipline in the Polish press in Great Britain”.***

At the same time, he could not hold himself back from threat¬

ening the USSR, hinting that on the Soviet Government’s

attitude towards the London-based Poles depended “closer

co-operation and understanding” of the USSR, the United

States and Britain “not only in the deepening war struggle,

but after the war”.** To this he received a reply which

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 203.

** Vneshnaya politika Sovietskogo Soyuza ..., Vol. I, pp. 301-03.

*** Correspondence ..., Vol. I, p. 125.

*) Ibid.

331

made it clear that the Soviet Government was fully aware

that the responsibility for the rupture of Soviet-Polish rela¬

tions devolved not only on the Sikorski Government but

also on the Churchill Government. . . The notorious anti-

Soviet press campaign,” the Soviet reply said, “launched by

the Poles as early as April 15... had not encountered any

opposition in London; ... it is hard to imagine that the Brit¬

ish Government was not informed of the contemplated

campaign.”*

The British Government’s open backing of the London-

based Poles in the April conflict with the USSR encouraged

the Poles to take further action. On July 4, 1943 Sikorski

was killed in an air crash in mysterious circumstances. His

death, it is believed, was not an accident but engineered by

those who wanted a tougher line towards the USSR in the

Polish question. The premiership of the Government in exile

was taken over by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, but despite all of

that Government’s efforts it clearly did not represent the

Polish people.

During the war the people in Poland had the opportunity

of giving plenty of thought to the destiny of their country

and came more and more to the conclusion that Poland’s

future could be secured only through co-operation and nor¬

mal relations with the Soviet Union. In Poland patriots

formed partisan detachments which fought the German

invaders. They set up a League of Polish Patriots in the

USSR in 1943 and with the Soviet Government’s permission

formed a Polish division, naming it after Tadeusz Kos-

ciuszko.

This gave rise to serious apprehensions in London. The

emigre Government started forming its own underground

armed forces in Poland, counting on using them against the

USSR. In the meantime these forces fought not so much the

Germans as the partisan detachments consisting of people

with progressive views. The British and Mikolajczyk govern¬

ments were worried lest the progressive forces in Poland

would see how hopelessly reactionary the London-based

Poles were and supplant them with a democratic patriotic

government.

To preclude this possibility the British Government re¬

turned to the question of the Soviet-Polish frontier in mid-

* Ibid., p. 127.

332

August, i.e., after the Battle of Kursk. The Foreign Office

now urged that the Poles recognise the Curzon Line as their

eastern frontier, and receive as compensation Danzig, East

Prussia and Oppeln Province of Upper Silesia.* Eden

suggested to the War Cabinet that in return for Britain’s

and the London-based Poles’ recognition of the Curzon Line

as the Soviet-Polish frontier, the Soviet Government should

be required to restore relations with the Polish Government

in exile “and to co-operate with them and with us in finding

a satisfactory solution to questions concerning Polish under¬

ground Resistance” and to the problem of the democratic

Polish organisations and army created on Soviet territory.**

The British Government was thus prepared to recognise

Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine as Soviet territory

but in return the Soviet Union would have to withdraw its

support for the revolutionary and progressive forces of the

Polish people and help to impose on them, after their libera¬

tion, the reactionary emigre Government, i.e., help to instal

an extremely reactionary and rabidly anti-Soviet regime in

Poland.

With this aim in view Churchill and Eden went to Tehran

(November 28-December 1, 1943) for a conference with

Stalin and Roosevelt. There on December 1, Churchill pro¬

posed the adoption of the following formula on the Polish

problem: “It was agreed in principle that the hearth of the

Polish state and people must be situated between the so-

called Curzon Line and the line of the Oder River, includ¬

ing Eastern Prussia and the Oppeln Province as part of

Poland.”*** Stalin and Roosevelt agreed to this formula and,

as the American notes of the sitting state, “it was apparent

that the British were going to take this suggestion back to

London to the Poles”.** At the Tehran Conference, the Brit¬

ish Government thus agreed to recognise the Soviet-Polish

frontier as running along the Curzon Line.

Churchill did not keep the promise he made at Tehran.

True, in a speech in Parliament on February 22, 1944, he

spoke in favour of the Curzon Line as the Soviet-Polish

frontier and agreed that the inclusion in the USSR of terri-

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 250.

** Ibid., p. 251.

*'■* International Affairs, No. 8, 1961, p. 122.

*) Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Cairo

and Tehran, 1943, Washington, 1961, p. 604.

333

tones east of that line was reasonable and just."' He there¬

by admitted that the Soviet stand on this question was just

and confirmed the promise he had made at Tehran.

The Polish emigre Government, however, refused to ac¬

cept the decision of the Tehran Conference, with the result

that Churchill repudiated his pledge. On February 27 he in¬

formed the Soviet Government that the frontier question

could be agreed only “when the victorious Powers are

gathered round the table at the time of an armistice or

peace”.* ** In the same message he demanded that the Polish

territory liberated by the Soviet Army, including part of

Lithuania and Western Ukraine, should be administered by

the Polish emigre Government in London; the rest of

Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia “should be ad¬

ministered by Soviet military authorities with the assistance

of representatives of the United Nations”.***

This outrageous proposal was given a worthy rebuff. On

March 3 the Soviet Government sent Churchill a reply in

which it stated that it was now convinced that the leaders

of the Polish Government in exile were incapable of estab¬

lishing normal relations with the USSR. “As regards the

desire to place certain Soviet territories under foreign con¬

trol,” the reply declared, “we cannot agree to discuss such

encroachments, for, as we see it, the mere posing of the

question is an affront to the Soviet Union.”**

Churchill replied four days later, on March 7. In his letter

he withdrew his suggestion of United Nations participation

in the administration of Western Ukraine and Western Bye¬

lorussia, but repeated the demand that the USSR should, in

effect, agree to the London-based Poles’ stand on the fron¬

tier issue, and once more ended with the warning that dis¬

agreement on this issue was threatening “the friendship

and co-operation of the Western democracies and Soviet

Russia”.***

Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, the British Ambassador in

Moscow, was instructed to hand this reply to the Soviet

Government and say that if it refused to satisfy the British

demands the Poles would be informed of the general con-

* Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, Vol. 397, col. 697-98.

** Correspondence ..., Vol. I, p. 202.

*** Ibid.

*) Ibid., p. 207.

**) Ibid., p. 208.

334

tent of its reply, that the Soviet reply would be made public,

that Churchill would make a statement on this point in Par¬

liament, and that a divergence between the USSR and the

two Western Powers on the Polish issue “would affect the

operations which all three were about to undertake”/ 1 ' This

was an obvious threat to abandon the plan to open the

Second Front. Kerr conscientiously carried out his instruc¬

tions.

Naturally, this blackmail and intimidation could not but

have had the reverse effect. Churchill was told that his “mes¬

sages and particularly Kerr’s statement bristle with threats

against the Soviet Union”, that “threats as a method are not

only out of place in relations between Allies, but also harm¬

ful, for they may lead to opposite results”. His attention was

drawn to the fact that at Tehran he had agreed to the Curzon

Line and was now pressing for something quite different in

contravention of the Tehran agreement.* **

Churchill was thus again caught violating a pledge he had

made on behalf of Britain. In the British Government it was

also considered that the Tehran agreement had been broken

by Britain. Even the Foreign Office, Woodward tells us,

considered that the Soviet Government had grounds for

maintaining that the British had given their agreement to

the Curzon Line. “We,” he says, “were indeed committed,

both at Tehran and in our subsequent messages, to the Cur¬

zon Line as part of a general agreement.”***

By repudiating the pledge given at Tehran, the British

Government, in effect, returned to its stand of 1941-42, de¬

manding that the Soviet Union relinquish part of its terri¬

tory. This stand, naturally, made the Soviet Union doubt

the intention of the British Government to co-operate with

it on a just basis.

Britain, Governments in Exile

and the Resistance Movements

The changing situation in 1943 and the first half of 1944

caused Britain to modify her relations with the emigre gov¬

ernments and her policy towards the Resistance movement.

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 286.

** Ibid., p. 287.

*** Correspondence ..., Vol. I, p. 212.

335

This was regulated by Britain’s immediate and long-term

objectives.

In this period the immediate objectives, i.e., Britain’s

desire for military support from the governments in exile

and the Resistance movement, gradually lost their signifi¬

cance because the Allies’ ultimate victory was becoming

more and more certain. The nearing victory brought Britain’s

long-term objectives to the fore. These were to use the gov¬

ernments in exile and the Resistance movement to prevent

revolutions in Europe and strengthen Britain’s hand at the

future peace conference and in the post-war world. Britain

had powerful means of influencing the governments in exile.

They were almost entirely dependent on her subsidies and

on her war supplies.

In 1943-44 Britain made wide use of governments in exile

in her attempts to set up various federations spearheaded

against the USSR and the cause of progress. As we have

already noted, the leading role in the attempt to form a

“federation” of Eastern Europe was played by the Polish

emigre Government. A similar federation of Western Europe

was strongly urged by Paul Henri Spaak, a minister in the

Belgian emigre Government, who had the support of his

own Government and of the Dutch and Norwegian govern¬

ments. He peddled the idea of forming a bloc embracing

all countries from Norway to the Iberian states.

The emigre governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and

Norway were in a somewhat better position than the emigre

governments of other countries. For one thing they were

recognised by the Allies as the only authority in their respec¬

tive countries and they were closely linked with the Resis¬

tance movements in their countries. The relations between

these governments and the Allied military command became

an increasingly important problem as the day of the Anglo-

American invasion of Western Europe drew nearer. This

problem was settled on May 16, 1944 with the signing of an

agreement between these governments and General Dwight

D. Eisenhower of the United States who was appointed to

the command of the Allied armies poised for the invasion of

Western Europe.*

The British Government did all in its power to hold up

the spread of the Resistance movement in Western Europe.

* H. C. Butcher, Op. cit., p. 541.

336

The British were not conducting active military operations

in that area and, consequently, were not particularly in¬

terested in direct armed support from the local population.

They were quite content with the network of agents which

the Special Operations Executive had infiltered into these

countries mainly for intelligence purposes and wrecking

activities. It was planned to make full use of this network

when the Allies landed in Western Europe. “The task of SOE

in Europe,” writes the British professor F. W. Deakin, “from

the end of 1942 to the autumn of 1943 was conditioned en¬

tirely by the top-level strategic planning of the British and

American Chiefs-of-Staff, and logically the main attention

was concentrated in Western Europe on preparation for an

eventual massive Allied intervention in these regions.”*

The network set up by SOE was not large at all. At the

close of 1942 in the occupied part of France it had six organ¬

isers, one courier and two wireless-operators. These agents

had no arms or supplies caches at their disposal. In the unoc¬

cupied part of France there were 25 organisers, 19 local

agents, six wireless-operators and a number of small caches.

“By 1944, however,” Deakin says, “some 900 British and

French agents had been parachuted into France, not counting

those who had arrived by land and sea.”’*'*

The forces making up the French and every other Resist¬

ance movement fell mostly into two categories: progressive

and reactionary. The Communists were prominent in organ¬

ising the Resistance and exercised immense influence among

progressive elements. The logic of the struggle inexorably

gave these elements a steadily stronger position in the Resist¬

ance inasmuch as they were the most active and dedicated

fighters against the nazi invaders. This trend markedly dis¬

turbed the British Government and the reactionary circles

in the countries concerned. They were aware that the growth

of the Left forces would hinder the restoration of the former

reactionary regimes in Europe and stimulate the maturing

of a revolutionary situation.

The British Government used mainly three methods to

check this development. It supplied arms and equipment

* F. W. Deakin, “Great Britain and European Resistance. European

Resistance Movements 1939-45”, Proceedings of the Second International

Conference on the History of the Resistance Movements Held at Milan,

March 26-29, 1961, Oxford, 1964, p. 106.

** Ibid., p. 108.

22-1561

337

chiefly to Resistance elements whose political views and

objectives were closest to those of British imperialism. The

opinion, as Deakin says, was that the “weapons furnished

by SOE must inevitably affect the balance of political forces

within any given Resistance movement”.* The British used

reactionary organisations in the Resistance to suppress pro¬

gressive organisations in the Resistance by means of armed

force, if necessary. Lastly, wherever the military situation

allowed it, they held the Resistance in leash, calling upon it

to wait and accumulate strength, to refrain from actively

fighting the nazi invaders.

This latter method was practised extensively in France,

in particular. In March 1943, when anti-German action was

intensified in France under the impact of the nazi defeat on

the Volga, the British Special Operations Executive, accord¬

ing to a memorandum of March 22 from the British Govern¬

ment to the French National Committee, warned those peo¬

ple in France with whom it maintained contact that they

had to do everything in their power to prevent the spread

of the Resistance wave. The British Government called upon

the Committee to advise elements with whom it had direct

contact to exercise the same restraint. De Gaulle had asked

the British for greater assistance to the French Resistance

and in this connection the memorandum said that assistance

on the scale desired by de Gaulle ran counter to the British

Government’s policy of preventing the spread of the wave

of uprisings, for it would lead to a situation which it [the

British Government.— V.T.] was seeking to avert.**

It was calculated that passive tactics would check the class

struggle in the various countries and prevent the Communists

from increasing their influence in the Resistance.

In Greece and Yugoslavia the situation was different

than in France, and there the British Government employed

somewhat different tactics towards the Resistance. In these

countries it desired active resistance to the nazis, for the

railways supplying the German forces operating against the

British Army in North Africa ran through these countries.

Trains transported war supplies to Piraeus (whence they

were sent on by sea), and on their return journey they were

loaded with Rumanian oil and wheat and Yugoslav bauxite,

* Ibid., p. 107.

** Sovietsko-Frantsuzskiye otnosheniya ..., pp. 123-24.

338

which was vital to the German aircraft industry. The British

Government considered it important to halt or at least di¬

minish this traffic. In October 1942 the first group of British

paratroopers was landed in Greece to organise wrecking

on the railway carrying 80 per cent of the supplies for Rom¬

mel’s army.*

The British paratroopers and the British military mission

sent to Greece found they had to deal with two Resistance

organisations. According to British figures, ELAS (People’s

National Army of Liberation) had nearly 15,000 men. It

was directed by the National Liberation Front representing

a coalition of Leftist parties, among which a prominent role

was played by the Communist Party. ELAS was waging an

active fight against the invaders and was opposed to the

return, after the war, of the Greek king and the British-

backed Government in exile. The king had compromised

himself in the eyes of the people by his support of the pre¬

war semi-fascist regime in Greece. Also operating in Greece

was an organisation known as EDES (National Democratic

Army), which, headed by the pro-British Colonel Xervas,

was an asylum for reactionary elements. EDES had a force

of nearly 5,000 men, but instead of fighting the Germans it

concentrated on undermining ELAS influence.

The British wanted to see the Greek Resistance united,

and that it should fight the Germans like ELAS but thought

like the EDES leaders. To achieve this aim repeated attempts

were made to integrate the two organisations under reac¬

tionary leaders, compel them to recognise the emigre Gov¬

ernment and agree to its return, together with the king,

after the country was liberated from the Germans. The British

arranged talks between the two organisations. None of these

attempts yielded positive results, and pressed by military

necessity the British Government had no alternative but to

supply arms and assist both EDES and ELAS. The British

military leaders were most persistent in urging assistance for

all Greeks fighting the Germans. They had to take the re¬

quirements of the Middle East Command into account.

Churchill was inclined to side with them. On the other

hand, the Foreign Office under Anthony Eden wanted

Britain to cut off aid to ELAS. They cared little for current

military requirements, being concerned chiefly with post-war

* F. W. Deakin, Op. cit., p. 16.

339

prospects. Eden feared that the Greek people would

associate themselves with ELAS and establish a democratic

regime after the war.

During the first six months of 1943, while fighting raged

in North Africa, the viewpoint of the military unquestion¬

ably held the upper hand. A Foreign Office directive of

March 1943 stated: “In view of the operational importance

attached to subversive activities in Greece there can be no

question of SOE refusing to have dealing with a given group

merely on the grounds that the political sentiments of the

group are opposed to the King and Government.”*

But after the Germans and Italians were driven out of

North Africa, Churchill’s Balkan strategy began to have a

telling effect on the British attitude to the Greek Resistance.

Consequently, on November 11, 1943, in their recommen¬

dations to Churchill on the further strategy of the war the

British military leaders wrote: “Yugoslavia, Greece and Al¬

bania. Our policy should be to place on a regular military

basis and to intensify our measures to nourish the partisan

and irregular forces in these countries.”** However, here

military considerations clashed with the political objectives of

the British Government.

Churchill was extremely partial to monarchies and ardently

desired to restore the Greek king to his throne after liber¬

ation. He and his Cabinet were impressed by the Greek

king’s obviously reactionary views. But this was the very

thing that did not suit the Greek people, on whose behalf

ELAS categorically opposed the king’s return. To facilitate

their task the British tried to get the king to show a more

democratic attitude, in words at least. He was required to

make a statement declaring that he would not return to

Greece if he was not invited by a representative Greek

Government after liberation. In return for this statement the

British promised him that they would suspend aid to

ELAS. The king remained adamant.

On March 13, 1944 the National Liberation Front set up

a Political Committee of Liberation for the express purpose

of convening a National Council consisting of freely elected

people’s representatives. The people started forming organs

* Ibid., p. 18.

** Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West, 1943-1946, London, 1959,

p. 66.

340

of power. Hatred for the British-backed king and sympathy

for the National Liberation Front spread even among the

emigre Government’s troops in Cairo. The Greek brigade

in Egypt mutinied in mid-April 1944. In the civil war that

was starting in Greece the British Government, naturally,

sided with the reactionaries: the mutineers were disarmed

by the British Army.

The British followed this up by bringing more diplomatic

pressure to bear in order to force the progressive section of

the Greek Resistance to recognise the reactionary Govern¬

ment and the king. The emigre Government was reorganised

and from May 17 to 21, 1944 a conference was held in the

Lebanon with the objective of achieving unity between the

different groups in the Greek Resistance and the emigre

Government. A formal decision was passed but it did not

lead to real unity.

In Greece the British Government unswervingly followed

a policy of suppressing the Leftist forces in the Resistance

and restoring the king and his Government to power, but

in Yugoslavia it adopted a different stand. On May 24, 1944

Churchill stated in Parliament that “in one place we support

a king, in another a Communist”.* He had in mind British

support for the Yugoslav partisan movement led by Josip

Broz Tito. This support was given reluctantly, under pres¬

sure from the Soviet Union.

A powerful partisan movement in which the leading role

was played by Communists was operating in Yugoslavia, as in

Greece. In addition, there were cetnik units commanded by

Colonel Draza Mihajlovic, the War Minister of the Yugo¬

slav Government in exile in London.

The partisans were waging a dedicated national libera¬

tion struggle against German and Italian occupation forces.

From the very outset of the war the Soviet Union steadfastly

supported the national liberation movement in Yugoslavia.

Britain maintained a diametrically opposite stand, support¬

ing Mihajlovic’s cetniks, who fought the partisans instead

of the invaders, thereby preparing the soil for the restora¬

tion of a reactionary regime after Yugoslavia was liberated.

These cetniks hated the partisans so much that they collab¬

orated with the invaders, joining them in their operations

against the partisans. In this way they discredited their

* The Times, May 25, 1944.

341

Government in London, of which Mihajlovi£ was nominally

a member, and created an impassable abyss between them¬

selves and the Yugoslav people. The partisan ranks swelled

rapidly, while those of Mihajlovic’s cetniks dwindled. This

showed that the situation in Yugoslavia was changing to

Britain’s disadvantage.

To stop this trend, Britain suggested that the partisan

forces and the cetniks should unite under Mihajlovic. Brit¬

ain expounded her views on this issue fairly comprehen¬

sively in a memorandum to the USSR on March 9. The

memorandum recalled that as early as November 1941 the

British Government, through its Ambassador in Moscow Sir

Stafford Cripps, had drawn the Soviet Government’s atten¬

tion to the desirability of a united front of partisans and

cetniks in Yugoslavia. It was suggested that the Soviet Gov¬

ernment might be inclined to persuade Communist elements

in Yugoslavia to place themselves at the disposal of General

Mihajlovic as the national leader. Such a united front and

recognition of Mihajlovic as the leader of that front would

have put an end to the partisan movement. This was obvious

to the Soviet Government, with the result that a negative

reply, couched in courteous terms, was sent to the British

Government. The Soviet Government stated that it had no

links with Yugoslavia and could not influence the partisans.*

Subsequently the British Government suggested “that

broadcasts to the partisans should be arranged from Moscow,

urging them to co-operate with General Mihajlovic”.**

This time, in July 1942, the Soviet Government replied une¬

quivocally that it had no intention of joining the British Gov¬

ernment in pressuring the partisans and that it did not trust

General Mihajlovic because of his ties with collaborationists.

The British Government stubbornly stuck to its stand, and

in a letter to the Soviet Ambassador in London it twisted

facts in an attempt to prove that Mihajlovic could be trusted.

Inasmuch as it had already communicated its stand on this

question to the British Government, the Soviet Government

left this letter unanswered.***

In its Yugoslav policy of this period the British Govern¬

ment sought to kill three birds with one stone. It hoped

* International Affairs, No. 8, 1958, pp. 124-25.

** Ibid., p. 124.

*** Ibid., p. 125.

342

that by securing conciliation between the partisans and the

cetnik forces and their integration under Mihajlovic it would

have at its disposal a military force operating against the

enemy, make sure that a people’s government would not

come to power after the war and prepare the conditions for

the return to Yugoslavia of the king and the emigre Govern¬

ment from London.*

A British military mission was sent to MihajloviS at the

close of 1942. However, the latter made a hash of things for

himself by flatly refusing to fight the invaders.** As a conse¬

quence of this, on the insistence of the British Command in

Cairo, steps were taken to elucidate the situation in the

camp of the partisans. The British Foreign Office, guided

by post-war considerations, was hostile to the demands of

the military. The stand of the British diplomatic leaders

lacked logic: on the one hand, they maintained that the mili¬

tary were overrating the forces and potentialities of the par¬

tisans and, on the other, voiced the apprehension that when

the war ended the partisan leaders might stir the people to

a struggle for a proletarian revolution.

On March 9, 1943 the British Government sent the Soviet

Government a memorandum on the Yugoslav question in

which, on the whole, it confirmed the Soviet Government’s

assessment of Mihajlovic’s behaviour, pointing out that

“during the last few months MihajloviS has been displaying

little activity against Axis forces. ... The partisans have un¬

doubtedly undertaken operations against the Axis, but at the

same time fighting has occurred between their forces and

those of General Mihajlovic.” Despite this admission, the

British Government suggested that the Soviet Government

act with it in securing a united front of the partisan and the

Mihajlovic forces. “It is realised,” the memorandum said,

“that it would be of great advantage to the common war

effort if the present dissensions between these rival elements

could be removed and a common front against the Axis es¬

tablished in Yugoslavia, with which both Great Britain and

the Soviet Union could co-operate. With this end in view,

His Majesty’s Government are anxious to harmonise so far

as possible their own policy towards Yugoslavia with that

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 335.

** F. W. Deakin, Op. cit., p. 18.

343

of the Soviet Union, and of seeking with them ways and

means of putting an end to the present unsatisfactory situa¬

tion.”* Declaring that it was prepared “to support all.. .

elements of Resistance”, the British Government requested

the Soviet Government “to exert their influence with the

partisans in order to achieve a common front” with the

Mihajlovic forces. The British Government had no means

of compelling the partisans to integrate with the Mihajlo¬

vic units and, therefore, felt it was imperative that “both the

British and Soviet governments should co-operate” in unit¬

ing and reorganising the partisan and Mihajlovic forces.**

On what terms was this integration to take place? On

those proposed in November 1941, i.e., that the partisans

should accept Mihajlovic’s leadership. The British Govern¬

ment did not conceal the fact that it was backing Mihajlovic

because it felt he was the force capable of fighting a revo¬

lutionary movement. This was the undertone of the statement

that “it has been decided to continue to support General

Mihajlovic, since it is felt that his organisation affords

the best chances of preventing an outbreak of anarchy and

chaos in Yugoslavia on the withdrawal of the Axis forces”.

To leave no doubt about what was meant by the words

“anarchy” and “chaos”, the memorandum specified: “The

situation in Yugoslavia is serious and has the makings of

a civil war.”*** It was thus suggested that the Soviet Govern¬

ment should support measures aimed at suppressing progres¬

sive, revolutionary forces in Yugoslavia and strengthening

the forces of counter-revolution and reaction. The Soviet

Union naturally could not subscribe to this, and it was use¬

less trying to explain why to the British Government. No

answer was therefore given to the British memorandum.**

Military considerations ultimately gained the upper hand

and in May 1943 the British Government sent several mili¬

tary missions to Tito. One of them was headed by Captain

F. W. Deakin.*** The British officers reported to Churchill

* International Affairs, No. 8, 1958, pp. 124-25.

** Ibid., p. 125.

*** Ibid.

*) I- Zemskov, “The ‘Division’ of Yugoslavia Into ‘Spheres of Influ¬

ence’ ”, International Affairs, No. 8, Moscow, 1958.

**) After the war Deakin became a professor of history. His report

is quoted in this book. It is published in full in La resistenza europea

e gli Alleati, Milan, 1962.

344

that the forces of the partisans were much stronger than had

been thought. Besides being able to do much in the struggle

against the Germans, they would be a powerful revolutiona¬

ry force after the war. Ignoring this factor and acting

against Eden’s judgement Churchill decided to supply arms

to the partisans. On July 4, 1943 the British Ambassador in

Moscow informed the People’s Commissariat for Foreign

Affairs that “as a result of these new connections and of

recent events my Government has decided to re-examine its

former policy and in future lend its support to all Resistance

elements in Yugoslavia irrespective of their political trends”.

The Soviet Government replied that it would take note of

this statement.’ 1 '

At first glance it seemed that the unbelievable had hap¬

pened when the British Government decided to help the

Communist-led partisan movement in Yugoslavia. But Chur¬

chill had his own calculations. Deakin writes: “It was becom¬

ing increasingly clear that the post-war balance of power

in the countries of liberated Europe would be conditioned

by the final dispositions on the map severally of the Anglo-

American and Russian armies.”* ** The Balkan strategy had

become an obsession with Churchill. He reckoned that in the

end he would gain control of the Balkans, and for this he

> had to have a force in the Balkans that would facilitate an

Anglo-American invasion in that area.*** The Yugoslav

partisans could be that force. Since the Balkans would in that

way be occupied by the British and Americans he had no

reason to fear any political consequences from co-operation

, with the partisans, who could be disarmed at any time if

they tried to act in opposition to British plans.

In November 1943 the partisans set up a National Com¬

mittee of Liberation, which fulfilled the functions of a Pro¬

visional Government. This seriously alarmed the British.

They refused to recognise the National Committee and took

energetic steps to secure its integration with the emigre

Government, reorganised and adapted for this purpose, and

obtain the consent of the leaders of Yugoslavia’s People’s

Liberation Army, which had been formed from partisan

units, to the king’s return to the country.

* International Affairs, No. 8, 1958, p. 61.

** F. W. Deakin, Op. cit., p. 112.

*** Arthur Bryant, Op. cit., p. 66.

345

The Soviet Union’s unfaltering support of the national

liberation movement in Yugoslavia, the successes of this

movement in the struggle against the nazi invaders, and the

world-wide odium earned by Mihajlovic through his col¬

laboration with the nazis compelled Britain to pay more at¬

tention to her relations with the partisans and cut short aid

to Mihajlovic in January 1944. On January 8, 1944, Chur¬

chill informed the leaders of the partisan movement of the

British Government’s decision to bait military assistance to

Mihajlovic and channel all aid to the partisans. At the same

time, he made it clear that Britain was still backing King

Peter and the Yugoslav Government in exile/''

In April 1944 in order to reconcile the partisan leaders

to the Yugoslav Government in exile Churchill advised King

Peter to “form a small administration composed of people

not particularly obnoxious to Marshal Tito”/* In May 1944

King Peter instructed Subasic, a proponent of co-operation

with the liberation movement, to form such an administra¬

tion.

Meanwhile the Germans raided Tito’s headquarters, and

Tito had to seek the shelter on Vis Island off the Adriatic

coast. The General Headquarters of the People’s Liberation

Army was transported to Vis Island by Soviet Aircraft,

and British troops were landed on the island to ensure its

safety/** ***

On June 16, 1944 Subasic signed an agreement with Tito

on the setting up of a coalition government which would

recognise the role played by the national liberation move¬

ment. This government was formed on July 7, 1944. The

British had made every effort to facilitate tbe Subasic-Tito

agreement, the reason being, as McNeill says, that Churchill

hoped an acceptable compromise could be arrived at in Yu¬

goslavia between the remodelled Government in exile and the

leaders of the Resistance movement; and that the govern¬

ment emergent from such a compromise would be well dis¬

posed towards Great Britain/'

Churchill’s compromise with the Yugoslav liberation move¬

ment in early 1944 was largely due to the support this move-

* International Affairs, No. 8, 1958, p. 61.

** Ibid.

*** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 344.

*) William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 389.

346

ment was getting from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union

and its Western Allies recognised the National Committee

of Liberation of Yugoslavia in December 1943. A Soviet

military mission was sent to the Yugoslav partisans in Feb¬

ruary 1944, and the Soviet weapons and other military sup¬

plies that began to arrive in large quantities gave the leaders

of the Yugoslav liberation movement a stronger position in

their talks with the British Government. E. Kardelj, one of

the leaders of that movement, said at a rally in Ljubljana

on June 12, 1945: “The Soviet Union was the country that

helped us selflessly from the very outset, requiring nothing

in return and binding us to nothing that would clash with

our national interests.” 55 '

Anglo-Turkish Relations

Britain regarded Turkey as a potential ally capable of

putting a certain number of divisions in the field (their bat¬

tleworthiness was an unknown quantity) and as a barrier on

Germany’s road to the Middle East. Another factor in which

Britain was interested was that being hostile to the USSR

Turkey could be used as a springboard for anti-Soviet

provocations. During the war Turkey had an agreement on

mutual assistance with Britain but did not align herself with

Britain against Germany and Italy. In fact, three days before

Germany attacked the USSR she signed a friendship pact

with the nazis. Formally she was a neutral in the war, but

actually she helped Germany substantially and planned to

attack the USSR as soon as its military position became des¬

perate. All this was well known in London, but nothing was

done to pressure Turkey, to demand that she fulfil the terms

of the mutual assistance agreement for fear that she would

irrevocably go over to Germany’s side. The British looked

through their fingers even at Turkish supplies of chromium

to Germany, despite the fact that these supplies were strate¬

gically important.

Anglo-Turkish relations underwent a fundamental change

after the Battle of Stalingrad. Turkey had not attacked the

Soviet Union, and this made the British hope they would be

able to draw Turkey over to their side completely. The situa¬

tion was making this a very pressing issue indeed. In 1943

* lzvestia , June 17, 1945.

347

Churchill and other British leaders were preoccupied with

their Balkan strategy in which a key role was assigned to

Turkey. They wanted Turkish troops to move into Southeast

Europe ahead of the Soviet Army, under British leadership

and with British military support. To achieve this aim they

had to compel Turkey to enter the war on the side of the

Allies. The efforts of the British Government in this direc¬

tion determined its policy vis-a-vis Turkey in 1943 and

1944.

At the very beginning of 1943 Churchill felt he had to

try to secure Turkey’s entry into the war in the spring of

the same year. He felt there was need for haste, for an in¬

vasion of the Balkans would have to be undertaken in the

immediate future. In January he wrote: “We are not count¬

ing on an early or sudden collapse [of Germany.— V. Tj,

but of course no one can be sure that it will not come sud¬

denly. ... We must be ready, both for the worst and for the

best.’”’' To be prepared for any eventuality, he agreed with

Roosevelt (at Casablanca) that he would forthwith make an

attempt to persuade the Turkish leaders to enter the

war.

The Americans were sceptical about this idea. They did

not like it because it was closely intertwined with the British

Balkan strategy, which, in addition to being spearheaded

against the Soviet Union, aimed at strengthening British

influence in Southeast Europe. “Churchill’s strategic plan,”

McNeill writes, “required the Turks to join the Allies, but

the Americans were reluctant to do anything positive to

bring this about.. . and some Americans also suspected that

Churchill was trying to use American men and material to

build up a British sphere of influence in the Mediterranean

as a make-weight against the Russians.”* ** ***

On January 30-31 Churchill had a meeting with Turkish

leaders at Adana to explore the possibility of Turkey joining

the Allies. The document which he handed to the Turkish

leaders stated that the “danger to Turkey on her Northern

flank has been removed for the time being by the shattering

victory of the Russians over the Germans”."'** He informed

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 709.

** William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 272.

*** Winston S. Churchill, Op. .cit., Vol. IV, p. 706.

348

the Turks of the agreement he had reached with Roosevelt

at Casablanca regarding the steps to bring about Italy’s de¬

feat. Then he enlarged on the idea that the “breaking down

of Italy would lead to contact with the Western Balkans

and with the highly hopeful resistance maintained both by

General Mihajlovic in Serbia and the partisans in Croatia

and Slovenia”. He said “the summer months will see in the

Mediterranean the largest operations.... These opera¬

tions ... will cause the very greatest agitation throughout

the Balkans.”' 1 ' Turkey was offered a share in Churchill’s

reactionary plans for the Balkans, in return for which she

was promised fresh deliveries of weapons, immediate sup¬

port from special units of British troops and, ultimately, the

support of the British armies in Iraq and Iran. Turkey

agreed to accept the weapons but declined to make any

pledge to enter the war. Churchill had to rest content with

the setting up of a Joint Anglo-Turkish Commission to

handle the question of British arms deliveries to Turkey.

British pressure on Turkey was maintained after the

Adana meeting. Britain threatened to suspend arms deliveries

and withhold political support, which, as the British tried

hard to convince the Turks, Turkey needed as a shield

against the Soviet Union. Churchill and the Foreign Office

were at loggerheads as regards how far Britain should go in

pressuring Turkey. The Foreign Office warned Churchill

that if he went too far the Turks might come to an agreement

with the Soviet Union.**

The game that Britain played with anti-Soviet cards was

made all the easier by the fact that the Turkish leaders were

extremely hostile to the Soviet Union, devising anti-Soviet

plans and, to a certain extent, helping Germany against

the USSR.

The question of Turkey entering the war was scrutinised

at the Moscow Conference of Soviet, British and US Foreign

Ministers in October 1943. The Soviet Foreign Minister

asked why Britain and the USA were supplying arms to

Turkey who had no desire to use these arms for the Allied

cause. “Soviet representatives at the Moscow Conference,”

writes the American historian William L. Neumann, “had

reason to suspect their Allies of wanting to maintain Turkey

* Ibid., p. 708.

** Lleweilyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 324.

349

as a future British-American outpost; and their suspicions

were later confirmed.”*

On November 5-8, after the Moscow Conference, Eden

had a meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister in Cairo.

On behalf of Britain, the USSR and the USA he asked

whether Turkey would enter the war. A negative reply was

received from Turkey on November 15. A significant point,

as Woodward says, is that Eden’s briefing was “that the

entry of Turkey into the war was desirable as the best, if

not the only way to prevent the Balkan countries from fall¬

ing entirely under Russian influence. If the Turks main¬

tained their neutrality, British forces would probably be

unable to get into the Balkans before the Russians had estab¬

lished themselves there.”** The Turkish trump was thus

used in an effort to prevent the liberation of the Balkan

countries by the Soviet Union and to replace German by

British domination in that area.

In line with his Balkan strategy, at the Tehran Confer¬

ence Churchill sought Stalin’s and Roosevelt’s agreement

to Turkey’s entry into the war. Roosevelt showed no partic¬

ular enthusiasm for the idea, and Stalin said he believed the

Turks would not fight Germany.

It is interesting to note that on November 30, 1943 Chur¬

chill, as recorded in American documents, on his own initia¬

tive declared that “such a large land mass as Russia deserved

access to warm water ports. He said that the question

would of course form part of the peace settlement, and he

observed that it could be settled agreeably and as between

friends.” “Marshal Stalin,” the American notes state, “re¬

plied that at the proper time that question could be discussed,

but since Mr. Churchill had raised the question he would

like to inquire as to the regime of the Dardanelles. He said

that since England no longer objected, it would be well to

relax that regime.

“The Prime Minister replied that England had now no

objections to Russia’s access to warm water ports, although

he admitted that in the past she had....

“Marshal Stalin said there was not need to hurry about

that question, but that he was merely interested in discuss¬

ing it here in general.

* William L. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 59.

** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 326.

350

“The Prime Minister replied that Great Britain saw no

objections to this legitimate question....

“Marshal Stalin said that Lord Curzon had had other

ideas.

“The Prime Minister replied that that was true, and that

it would be idle to deny that in those days Russia and England

did not see eye to eye.

“Marshal Stalin replied that Russia also was quite differ¬

ent in those days.”*

The British Government thus raised this question on its

own initiative and felt it wise to review the Straits regime

with due consideration for the Soviet Union’s legitimate

interests, which had been encroached upon in a period when

the USSR was weak. When at Tehran the Soviet Foreign

Minister asked Churchill what he had in mind about the

Straits, the latter said “he could not commit the War Cabi¬

net, but that he thought that the regime of the Straits should

be reviewed”** to take Soviet interests into account. This dis¬

cussion on the Straits, started on Churchill's initiative, did

not lead to the adoption of any decision.

The Tehran Conference gave Churchill and Roosevelt the

authorisation to demand Turkey’s entry into the war against

Germany.*** Churchill and Roosevelt had a conference with

Turkish leaders in Cairo in early December 1943, but failed

to persuade them to come into the war. Further pressure was

brought to bear on Turkey in March and April 1944, with

the sole result that Turkey severed diplomatic relations with

Germany on August 2, 1944. Turkey declared war on Ger¬

many only in February 1945 as a symbolical gesture calcu¬

lated to ensure a seat in the United Nations Organisation.* 5

Britain’s Relations

with Spain and Portugal

Britain’s apprehensions that Franco Spain might join Hit¬

ler or that Germany might occupy Spain and attack the

British fortress of Gibraltar from the rear were dispelled in

* Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Cairo

and Tehran , 1943, pp. 566-67.

** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 327.

* :, " f International Affairs, No. 8, 1961, p. 120.

*) William L. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 59.

351

early 1943. The Germans did not take that step at the time

of the Allied landing in North Africa—they were bound

hand and foot on the Eastern Front—and much less were

they in a position to undertake such an operation after 1942.

This determined the change in Anglo-Spanish relations.

The Spanish Government took a series of diplomatic steps

to induce Britain to initiate a compromise peace with Ger¬

many and Italy. A relevant note was delivered to the British

Foreign Office by the Duke of Alba, the Spanish Ambassa¬

dor in London, on October 12, 1942. In January 1943 Franco

sent Churchill a letter in which he pointed out that by re¬

jecting a compromise peace Britain was creating a situation

favourable to “revolutionary tendencies”, to “communism

and Russian control” of Europe.* Franco knew what cards

to play, but he laboured in vain because at the time Chur¬

chill was unable and it was not in his interests to steer to¬

wards a compromise peace with Germany and Italy. None¬

theless, Franco derived some advantage from his flirtation

with Britain. This flirtation must have been taken note of

by the British Government because subsequently it made

Churchill decide to preserve the Franco regime in Spain.

After Italy withdrew from the war the British and Amer¬

icans increased their pressure on Spain without fearing any

further rapprochement on her part with Germany. Franco

was told he would have to stop his tungsten deliveries to

Germany, expel German agents from Spain and turn over

all Italian ships in Spanish ports to the Allies. Franco had

no alternative but to satisfy these demands, although where

possible he tried to procrastinate. In January 1944, when

the Allies stopped oil deliveries to Spain, he was forced to

become more tractable.

At the same time the British Government pressured Franco

on matters of Spanish home policy. Having decided that

the reactionary fascist regime would be preserved in Spain

after the war, the British tried to get the Franco regime to

acquire a more or less democratic look, externally at least.

This was necessary chiefly to save Franco himself. British

historians complain that Franco had other ideas, being con¬

fident of his future.** In February 1944 Sir Samuel Hoare,

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 365.

** Ibid., p. 367.

352

the British Ambassador in Madrid, asked Franco whether

he did not think the Falange, the fascist party, should be

disbanded. This did not alarm Franco. He merely ignored

the question, being aware that Churchill would not go beyond

these vague wishes. This was soon confirmed by Churchill

personally. On May 24, 1944 he told Parliament he ex¬

pected that after the war Spain would co-operate in ensur¬

ing peace in the Western Mediterranean and that internal

political problems in Spain were a matter for the Spaniards

themselves.* The British Government thereby officially

made known its intention to do nothing to harm the Franco

regime and recorded its hope of co-operating with Franco

after the war. When Eden and Sir Samuel Hoare, who con¬

sidered this a much too direct approach, declared it would

be well to induce Franco to improve his administration,

Churchill sharply replied that he would not like to see a

Communist-controlled Spain. Eden replied that he too had

no intention of sparking revolution in Spain, but if the

Franco regime did not draw closer to the people civil war

might break out. These dissensions between Churchill and

the Foreign Office concerned, naturally, only the method by

which to preserve the fascist regime in Spain. Churchill and

Eden saw eye to eye on the need to do everything to prevent

the Spanish people from seizing power.

Britain’s relations were much simpler with the other fas¬

cist dictator in the Iberian Peninsula—Salazar, dictator of

Portugal. There was no problem over the preservation of

that regime. The British had no doubts that Salazar would

remain in power because his dictatorship had been estab¬

lished under different conditions than the Franco dictator¬

ship, and was not hated so much in the world. Besides, Por¬

tugal was aiding the Axis on an incomparably smaller scale

than Spain.

True, Portugal supplied Germany with a vital strategic

raw material like tungsten, despite having a treaty of al¬

liance with Britain (signed as far back as 1380) and despite

having proclaimed her neutrality in the war. Throughout

the war Britain sought to make Portugal stop her tungsten

deliveries to the Germans and sell this strategic material

only to the Allies. Salazar reduced these deliveries to Ger¬

many in proportion to the Allied successes, but refused to

* Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, Vol. 400, col. 771.

23-1561

353

suspend them altogether. Not even Churchill’s personal mes¬

sage of March 15, 1944 helped. He put an embargo on the

export of tungsten to Germany only on June 5, 1944, the

day before the Allies landed in France.

Another important problem in Anglo-Portuguese relations

was the Azores Islands, which the Allies wanted as a naval

and air base. These islands were militarily important in the

struggle against German U-boats and in protecting shipping

en route from Britain to the United States across the Atlan¬

tic. In February 1941 when the British Government believed

a German invasion of Portugal was possible, it advised the

Portuguese Government, in the event such an invasion took

place, to put up only a symbolic resistance and evacuate to

the Azores. This would enable the British to use the islands

for their own purposes under the pretence of defending the

Portuguese Government in exile.

Salazar agreed to this plan, but the Germans did not

invade Portugal. In 1943 the Allies again turned their gaze

on the Azores. Churchill was prepared to take them by force

if Salazar resisted. But that did not happen. On August 18,

1943, Britain and Portugal signed an agreement, which,

within the framework of Britain’s ancient alliance with Por¬

tugal, gave her the use of the islands as a war base/ 1

However, the situation soon became complicated. The

Americans demanded to be allowed to station 10,000 troops

on the islands. This alarmed both Portugal and Britain. The

British Government feared that once the Americans got the

use of the Azores they would never leave them. A conflict

flared up “between friends”, and it ended with the under¬

standing that US troops would use the islands on the terms

of the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of August 18, 1943.

Anglo-US Contradictions Become Aggravated

The year 1943 was marked not only by a radical change

in the balance of power between Britain and the USSR in

favour of the latter as a result of the mounting Soviet mili¬

tary effort and the enhancement of the Soviet Union’s role

in ensuring the ultimate victory of the United Nations.

Britain’s position changed in the Anglo-US alliance as well.

Greater US aid under Lend Lease increased Britain’s fight-

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 381.

354

ing capacity at the time, but in the long term it made

Britain more dependent on the USA. US Lend Lease aid to

Britain amounted to 662 million dollars in 1941, 2,391 mil¬

lion dollars in 1942 and 4,579 million dollars in 1943. The

corresponding figures for the British Empire were 1,082,

4,757 and 9,031 million dollars.* The USA’s entry into the

war and its role in joint military operations likewise changed

the general power balance to Britain’s disadvantage.

The USA was aware of its rapidly mounting advantages

and planned to waste no time in making use of them in order

to oust its Ally and rival from some spheres. This could

not help but aggravate the contradictions between the two

countries. In 1943 and during the first six months of 1944

these contradictions made themselves felt in a number of

fields.

The British Government was extremely worried by the

continued shift of the balance of strength in merchant ship¬

ping away from Britain, which had, by virtue of economic

and strategic considerations, always sought to have a large

merchant marine. But now the Germans were sinking a large

number of British vessels and Britain was unable to replace

these losses by herself. The USA was building many mer¬

chant ships but refused to turn them over to permanent

British ownership, agreeing only to their use for the trans¬

portation of freight to Britain. This threatened to place

British shipping at a great disadvantage in the post-war

competition. The problem was so serious that Churchill

raised it at his talks with Roosevelt in Washington in May

1943. He could not, of course, state his real reasons. His

argument was that the Americans did not have trained crews,

while the British had, and, therefore, the Americans should

hand over most of the monthly output of ships to the Brit¬

ish. Roosevelt ordered the monthly transfer of some ships

to the British, but since the USA remained the legal owner

of these vessels this measure alleviated the current difficul¬

ties experienced by British shipping but could not improve

its post-war position.

In 1943 the USA launched an energetic offensive against

Britain’s financial positions. Under the Lend Lease Agree¬

ment signed in 1942, Britain supplied the USA with raw

* R. G. D. Allen, Mutual Aid, London, 1953, p. 250.

23 *

355

materials not as mutual aid but for dollars because she had

to pay for the orders placed by her in America before the

Lend Lease Act was passed. By 1943 these payments were

ended and Britain’s currency reserves began to grow rapidly,

partially as a result of spending by US troops stationed in

Britain and other countries of the British Empire. In May

1941 Britain’s gold and dollar reserves amounted to 430

million dollars; the British asserted that for the normal func¬

tioning of finances these reserves had to total not less than

600 million dollars. On November 30, 1942 they rose to

928 million dollars and by November 1943 to 1,200 million

dollars.'"'

This accumulation of gold and dollar reserves greatly

improved Britain’s financial position, a development which

did not suit the USA. On January 1, 1943 the Inter-depart¬

mental Committee set up by the US President submitted a

report stating that “the balances now held by the United

Kingdom are adequate” and that “the United Kingdom’s

gold and dollar balances should not be permitted to be less

than about 600 million dollars nor above about 1,000 mil¬

lion dollars”.* ** The US Government thus felt it could decide

such issues for the British Government without preliminary

consultation.

In this situation, as the Assistant Secretary of State Dean

Acheson wrote on October 16, 1943, the US Government

“pushed the British to agree to give us raw materials on

reverse Lend Lease”.*** Britain finally had to give in

although the talks were dragged out from May to December.

The relevant agreement was signed on December 17, 1943.

Research into the manufacture of the atom bomb caused

considerable friction. After 1939 laboratory work in this

field was organised on a large scale both in Britain and the

USA. The scientists of both countries began exchanging in¬

formation on this question in September 1940, when a dele¬

gation of British scientists led by Henry Tisard visited the

USA. The prospect was that the research would show results

at some remote date in the future and current military require¬

ments did not seem to indicate the advisability of allocat¬

ing large funds for this research. However, the fear that the

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. Ill, pp. 49, 98.

** Ibid., p. 49.

*** Ibid., p. 90.

356

Germans might be the first to produce the new weapon com¬

pelled the British to continue work in this field. In June 1942,

in order to accelerate this work, Britain and the USA agreed

to combine their efforts. Churchill gave his consent to halt¬

ing parallel work in Britain so that it could be concentrated

entirely in the USA. He promised that British scientists

would be sent to the USA. In return Roosevelt promised to

share information on the results of the research.

Some information trickled to the British as long as the

work was in the laboratory stage. But the situation changed

on May 1, 1943, when the Engineering Department of the

US Army took over. On the pretext that it was a top secret

project the British were refused further information. Chur¬

chill protested and threatened that the British would start

parallel work in Canada or somewhere else. In May 1943

he managed to persuade Roosevelt to renew transmitting

information to British scientists.* This could hardly be

qualified as a British success, for the agreement that had been

signed put an end to independent British work on the manu¬

facture of the atom bomb.** Friction over this issue was

temporarily removed, but Anglo-US contradictions in the

sphere of nuclear armaments were to become further aggra¬

vated in the near future.

Until 1943 no sharp clashes took place between Britain

and the USA in Latin America. The steps which the USA

took officially to strengthen the defences of the Western

Hemisphere and actually also to enhance its influence in

Latin America did not run counter to British interests where

the conduct of the war was concerned. Inasmuch as military

requirements were given top priority, Britain did not oppose

US actions in Latin America. With the exception of Argen¬

tina, all the Latin American countries accepted US leadership.

After the question of survival was removed from the

agenda and an Allied victory became a certainty, Britain

felt she could, at least timidly, go to the defence of her eco¬

nomic positions in South America. This was confined to pro¬

tests against LTS actions to force Argentina to accept

Washington’s leadership.

During the war Argentina was legally a neutral country,

and she substantially expanded her ties with both the anti-

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 723.

** Ronald W. Clark, The Birth of the Bomb, London, 1961, p. 187.

357

fascist coalition and the Axis powers. US attempts to pres¬

sure Argentina into suspending her economic and diplomatic

relations with the Axis were resisted by the Argentinian

Government. In Argentina the British had more capital in¬

vestments than the Americans, and in its resistance to Amer¬

ican pressure the Argentinian Government tried to rely on

Britain. This was understood in the USA, and the US State

Department sought British support.

Politically, the US official stand held the balance in its

favour. The USA wanted Argentina to join the struggle

against the Axis, and this was appreciated by the peoples

and conformed to their desires. The British Government

maintained that, firstly, the USA was overrating the sig¬

nificance of Argentinian collaboration with the Axis powers,

secondly, pressure on Argentina would only increase

resistance by her, and, thirdly, Britain could not afford the

luxury of severing commercial relations with Argentina.

However, in view of Britain’s dependence on the USA she

had to accede to pressure from Washington. Besides, in this

issue Churchill showed a much greater willingness to meet the

American demands than Eden. On February 27, 1944 he

wrote to Eden: “When you consider the formidable questions

on which we may have difficulty with the United States, oil,

dollar balances, shipping, policy to France, Italy, Spain, the

Balkans, etc., I feel that we ought to try to make them feel

we are their friends and helpers in the American sphere.”*

Earlier, on December 31, 1942, the Foreign Office had

published a statement declaring that trade with Argentina

could not continue if the Argentinian Government failed to

take steps against the German agents in Argentina who kept

German U-boats informed of the movements of British mer¬

chant ships. The Argentinian Government satisfied this de¬

mand in some measure, but in February 1943 reiterated its

intention to remain neutral. A coup was accomplished in

Argentina in June 1943, but it did not bring about a change

in that country’s foreign policy.

In January 1944, when victory over the fascist bloc was

obviously drawing near, Argentina broke off diplomatic and

economic relations with the Axis powers.** Another coup

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 413.

** Annual Register. A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad

for the Year 1944 , London, 1945, p. 316.

358

took place in Argentina in February of the same year. The

US State Department announced that the new Government

would be recognised only if it satisfied US demands. The

Argentinians showed no desire to co-operate, with the result

that the USA called on Britain to join with it in recalling

her Ambassador from Buenos Aires. After prolonged

wrangling the British acceded and in early July the ambas¬

sadors were recalled for consultations. ' This was effected

only after Roosevelt had sent a personal message to

Churchill.

Although the British Government recalled its Ambassa¬

dor it negotiated a four-year agreement on the purchase of

all Argentinian meat exports. In the obtaining situation this

was obvious support for Argentina, and the US State De¬

partment was quick to lodge a protest. The British replied

that 40 per cent of their meat came from Argentina and

they could not jeopardise that source of supply. Roosevelt

had to intervene again. He demanded that the British

refrain from signing a long-term agreement, and negotiate

monthly supplies of meat instead. Once again the British

had to yield to American pressure.

Britain and the Arab Middle East

During the First World War the British had organised

Arab uprisings in Middle Eastern territories ruled by Tur¬

key. Officially, this was done on the pretext of helping the

Arabs win liberation, but in reality the purpose was to drive

out the Turks and seize these territories. On the eve of the

Second World War the Arab countries were burning with

anger at British duplicity. Dissatisfaction was rife not only

among the people but also among the feudal nobility, many of

whom had not received the thrones or high-placed positions

promised them by Britain. This dissatisfaction was skilfully

utilised by Germany, which now came forward as the “cham¬

pion” of Arab freedom. The Germans strove to incite the

Arabs against Britain. London was well aware of this, par¬

ticularly after the pro-German, nationalist and anti-British

coup brought about by Rashid Ali al-Qilani in Iraq.

* Annual Register. A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad

for the Year 1944 , London, 1945, p. 817.

359

Knowledge of the enormous threat to British imperialism

in the Middle East, a threat springing from the growth of

liberation aspirations among the Arabs, compelled the Brit¬

ish to manoeuvre and flirt with the Arabs. Britain’s actions

were facilitated by the fact that after British and Gaullist

troops had occupied Syria and the Lebanon in 1941, British

troops marched into all other Arab territories with the ex¬

ception of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. The three British

armies stationed in the Middle East were used for this

purpose.

In May 1941 the British formed the Arab Telegraph Agen¬

cy to handle news dissemination in the Arab world. Early

in 1942 they opened a radio station at Jaffa, Palestine.’ 5 ' In

April 1941 they set up the Middle East Supply Centre (in

which the Americans took a hand beginning in 1942) which

controlled the supply of food and prime necessities to that

region. All Middle Eastern countries were brought into the

sterling bloc, which enabled Britain to control the local econo¬

my and its foreign ties.**

These measures to integrate the Arab territories economi¬

cally were undertaken to facilitate British control over them

and satisfy the Arabs. The British-backed projects for an

Arab federation in the Middle East were likewise designed

to serve the above purpose. The British historian G. Kirk

claims that the “suggestion that the movement for Arab

unity and the Arab League were British creations is ab¬

surd”.*** This categorical assertion hardly fits in with the

facts.

On May 29, 1941, as soon as the anti-British coup in Iraq

was put down, Eden declared that a striving for political,

economic and cultural unity was observed in the Arab coun¬

tries and that Britain would support any project aimed at

achieving such unity.*' Explaining this statement, the Amer¬

ican historian G. Lenczowski writes: “Axis influence was

at its peak, and Britain felt an urgent need to make a bold

bid for Arab friendship.”**'

* L. C. Hurewitz, Unity and Disunity in the Middle East, p. 232.

** E. A. Speiser, United States and Near East, Cambridge, Harvard

University Press, 1947, p. 115.

*** G. Kirk, The Middle East in the War, London, 1953, p. 23.

*' The Times, May 30, 1941.

**' G. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, New York,

1957, p. 503.

360

In 1942, Nuri Said, the pro-British Prime Minister of Iraq,

advanced a plan for the creation of an Arab League. The

British Government supported this initiative by its puppet,

but on February 24, 1943 Eden declared that such a project

had to have the support of all the Arab countries.* The

Eden statement was prompted by the reluctance of the Egyp¬

tian ruling circles and the rulers of Saudi Arabia to unite

under the leadership of the Hashimite rulers of Iraq. Sub¬

sequently, the initiative to form an Arab League was taken

over by the Egyptian statesman Mustafa el-Nahas Pasha.

In line with the Egyptian proposals, seven Arab states

signed a protocol at Alexandria on October 7, 1944, under

which they pledged to set up an Arab League. In Cairo on

March 22, 1945 representatives of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq,

Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Transjordan signed a pact in¬

stituting this League. The pact established fairly loose con¬

tact between the members of the League. That suited its

participants, who did not want a lasting federation. Like¬

wise, the British Government was not interested in durable

Arab unity; its support for the idea of unity was nothing

more than a forced concession to the Arabs. At first this

concession was a step to parry the efforts of the Axis powers,

who were trying to use Arab nationalism for their own

purposes, but after 1942 the idea of Arab unity was directed

against US attempts to gain a foothold in that region and

also against the growing national liberation movement, which

could count on assistance and support from the Soviet

Union.

The British handling of the Palestine issue must likewise

be examined in the light of their attempts to appease the

Arabs. During and after the First World War Britain

promised to help create a Jewish national home in Palestine.

This issue became extremely acute when the nazis began to

exterminate Jews en masse. The flow of refugees to Pales¬

tine began to swell. This alarmed the Arabs, for it threatened

to drive them from the lands they owned in Palestine and

to increase the Jewish population of Palestine. In 1939, in

its courting of the Arabs the British Government sharply

reduced the flow of immigrants to Palestine, despite its

promises to the contrary. The Jews were in no position to

* American Political Science Review, February 1946, p. 90.

361

bargain with the British and deny them support in the war

against the Axis powers: this was not possible because of the

attitude adopted towards the Jews by the nazis.

The Jews, therefore, in spite of their anger, had to tolerate

Britain’s new policy in the Palestine issue. In 1943, when the

threat of an Allied defeat had passed, the Jews started

an armed struggle in Palestine with the objective of remov¬

ing the restrictions on the entry of immigrants. This was

accompanied by active propaganda by the Jewish commun¬

ity in the USA against British policy. As early as 1942 the

Zionist organisation in the United States pressed for the

creation of a Jewish state embracing the entire territory of

Palestine, the formation of a Jewish army and the lifting

of restrictions on the entry of immigrants to Palestine (the

so-called Biltmore Programme).”'

Despite the irritation it caused in Britain, the propaganda

campaign for the realisation of this programme was pushed

forward actively in the USA in 1943. Congress and the

White House were inclined to support it. A motion calling

for US intervention in the conflict between the Jews and

Britain was submitted in Congress on January 27, 1944. It

demanded the implementation of the Biltmore Programme.

Roosevelt publicly supported this demand. The British Gov¬

ernment protested against the American pressure but at the

same time drew up various projects for the creation of an

association of Levantine states, within whose framework

it was hoped to settle the Palestinian issue.

In this question the American Government acted both

under pressure from the fairly strong Jewish bourgeoisie in

the USA and on the calculation that a future Jewish state

created with its support would be an American bastion in a

British sphere of influence. However, it by no means intended

to side unconditionally with the Jews against the Arabs.

Pressure from the oil monopolies made it seek better rela¬

tions with the Arabs rather than quarrel with them. Oil was

the prime cause of the acute Anglo-US conflict over the

Middle East in 1943.

The American oil monopolies had obtained concessions in

Iraq, the Bahrein Islands and Saudi Arabia before the

Second World War, but they had done little to tap them. The

* G. Kirk, Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam

to Modern Times, London, 1957, p. 204.

362

Second World War brought to light the enormous economic

and strategic significance of oil. The Middle East had 42 per

cent of the world’s explored oil reserves, and the American

monopolies were determined to control them. That was one

of the reasons Roosevelt so quickly agreed to the invasion

of North Africa, gave Britain tanks and other weapons for

their operations in the Middle East and did not vigorously

oppose Churchill’s Mediterranean strategy. As a result, the

conduct of the war in that region ceased to be a purely

British affair. American troops appeared in Iran, Egypt and

Palestine mainly in connection with the delivery of freight

to the USSR and the supply of armaments to Britain. The

US Navy and merchant marine played a considerable part

in delivering military supplies to the Middle East. The US

Air Force built a network of bases linking up North Africa

with India, Burma and China. Lend Lease embraced most

of the Middle Eastern countries.

In 1943 the Americans demanded payment for all this.

In July the US Government set up an oil reserves corpora¬

tion to handle the purchase of oil-rich land abroad, as it was

feared that the oil reserves in the USA were being exhausted.

The US press raised a howl. The purpose of this hue and

cry was obviously to force Britain to share what it had in

the Middle East. High-placed American officials, like the

intelligence chief Colonel Donovan, the Republican presi¬

dential candidate Wendell Wilkie and Ambassador Averell

Harriman regularly toured the Middle East, studying pos¬

sibilities for pressuring the British in that region. Even

President Roosevelt, on his return journey from the Yalta

Conference in early 1945, considered it necessary to stop for

a few days in the Suez Canal zone for a meeting with Arab

rulers.

Active US intrusion into this preserve of British imperial¬

ism began in 1941. By the summer of 1943 this pressure was

stepped up to such an extent that, as Woodward observes,

the Foreign Office became “disquieted at the increasing lack

of consideration shown by the Americans for British inter¬

ests”, while Eden informed the War Cabinet of the “uncer¬

tainty about American policy in the Middle East”."' It was

decided to instruct Halifax to ask the Americans what they

specifically wanted.

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 395.

363

In December 1943 the State Department suggested urgent

talks with Britain on the Middle East oil reserves. This gave

rise to uneasiness in London. Churchill wrote to Roosevelt

“that certain British quarters feared that the United States

wished to deprive Britain of her Middle East oil interests”.*

At the talks, held in April-May, agreement was reached on

the setting up of an international oil commission. The

agreement did not prove to be as terrible as was feared in

London, and the British insisted that it be signed without

delay. Their efforts brought no result. The American oil

companies were dissatisfied with the agreement and pre¬

vented it from being signed. The struggle for Middle East

oil continued.

This struggle reached its highest point in Saudi Arabia,

which the Americans believed had the most promising oil¬

fields. Besides, the British ties with the Saudi Arabia rulers

were weaker than with the governments of other Arab

countries.

The British tried to strengthen these ties. In 1940, 1941

and 1942 they granted subsidies to King Ibn Saud. In 1943,

when the USA started an all-out offensive to drive British

interests out of that country, Roosevelt parried British sub¬

sidies by spreading Lend Lease to Saudi Arabia. The Amer¬

icans used British methods, intending to buy over the rul¬

ing circles.** They demanded that instead of being purely

British, the missions sent to Saudi Arabia should be Anglo-

American. A temporary agreement began to take shape,

under which Britain took charge of Saudi Arabia’s political

and military problems and the United States handled her

economic affairs. A clear-cut borderline could not be drawn

between these spheres and therefore the Anglo-American

struggle went on.

The British and American representatives on the spot in¬

trigued against each other to undermine the position of the

other party. The State Department protested to the Foreign

Office against what it said were the persevering attempts of

the British Minister in Saudi Arabia to damage American

positions in that country. The Foreign Office countered this

with analogous accusations levelled at the American Envoy.

* G. Kirk, The Middle East in the War, London, 1953, p. 360.

** L. C. Hurewitz, Op. cit., p. 128.

364

This exchange ended with the transfer of the two envoys

to other posts. The USA was the stronger adversary and the

struggle for Saudi Arabia went in its favour.*

Far Eastern Strategy and Policy

In the Pacific theatre the situation was stabilised in 1943.

Japan, which had expanded as far as she could, began

consolidating her strategic positions and building up strength.

Similarly, the Allies dug in in their new positions. On the

whole, however, 1943 witnessed a turn of the tide in the war

in the Far East in favour of the Western Allies. In February

American troops compelled the Japanese to abandon Gua¬

dalcanal in the Solomon group and then began pressing

them on New Guinea. Naturally, these small-scale opera¬

tions were not of decisive significance, but they showed that

the tide was turning. It was still very far to Tokyo, and it

was hardly possible to island-hop to Japan. The decisive

battles would obviously be fought in the Asian continent,

but there the situation was not favourable to the Allies. Ja¬

pan had cut China off completely from the sea and was pre¬

paring operations that she hoped would finally give her con¬

trol over the entire country. Communication with China was

maintained by the Allies exclusively by air from India via

the Himalayas. Effective assistance in the way of weapons

could not, of course, be given along that difficult and dan¬

gerous route. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek did not want to

fight the Japanese. He was preparing for battle against the

Chinese Communist armies. The Americans and, in some

measure, the British feared that Kuomintang China might

surrender to Japan. She had to be given assistance without

delay.

This was the subject of the Roosevelt-Churchill-Chiang

Kai-shek conference in Cairo on November 22-26, 1943. Di¬

vergences between the British and the Americans came to

the fore on the question of procedure, even before the con¬

ference got under way. Churchill and his military advisers

were greatly displeased that Roosevelt had invited Chiang

Kai-shek to the conference before the British and Americans

could reach agreement on basic questions. A hallmark of

British diplomacy is that it has always tried to engineer a

* Ibid., p. 129.

365

collision between its partners, seeking to reach agreement

with them separately in order later, by joint effort, to im¬

pose the results of this agreement on the third partner. This

method of adopting separate decisions beforehand was

widely practised by the British Government vis-a-vis

the Soviet Union. In the given case it wanted to use the

same method against China, but Roosevelt got in the

way.

The decisions adopted at the Cairo Conference concerned

military-strategic and political problems. The Americans

suggested an offensive operation from India via Burma in

the direction of China. A major offensive involving Chinese,

British and American troops was planned in North Burma

with the object of clearing the Japanese out of Burma and

restoring overland communication with China. The Chinese

insisted on a landing in the Andaman Islands in support of

the operation to prevent the Japanese from transferring rein¬

forcements to North Burma. They suggested that the landing

should be effected by the British Navy. Roosevelt supported

the Chinese in this issue."'

This did not suit Churchill, chiefly for political motives.

He did not wish to see the British colony of Burma recovered

by the Americans, much less by the Chinese. In 1940 the

national liberation movement in Burma had extracted from

the British Government the promise of independence and

Dominion status for Burma. The fact that the Japanese had

booted the British out of Burma by no means enhanced Brit¬

ish prestige in that country. Churchill was aware that if

Burma were liberated from the Japanese not by the British

but by the Americans and the Chinese it would be extremely

difficult to restore British colonial rule there.* ** These were

the political motives behind his strategy. He considered that

Japan had to be defeated by naval forces, which would cut

the Japanese lines of communication and impose a blockade

which would force Japan to surrender.

Since Japan was firmly entrenched on the continent, this

strategy was unrealistic. This was appreciated by the Amer¬

icans, who considered that the Japanese armies in China,

Indo-China, Malaya, Burma and the Philippines could func¬

tion as independent units even if they were cut off from

* Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 628.

** William L. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 65.

366

Japan proper.* Therefore, a land army was needed that

could smash the Japanese forces in the Asian continent.

Such an army had to be provided by China. Incidentally,

this explains Roosevelt’s attention to China at this period.

However, he and his military advisers were already beginning

to see the military weakness of Kuomintang China and to

pin their ultimate hopes on Soviet assistance against Japan.

In the end Roosevelt’s point of view predominated. Chiang

Kai-shek was promised a land operation in North Burma

and a landing operation south of it.** He took these prom¬

ises away with him to Chungking.

Churchill clearly had no intention of fulfilling this agree¬

ment as any other which did not fit in with his plans. De¬

velopments soon came to his aid. From Cairo he and Roose¬

velt went to the Tehran Conference, where they found that

the Soviet Union was in future prepared to help its Allies

against Japan. This, as Churchill lost no time in pointing

out, “changed the entire strategic picture” and, he said, there

was no longer any need for the operation agreed upon in

Cairo. It was Roosevelt’s turn to yield. The American Pres¬

ident feared that if Chiang Kai-shek learned of the shelving

of the Cairo agreement he might be tempted to come to

terms with the Japanese. At the same time he was aware

that the British would not provide forces for a landing

south of Burma. He did not wish to provoke an open con¬

flict with Churchill over this question, with the result that

the strategic plan adopted at Cairo had a life-span of only

ten days.

Discussion of Far Eastern strategy at the Cairo Confer¬

ence brought to light serious differences between the Allies in

that part of the world. Sherwood is quite right in noting

that in Southeast Asia “the British and Americans were

fighting two different wars for different purposes, and the

Kuomintang Government of China was fighting a third war

for purposes largely its own”.***

The Cairo Conference is known mainly for its Declara¬

tion, which stated that it was the purpose of Britain, the USA

and China “that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands

in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the

* Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., pp. 771-72.

** Ibid., p. 773.

*** Ibid., p. 778.

367

beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the

territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Man¬

churia, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the

Republic of China”.*

Thus, where it concerned the USSR, the USA and Britain

insisted that territorial issues should be postponed to the

peace conference, but at Cairo they adopted an important

decision on territorial issues in the Far East. This, it was

claimed, was necessary in order to deprive Chiang Kai-shek

of the possibility of signing a separate peace with Japan,

because under no circumstances would the Japanese have

agreed on even approximately similar peace terms with

China. The promise to restore Taiwan and other territories

to China was made to stimulate her desire to contribute to¬

wards victory in the Far East. The Cairo Declaration was

unquestionably linked with Roosevelt’s wish to raise Chiang

Kai-shek China to the status of a Great Power. At the close

of 1943, when the Soviet Union’s role in the war and the

post-war world was becoming more or less clearly defined,

the USA needed a relatively strong China both as a weapon

in the Far East generally and as an ally of the USA and

Britain against the USSR. The American official mind, Feis

says, “was that the Chinese people.. . would, in recognition

of the chance being conferred upon them, prove to be relia¬

ble and friendly partners of the West”.**

The initiative for the adoption of the Cairo Declaration

belonged to Roosevelt. Churchill was critical of it. He did

not like anything that helped to elevate China to the status

of a Great Power. He had reason to fear that the USA

would use China also against British interests in the Far

East. Moreover, even before China attained Great Power

status, Chiang Kai-shek made known his expansionist inten¬

tions, some of which concerned the British Empire. “The

Foreign Office,” Woodward writes, “were also disturbed at

the large claims which General Chiang Kai-shek was putting

forward for Chinese influence and territorial dominion after

the war.*** At a talk with Roosevelt in Washington in March

1943, Eden told him that the British Government was assailed

* Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Cairo

and Tehran, 1943, Washington, 1961, p. 448.

** Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 253.

*** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 425.

368

with doubts about what role China would play in the post¬

war world and, in any case, he, Eden, did not like the idea

of giving China too much freedom in the Pacific. In a record

of this talk Harry Hopkins noted: . . from what Eden said

it made me think the British are going to be pretty sticky

about their former possessions in the Far East.” 1 '' They had

good reason for this.

The Chinese persevered in their criticism of British action

in India. Chiang Kai-shek’s wife, Soong Mei-ling, who was

very active in affairs of state, was particularly critical of

the British during her visit to the USA in 1943. Halifax

was instructed to lodge a protest with the Chinese Ambas¬

sador in the USA against Madame Chiang Kai-shek’s state¬

ments. In March 1943 Chiang Kai-shek published a book,

Destiny of China, which contained a fairly large dose of

criticism of Britain. This too evoked a negative reaction on

the part of the British Foreign Office. The publication in

July 1943 by the Chinese Information Ministry of a map

in which the whole of North Burma, i.e., a British colony,

was shown as Chinese territory, likewise did not pass unno¬

ticed in London.

Diplomatic relations between Britain and China gradually

diminished, and from the close of 1943 onwards the talks

with China on behalf of the Allies were conducted mostly

by the United States.

The Americans claimed the role of arbiter also in

Britain’s relations with other countries with possessions in

Southeast Asia. In December 1944 when the US State

Department suspected that the British, French and Dutch

were planning to make a deal on something concerning their

possessions in the Far East, it informed the British Foreign

Office that the President expected consultations with the

USA on any problem relating to Southeast Asia.

Problems of the Post-War Settlement

From British historiography we learn that in Britain the

Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration are

used as the starting point for an examination of the prob-

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. Ill, p. 36.

24-1561

369

lems connected with the post-war peace settlement. This is

an obviously incorrect approach.

Both these documents were mainly propagandists, and

the only reason they are given such prominence is, evident¬

ly, to persuade people that in the war Britain and the USA

pursued lofty aims which conformed to the interests of the

peoples. Actually, however, the British Government serious¬

ly got down to studying post-war problems only after the

Battle of Stalingrad had shown who would win the war. The

Foreign Office, Woodward tells us, began to think of and

plan for the post-war settlement “as soon as they were re¬

leased from conducting what might be called the diplomacy

of survival”.* The approximate alignment between the lead¬

ing powers of the anti-fascist coalition began to shape out at

the time.

Developments at the firing-lines brought the British lead¬

ers more and more round to what for them was the gloomy

conclusion that when the war ended both the USA and the

Soviet Union would be considerably stronger than Britain.

General Kennedy says that Jan Smuts, one of the senior

statesmen of the British Empire and Prime Minister of the

Union of South Africa, told the British leaders at the close

of 1943: “In my opinion, there will be two colossi after the

war. In Europe, Russia. ... The other colossus will be North

America.”** Under these conditions the materialisation of

Britain’s plans concerning the post-war organisation of the

world depended in many ways on the attitude the USSR and

the USA adopted to these plans. The British Government

did not even count on its plans receiving complete support in

Moscow and Washington. This could never have happened

because the three powers were pursuing different objectives

in the war. Their alliance emerged and developed as a result

of their common desire to defeat the common enemy. But

as regards plans for the post-war arrangement of the world,

they were divided by pronounced contradictions. Woodward

is quite right when he writes: “There was a common politi¬

cal purpose—the defeat of the enemy in war—but ‘victory’

was by no means a simple term; it had one meaning for the

United States, another for Great Britain, and ... a third

meaning for Russia.”***

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. XLVII.

** John Kennedy, Op. cit., p. 318.

*** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. XXXIV.

370

The Soviet Union pursued the just objective of liberation,

while Britain and the USA had imperialist aims, in addition

to the objective of defeating the Axis powers. For Britain

this meant a clash of interests not only with the Soviet Union

but also with the USA, which was steering a line towards

world hegemony, towards depriving Britain of her colonial

possessions, markets and sources of raw materials. For the

British Government this presaged a difficult struggle over

post-war problems, and as the end of the war drew nearer

this struggle became more and more difficult because the

balance of power was rapidly changing to Britain’s disad¬

vantage.

In relation to the problems of the post-war settlement the

British Government displayed much less realism and com¬

mon sense than the US Government. The reason for this

was that at the time the US Government was headed by

Roosevelt, a bourgeois politician who approached many prob¬

lems quite realistically. Churchill, on the other hand, never

again rose to the level of statesmanship which in 1941

brought him round to an alliance with the USSR. His con¬

suming animosity and hatred for socialism and the Soviet

Union, for everything progressive prevented him from cor¬

rectly understanding the situation and acting in conformity

with it and with Britain’s actual possibilities. In 1943-45,

although the situation was completely unlike anything known

in Europe and the world as a whole, the British Govern¬

ment acted in the spirit of its old, traditional policies.

It got down to working out its post-war policy at the close

of 1942. Eden drew up and submitted a series of documents

on this question to the War Cabinet. Then followed explor¬

atory talks with the Americans to ascertain their views on

the post-war arrangement. Most important from this stand¬

point was Eden’s trip to Washington in March 1943, when

he discussed this problem with Roosevelt twice and had

meetings with many other American statesmen. But even

after these talks the British could not exactly tell what

the American position was. Eden was not sure whether

what Roosevelt, Hull and Welles told him represented

considered US policy or whether they were simply thinking

aloud.

On March 15, 1943 Eden told Roosevelt that “Russia was

our most difficult problem”, adding, “England would prob-

24 *

371

ably be too weak to face Russia alone diplomatically”.*

Indeed, the Soviet Union was moving towards the end of

the war as a powerful state, which for the British Govern¬

ment was a great and unpleasant shock. Unlike Roosevelt,

who, as may be assumed from certain data, planned to pro¬

mote relations with the USSR on a basis of coexistence,**

Churchill, as his own memorandum of October 1942 to the

War Cabinet bears witness, decided to fight “Russian bar¬

barism” with all the resources at his disposal.

In 1943 Soviet strength reached a level where the British

as well as the US Government no longer found it possible

to raise the question, as in 1941-42, of depriving the USSR

of part of its territory after the war and reducing it to its

1939 frontiers, which were established in the period of the

Soviet Union’s temporary weakness after 1917, when the

imperialist powers wrested some of its Western territories

away by force. However, in return for their recognition of

the Soviet Union’s legitimate frontiers they planned to de¬

mand considerable concessions.***

Aware that she would be much too weak to face the So¬

viet Union alone, Britain decided to align Europe against it.

The first stage of this alignment was to be the setting up of

a series of federations and blocs, and the second—the for¬

mation of a British-dominated European Council to head

these federations. In a memorandum to Eden on October 21,

1942 Churchill wrote that he hoped to see “a Council con¬

sisting of perhaps ten units... with several confederations—

Scandinavian, Danubian, Balkan, etc.”, and a “United States

of Europe”.** Woodward tells us that the “Foreign Office

had been considering... the possibility of two confedera¬

tions—one for Central, and the other for Southeast Europe,

covering the states lying between Germany and Italy on the

one side, and Russia and Turkey on the other”.*** That all

this was spearheaded against the USSR is obvious not only

from the Churchill memorandum of October 1942. In a

document handed to Turkish leaders at Adana early in 1943

Churchill wrote: “...We should arrange the best possible

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. Ill, p. 13.

** J. Agar, ‘The Price of Power, Chicago, 1957, p. 54.

*** Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. Ill, p. 14.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 562.

**) Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 437.

372

combination against her” [meaning the Soviet Union.—

v.r.].*

The Soviet Government saw through these intrigues. At

the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in October 1943

the Soviet representative spoke categorically against at¬

tempts to set up anti-Soviet blocs, emphasising that this poli¬

cy would not only harm small countries but would damage

general European stability."'"' The United States was likewise

against the idea of a European Council under British aegis,

but for a different reason: the way Churchill saw the Euro¬

pean Council, it would, to some extent, be directed against

the United States as well.*”'* These factors worked against

Britain and during the war she was unable to put into effect

her plan of forming an anti-Soviet bloc.

The question of controlling Soviet relations with the

European countries whose territories would be liberated by

the Soviet Army was causing intense anxiety in London. The

British Government was aware that the Soviet military

presence in these countries would hamper the reactionary

forces there and foster the growth of revolutionary senti¬

ments, and that true to proletarian internationalism, the

Soviet Union would give the peoples the necessary assistance

in their struggle for social emancipation.

To avert this and tie the Soviet Union’s hands, the British

Government suggested setting up a United Nations Com¬

mission for Europe. Here the objective, as Woodward points

out, was to create the “machinery for the immediate purpose

of meeting the confusion—and the risks of chaos and an¬

archy—certain to occur at the end of the war”, and “to secure

a common policy, and, in particular, to prevent unilateral

action by the Russians”.** By chaos and anarchy the British

Government clearly meant the revolutionary movement. In

addition to preventing the USSR from “unilaterally” help¬

ing this movement, it planned to draw the Soviet Union

into action designed to halt and crush the movement. The

Soviet Government saw what the British were aiming at,

and at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow in Octo¬

ber 1943 secured the adoption of a decision to set up, in¬

stead of the proposed international counter-revolutionary

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 636.

** Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. I, p. 639.

*** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. XLVIII.

*) Ibid., p. LII.

376

machinery, a European Advisory Commission which was

given the task of drawing up recommendations on the terms

of surrender for Germany and her satellites and on the

mechanism of putting these terms into effect.*

Parallel with its attempts to ensure the possibility for

diplomatic intervention in the affairs of Eastern Europe in

the interests of the counter-revolution, the British Govern¬

ment prepared to take steps against the revolutionary

movement on territory that might be occupied by British

troops. General Kennedy says that as early as September 1943

British military leaders were estimating the number of troops

they would need to meet “the numerous requests from the

Foreign Office for keeping order, supervising elections,

preventing civil war, and so on, in a great many foreign

states”.**

The British Government was not quite clear about Ger¬

many’s future after the war. On the one hand, it feared

Germany and felt she should be punished for everything she

had inflicted on Britain. For that reason the British, like the

Americans, wanted Germany’s dismemberment. In his

record of a talk between Eden and Roosevelt on March 15,

1943, Harry Hopkins notes that “both the President and

Eden agreed that, under any circumstances, Germany must

be divided into several states”.*** Different variants of this

dismemberment were put forward at the Foreign Ministers

Conference in Moscow and at the Tehran Conference of

Heads of States. Since the USSR was emerging from the war

stronger than ever before, and the British Government was

planning to unite Europe against it, Germany would ob¬

viously be needed for the British scheme. The point of

departure in Churchill’s memorandum of October 1942 was

that Germany would be a component of the post-war united,

anti-Soviet Europe. At the close of 1942 the British Foreign

Office prepared a memorandum, which said that “if the Rus¬

sians refused co-operation [i.e., if the USSR refused to ac¬

cept British dictation.— V. T.], we should eventually have to

accept the collaboration of Germany”.* 1 Britain’s military

leaders were likewise obsessed with the idea of using Ger¬

many against the USSR. General Kennedy says that in Sep-

* W. Strang, Home and Abroad, London, 1956, pp. 201-02.

** John Kennedy, Op cit., p. 304.

*** Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. Ill, p. 16.

*) Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 435.

374

tember 1943 “another matter which we began to turn over

in our minds was the strength of the forces which we should

retain in peace-time. To us there seemed to be only one

Great Power who could be regarded as the possible enemy:

Russia. From this arose the question of what side Germany

might take in a future war.”* This line of thinking deprived

the British Government of the possibility of firmly deciding

its position in regard to a post-war Germany.

While Britain and the USA had little divergences over the

German problem, the situation was different on the question

of colonial and dependent territories. America’s rulers were

determined to use their war-won advantages over Britain to

blow up the British Empire. Churchill, the militant imperial¬

ist that he was, was driven to a frenzy by American pressure

in this sphere. At a banquet given by the Lord-Mayor of

London in November 1942 he declared defiantly: “We mean

to hold our own.”** But high-flown verbiage was of little

help.

In the second half of 1942 the US State Department set

up a committee under Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary of

State, to work out a preliminary plan for an international

trusteeship system.*** London was aware of American activ¬

ities in this sphere. Besides, the general feeling in the

colonies, particularly in India, made the British Government

occupy itself with the colonial problem. In February 1943 it

proposed that it and the US Government publish a joint

statement on colonial policy, which would declare that the

level of development was appreciably different in the various

dependent territories and, therefore, the administering state

must, in each given case, promote social, economic and

political institutions in the colonies until such a time as the

colonial peoples would be in a position to go over to self¬

administration. Not even approximate dates were named for

such self-administration. Moreover, the British proposed

declaring that responsibility for the security and administra¬

tion of the colonies must continue to rest with the colonial

powers concerned, and suggested setting up regional com¬

missions to ensure international co-operation in raising the

standard of living in the colonies.* 1 Thus, instead of granting

* John Kennedy, Op. cit., p. 304.

** William L. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 46.

*** Ruth B. Russell, Op. cit., pp. 84-85.

*) Ibid., pp. 88-89.

375

independence to the enslaved peoples, Britain only promised

to show concern for their development.

The publication of such a joint statement would have

meant that the USA supported British policy in the colo¬

nial question and officially renounced the Atlantic Charter.

At the same time, however, the London politicians were not

inclined to make any concessions in this issue to the American

monopolies, and this, of course, made their proposal inac-

ceptable to the US Government.

The question of colonies and semi-dependent territories was

brought up at the Foreign Ministers Conference held in Mos¬

cow in October-November 1943. This was the first time this

issue was formally examined with the participation of the

Soviet Union. Prior to this it was dealt with by the USA

and Britain as their own exclusive province.

At the Conference on October 24 Cordell Hull handed the

Soviet Foreign Minister a draft United Nations Declaration

on national independence, at the same time informing Eden

of this. It was not necessary to send the latter a copy, since

he had received one in March. Essentially, the American

draft consisted of two parts: the first contained provisions for

the actual re-carving of the colonies to give the American

monopolies access to the colonial possessions of other powers;

the second part consisted of demagogic verbiage designed

to camouflage the USA’s real aims with externally demo¬

cratic assertions. The American aims were most clearly set

out in the first point, one of whose paragraphs stated that

colonial powers had to pursue a policy which would allow

the natural resources of colonial territories to be developed,

organised and marketed in the interests of the colonial peo¬

ples themselves and the world as a whole. In regard to the

colonial peoples, the declared policy would require extensive

and constant consultation and co-operation between countries

directly responsible for the future of the different colonial

territories, and other powers having considerable interests

in areas where such territories are situated. Provision was

made for the creation of the machinery to organise such con¬

sultation* The development of the colonies “in the interests

of the whole world” must be interpreted to mean US parti¬

cipation in the exploitation of the colonies under the guise of

promoting their development. The point on consultation and

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. I, pp. 748-49.

376

co-operation with other powers meant giving the USA access

to the administration of the colonies from behind the screen

of an international body. That was the crux of the matter.

On October 26 Eden sent Hull an unofficial memorandum

in which he wrote that the draft declaration as presented by

the Americans was not acceptable to the British Govern¬

ment. 51 ' When the American draft declaration was brought

up for discussion at the Foreign Ministers Conference on

October 29, Eden said he was not prepared to deal with the

question and that his Government did not concur with the

views stated in the American document. This attitude pre¬

vented a thorough discussion of the issue, and the Soviet

representative, therefore, confined himself to stating that the

question of the enslaved nations had to be given further study

and that the Soviet Government attached great importance

to it.* **

As we have already noted, when Churchill and Roosevelt

considered the post-war world at their Atlantic Conference

in 1941, they agreed that after the war the USA and Britain

would assume the functions of world policemen and that a

world security organisation would be set up under their

leadership only after the world had had time to become

stabilised. Their intention was to disarm and, consequently,

subordinate to their will not only the aggressive powers but

also the Soviet Union. But two years later the situation be¬

came such that at the Moscow Conference of Foreign

Ministers a Declaration was adopted on world security which

put paid to these plans. In that Declaration the USSR, the

USA, Britain and China said “they recognise the necessity

of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general

international organisation, based on the principle of the sov¬

ereign equality of all peace-loving states and open to mem¬

bership by all such states, large or small, for the maintenance

of international peace and security”.*** What a far cry this

was from the plans mooted by British and Americans in

August 1941! The democratisation of these plans was due

to the role which the Soviet Union was playing in the war.

Britain’s stand on this issue underwent repeated modifi¬

cations in the course of two years. Towards the end of 1942

* Ibid., p. 666.

** Ibid., p. 667.

*** The United Nations Yearbook, 1946, p. 21.

377

the dreams which Churchill had cherished in 1941 of undi¬

vided Anglo-US domination of the world gave way to a plan

for the creation of regional confederations, with Britain

holding sway in some of them and using them against both

the USSR and the USA. “Perhaps such a system,” Feis

writes, “had appealed to him [Churchill.— V. 7\] as better

enabling the British Empire and the smaller countries of

Europe to hold their own against the massive American and

Russian states.”* However, opposition from these massive

states caused a further evolution of Churchill’s views. In

1943 he had to agree to the establishment of a single world

security organisation. Roosevelt’s views likewise underwent

an evolution. He refrained from officially advancing the

plan for Anglo-US control of the post-war world and

likewise accepted the plan adopted at the Moscow Confe¬

rence.

A noteworthy point is that at the Moscow Conference it

was agreed that the world body should be set up as early as

possible, i.e., during the war, while at the Atlantic Confer¬

ence the intention was to set up such a body not immediately

but when some time had passed after the termination of the

war. Britain and the USA changed their intention because in

some ways they hoped to use the planned organisation against

the USSR in order to limit its potentialities in the struggle

for a just, democratic peace. Feis writes that the USA and

Britain hoped that by forming, while the war was still on,

a system for maintaining peace, the Soviet Government could

be prevailed upon to accept their demands.**

Having consented to the formation of a world security

organisation, the British Government plunged energetically

into activity to make sure that the leading group of powers

influencing that organisation would be selected in Britain’s

interests. Roosevelt felt that this group of powers should

consist of the USA, Britain, the USSR and China. Churchill

could not object to this role for the Soviet Union: the times

were different, and the Soviet Union itself was different. But

he opposed China’s inclusion. The Americans insisted, main¬

taining that in a conflict with the USSR China would align

herself with the USA and Britain.*** Churchill fell in with

* Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 216.

** Ibid., p. 215.

***' Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. Ill, p.

39.

378

this, but feared that in a conflict between Britain and the

USA China would side with the latter. Churchill subsequent¬

ly wrote that it was very easy to select these four powers,

but as “to China, I cannot regard the Chungking Government

as representing a great world power. Certainly there would

be a faggot vote on the side of the United States in any

attempt to liquidate the British overseas Empire”.* To coun¬

terbalance this vote, the British Government insisted on

France being included in the directing body of the future

peace-keeping organisation. It hoped France would back

Britain in the same way that China would support the USA.

In addition the British suggested including two of their do¬

minions—Canada and Australia.

The debates on this issue were a manifestation of the

struggle between Britain and the USA for the leading role

in the post-war world. Writing in International Affairs in

1955, Woodward pointed out that Roosevelt “had his own

views about the future of the world: these views might have

seemed at times to others too much like a world predomi¬

nance of the United States somewhat thinly disguised under

a four-Power government operating through the machinery

of the United Nations”.** While opposing American plans

of world hegemony, the British were quite prepared to share

this hegemony with them. In talks with the Americans Chur¬

chill mooted the idea of a close alliance envisaging even a

common citizenship, to say nothing of uniting the armed

forces of the two countries.

All this clashed with the desires of the people of Britain,

who felt that after the war the Allies should continue acting

in a united front in the struggle for world peace and security.

On this point McNeill writes: “Feeling, as most people in

Britain did, deeply grateful to the Russians for their heroic

fight against Hitler, the British public did not see why the

war-time alliance should break down after victory, and

hoped devoutly that it would not.”*** This feeling hampered

the manoeuvres of the British Government, frequently com¬

pelling it to accept the Soviet Union’s progressive sugges¬

tions on a post-war settlement.

* Winston S. Churchill. Od. cit., Vol. IV, p. 562.

** International Affairs, July 1955, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, p. 280.

*** William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 322.

379

Final Decision on the Second Front

The summer-autumn campaign, which turned the tide of

the war, ended at the close of 1943. By that time the Soviet

Army had liberated two-thirds of the Soviet territory which

the enemy had occupied. The flower of the German Army

had been exterminated. These changes in the military situa¬

tion forced the Germans to go over to a strategy of defence

on the Soviet-German Front. “By that time,” McNeill says,

“the notable achievements of Russian industry in producing

armaments, and the growing confidence and skill of the mas¬

sive Red Army, opened the prospect of total victory over

Germany. Even without the help of winter weather, the Rus¬

sian Army had shown itself able to advance against the Ger¬

mans; even without a Second Front in France in 1943 Hit¬

ler’s troops could not stand fast against Russian attack.”"'

These changes in the Soviet Union’s strength and in the

course of the war influenced the stand of the Western Allies,

chiefly of Britain in the question of a Second Front. As we

have already said, at the Quebec Conference Churchill and

Roosevelt had agreed that the landing in Western France

would be effected on May 1, 1944, but this did not suit

Churchill, and the Americans felt this decision was not final

either. The cardinal point of this decision, i.e., the date

agreed on for the invasion, was not divulged to the Soviet

Union evidently out of a desire to preserve freedom of action.

Indeed, even after Quebec the British kept insisting on an

invasion of the Balkans instead of a landing in France. At

the close of September Churchill ordered an operation with

the objective of seizing the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean

Sea, but this expedition ended in failure, which Robert E.

Sherwood describes as “shocking and humiliating”.* ** "' British

military leaders were indignant, feeling that they owed this

fresh disgrace to Churchill. General John Kennedy says that

the “whole business was a gamble” and “a good example of

the price we have to pay occasionally for Winston’s con¬

fidence in his own military judgment”.***

At the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in October

1943 the Soviet Government bluntly asked the British and

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 325.

** Robert E. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 765.

*** John Kennedy, Op. cit, p. 313.

380

Americans whether the pledge given by Churchill and Roose¬

velt in June 1943 to start the invasion of Northern France

in the spring of 1944 remained in force. General Ismay spoke

on behalf of Britain. As might have been expected he did

not give a direct answer, saying: “This invasion is to be

launched as soon as practicable after weather conditions in

the English Channel become favourable.”* Moreover, the

invasion had to depend on the results of the bombing of

Germany, the availability of landing craft, the number of

German divisions in France, Belgium and the Netherlands,

and other conditions. But he did not name the date for the

landing. The string of reservations that Ismay intertwined

with his communication on the landing decision was evidence

of the British Government’s desire to create as many loop¬

holes as possible for evading fulfilment of that decision.

Chester Wilmot writes that at the Conference the Soviet

delegation was “suspicious and sceptical” about the stand of

Britain and the USA on the question of a Second Front

because Ismay and his American colleague General Deane

made “it clear they could give no unconditional assurance”.**

What assurances could they have given when, as Wilmot

testifies, after Quebec Churchill was searching “for new ways

of striking at the Germans in the Mediterranean” ?*** From

Ismay’s memoirs we learn that at the Moscow Conference

Churchill notified Eden and Ismay that the invasion would

be postponed for two months.** “Major-General Deane,”

writes Neumann, “recognised that the Russians had good

reason to question British-American sincerity on their new

invasion promise.”***

The dissensions over this issue were not settled either

before or after the Moscow Conference even between the

British and Americans. General John Kennedy, the most

outspoken of all the British military authors of memoirs about

the Second World War, says that in October 1943 there was

“still a very distinct cleavage of opinion between us and the

* Foreign Relations of the United. States, 1943, p. 139. Ismay’s

claim that he named the date for Overlord (The Memoirs of General

the Lord Ismay, London, 1960, p. 315) evokes nothing but amazement

for it is a deliberate lie.

** Chester Wilmot, Op. cit., p. 136.

*** Ibid., p. 137.

*) T he Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay, pp. 326-27.

**) William L. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 58.

381

Americans as to the correct strategy in Europe. CIGS feels

very strongly that we should exploit the openings in the Medi¬

terranean and extend the range of our offensive operations

to the Aegean and the Balkans.”* An entry in his diary

under the date-line October 28, 1943 declares that the “PM

has taken a strong line with the Americans on the Mediter¬

ranean versus Overlord strategy”.**

Churchill’s Mediterranean-Balkans strategy ruled out the

invasion of France. It was a choice of one or the other. This

is admitted by the British military leaders themselves. Gen¬

eral Kennedy wrote on October 31, 1943 that “if we allot

further resources for operations in the Aegean and the Balkans,

as we should do to take full advantage of the situation, Over-

lord must perforce be postponed. The Americans take the

view that this is a breach of contract and almost dishon¬

ourable.”*** The Americans were right. This was the situa¬

tion in the question of the Second Front when the Tehran

Conference opened at the close of November 1943.

In mid-November General Kennedy made the following

entry in his diary: “We have now crystallised our ideas as

to the strategy to be advocated in the coming conference.

The main points are—to continue the offensive in Italy, to

increase the flow of supplies to partisans in the Balkans, to

bring about an upheaval by inducing the Balkan powers to

break away from Germany, to induce Turkey to enter the

war, and to accept a postponement of Overlord. All these

proposals have been worked out in a fair amount of detail

here, and the stage is now set for the discussions.”**

The discussions at Tehran opened on November 28, 1943

with Roosevelt’s statement that at Quebec a plan had been

drawn up envisaging an invasion across the English Chan¬

nel on about May 1, 1944. “If we undertake large-scale

landing operations in the Mediterranean,” he said, “the ex¬

pedition across the Channel will have to be postponed for

two or three months. That is why we should like to have

the advice of our Soviet colleagues on the matter.”*** The

reply he got was that the Soviet Government believed “the

best result would be yielded by a blow at the enemy in

* John Kennedy, Op. cit., p. 307.

** Ibid., p. 308.

*** Ibid., p. 309.

*) Ibid., pp. 312-13.

**) International Affairs, No. 7, 1961, p. 136.

382

Northern or Northwestern France. Even operations in South¬

ern France would be better than operations in Italy.”*

True to his wonted practice, Churchill spoke generally in

favour of the invasion of France, but did not name the date.

Then he waxed eloquent on “how best to use our forces in

the Mediterranean . .. without any detriment to Overlord,

so that this operation could be carried out in time or, possibly,

with some delay”. He declared: “Our first task is to take

Rome.” The next important question, he said, was “to con¬

vince Turkey to enter the war. This would make possible

the opening of communications through the Dardanelles and

the Bosporus” for the occupation of the islands in the Eastern

Mediterranean.** On the next day he repeated his argu¬

ments, in an effort to show how all this would help the Soviet

Union and contribute to victory over the Germans, and sug¬

gested using numerically small forces for an operation in the

Balkans.

Roosevelt pointed out that if an expedition was undertaken

in the Mediterranean, Overlord would not be carried out in

time.*** Stalin said “it would be good to carry out Opera¬

tion Overlord in May, say the 10th, 15th or 20th”.*> Chur¬

chill declined to commit himself, so Stalin said he “should

like to know whether the British believe in Operation Over-

lord or simply speak of it to reassure the Russians”.** 1

Churchill did not give an intelligible answer to this. Roose¬

velt spoke against a postponement of the operation. On the

following day, in a bilateral talk with Churchill, Stalin

warned him that if the invasion failed to take place it would

have injurious consequences.

Churchill eventually had to give in. It was decided that

Overlord would be launched some time in May and would

be supported by an operation in Southern France. In order

to give the Germans no possibility of manoeuvring with their

reserves or transferring any considerable forces from the

Eastern Front to the West, the Soviet Government promised

a large-scale offensive on the Eastern Front by May. The

final decision to open a Second Front was thus adopted on

November 30, 1943.

* Ibid., p. 137.

** Ibid., p. 138.

*** International Affairs, No. 8, 1961, p. 113.

*) Ibid.

**> Ibid., p. 114.

383

Churchill yielded very reluctantly. But he could not ignore

the pressure brought to bear by the Soviet and US govern¬

ments and by the peoples, mainly the British people, the

bulk of whom felt that by dodging the Second Front issue

the British Government was acting dishonourably towards

its Soviet Ally.

Another factor was that by that time it had become evident

that the British Government’s strategy had flopped. It had

staked on an economic blockade of Germany, but this stake

failed to justify itself. It had counted on “stirring Europe”,

i.e., drawing the European peoples into the war against

Hitler, but it became frightened of its own idea and, in effect,

acted in opposition to the spread of the anti-fascist struggle

in enemy-held territory in Europe. Europe was indeed stirred,

but not through the efforts of the British Special Opera¬

tions Executive; this was achieved by the Soviet victories

over the German invaders. Britain had calculated on the

strategic bombing of Germany, but this had not produced the

expected results either. Charles Webster and Nobel Frank-

land, the authors of an official British four-volume history

of the strategic bombing of Germany, speak of “the cardi¬

nal failure of British air strategy and operational doctrine”.*

The British thought that the bombing would break the mo¬

rale of the German people, disrupt German industry and

thereby make Germany surrender by April 1, 1944, but they

miscalculated.** By October 1943 the British Government

had reliable information that the Germans were preparing

to use missiles and unmanned aircraft against Britain. This,

among other factors, induced Britain to agree to a Second

Front, for such a front held out the possibility of occupying

the territory where the missile launching pads were located.

Roosevelt’s stand on the Second Front issue was deter¬

mined by public opinion and also by the desire to preserve

capitalism in Europe. The Americans feared Churchill’s

Balkan strategy would only lead to the Anglo-American

forces becoming stuck in the mountains, while the Soviet

Army would liberate the whole of Western Europe. What

they wanted was a means to enable the Anglo-American

* Charles Webster and Nobel Frankland, “The Strategic Air Offen¬

sive Against Germany, 1939-1945”, The English Historical Review,

January 1964, p. 133.

** Ibid.

384

forces to reach continental Europe ahead of the Soviet Army.

That means was a massive invasion of France across the

English Channel from Britain. Lastly, the US Government

wanted good relations with the USSR in order to secure its

assistance in the war against Japan.

The commitments undertaken at Tehran were discharged

differently. The British undertook to invade Europe, jointly

with the USA, in May 1944. True, not for a considerable

length of time, but they nonetheless dragged out this dead¬

line. The Soviet Union, however, punctiliously fulfilled its

pledge to start a large-scale offensive in the spring of 1944

in order to facilitate the Allied landing across the English

Channel. Feis writes that “when this promise was kept and

the Soviet armies did start their great offensives roughly on

schedule, and did keep all the German forces in the East

engaged, the Western military commanders were not only

appreciative but impressed. They—and their number in¬

cluded the Supreme Commander of Overlord, General Eisen¬

hower—were convinced of the reliability” of the Soviet Gov¬

ernment’s word."'

While the Soviet Government’s honourable discharge of

its commitments enhanced its prestige, the British Govern¬

ment, for its part, harmed Britain morally and politically

by repeatedly breaking its word.

* Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 264.

25-1561

Chapter Six

CONCLUDING STAGE

OF THE WAR

(June 1944-September 1945)

British Economy and Home Policy

in 1941-45

The Soviet Union’s entry into the war tremendously in¬

fluenced British economy. Germany’s armed forces—land

armies, air forces and large naval forces—were tied down on

the Eastern Front and this allowed Britain to enlarge her

war industry and strengthen her own armed forces. The

threat of a German invasion evaporated, and German air

raids on British towns and industrial regions ceased.

Britain used these favourable conditions to build up a large

army and air force and greatly enlarge her navy. The nu¬

merical strength of her fighting forces rose from 480,000 in

1939 to 5,100,000 in 1945.* Together with the troops mustered

in the Dominions and colonies Britain had 9,500,000 men

under arms. On the whole, the British economy coped with

the task of arming and supplying this large army. True, a

great measure of assistance came from the Empire and the

United States of America.

Industry in Britain proper accounted for seven-tenths of

the armaments and equipment of the troops under British

command; one-tenth came from the Dominions and the

colonies. The remaining one-fifth came from the USA—first

for cash, and from 1941 onwards under Lend Lease.**

During the war Britain produced 131,000 aircraft, 264,000

* A. J. Youngson, T he British Economy, 1920-1957, London, 1960,

p. 146.

** Statistics Relating to the War Efforts of the United Kingdom,

London, 1944.

386

machine-guns, 160 million artillery shells, 8,300 million

cartridges, about 1,000,000 tons of bombs, and large quan¬

tities of other armaments and equipment.* ** To achieve this

output many enterprises were switched to war production,

some were enlarged and many new ones were built.

There were many difficulties, but Britain was able to

tackle them in more favourable conditions than the Soviet

Union. First and foremost, she had to resolve intricate tech¬

nological problems in order to manufacture up-to-date arms

and equipment. Although Britain had a large scientific and

technical apparatus and skilled workers she was not always

able to resolve this problem smoothly and, most important

of all, quickly. The shortage of some raw materials caused

enormous difficulties in the work of the war industry. When

Japan entered the war and seized extensive territories in

the Far East she deprived Britain of some major sources of

strategic raw materials like rubber, tin and lead.

However, manpower was the main problem. There was no

shortage of manpower during the “phoney war”: as late as

April 1940 there were more than a million unemployed in

Britain. When the “phoney war” came to an end, Britain

began enlarging her army and war production, and early in

1941 she began to experience a shortage of skilled labour,

particularly of instrument makers and equipment adjusters.

Urgent steps had to be taken to improve skills and stand¬

ardise production processes. In the engineering industry the

number of persons receiving the wage rate of skilled workers

doubled by mid-1942. By that time the problem entered a

new stage—the country began to experience a shortage of

labour generally. This was the main factor limiting produc¬

tion/ 1 '"' The Government had to introduce a system regulating

labour resources. In this sphere the Ministry of Labour was

given extraordinary powers.

Government control was established over practically the

whole economy. The introduction of a system of “central

planning”, as it was called, was accompanied by the institution

of many new ministries, among them the ministries of food,

aircraft, industry, merchant marine and supply. Food and

clothes were rationed. These steps were taken to effect the

most complete and operational mobilisation of the country’s

* Statistical Digest of the War, London, 1951, pp. 144-48, 152-55.

** A. J. Youngson, Op. cit., p. 145.

25 *

387

economic resources for the conduct of the war. Moreover,

they were used by the monopolies to throttle many rivals.

State control of the economy in the interests of the monop¬

olies was ensured, firstly, by the fact that direct represent¬

atives of the monopolies were included in the Government

and placed at the head of the corresponding economic min¬

istries, and, secondly, by the fact that practical control in

concrete economic fields and in industry was exercised also by

monopoly representatives, who acted as representatives of

the Government. The monopolies “lent” the Government

their best executives for this purpose. As The Econotnist

pointed out, these Government controllers had “an unavoid¬

able bias towards seeing things through the particular spec¬

tacles of the interest from which they come”.*

By taking all the economy-regulating levers into their own

hands, the monopolies helped to develop state-monopoly

capitalism in Britain during the war. The machinery of state

was thereby still further subordinated to the monopolies,

which used it more fully and effectively in their own in¬

terests. The concentration of production and capital was

likewise speeded up. With their own men in key positions

in the state apparatus, the monopolies distributed the lion’s

share of war orders among themselves, deriving huge profits

and, at the same time, being able to exempt these profits from

taxation.

British industry developed very unevenly during the war.

Various branches of the engineering industry registered a

considerable growth, but the iron and steel industry did not

increase output. Foreign trade diminished as a result of the

military situation, despite the Government’s all-out effort to

boost it. Agriculture received a great deal of attention from

the Government. At ordinary times Britain’s agriculture fell

very much short of satisfying the country’s food and agri¬

cultural raw materials requirements. But this was not danger¬

ous because both food and agricultural raw materials were

purchased cheaply in the Dominions, colonies and some other

countries, and brought in British ships. During the war, how¬

ever, the blockade imposed by the enemy and the shortage

of merchant shipping made this dependence on overseas

supply extremely hazardous. To alleviate the situation the

Government gave agriculture considerable additional man-

* The Economist, December 9, 1939, p. 364.

388

power. Steps were taken to increase mechanisation. Fixed

prices were introduced for farm products. These prices like¬

wise stimulated farm production.

The political factor played an important role in boosting

war and farm output. Britain was fighting a just, anti-fascist

war. She was an Ally of the Soviet Union. This opened up a

tremendous and additional source for the growth of produc¬

tion such as was never known before in British history.

Striving to help the Soviet people as much as possible and to

hasten the end of the war, the British workers worked with¬

out stinting their strength and achieved an appreciable in¬

crease in labour productivity in spite of the fact that working

conditions were much more difficult than before.

The British Government dreaded an exacerbation of class

contradictions in war-time conditions. Churchill warned his

colleagues in the Government that they should take into

account that Britain was “a modern community at war, and

not Hottentots or Esquimaux”."' This remark mirrored not

only the racialism of an imperialist but also the apprehen¬

sions of the head of a bourgeois government that in pursuit

of profits the bourgeoisie might go too far in their offensive

on the British people’s standard of living. In order to slow

down the rise of food prices the Government introduced a

subsidy scheme. Externally, this gave the impression that the

Government was concerned about the requirements of the

working people, because thanks to the subsidy food prices

did not climb rapidly. Actually, however, this was not an

expression of concern by the Government: the subsidies came

from taxes levied on the working people.

The British people’s tax burden during the war was much

heavier than in 1914-18. In 1939-45 more than half of the

war expenditures were covered at the expense of taxes; dur¬

ing the First World War taxes covered less than one-third

of the war expenditures. During World War II direct taxes

rose from 516 million to 1,894 million pounds, while indirect

taxes increased from 656 million to 1,512 million pounds."'* **

During the years that Britain was a member of the anti¬

fascist coalition political trends predominated in the class

struggle. In the situation obtaining in Britain in those years,

* W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, Op. cit., p. 491.

** Annual Abstract of Statistics, No. 84, 1935-46, London, 1948,

her military and political alliance with the Soviet Union

could be maintained and used as an effective weapon against

the common enemy only through the British people’s per¬

severing struggle to get their Government to fulfil its com¬

mitments to the USSR. This was the principal aspect of the

class struggle in Britain throughout the last four years of the

Second World War.

In the course of three years (1941-44) the British people

doggedly pressed their Government conscientiously to honour

its commitments to the USSR and conduct the war more

vigorously. In this aspect the Second Front was of paramount

importance. The British people sensed the hollowness of the

Government’s excuses. Progressives, mainly British Com¬

munists, explained to them the class reasons behind the Gov¬

ernment’s reluctance to open a Second Front. Large demon¬

strations were held in London and other cities calling for the

earliest possible invasion of continental Europe. Delegations

were sent to present this demand to Parliament, and MPs

were questioned about it. Letters and telegrams demanding

a Second Front poured into the office of the Prime Minister.

Although the British people’s struggle for an honourable

fulfilment by Britain of her Allied obligations to the USSR

did not bring about the timely opening of a Second Front

it greatly strengthened the anti-fascist coalition. It was one

of the factors compelling the British Government to sign a

series of agreements with the USSR and USA ensuring joint

action against the common enemy and envisaging a demo¬

cratic post-war settlement.

In Britain the strike movement during the latter period

of the Second World War was much weaker than during the

corresponding years of the First World War. The workers

went on strike only as a last resort, when the behaviour

of employers exhausted their patience.

On the eve of the war and after it broke out the British

ruling circles did not want Allied relations with the Soviet

Union. One of the reasons was that the joint struggle of the

peoples of the USSR and Britain would inevitably have won

sympathy for the USSR and for socialism in general and led

to a swing to the Left. Developments bore this out. Under

the impact of the Soviet people’s heroic struggle against the

nazi invasion and Britain’s joint participation with them in

the liberation war against the nazis there was a massive

swing to the Left in the mood of the British people.

390

This manifested itself in many ways. First and foremost,

by the fact that masses of people who had formerly been

politically inert began to react to political problems. Another

manifestation was the immense interest that was taken in

the Government’s plans for post-war social reforms.

The growth of political awareness among the British work¬

ing class was shown by the increasing prestige enjoyed by

the Communist Party of Great Britain, which worked tire¬

lessly to mobilise all of the country’s forces for the struggle

against the fascist coalition. In 1942 its membership reached

53,000.

Also indicative of the increased activity of the British

working class was the growth of the trade union membership.

A positive feature was the trend towards the integration of

the trade unions. Changes took place in the Labour Party as

well. The rank and file displayed greater interest in political

problems, and the number of individual party members grew.

At its conferences it came out in favour of nationalising

transport and key industries. This was evidence of that party’s

partial return to its militant spirit of 1918, when for the first

time it championed nationalisation.

The mass movement for solidarity with the Soviet people

was a convincing indication of the growth of Leftist feelings

among the British people. The Soviet Union’s smashing vic¬

tories over the nazi bloc blew up the curtain of lies and

slander which reactionaries of all hues had assiduously built

up after the USSR had come into existence. The British peo¬

ple came to know the Soviet people better and demonstrated

their solidarity with them. This was expressed not only in

the struggle for the timely opening of a Second Front. Various

organisations—women’s, youth and so on—sprang up in

Britain and the aim they set themselves was to promote

friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union. Cam¬

paigns to raise funds to help the Soviet Union were launched

throughout Britain.

The British ruling classes were perfectly well aware that

the swing to the Left among the working masses was threat¬

ening their economic and political plans at home and abroad.

To offset this tendency they started a drive to brainwash

the people in a reactionary spirit, the chief aim being to ex¬

punge the rank-and-file Englishman’s sympathy for the So¬

viet Union and his respect and admiration of socialism. The

turning point came at the close of 1942, when Churchill

391

realised that the Soviet Union was winning the war. That

marked the beginning of a steadily mounting campaign of

slander and insinuation against the Soviet Union. The ruling

circles went to all lengths to inject a feeling of hatred and

ill-will for the USSR, to sow doubts about the progressive

and democratic nature of its foreign and home policies. The

circumstance that Britain was an Ally of the Soviet Union

somewhat restrained the ill-wishers and hampered their

propaganda efforts.

Right-wing Labour and trade union leaders were most

active in the anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. They went

so far as to railroad through the Labour Party Executive a

decision which marked down as “subversive” the Anglo-

Soviet Unity Committee, the National Anglo-Soviet Unity

Conference, the Anglo-Soviet Youth Friendship League and

other organisations working to promote and strengthen

friendship and co-operation between Britain and the USSR.

This decision stated that affiliation to such organisations

was incompatible with membership of the Labour Party.

Subsequently, in a note to the British Government, the

Soviet Government pointed out that so long as the British

Government “needed the Soviet Union, without whom it

could not defeat Hitler Germany, it somehow restrained . . .

its hostility towards the Soviet State. But even before the

war terminated, as soon as it became obvious that nazi Ger¬

many would be defeated, the Labour leaders, disquieted by

the British people’s growing friendship for the people of the

Soviet Union, began to hasten measures to undermine these

friendly feelings.’” 1 '

Such were the internal political conditions under which

Britain pursued her foreign policy at the concluding stage

of the war.

Allied Invasion of the European Continent

The long-awaited Anglo-American landing in Northern

France at last began on June 6, 1944. Well-prepared, it was

a complete success, due mainly to the Allied overwhelming

numerical superiority over the enemy. When the Allied

troops began to land in France the balance of strength in

their favour was: men—2.1:1; tanks—2.2:1; combat planes

* Pravda, February 25, 1951.

392

—nearly 22:1. The main German forces continued to be

pinned down on the Eastern Front, where in accordance with

the pledge given at Tehran the Soviet Army had launched

a powerful offensive.

The Allies owed much of the success of their invasion

to the Resistance in France and other West European coun¬

tries. The French Resistance had more than 100,000 fighters

in the field."' They helped the invasion forces to land and

then went on to liberate a large part of France, including

Paris, Lyon, Marseilles, Toulouse and many other towns.

In the night of June 5-6, Resistance fighters carried out 960

wrecking operations on railways in France and Belgium. As

Supreme Allied Headquarters noted, the “enemy was facing a

battlefield behind his lines”."'"' General Eisenhower, the inva¬

sion commander, wrote to Major-General Sir Colin Gubbins,

the Operational Commander of SOE: “While no final

assessment of the operational value of Resistance action has

yet been completed, I consider that the disruption of enemy

rail communications, the harassing of German road moves

and the continual and increasing strain placed on German

war economy and internal security services throughout Oc¬

cupied Europe by the organised forces of Resistance, played

a very considerable part in our complete and final victory.”*"'*

The Atlantic Wall, whose might had been made much of

by the Germans and spoken highly of by Churchill, proved

to be largely the product of German propaganda.

Churchill’s opposition somewhat delayed the landing in

France. He succeeded in delaying for a longer time the Allied

landing in Southern France, which had been agreed upon at

Tehran. It was effected only in mid-August 1944. Churchill

had set his mind on moving his troops from Italy to the East,

to the Balkans, in order “to reach Vienna before the Rus¬

sians”.** In this connection Eisenhower wrote: “As usual the

Prime Minister pursued the argument up to the very moment

of execution.”***

By mid-December 1944 the slowly advancing Anglo-

* F. W. Deakin, Op. cit., p. 109.

** Ibid.

*** Ibid.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 90.

**) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, New York, 1948,

p. 284.

393

American forces reached the German frontiers, where they

stopped as soon as resistance more or less stiffened.

Meanwhile the Soviet Army was conducting a massive

offensive along a line running all the way from the Gulf of

Finland to the Carpathian Mountains. In the period from

January to May 1944 it liberated the whole of the Ukraine

and the Crimea, and entered Rumania. The offensive mount¬

ed by it in June in Byelorussia took it into Eastern Prussia

and up to the Vistula River. Another offensive in the south

knocked Rumania out of the war in August. Finland with¬

drew from the war in September, and at the same time So¬

viet troops entered Bulgaria. In January 1945 the Soviet

Army forced Hungary, Germany’s last ally, to abandon the

fascist camp. Together with the People’s Liberation Army of

Yugoslavia and Bulgarian troops, the Soviet Army smashed

the German forces in Yugoslavia. In addition to liberating

Yugoslavia, this enabled the patriotic forces of Albania and

Greece to complete the liberation of their countries. In ful¬

filment of its mission of liberation, the Soviet Army drove

the fascist invaders out of Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

Last Stage of the Economic War

The turning point achieved by the Soviet Army at Stalin¬

grad marked the beginning of the last stage of the economic

war. In 1942, prior to Stalingrad, when the British Govern¬

ment was not clear about the prospects of the war, a

prominent place in its defence strategy was accorded to the

naval blockade, air operations and subversion in enemy-held

territory. This “indirect strategy” was the most active com¬

ponent of Britain’s general strategy. In this, Medlicott writes,

may be detected “a tendency to exaggerate the immediate

effectiveness of bombing and blockade”.*

After Stalingrad, the economic wars which had played

almost the decisive role in British strategy, gave way in im¬

portance to Allied action by direct military means while

itself assuming a more offensive character. This is seen from

the plans drawn up in 1943, which no longer spoke of any

possibility of Japan joining forces with the European Axis

powers. All they envisaged was steps to maintain the disrup¬

tion of communications between the Axis powers. Allowance

* W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 383.

394

was made for the possibility of destroying Japan’s economy,

which depended heavily on supply lines. In Europe the plans

called for offensive measures to dislocate German and Ital¬

ian economy, for instance, by air raids on enemy industrial

and transport centres, attacks on enemy coastal shipping,

the use of diplomatic channels to prevent the enemy from

receiving supplies from neighbouring neutrals, and the

encouragement of the Resistance movement in occupied

territories."'

The war turned in favour of the Allies slowly, and time

was needed before this could influence the policy of neutral

countries neighbouring on Germany. In 1943 the neutrals

were still hesitant about seriously offending Germany, fear¬

ing reprisals from her. There was another reason for this

“hesitation”. By maintaining economic relations with Ger¬

many and supplying her with strategic raw materials and

manufactured goods, the neutrals compelled the Allies to

offer them an increasingly higher price for halting these sup¬

plies to the Germans and selling them to the Allies. For this

purpose Turkey used her chromium supplies to Germany,

Sweden her iron ore and ball-bearings, and Portugal and

Spain their tungsten. Moreover, the neutrals had no desire

to menace the fat dividends their firms were getting by sup¬

plying strategic materials to the Axis powers, which were

sliding to their doom. It was a complex matter to re-orient

their economic ties on the Allies and, besides, this would

take time and would be accompanied by inevitable losses.

Thus, the complete rupture between the neutrals and the

enemy depended directly on the military situation.

Soviet victories, which compelled the Allies finally to

undertake the invasion of Western Europe, made the Euro¬

pean neutrals more tractable. There was now no doubt about

an Allied victory. In mid-1944, all these factors taken

together enabled Britain to blockade Germany completely.

She made this official by a number of agreements with the

neutrals. In April 1944 Turkey was induced to halt her

chromium supplies to Germany, and in June 1944 she had

to agree to halve her exports to Germany as compared with

1943. On August 2 she had to sever all relations, both eco¬

nomic and diplomatic, with the Axis powers."” 5 '

* Ibid., pp. 382-83.

** Ibid., p. 611.

395

Sweden considerably reduced her supplies to Germany as

early as 1943. However, nothing Britain did could induce

her to cut down her supplies of ball- and roller-bearings to

Germany, where the shortage of these items was extremely

acute. In order to make Sweden stop these supplies the Brit¬

ish offered 200 of their Spitfires as an additional incentive.

A satisfactory agreement on this question was obtained from

Sweden only in June 1944. She had to cut down on her other

exports to Germany drastically during the second half of

1944. Swedish-German trade ceased early in 1945.*

With regard to trade with the enemy, Switzerland made

her first substantial concessions to the Allies in December

1943. In May 1944 she had to go farther in the same direc¬

tion. In October 1944 the Allies made her completely stop

her supplies of armaments, equipment, ball-bearings and

other items of military importance to Germany. In January

1945 when Allied troops reached the frontiers of Switzer¬

land, her Government agreed to satisfy all Allied demands

with regard to the blockade of Germany.**

In May and June 1944 Spain and Portugal acceded to the

Allied demands to stop supplying tungsten to Germany. The

appearance of Allied troops on the Franco-Spanish frontier

in August 1944 put an end to trade between these countries

and Germany. The ring round Germany was thus finally

closed. However, this happened only shortly before the war

in Europe ended.

In Britain opinion is divided about the contribution that

the economic war made towards victory in the Second World

War. Scepticism is particularly rife on this score among mi¬

litary leaders.*** Everybody, however, concurs with the view

that the broadly conceived economic war was in reality

nothing more than an economic blockade and did not justify

the hopes which the British leaders had placed in it in 1939-

42. Victory was eventually won by other, more effective

means. As regards the economic blockade it played a

positive, even if modest, role in denying Germany and Italy

access to foreign sources of strategic raw materials.

* W. N. Medlicott, Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 417, 611.

** Ibid., p. 611.

*** Sir A. Harris, Bomber Offensive, London, 1947, p. 220.

396

British Policy in Occupied Territories

The concluding period of the war in Europe witnessed the

growth of a revolutionary situation, and in this period one of

the cardinal objectives of the foreign policy of British impe¬

rialism was to combat the maturing socialist revolution. The

internal conditions for a socialist revolution became ripe in

European countries as a result of economic and political

development over a long span of time. The war sharply ag¬

gravated the class contradictions and accelerated the develop¬

ment of the revolutionary process. The defeat of fascism and

the complete discrediting of the most reactionary circles of

the bourgeoisie who collaborated with the German and

Italian fascists in occupied countries greatly weakened the

European bourgeoisie. At the same time, the huge scale of the

Resistance movement in which a very active part was played

by Communists and the swing to the Left among the peoples

under the impact of the decisive victories of the Socialist

Soviet State released revolutionary forces in Europe. In

Western Europe, where British and American troops landed,

these revolutionary possibilities were not turned to account

because British and US imperialism went to the assistance

of West European capitalism and by direct military and

political intervention did not let the peoples establish a socio¬

economic system which would conform with their freely

expressed will. The relevant points of the Atlantic Char¬

ter, solemnly proclaiming this right of the peoples, were

thus flagrantly trampled.

France was the object of special concern by the British

Government. A mighty Resistance movement had formed

in that country, and General de Gaulle, head of the French

Committee of National Liberation, proved to be uncom¬

promising in spheres where Britain tried to take over some

French colonial interests.

Churchill and Roosevelt did not inform de Gaulle of their

decision to invade France, pleading security considerations.

Neither was there, at the time the invasion was launched,

agreement between the Allied command and the French Com¬

mittee regarding the civil administration in France after her

liberation. De Gaulle was summoned by Churchill from

Algeria to London only three days before the landing, and

on June 4 he was told of the impending operation and asked

to address the people of France by radio. De Gaulle was

397

greatly annoyed by this treatment, but he complied with

Churchill’s request.

Immediately after the landing was effected it was found

that the French Committee of National Liberation, which had

by that time been renamed the Provisional Government of

France, enjoyed the support of the bulk of the French peo¬

ple. Of great importance here was the support it got from

the French Communist Party. On June 9 Resistance fighters

were officially included in the French Army of the Provision¬

al Government, and on June 25 General Pierre Koenig was

put in command of these forces with direct subordination to

General Eisenhower.

There was no other body representing an embryo of au¬

thority in France, and the Allies (the Americans were very

reluctant to take this step) had to deal with the government

headed by de Gaulle. Three additional factors made them

take this step: first, the attempts to establish a purely occupa¬

tion regime after the model of the regime in Italy were

bitterly opposed by the French people (as a matter of fact,

these attempts gave the de Gaulle Government greater sup¬

port among the French people); second, time was pressing,

for a stable authority had to be set while the initiative of

the people had not gone farther to the Left than the de

Gaulle programme and had not led to the emergence of

more democratic organs of power; “hence, the establishment

of a strong provisional authority was necessary,” Woodward

writes, “in order to prevent the inevitable outburst of popu¬

lar feeling from developing into a civil war after the libera¬

tion of the country”"'; third, there was energetic Soviet sup¬

port for the Provisional French Government. On August 25,

the day when Frenchmen liberated Paris themselves, Britain

and the USA signed an agreement with the Provisional

French Government placing the administration of liberated

French territory into its hands.

After the de Gaulle Government was established in Paris,

the British had to draw the relevant conclusions. They made

an attempt to bind France to their chariot by signing a treaty

of alliance with her. The balance of power between Britain

and France at the close of 1944 was such that a treaty of

alliance would have reduced France to a subordinate posi¬

tion. De Gaulle was perfectly well aware of this and de-

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 260.

398

cided to strengthen his hand by signing a treaty of alliance

with the Soviet Union as a preliminary step. He arrived in

Moscow for that purpose on December 2, 1944.

Rapprochement between France and the USSR clearly did

not enter into the plans of the British Government. How¬

ever, it was unable to disrupt the impending Franco-Soviet

alliance, and on December 5 Churchill informed the Soviet

Government “that it might be best of all if we were to con¬

clude a tripartite treaty between the three of us which would

embody our existing Anglo-Soviet Treaty with any improve¬

ments”/' 1 ' He was hardly serious about such an extension

of Anglo-Soviet Allied relations. His suggestion was designed

to prevent direct Franco-Soviet Allied relations and dissolve

them in a tripartite treaty with Britain’s participation. On

December 7 the Soviet Government stated its acceptance of

Churchill’s suggestion, thereby demonstrating its desire to

found its relations with France and Britain on firm, long-term

alliance and co-operation.* ** De Gaulle, however, rejected

Churchill’s suggestion, and a 20-year Treaty of Alliance

and Mutual Assistance was signed by the USSR and France

on December 10.

After signing this treaty the French informed the British

that they were prepared to negotiate a similar treaty with

Britain. The British Government scrupulously scrutinised

this proposal. The Foreign Office and the British military

leaders came to the conclusion “that we might discuss with

the French the possibility of establishing some kind of ma¬

chinery for regional defence in Western Europe”. They felt

that an Anglo-French treaty might be the “first step” in

forming a “Western group”, and that this group would be of

advantage to Britain “(i) strategically because it would give

us a defence in depth, (ii) politically because in association

with the Western European countries and the Dominions we

could hold our own more easily with the United States and

the USSR and (iii) economically because our own position

would be greatly strengthened by close economic and com¬

mercial ties with Western Europe”.*** These plans tied in

with Britain’s post-war European policy as formulated

by Churchill in October 1942. They were quite plainly

* Correspondence ..., Vol. I, p. 281.

** Ibid., p. 286.

*** Llewellyn Woodward, Op.cit., pp. 271-72.

399

spearheaded against the Soviet Union. This approach to

a treaty with France exposes Churchill’s insincerity when

in December 1944, for tactical reasons, he had

offered a tripartite alliance between the USSR, Britain and

France.

Anglo-French contradictions, especially their struggle for

Syria and the Lebanon, became particularly acute in the

spring of 1945 and blocked the way to a treaty of alliance

between Britain and France.

In Italy the British backed reactionary circles and the

completely discredited monarchy. In face of the mounting

national liberation, anti-fascist struggle in nazi-occupied

Northern Italy, which in April 1945 grew into a nation-wide

uprising, this backing became increasingly more energetic.

The British Government resented the return to Italy of

Count Carlo Sforza, who had been living in exile in the USA

and had come out against the Italian monarchy. When Sforza

quite justifiably called King Victor Emmanuel a stupid

and criminal monarch, Churchill made a public speech on

February 22, 1944 in defence of the Italian king. A crisis

was provoked in November 1944 when the British Ambassa¬

dor in Italy tried to prevent Sforza from obtaining a post in

the Government. The Americans took up the cudgels for

Sforza, whom they regarded as a reliable person. Eventu¬

ally, but not for long, Churchill managed to secure Sforza’s

exclusion from the new Government formed by Bonomi.

Moreover, Churchill destroyed the unity of the group of

Italian political parties in the Committee of National Liber¬

ation, which pressured for the abolition of the monarchy.

Through the efforts of the British Government, the monar¬

chy, bulwark of reaction in Italy, hung on throughout the

war, but the Italian people finally rid themselves of it in

1946.

The British obstructed social and economic reforms in Italy

and took steps to disarm Italian Resistance fighters, who had

assisted Allied troops which had made no headway for many

months and until the spring of 1945 had been unable to crush

the resistance of a relatively small German force.

The British Government regarded the disarming of Re¬

sistance fighters in Italy and other countries as a means of

preserving the bourgeois system in Europe.

Churchill cynically deceived public opinion in order to

disarm the Resistance in Belgium and instal a Government

400

that had been in exile in London. A rumour was spread that

the Belgian Resistance was plotting an uprising against the

returning Government. On November 28, under this pre¬

text, the British commandant of Brussels placed his troops

at the disposal of the Belgian Government.”'

This coincided with British attempts to prevent Sforza

from being nominated Italian Foreign Minister. These

attempts sparked a wave of indignation in Britain, where

public opinion justifiably evaluated them as aimed at

undermining the forces of democracy. On December 1 Eden

declared in Parliament that the action taken by the

commandant of Brussels had the sole purpose of maintaining

law and order and protecting the Belgian Government.”” This

argument convinced nobody. Moreover, it was an official

admission of two points: first, that British troops were needed

to preserve in Belgium a system such as Britain wanted to

see in that country, and, second, that these same troops were

needed to put in power the Government that had been in

exile in Britain. Hence the logical conclusion that in both

cases the Belgian people wanted something quite different

and that British troops had to be used to force them to accept

what they had rejected but what London felt was of advan¬

tage to itself.

All this debunked the British Government, which sought

to pose as a champion of democracy. Matters deteriorated so

far that the Labour Party found it necessary officially to

raise the question of the Government’s policy in territory

occupied in Europe by British and American troops. Seymour

Cocks moved an amendment to the Address from the

Throne “regretting that the King’s speech contained no as¬

surance that British forces would not be used to disarm the

friends of democracy in Greece and other parts of Europe

and suppress the popular Resistance movements there”.””” It

was thereby stressed that in occupied territories Britain was

using her Armed Forces to suppress democracy and the pro¬

gressive aspirations of the people and instal and maintain

reactionary regimes. Cocks declared in his speech that in

Britain there was a feeling that “as victory was approaching

British policy seemed inclined to support many of the worn-

* Annual Register ..., London, 1945, pp. 103, 242.

** Ibid., p. 103.

*** Ibid., p. 104.

26-1561

401

out regimes in Europe as against the popular forces which

had emerged”."'

Cocks’s amendment was seconded by the Commonwealth

leader Sir Richard Acland, and Churchill had to defend him¬

self. Without batting an eyelid he told a deliberate lie, saying

that in Belgium “a putsch had been organised at the end of

November to throw out the properly constituted Government

of M. Pierlot”.* ** The truth soon came to light. A News

Chronicle correspondent in Belgium wrote in that paper that

“after making careful inquiries he had been unable to find

any trace of the intended putsch which Mr. Churchill had

alleged as the ground of British interference in Bel¬

gium”.^*** Had the Belgian people no right to replace the

government that had arrived from London with a government

consisting of leaders who had remained behind in Belgium

during the war and fought for liberation? Was not this right

recorded in the Atlantic Charter, proclaimed by Churchill

on behalf of Britain and by Roosevelt on behalf of the USA?

The British actions in Belgium distinctly showed that on the

lips of Churchill the Charter’s words about freedom were

only a propaganda subterfuge. The Charter was discarded

the moment British imperialist interests were affected first

in the colonies and then in Europe.

Britain’s Struggle Against Revolution

in Southeastern Europe

The British drive to throttle the aspirations of the Euro¬

pean peoples for social liberation went farthest in Greece.

After the mutiny by the Greek troops in Egypt was crushed

in the spring of 1944 and agreement was reached in May

1944 in the Levant between the various Greek political

organisations, the British Government launched active meas¬

ures to prevent any upsurge of democracy in Greece. Democ¬

ratic organs of state power, created by the Greek people

themselves, had emerged in Greece by the spring of 1944.

The National Liberation Front (EAM) and the People’s

National Army of Liberation (ELAS) were unquestionably

the dominant political and military forces enjoying the

* Annual Register ..., London, 1945, pp. 104-05.

** Ibid.

*** Ibid., p. 108.

402

support of the overwhelming majority of the people. In

this situation Britain ceased material and other aid

to these organisations, the only ones which had really

fought the German invaders, and considerably increased aid

to various reactionary elements despite the fact that they

had collaborated with the enemy. Moreover, the British Gov¬

ernment took energetic steps to present the Greek Govern¬

ment in exile as a democratic organ of power, and to make

sure that King George II did not divulge his reactionary

intentions. At the same time, military units were formed on

which the Government could rely when it returned to the

country. However, in London it was appreciated that these

steps were inadequate to compel the Greek people to accept

the king and the Government in exile. At the close of Octo¬

ber 1944 ELAS had more than 120,000 men, armed mostly

with weapons seized from the Italians and Germans. The

British Government, therefore, decided on armed interven¬

tion in Greece in order to impose on the Greek people a

regime they did not want.

Implementation of Churchill’s Balkan strategy held out

the prospect of resolving this problem without much trouble.

As early as August 1943 Churchill had written to Eden that

if “substantial British forces take part in the liberation of

Greece the King should go back with the Anglo-Greek

Army”.* However, when the chances that Churchill would

succeed in cancelling the invasion of France and organis¬

ing an Allied landing in the Balkans diminished, the British

Government decided on a landing in Greece after the Ger¬

mans would withdraw. The purpose of this operation was

to restore a reactionary regime in that country against the

clearly expressed will of the Greek people. Foreseeing this

possibility, the Chief of the British Imperial Staff wrote in

September 1943 that “if Greece is liberated as a result of

an Axis withdrawal, we shall be forced to provide sufficient

troops to further the present policy of His Majesty’s Govern¬

ment. This would involve us in a military commitment of

at least two divisions, since a weaker force might land us in

an embarrassing position vis-a-vis the Resistance groups, who

were... carrying considerable sway in the country when it

had been liberated.”**

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. V, p. 479.

** J. Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V, August 1943-September 1944,

London, 1956, pp. 86-87.

26 *

403

This plan was put into effect in the autumn of 1944 when

Greece was liberated. British paratroopers were landed in

Athens on October 13, and five days later the British flew

in the Greek Government in exile headed by George Papan-

dreou. EAM and ELAS were masters of the situation in

Greece. The collaborationist, reactionary element, so dear

to Churchill’s heart, was a negligible force. To bolster this

force, some 60,000 British troops had been transferred to

Greece by the close of December. The British looked for a

direct confrontation with ELAS in order to suppress resist¬

ance by force. On November 16, in pursuance of this poli¬

cy, General Scobie was instructed to order ELAS units to

quit Athens and in the event they did not do so to disarm

them. Churchill ordered Scobie to act without hesitation “as

if you were in a conquered city where a local rebellion is in

progress”.*

Scobie acted on his instructions. British troops and the

British-controlled Greek police opened fire on a peaceful

500,000-strong demonstration in Athens on December 3,

1944. This marked the beginning of the British imperialist

war against the Greek people, a war that dragged out for

several years. The British had to take Athens by assault.

Sparing the districts populated by the Greek bourgeoisie, the

British troops, Fleming writes, “gradually conquered, block

by block”, vast districts in which the poor lived. “Hundreds

of buildings were destroyed, usually containing homes of

the poorer people of Athens, at least eighty per cent of whom

were on the side of EAM. The property damage approached

$250,000,000. Casualties ranged between two and five

thousand. ”**

In February 1945, at Varkiz, a town near Athens, after

50 days of fighting, the leaders of ELAS and EAM signed

with the Greek Government an agreement to end the state

of emergency, hold a plebiscite on the question of the state

system, disarm the armed forces in the country and form a

new army. However, the Greek people were deceived. While

ELAS disarmed, the Greek Government formed monarchist

gangs consisting mostly of criminals who had collaborated

with the enemy during the occupation. A reign of terror

broke out spearheaded against patriots who had fought the

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 252.

** D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., p. 181.

404

nazis in alliance with Britain only a few months earlier. At

a press conference in Athens on October 18, 1944, British

Brigadier Barker-Benfield told the assembled reporters: “We

should never have been able to set foot on Greece had it not

been for the magnificent efforts of the Resistance movements

of EAM and ELAS.” He told the truth inopportunely, and

within 48 hours he was ordered out of Greece together with

other British officers who had served with the Greek parti¬

sans.* The partisans, patriots of their country, had done

much to enable British troops to enter Greece, and now they

were hunted only because they desired to arrange their lives

by themselves.

The war which the British Government started against

the Greek people at the close of 1944 was denounced by

progressive world public opinion. In Britain this war was

supported by the Conservative Party and its representatives

in Parliament, who formed the majority in the House of

Commons, the Right-wing Labour leaders, above all those

in Churchill’s Cabinet, and many Conservative newspapers.

Churchill was lauded by the fascist dictators Franco and

Salazar and by the reactionary press in the United States.

The Portuguese dictator’s official press congratulated Chur¬

chill on his actions in Greece, assessing this as an indispu¬

table victory for Churchill, the guardian of bourgeois, reac¬

tionary law and order, over Churchill, the Ally of the Soviet

Union.**

On the other hand, the intervention was condemned not

only by the Communist Party of Great Britain but also by

the overwhelming majority of the Labour and Liberal par¬

ties, by the Commonwealth Party, by the trade union move¬

ment and even by bourgeois newspapers like The Times.***

In Yugoslavia things shaped out differently than in

Greece. The British Government overpoweringly desired to

prevent democratic changes in that country, too, and restore

the reactionary regime. For this purpose it planned to use the

Yugoslav Government in exile and King Peter, whom it had

in its pocket. But the situation did not allow the British to

employ force as in Greece. Soviet troops had reached the

Yugoslav frontier in September 1944, enabling the USSR to

* Ibid., p. 183.

** Labour Monthly, January 1945, p. 28.

*** Ibid.

405

stretch its hand out to help the peoples of Yugoslavia. Con¬

sequently, the significance of British aid to Yugoslavia waned

sharply, and the leaders of the Yugoslav people were able to

adopt a firm line in their dealing with the British Govern¬

ment. The democratic forces of Yugoslavia had grown to

such an extent that Britain had neither the resources nor the

possibility of successfully fighting them. By the summer of

1944 the People’s Liberation Army had nearly 350,000 men.*

Moreover the opposition put up by the Greek people to the

British intervention tied the hands of the British Govern¬

ment and deprived it of the possibility of taking similar

measures in Yugoslavia.

Whether it liked it or not, the British Government had

to confine itself to political and diplomatic pressure. Chur¬

chill took this upon himself. At a meeting with Tito in Italy

on August 13-14, 1944 he tried to obtain the former’s agree¬

ment to a merger between the Government in exile and the

National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia and to King

Peter’s return to Yugoslavia. The British felt this would at

least somehow strengthen the position of the reactionary ele¬

ments in that country and weaken the revolutionary nature

of the Yugoslav people’s struggle for liberation.**

Soviet support enabled the Yugoslav leaders to repulse

this pressure. On September 21, 1944 Tito arrived in Moscow

where agreement was reached on the supply of Soviet ar¬

maments for a number of Yugoslav divisions, on joint Soviet-

Yugoslav operations to complete the liberation of Yugoslavia

and on the withdrawal of Soviet troops upon the comple¬

tion of those operations. This powerfully stimulated the

Yugoslav people in their struggle for freedom, and therefore,

when after all a Provisional People’s Government headed

by Tito and with the participation in it of Subasic and other

members of the former Government in exile was formed on

March 7, 1945, it could no longer be used by the British and

Americans to achieve their aims in Yugoslavia. Although

the new Government’s composition and programme clearly

did not suit them, Britain and the USA had no alternative

but to recognise it. In Belgrade the British Embassy was re¬

opened on March 14, 1945.*** The Soviet Government had

* Istoriya Yugoslavii (A History of Yugoslavia), Vol. II, Moscow,

1963, p. 236.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 79-84.

*** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 349.

406

appointed its Ambassador to new Yugoslavia four days

earlier.

In pursuance of British policy towards Yugoslavia at the

concluding stage of the war Churchill spread a deliberate

invention about what he called the division of Yugoslavia

into spheres of influence.

Referring to his talk with Stalin on October 9, 1944 in

Moscow, he wrote: “The moment was apt for business, so I

said, ‘Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your

armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests,

missions, and agents there. Don’t let us get at cross-purposes

in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned,

how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predomi¬

nance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in

Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?’ While this was

being translated I wrote out on a half-sheet of paper:

Rumania

Russia.

The others.

Greece

Great Britain

(in accord with USA)

Russia.

Y ugoslavia.

Hungary.

Bulgaria

Russia.

The others.

90%

10 %

90%

10 %

50-50%

75%

25%

“I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard

the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his

blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back

to us.”*

That, Churchill asserts, is how “agreement” was reached

on the division of Yugoslavia into “spheres of influence”.

But even people unskilled in diplomatic techniques will un¬

derstand that international agreements are not concluded

in that way. In Churchill’s own words, quoted above, there

is nothing to indicate that Stalin said or wrote anything in

reply to the note passed to him. Consequently, he neither

gave his agreement to Churchill’s proposal nor said any¬

thing to indicate his attitude to it.

The fact that in narrating this episode Churchill served

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 198.

407

out what he desired for reality is shown in documents in the

Soviet Foreign Ministry’s archives. The record of this talk

between Stalin and Churchill says: “Churchill announced

that he had prepared a rather dirty and clumsy document

that showed the distribution of Soviet and British influence

in Rumania, Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The table

was drawn up by him to show what the British think on

this question.”*

The Soviet record (no co-ordinated records of the 1944

Moscow talks were made) thus shows that Churchill had

indeed advanced the idea of carving up some countries, in¬

cluding Yugoslavia, into spheres of influence. Generally

speaking, in view of his and the rest of the British Govern¬

ment’s obsession with ideas of this kind, this is not surprising.

The Soviet Government understood what the British thought

on this score and took note of it. Nothing more. It did not

even feel it was necessary to express its attitude to this Brit¬

ish proposal. Neither the Churchill table nor any agreement

on this issue are mentioned in the Soviet record of the talks.

Had such agreement been reached it would unquestionably

have been indicated in the record.** Churchill’s assertion

that Stalin had agreed to divide Yugoslavia into spheres of

influence is thus a piece of fantasy.

Churchill’s invention was not the result of a poor memory.

It was made deliberately, to cast doubts on the Soviet

Union’s attitude to the liberation struggle of the Yugoslav

people. For that reason Churchill’s fabrication is best of all

refuted by widely known facts about the Soviet Union’s con¬

sistent and steadfast support for that struggle. The testimony

of many leaders of that struggle could be quoted. We

shall confine ourselves to the testimony of one of them,

Edvard Kardelj, who said in 1945: “Our sacrifices, our

efforts and our faith were crowned with victory because

the mighty Soviet Union and its Red Army were on our

side.”***

Hand in glove with the USA, Britain made desperate

attempts to restore the post-World War I reactionary, anti-

Soviet regime in Poland. These efforts were doomed to

* International Affairs, No. 8, 1958, p. 57. The value of this article

is that it is founded on unpublished documents from the Soviet Foreign

Ministry’s archives.

** Ibid.

*** hvestia, June 17, 1945.

408

failure from the very beginning, because during the conclud¬

ing stage of the Second World War the situation in the world

and in Eastern Europe differed radically from that which ob¬

tained when the reactionary anti-Soviet Polish Government

came to power. Churchill pinned his hopes on the Polish

Government in exile and its armed agents operating in Po¬

land. The intrigues of the British and of the London-based

Poles worried not only the Soviet Union but also the patriot¬

ic forces in Poland, which realised that Poland could not be

rejuvenated on the old foundations. After the Government

in exile had shown its reluctance to co-operate with the

Soviet Union with a view to rejuvenating Poland and

brought matters to the point where relations were ruptured

with it, the Polish patriots took steps to create a really pro¬

gressive Government which would be authorised to act on

behalf of the people and direct their destinies until libera¬

tion. This Government, the Krajowa Rada Narodowa, was

formed in the night of January 1, 1944 in Warsaw. The for¬

mation of this Government meant that the democratic, anti¬

fascist forces, which were fighting for the national and so¬

cial liberation of the Polish people, had undertaken the

responsibility for the destinies of Poland.

The Polish Government in exile, which had instructed its

agents in Poland physically to destroy democratic, patriotic

leaders, now intensified this struggle. At the same time,

the Armija Krajowa (also called the Home Army), which

took its orders from that government, instructed its units to

stop fighting the invaders and prepare to seize power after

Poland was liberated by the Soviet Army.

Britain and the USA pressed the Soviet Union to restore

and maintain relations with the London-based Poles. But,

obviously, this was impossible because the Government in

exile doggedly refused to recognise the Curzon Line as the

frontier between the USSR and Poland, hoping that the war

would weaken the USSR or, if that did not happen, that after

the defeat of Germany, Britain and the USA would start a

war against the USSR and restore the reactionary regime in

Poland. These plans sound wild today, but in 1944-45 they

underlay the political line pursued by the London-based

Poles. Penstwo Polski, an underground newspaper circulated

in Poland by the Polish Government in exile, declared in the

spring of 1944: “An essential condition for our victory and

our very existence is at least the weakening, if not the

409

defeat, of Russia.”* In 1944 Churchill told Mikolajczyk: “1

talked to your General Anders the other day, and he seems

to entertain the hope that after the defeat of the Germans

the Allies will then beat Russia.”*”" In order to attain its

ends the emigre Government did its best to spoil relations

between the Allies.

Moved by its desire to strengthen Allied unity, the Soviet

Government consented to compromises in the Polish issue.

In June 1944, despite the outrageous actions of the Govern¬

ment in exile and its agents in Poland, the Soviet Govern¬

ment declared it was prepared to hold talks with that

Government if it recognised the Curzon Line and was reor¬

ganised in such a manner as would exclude the predominan¬

ce in it of pro-fascist, anti-Soviet elements. These compro¬

mise proposals fell on deaf ears.

On August 1 the Armija Krajowa led an uprising against

the Germans in Warsaw. This was a huge provocation on the

part of the Government in exile. The Warsaw uprising

came as a complete surprise to the Soviet Command. The

Polish Government in exile did not notify the Soviet Gov¬

ernment in advance that the uprising would take place with

the result that Soviet troops were unable to go to the assist¬

ance of the insurgents. The uprising was ruthlessly crushed

by the Germans. It is said that 250,000 Poles perished.***

Such was the cost of the crime perpetrated by the emigre

Government, which acted with the backing of the British

Government, without whose knowledge such an act could

not have been undertaken.**

The calculation of the organisers of the uprising was that

Soviet troops would come to the assistance of Armija Krajo¬

wa and thus help to instal the emigre Government in War¬

saw against the wishes of the Polish people. For that reason

no advance notice of the uprising was given to the Soviet

Government.

However, the provocateurs badly miscalculated. The up¬

rising was started at a time when the Soviet troops had ex¬

hausted their strength in a massive offensive that drove the

Germans back 400 kilometres, and were, therefore, in no

* Comment , August 29, 1964, p. 547.

** D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., p. 237.

*** Ibid., p. 233.

*) Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 300.

410

position to breach the powerful fortifications around Warsaw

or try to force the Vistula. Such an operation required pains¬

taking preparations.

On August 16, 1944, Stalin wrote to Churchill: “Now,

after probing more deeply into the Warsaw affair, I have

come to the conclusion that the Warsaw action is a reckless

and fearful gamble, taking a heavy toll of the population.

This would not have been the case had Soviet Headquarters

been informed beforehand about the Warsaw action and

had the Poles maintained contact with them.”*

In a message to Stalin on August 20, 1944, Churchill and

Roosevelt tried to pressure him into ordering Soviet troops

to storm Warsaw, threatening that if such action was not

taken they would use public opinion against the USSR.**

The following reply was sent to them on August 22: “Soon¬

er or later the truth about the handful of power-seeking

criminals who launched the Warsaw adventure will out.

Those elements, playing on the credulity of the inhabitants

of Warsaw, exposed practically unarmed people to German

guns, armour and aircraft. The result is a situation in which

every day is used, not by the Poles for freeing Warsaw, but

by the Hitlerites, who are cruelly exterminating the civilian

population.

“From the military point of view the situation, which

keeps German attention riveted to Warsaw, is highly un¬

favourable both to the Red Army and to the Poles. Never¬

theless, the Soviet troops, who of late have had to face

renewed German counter-attacks, are doing all they can to

repulse the Hitlerite sallies and go over to a new large-scale

offensive near Warsaw. I can assure you that the Red Army

will stint no effort to crush the Germans at Warsaw and

liberate it for the Poles. That will be the best, really effec¬

tive help to the anti-nazi Poles.”***

In order to cover up their crime, those who organised the

slaughter at Warsaw assert that the Soviet Army was in a

position to help the uprising but that due to what they allege

to be political considerations the Soviet Government did not

render that assistance.

Many Western historians admit the untenability of this

* Correspondence ..., Vol. I, p. 254.

** Ibid.

*** Ibid., p. 255.

411

allegation. One of them writes: “At the end of a drive of

almost unparalleled length, when their offensive force was

spent, the Russians ran into the extremely formidable belt

of defenses before Warsaw. They were driven back, had to

stop to rest, regroup, build railways, bring up supplies and

begin again. . . . That the Red Army did not deliberately

wait outside of Warsaw for the Home Army to be destroyed

in the city is fully established by the military history of the

time.”*

In October 1964, The Observer, a British bourgeois week¬

ly, carried an article about the Warsaw uprising which drew

world-wide attention. It contained the significant and true

observation that “militarily, the rising had been directed

against the Germans, politically against the Soviet Union”.

The author of the article reviewed the “popular version”,

according to which the Soviet Army had deliberately with¬

held assistance to the insurgents, and unequivocally rejected

it. “In fact,” he wrote, “the German armour won a limited

but bloody victory to the Northeast of Warsaw, annihilat¬

ing the Soviet tank forces advancing towards the capital. The

Red Army fell back and prepared to regroup its forces.

Thus, the rising took place at a moment when the massive

German reinforcements were free to deal with it. In mid-

September the Russians moved forward again to the Vistula,

but by now the Germans had expelled the insurgents from

the waterfront at Warsaw and held the river crossing in full

force. A Polish brigade with the Red Army tried to cross

and was cut to pieces.”** “Thus perished one more lie,” Com¬

ment, another British weekly, wrote in response to the article

in The Observer .***

Alexander Werth, a British correspondent accredited to

Moscow during the war, likewise helped to explode this lie.

He visited the Soviet troops at the approaches of Warsaw

in the autumn of 1944, and in a book published 20 years

later and based on a comparison of Soviet, German and

Polish sources as well as on personal observations he drew

the conclusion that the accusations levelled at the USSR

in connection with the Warsaw uprising had no grounds.

He writes that “in August and September 1944 the available

* D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., pp. 234-35.

** The Observer, August 9, 1964, p. 8.

*** Comment, August 29, 1964, p. 560.

412

Red Army forces in Poland were genuinely not able to cap¬

ture Warsaw”.*

Churchill and Eden went to Moscow in October 1944 to

try to save at least part of the reactionary Polish forces.

Mikolajczyk and some emigre ministers likewise went to the

Soviet capital. By that time the Polish Committee of Na¬

tional Liberation, the temporary executive organ of revolu¬

tionary power set up by the Krajowa Rada Narodowa on July

21, was already functioning on liberated Polish territory.

Mikolajczyk’s appearance in Moscow after the Warsaw prov¬

ocation was testimony of the Soviet Government’s patience

and its desire to co-operate with the British and US govern¬

ments, in spite of the fact that on the Polish issue their stand

was clearly unjust with regard both to the USSR and the

Polish people. Once more the Government in exile refused

to waive its claim to Western Byelorussia and Western

Ukraine.

In early January 1945 the Polish Committee of National

Liberation was reorganised into the Provisional Government

of Poland, and the Soviet Government recognised it as such.

At the Crimea Conference the Soviet Union once more met

its Allies half-way by agreeing to the reorganisation of the

Provisional Polish Government “on a broader democratic

basis with the inclusion in it of democratic leaders in Poland

herself and of Poles living in exile”.** The British Govern¬

ment, however, refused to respond realistically to this Soviet

concession. It unreasonably insisted on a reorganisation

which would, in effect, replace the Provisional Government

with a somewhat improved variant of the emigre Govern¬

ment. This was unacceptable both to the Polish people and

to the USSR. “It was impossible at that late date,” Fleming

points out, “to create a Poland oriented diplomatically to

the East, but politically and ideologically to the West.”***

Nothing came of the British attempts to turn Poland,

liberated by the Soviet Army, into an anti-Soviet outpost of

imperialism and a link in a new variant of an anti-Soviet

cordon sanitaire. The might of the USSR and the will of

the Polish people frustrated these plans.

The same factors operated when Britain and the USA

tried to halt the socialist revolution in East European

* Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-1945, London, 1964, p. 882.

** Vneshnaya politika Sovietskogo Soyuza ..., Vol. Ill, p. 106.

*** D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., p. 238.

413

countries that had been Germany’s allies. In 1943 the ruling

classes of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria realised that the

nazis were losing the war and began actively to look for a

way out of the war. Naturally, they looked for a way that

would allow them to retain their positions. The best solution,

they felt, was to sign a separate armistice or peace with

Britain and the USA. This time their interests coincided with

those of Britain and the USA, who were determined to pre¬

serve reactionary regimes in Eastern Europe.

As regards the peoples of these countries, the defeat of the

fascist powers confronted them with the question of choos¬

ing the road of post-war development. For them the preser¬

vation of the old reactionary regimes meant the preservation,

in one way or another, of the fascist regimes that led Hun¬

gary, Rumania and Bulgaria into an alliance with nazi Ger¬

many and to a military disaster. Naturally, the old, bankrupt

policies were obnoxious to the peoples, who wanted their

countries to develop along democratic lines. Fascism’s mili¬

tary defeat and the complete discrediting of the capitalist

circles associated with the fascists facilitated the solution of

this problem. Moreover, the peoples of these countries could

count on support from the Soviet Union.

In 1943, prior to the Tehran Conference, the British had

been certain of the success of their political and strategic

designs in the Balkans, and reacted favourably to the peace

overtures which the ruling circles of Hungary, Rumania and

Bulgaria were making through fairly numerous channels.

The British sought to come to terms with those circles

on their withdrawal from the war as soon as British and

American troops landed in the Balkans and reached the

frontiers of their countries. This suited both the British and

the governments of the enemy countries concerned, for it

gave the British the possibility of occupying these countries

before the Soviet Army could reach them, and as for the

discredited regimes they had the possibility of remaining in

power with the support of the occupation forces.

In accordance with these designs Britain, the USA and

Hungary signed a preliminary secret agreement on Septem¬

ber 9, 1943. This agreement was preceded by negotiations

between a representative of the Hungarian Government and

the British Minister in Turkey in August of the same year.

At these negotiations the Hungarians said their Govern¬

ment was prepared to lay down arms as soon as Anglo-US

414

forces reached the Hungarian frontier. Under the deal made

at these negotiations, on September 9, 1943 on a ship in

the Sea of Marmora the British Minister in Turkey Sir

Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen gave the Hungarian represent¬

ative the terms of the preliminary agreement. Under this

agreement the Hungarian Government reaffirmed its com¬

munication of August 17 regarding its surrender, while the

Allies promised not to divulge the agreement until their

troops were on the Hungarian frontier; regular liaison was

established between the Western Allies and the Hungarian

Government.* The nature of this agreement testifies to the

British intention of helping the fascists to remain in power

after Hungary’s surrender.

The Rumanian Government likewise negotiated with Brit¬

ain and the USA with the purpose of concluding a separate

deal. Alexandre Cretzianu, the Rumanian envoy in Turkey,

conducted these negotiations with British Embassy staff in

Ankara in the autumn of 1943. In his memoirs Cretzianu

says he was instructed to inform the British “that the pres¬

ent Government [the fascist Government headed by Anto-

nescu.— V.7.] considers itself to be in office solely to ensure

order, and that it would immediately yield the reins to a

Government approved by the British and Americans”.** At

the same time, the Rumanian Government contacted the US

Ambassador in Madrid. But these negotiations proved to be

abortive.

The situation changed considerably after the Tehran

Conference, when Churchill’s Balkan strategy was officially

scrapped. This deprived the British Government of the cer¬

tainty that its troops would reach the frontiers of the Balkan

and East European countries, and therefore there was no

longer any need to sign preliminary agreements with the

German satellites after the model of the agreement signed

with the Hungarian fascist regime. However, as the final

defeat of the fascist bloc loomed larger, the ruling circles

of these countries grew more and more frantic in their desire

to surrender to Anglo-American forces. In January 1944 the

Antonescu Government used neutral channels to send a

* Vengriya i vtoraya mirovaya voina. Sekretniye diplomaticheskiye

dokumenty iz islorii kanuna i perioda voiny (Hungary and the Second

World War. Secret Diplomatic Documents of the Eve and Period of

the War), Moscow, 1962, pp. 298-99.

** Alexandre Cretzianu, The Lost Opportunity, London, 1957, p. 94.

message to Washington, stating that “Rumania is not waging

war against Britain and the United States. When British and

American troops arrive on the Danube, they will not be op¬

posed by Rumanian troops. The Rumanian troops at that

moment will be on the Dniester, fighting back the Russians.”' 5 '

This stand had the backing of the leaders of the “opposi¬

tion” bourgeois-landowner parties in Rumania.

Britain and the USA had no right to negotiate an armistice

or peace with Germany or her satellites without the knowl¬

edge and participation of the USSR. This was stipulated in

the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 and in the United Nations

Declaration of January 1, 1942. Besides, in 1944 the mili¬

tary situation was such that a separate armistice signed by

Britain and the USA could change nothing in Eastern

Europe inasmuch as their troops could not get to that area.

Therefore, when the Rumanian Government sent Count Barbu

Stirbey at the head of a delegation to Cairo in the spring of

1944, he had to talk to representatives of the USSR, Britain

and the USA. The Rumanian Government turned down the

terms that were offered to it because it still hoped that the

German occupation troops would be replaced by Anglo-

American forces. In August 1944 the Soviet Army’s offensive

carried it to the Rumanian frontier, compelling Rumania

to sue for peace. The armistice was signed in Moscow on

September 12, 1944; the text was drawn up jointly by the

governments of the USSR, Britain and the USA.

Soon afterwards Germany’s northern ally, Finland, with¬

drew from the war. Soviet and British representatives, act¬

ing on behalf of the United Nations, conducted talks with

the Finnish Government delegation in Moscow on Septem¬

ber 14-19. These talks ended with the signing of an armistice

on September 19.

Bulgaria withdrew from the war under somewhat

different conditions. In the summer of 1944 the Bulgarian

Government sent its representative, Mushanov, to Cairo to

negotiate Bulgaria’s withdrawal from the war and that

country’s occupation by Anglo-US forces.* ** A British mis¬

sion secretly went to Bulgaria in early September, and in the

talks it came to light that the British wanted Bulgaria to be

* Alexandre Cretzianu, Op. cit., p. 130.

** Istoriya Bolgarii (A History of Bulgaria), Vol. II, Moscow, 1955,

p. 356.

416

occupied by Turkish troops, who would subsequently be

replaced by Anglo-American units.

On September 5 the Soviet Union declared war on Bul¬

garia, and the liberation of Bulgarian territory from the

German invaders was started. On the night of September 8-9,

a popular uprising led by the Communist Party broke out

in Bulgaria. The Fatherland Front Government that was

formed by the victorious insurgents declared war on Ger¬

many, and on October 28 Bulgarian representatives signed

an armistice with the USSR, Britain and the USA in Moscow.

Hungary was the last of Germany’s European allies to

withdraw from the war. The Hungarian Government had

maintained uninterrupted contact with British and Ameri¬

can representatives, and it is significant that on the basis of

information received as a result of this contact the Chief of

the General Staff reported to the Council of Ministers of

Hungary as early as August 25, 1944 that “foreign circles

feel that Hungarian troops must hold the front against the

Russians and offer no opposition to the British”.* At that

meeting the permanent Deputy Foreign Minister said that

“the Anglo-Saxons do not want Hungary to be occupied by

the Russians. They want the Hungarians to keep the Rus¬

sians back until they themselves are able to occupy Hunga¬

ry.”** However, the war followed a course that was not quite

to the liking of the Anglo-Saxon powers, and on October

11, 1944 a delegation from the Horthy Government signed

a preliminary armistice agreement in Moscow. True, soon

afterwards the Germans installed a new Government in

Hungary and the armistice remained unrealised. In Decem¬

ber 1944 the democratic forces in Hungary formed a Pro¬

visional National Government on liberated Hungarian ter¬

ritory, and representatives of that Government signed the

armistice terms in Moscow on January 20, 1945.

In Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, at the time they with¬

drew from the war, the class struggle grew into an armed

uprising of the people, into a general democratic revolution.

This gave rise to deadly alarm in London and Washington.

In view of the Soviet military presence in these countries

Britain and the USA were unable to occupy them and

throttle the people’s progressive aspirations by military force.

* Vengriya i vtoraya mirovaya voina ..., p. 330.

** Ibid.

27-1561

417

They hoped to achieve this through political and diplomatic

pressure. Since the armistice was signed on their behalf as

well, the British and United States governments had their

representatives on the Allied control commissions in Hun¬

gary, Rumania and Bulgaria and persistently sought to in¬

terfere in the internal affairs of these countries, trying to

pressure their governments and secure support from the

USSR, which was the occupying power. Their efforts were

aimed at restricting the activities of the revolutionary forces

of the Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian peoples and pre¬

serving, as far as possible, the position of the reactionary ele¬

ments, i.e., hindering the establishment of popular govern¬

ments and preserving the capitalist regime. Naturally, the

Soviet Union could not endorse these efforts. Its sympathies

were wholly and completely with the working masses and

it gave them every assistance. This caused serious complica¬

tions in its relations with its Allies.

The question of Allied policy in liberated Europe was

brought up at the Crimea Conference in February 1945. At

that conference it was agreed that the peoples liberated from

nazi occupation and the peoples of the former Axis satellite

states in Europe would be helped “to solve by democratic

means their pressing political and economic problems”. The

implication was that these peoples would be helped do

destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create

democratic institutions of their own choice” and “form interim

governmental authorities broadly representative of all demo¬

cratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest

possible establishment through free elections of governments

responsive to the will of the people”.* This decision con¬

formed to the interests and requirements of the peoples

concerned.

Soon it was found that both the British and the Americans

were giving an interpretation to the Declaration on Liber¬

ated Europe that differed completely from what the peoples

thought it meant. Democracy, in the Anglo-American inter¬

pretation, implied the restoration in Hungary, Rumania and

Bulgaria of the power of the bourgeoisie and parties that had

collaborated with nazi Germany, fought on her side against

the USSR and established fascist regimes in their countries.

* Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Malta

and Yalta, 1945, Washington, 1955, p. 972.

418

The peoples, naturally, rejected these claims and extended

the revolutionary democratic reorganisation of their coun¬

tries. Neither could the Soviet Union endorse this policy be¬

cause, firstly, it clashed with the interests of the peoples of

the countries concerned; secondly, in the event it was suc¬

cessful and anti-Soviet regimes were re-established the

security of the USSR would again be threatened; and, thirdly,

it would be a violation of the Allied decisions passed at the

Crimea Conference. Fleming notes that in Eastern and South¬

eastern Europe Britain and the USA “sought to preserve

the power of the top social strata which had long ruled these

countries”.*

The Soviet Union understood the Yalta decisions differ¬

ently. It interpreted the word “democracy” in its direct

meaning, i.e., rule by and for the people, and, naturally, in

its policy towards Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria it was

guided by the interests of the peoples of those countries. As

The Times wrote, “Democracy to them [i.e., to Soviet peo¬

ple.— V. 7.] is democracy of the Left”.**

The British Government adopted a disapprobatory atti¬

tude to the Yalta decisions on liberated Europe, having

signed them reluctantly. It would have been more to its

liking if these decisions contained a direct demand for the

preservation of capitalism in the countries concerned. British

politicians and historians accuse Roosevelt of having been

much too tractable at Yalta. Clement Attlee subsequently

wrote: “That was Roosevelt’s line at Yalta. It was two to

one against us. We had to agree to many things we oughtn’t

to have agreed to.”*** “I don’t think,” he said, “Roosevelt

really understood European politics. I don’t think any Amer¬

ican did.” Asked what could have been done to make devel¬

opments in Eastern Europe follow the course desired by the

British Government, he replied: “I think if Alexander had

been allowed to go in Italy, he would have joined hands

with the Yugoslavs and moved across into Czechoslovakia

and perhaps right over Germany before the Russians got

there.”*) This was Churchill’s old song in the rendition of

his Labourite replacement. Attlee grieved over the fact that

* D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., p. 210.

** The Times, April 12, 1945, p. 5.

*** F. Williams, Op. cit., p. 52.

*) Ibid., p. 51.

27 *

419

British troops had not had the possibility of strangling the

freedom aspirations of the East European peoples.

Attlee and people like him have really no grounds for

heaping everything on Roosevelt. The US President backed

the Yalta decisions not out of love of democracy but be¬

cause he thought in realistic terms and, as distinct from

Churchill, did not suffer from an inclination for adventurist

gambles. He realised that Britain and the USA had not

the strength to secure the aims which Churchill pur¬

sued in Eastern Europe. This was later reiterated by the New

York Herald Tribune , which wrote: “Neither our military,

our economic nor our ideological power reached far enough

to determine the fate of the Balkan states.”*

It is not to be ruled out that already then Roosevelt was

aware of the extent to which, in the course of the war, the

balance of power between the bourgeois world and the So¬

viet Union had changed in the latter’s favour. Having

realised this he probably pondered the expediency of accept¬

ing, in the relations with the USSR, the Soviet principle, of

peaceful coexistence of countries with different social sys¬

tems. Roosevelt, it goes without saying, had the interests of

the capitalist system at heart. The following considerations

offered by the American Professor J. P. Morray weigh heavily

in favour of this theory: “The spirit of Yalta, which he

[Roosevelt.— V. T.] vainly fostered, was an expression of his

determination to keep the competition peaceful lest mankind

suffer the agony of a new war on the very morrow of finish¬

ing the old one.”**

Questions of Strategy at Yalta

The end of 1944 witnessed a painful Anglo-American set¬

back on the Western Front. The Germans uSed the halt of

the Allied offensive at Germany’s frontiers to launch a

counter-offensive in the Ardennes, Belgium.. The German

objectives were to cut off and annihilate the Anglo-American

forces in Belgium and the Netherlands, prevent them

from resuming their offensive in 1945 and, thereby, get the

possibility of transferring a considerable part of their troops

* New York Herald[ Tribune, March 5, 1947, p. 30.

** J. P. Morray, From Yalta to Disarmament, Cold War Debate,

New York, 1961, p. 37.

420

to the Eastern Front. The Germans breached the Allied

Front and advanced 90 kilometres. The ensuing grave situa¬

tion caused a fresh outburst of the long-standing conflict be¬

tween the British and the Americans over who should have

the command of the land forces in Western Europe. The

British wanted all the land armies to be subordinated to

Field-Marshal Bernard Montgomery, but the Americans were

flatly opposed to this. The German offensive was checked

but the threat that the Second Front would be wiped out

remained acute.

This compelled Churchill, on January 6, 1945, to write to

Stalin and ask for the assitance of “a major Russian offen¬

sive on the Vistula Front, or elsewhere, during January”.*

The reply he got was that “in view of the Allies’ position on

the Western Front” it had been decided “to complete

preparations at a rapid rate and, regardless of weather, to

launch large-scale offensive operations along the entire

Central Front not later than the second half of January”.**

On January 12, eight days before the deadline, Soviet troops

struck a massive blow. The Germans at once discontinued

their offensive operations in the West and began transfer¬

ring troops to the East. During the first three weeks of the

offensive the Soviet Army advanced 500 kilometres, reach¬

ing the Oder and a point 70 kilometres away from Berlin.

This magnificent example demonstrating the Soviet Union’s

desire to fulfil its Allied duty to the letter and really co¬

operate with Britain and the USA still further enhanced its

prestige in the anti-fascist coalition. It showed Britain and

the USA that the Soviet Union was a dependable Ally.

During the bitter December and January days of the fighting

in the Ardennes they realised once more how much they

needed their alliance with the USSR. With only one-third

of their forces the Germans created a terrible threat to the

Anglo-American front. It was perfectly clear what would

have happened if the Soviet Union had not been pinning

down the other two-thirds of the German forces on the

Eastern Front.

In 1951, when Averell Harriman had to explain the stand

that was taken by the US delegation at the Crimea Confer¬

ence, he said: “These tremendous and courageous operations

* Correspondence. .Vol. I, p. 294.

** Ibid., pp. 294-95.

421

by the Soviet Army and the fact that Stalin honoured

such a vital military commitment influenced the attitude of

British and American representatives in subsequent negotia¬

tions with the Soviet Union—and built up favourable opin¬

ion for the Soviet Union among the people of the United

States and the other Western Allies.’”''' This influenced all

the decisions of the Crimea Conference, primarily, the deci¬

sions on Allied strategy.

A vast number of documents and books testify to the fact

that Britain and the United States never conceived of ending

the war in the Far East without Soviet military assistance.

However, it would be wrong to assume that in early 1945

it was the only theatre where they needed Soviet assistance.

The German break-through in the Ardennes convincingly

showed how vital Soviet assistance was to Britain and the

USA during the last months of the war in Europe. That

explains why at Yalta Field-Marshal Alan Brooke of Britain

and General Marshall of the USA raised the question of

co-ordinating Allied operations with those of the Soviet

Army. They declared that the Allies were planning an of¬

fensive north and south of the Ruhr, in the course of which

the Anglo-American troops would have to force the Rhine.

They expected powerful resistance from the Germans and

requested the Soviet Command to build up pressure on the

Eastern Front to prevent the Germans from transferring any

forces to the West. The Soviet Union, for its part, considered

that an Allied offensive in the West was necessary in order

to facilitate the operations of the Soviet Army. True, the

Allies declared they could not guarantee that the Germans

would not transfer reinforcements from Italy to the Eastern

Front.* ** In the end agreement was reached. The Americans

proposed establishing liaison between the US, British and

Soviet military leadership. This proposal did not please

Churchill very much because he feared it might cost him

much of his influence over the decisions taken by Eisen¬

hower and his staff. Nonetheless he had to yield because the

Soviet and American representatives favoured the proposal.

Moreover, at the Crimea Conference it was agreed that

the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan two or

* Congressional Record. Proceedings and Debates of the 82nd

Congress, First Session, Vol. 97, No. 158.

** Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 500.

422

three months after Germany surrendered and the war in

Europe ended. This agreement was preceded by long nego¬

tiations between Britain and the USA, on the one hand, and

the Soviet Union on the other. In one way or another this

question was raised at almost all the top-level Allied confer¬

ences. As long as victory over Germany was still a matter of

the distant future, the Soviet Union, naturally, could not

comply with the desire of the Allies in this question. But at

Tehran the Soviet Government assured Churchill and Roose¬

velt that their desires would be met. To a large extent this

assurance unquestionably expedited the satisfactory settle¬

ment of the question of the Second Front. In October 1944

when Churchill was in Moscow he again raised the question

of Soviet involvement in the war against Japan.

However, a verbal agreement did not suit Roosevelt, who,

according to Neumann, “was determined at Yalta to secure

a written pledge.”*

That pledge was given. The document containing it stated

the political terms on which it was to be discharged. The

Soviet, British and American leaders agreed on the status

quo of the Mongolian People’s Republic, the restoration of

Russia’s rights that had been violated by Japan’s perfidious

attack in 1904, and the transfer of the Kuril Islands to the

USSR. This agreement provided for the return to the Soviet

Union of the southern part of Sakhalin Island, for priority

of Soviet interests in the internationalised port of Dairen,

the restoration of the lease of Port Arthur as a Soviet naval

base, and joint Sino-Soviet management of the Chinese

Eastern and South Manchurian railways.**

This agreement only restored historic justice, returning

to the Soviet Union what had been forcibly wrested from a

weak Russia by Japan early in the 20th century. Neumann

writes: “Franklin Roosevelt was restoring to Russia what his

predecessor Theodore Roosevelt had helped to secure for

Japan at Portsmouth in 1905.”*** Roosevelt arrived in the

Crimea after having carefully considered this issue. On

the basis of State Department archival documents relating

to the Crimea Conference, Herbert Feis says that when this

issue was reviewed Roosevelt “went on to state what he

* William L. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 92.

** Vneslinaya politika Sovielskogo Soyttza.. Vol. Ill, pp. 111-12.

*** William L. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 93.

423

considered the Soviet Union could ask with just title”.* The

American historian goes on to declare that “perhaps by the

show of free and ready assent he was trying to make it a

little harder for the Russians to press for more”.** But no

requests for more were forthcoming. Even Churchill had

nothing to say against this agreement reached by the heads

of the Soviet and US governments and then communicated

to him. “I replied,” he writes, “that we... were in favour

of Russia’s losses in the Russo-Japanese war being made

good.”***

It was by no means generosity which made Roosevelt and

Churchill agree to restore the Soviet Union’s rights in the

Far East. Their motive was that this would enable them to

receive maximum Soviet assistance in the war against Japan.

At the same time, they felt a written pledge would tie the

Soviet Union’s hands at the future peace conference on the

Far East.

Many Western historians reproach Roosevelt for having

consented, at Yalta, to the restoration of the Soviet Union’s

rights in the Far East. Criticism of this kind is plainly un¬

tenable. All it shows is that this category of historians is

guided not by considerations of justice and the historical

rights of peoples but solely by hatred of the Soviet Union.

Besides, they are not consistent in their criticism. They do not

criticise Roosevelt for the decision taken at the Cairo Con¬

ference with Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek to return to

China what Japan had at various periods wrested away from

her by force. They thus use two yardsticks, apply two forms

of justice. This is not surprising. This approach to the Al¬

lied decision to divest Japan of the fruits of her policy of

conquest shows the class position of the historians

concerned.

Churchill and Roosevelt were guided principally by their

desire to secure Soviet assistance in the Pacific theatre. In

early 1945 the strategic situation in that theatre was such

that to defeat Japan the Americans and the British had to

undertake numerous landing operations on the islands around

her. This would have cost them much too high a price. Besi¬

des, they would then have had to invade Japan proper. Rough

* Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 511.

** Ibid.

*** \yinston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 341.

424

estimates of the possible manpower losses struck them with

horror. But that was not all. Even after the loss of Japan

proper the Japanese would have been in a position to continue

the war in Manchuria and other occupied Chinese, territory.

Consequently, land armies were needed to smash the Japa¬

nese forces in the Asian continent and thereby reduce Japan

to surrender. By 1945 it was found that assistance of this

kind could not be given by Kuomintang China. There was,

therefore, only the Soviet Union, and for that reason US

military leaders pressed their Government to secure Soviet

assistance. They calculated that even with that assistance the

war against Japan would last at least eighteen months after

Germany was defeated.

Harriman tells us that the “military authorities esti¬

mated .. . that Soviet participation would greatly reduce

the heavy American casualties. . . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff

were planning an invasion of the Japanese home islands,

and were anxious for the early entry of Russia in the war

to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria.” :f

To back up this statement Harriman refers to a memoran¬

dum drawn up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Roosevelt on

the eve of the Crimea Conference. In that memorandum they

offered detailed arguments in favour of securing the earliest

possible Soviet entry into the war against Japan. “These

military considerations,” Harriman says, “had been the sub¬

ject of careful study by Roosevelt for a long time and they

were uppermost in his mind at Yalta.”* ** In official State De¬

partment documents, published in 1949, US Secretary of

State Dean Acheson is quoted as having stated that the US

Government was mainly concerned with securing the Soviet

Union’s entry into the war against Japan as soon as possible

so that the Japanese army in Manchuria could not return to

Japan at the critical moment.***

Another reason for the tractability of the British and

Americans at Yalta was that even in 1945 they were unable to

cope with Germany without assistance. Answering those who

criticise the British and US governments for their eagerness

to reach agreement with the USSR at Yalta, Churchill writes:

“It is easy, after the Germans are beaten, to condemn

* Congressional Record ..., Vol. 97, No. 158, p. 3.

** Ibid.

*** United States Relations With China, Washington, 1949, p. 8.

425

those who did their best to hearten the Russian military

effort and to keep in harmonious contact with our great Ally,

who had suffered so frightfully. What would have happened

if we had quarrelled with Russia while the Germans still

had two or three hundred divisions on the fighting front.”' 1

Although Churchill wrote this in 1953, in 1945 and later

he felt displeased with the decisions adopted at Yalta, firstly

because they took into account the Soviet Union’s just and

democratic stand on a number of issues and, secondly, be¬

cause he had played a secondary role at the Conference, hav¬

ing been compelled to reckon with the stand of the Soviet

and American leaders. As the war drew to an end Britain

found herself increasingly weaker than the USSR and the

USA, and consequently her voice carried less and less weight

in the Big Three.** Regarding the Yalta decisions on the Far

East, Churchill writes: “I must make it clear that though

on behalf of Great Britain I joined in the agreement neither

I nor Eden took any part in making it. It was regarded as

an American affair, and was certainly of prime interest to

their military operations. It was not for us to claim to shape

it. Anyhow, we were not consulted, but only asked to

approve. This we did.”***

The Problem of Germany

Like all her plans for the post-war settlement, Britain’s

plans with regard to Germany were determined by the two

contradictions in the world: the basic contradiction between

socialism and capitalism and the contradiction between im¬

perialist powers. At first the second contradiction was ex¬

tremely pronounced, but with the approach of victory it was

overshadowed by the basic contradiction, and the British,

in spite of the lessons taught them by history, got down to

drawing up new plans to use Germany against the Soviet

Union. Field-Marshal Alan Brooke, Chairman of the British

Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, made the following

entry in his diary under the data-line July 27, 1944: “Back

to War Office to have an hour with Secretary of State dis¬

cussing post-war policy in Europe. Should Germany be dis-

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 352.

*"*' R. W. Thompson, The Price of Victory , London, 1960, p. 20.

*** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 342.

426

membered or gradually converted into an ally to meet the

Russian threat of twenty years hence? I suggested the latter

and feel certain that we must from now onwards regard

Germany in a very different light. Germany is no longer

the dominating power in Europe—Russia is.... Therefore,

foster Germany, gradually build her up and bring her into

a Federation of Western Europe. Unfortunately this must

all be done under the cloak of a holy alliance between Eng¬

land, Russia and America.”* During the concluding stage

of the war and after hostilities ended British policy with

regard to Germany was pursued in accordance with this line

as formulated by Alan Brooke after discussing this question

with Anthony Eden.

The significance of the plans for a United States of West¬

ern Europe was defined in crystal-clear terms by Alan

Brooke. British politicians and historians have made a tre¬

mendous effort to spread the unfounded view that this union

was conceived by the British Government as a defensive

alliance against Germany. Woodward, for instance, wants

the reader to believe the detailed plan for “regional” defence

was directed “against a renewal of German aggression”.**

Brooke, on the other hand, maintains that this was a plan

for an alliance not against Germany but with her against

the USSR. The truth given in his diary was confirmed by

Britain’s actions after the war.

One surely cannot accept as serious the attempts to

represent the West European bloc planned by the British

Government as a means to prevent future German aggression.

It probably does not occur to those who peddled the idea

that at a time when a powerful anti-fascist coalition existed

and fought Germany and had set itself the aim of remov¬

ing the threat of German aggression once and for all, the

creation of such a bloc was both strange and suspicious. It

was all the more suspicious in the light of the Anglo-Soviet

Treaty of 1942. The existence of plans of this kind was

testimony that Britain had no intention of preserving an

effective alliance with the USSR after the war because her

membership of an anti-Soviet bloc would ultimately have

nullified that alliance. That is exactly what happened in

1955.

* Arthur Bryant, Op. cit., p. 242.

** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 465.

427

The British ruling circles were agreed on the necessity of

using Germany against the USSR after the war, but there

were many disagreements regarding the best ways and means

of achieving that purpose without jeopardising Britain’s se¬

curity. A hard line towards Germany after the war was

urged by Sir Robert G. Vansittart, the well-known British

diplomat. In the USA a similar line was demanded by the

US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. In

Britain many politicians feared Germany’s might after the

war and wanted her to be dismembered. Thus, the anti-

Soviet designs for using Germany against the USSR clashed

with considerations about the need to weaken her as much

as possible to rule out any threat from her to British interests

in Europe. The same situation obtained in the USA. That

explains why at the second Quebec Conference in Septem¬

ber 1944 Churchill and Roosevelt adopted the Morgenthau

Plan of turning Germany into primarily an agricultural

country and carving her up into a number of weak states.*

This implied that at the time the British Government felt

a dismembered Germany would best serve its purposes. How¬

ever, as the war was drawing to a close the British became

less and less certain that a dismembered Germany would be

a sufficiently effective counterbalance to the Soviet Union.

Besides, they had to reckon with the Soviet Union’s objection

to Germany’s dismemberment.

The European Advisory Commission began its work in

London in January 1944. Its task was to draw up the terms

for Germany’s surrender, determine the occupation zones of

the three Allied powers in Germany and submit proposals

for the Allied control mechanism in Germany. On the com¬

mission Britain was represented by Lord Strang, the Soviet

Union by F. T. Gusev, who replaced I. M. Maisky as the

Soviet Ambassador in London in October 1943, and the USA

by Ambassador John G. Winant.

In the commission on January 25, 1944 Britain suggested

forming a committee which would consider the question of

Germany’s dismemberment. Winant seconded this sugges¬

tion. F. T. Gusev, however, declined to discuss it- The

“result was that discussion of Strang’s Draft Terms of Ref¬

erence for the Dismemberment of Germany Committee was

* Cordell Hull, Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1604-10.

428

postponed and EAC never returned to the matter”.* Britain

accorded the EAC considerably more attention than either

the USSR or the USA. Strang had a large staff and received

constant assistance from various ministries, and the Govern¬

ment frequently discussed the stand Strang had to adopt in

the commission.** The British counted on ensuring some of

their interests in the German issue by pushing relevant de¬

cisions through the EAC. Time was working against them

and they were eager to get these decisions through at this

stage. The Americans, on the other hand, did not give the

EAC any particular attention. They were in no hurry to

pass decisions. In October 1944 Roosevelt wrote to Hull that

he disliked “making detailed plans for a country which we

do not yet occupy”.***

The terms of Germany’s surrender did not evoke much

argument. Strang submitted a draft of a document consisting

of 70 articles specifically treating of not only the military

and political but also the economic aspect of the problem.

It suited the British to tie the hands of their Allies before¬

hand with definite commitments. The Americans wanted

freedom of action and submitted a draft consisting of 13

points of a very general nature. The Soviet draft was more

detailed and concrete and concerned mainly the military

aspect. A compromise decision was adopted.**

Agreement was reached quickly on the question of control.

The EAC recommendations provided for a Control Council

consisting of representatives of the USSR, Britain and the

USA. The three Allied commanders in the corresponding

zones of occupation would form the Control Council. Argu¬

ment raged mostly around the question of demarcating the

occupation zones. After the war some Western leaders, guided

by anti-Soviet sentiments, condemned their governments for

having agreed to what in their opinion was a much too large

Soviet occupation zone and for having left Berlin in that

zone. Lord Boothby, a Conservative leader, for instance,

maintained that the Western Allies “agreed to a zonal sys¬

tem in Germany, the authors of which ... should be certified

* International Affairs, No. 5, 1955, p. 41. The article from which

the quotation has been taken is based on important, hitherto unpublished

documents from the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

** W. Strang, Op. cit., p. 203.

*** Ibid., p. 209.

*) Ibid., pp. 209-10.

429

as insane if they are still alive”.* With the exception of

Winant, all of them are alive, and Strang and one of his as¬

sociates, Goronwy Rees, took steps to justify themselves.

Strang has done it in his memoirs, while Rees wrote to The

Sunday limes. According to Rees, the British recommenda¬

tions to the EAC were drawn up by Attlee’s Ministerial

Committee, which had been set up by Churchill in 1943, and

then by the Post-Hostilities Planning Committee which re¬

placed it. These bodies drew up “the plan for the Three-

Power occupation of Germany, including the Three-Power

occupation of Berlin”.**

Under the British draft, of which this part did not evoke

much objection, the Soviet occupation zone was to embrace

40 per cent of Germany, 36 per cent of her population and

33 per cent of her productive resources. Provision was made

for a reduction of the Soviet zone after part of German ter¬

ritory passed to Poland.***

The zones question was the subject of the most heated ar¬

guments between the British and Americans. The British in¬

sisted on getting northwestern Germany as their zone of oc¬

cupation, which meant that the southern and southwestern

parts would remain for the Americans. Roosevelt was cate¬

gorically opposed to this. Both sides proffered the most

diverse arguments, but when Feis notes that the British

“wanted to be in a position to control Britain’s great com¬

petitor, the Ruhr”** he pinpoints the reason for the dog¬

gedness shown by Britain. The argument was taken to the

top level, and at the Quebec Conference in September 1944

Roosevelt yielded to Churchill’s solicitations.

Replying to the criticism of the decision giving the Soviet

Union a zone whose boundaries were only 100 miles east of

the Rhine, Strang observes that “it is well to recall the cir¬

cumstances of the time. The discussions on the occupation

of Germany began before D-day, and . . . were concluded in

mid-September 1944, when we were still far from establishing

ourselves on the Rhine. It could not be foreseen how deeply

the Western Allied forces would penetrate into Germany.

There was still some doubt whether ... the Soviet armies

would cross the German frontier, and whether they would

* The Sunday Times, August 13, 1961.

** Ibid.

*** W. Strang, Op. cit., p. 214.

*) Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 362.

430

not stand fast there, having expelled the enemy from their

soil and that of their neighbours, and leave the Western

Allies to finish off the war. ... It seemed to our Government

to be of advantage to us that they should be encouraged to

work with us to the end.’”'' Further, Strang notes that with this

objective in mind it was felt there had “to be three zones,

there must be broad equality among them, taking into ac¬

count area, population and productive resources.”"’*' If there

was anything to criticise the Western Allies for, it was by

no means for an excess of attention to Soviet interests. In¬

deed, even Strang has admitted that the zones were equal,

which meant that the Soviet Union, which had made a larger

contribution to victory than either Britain or the United

States, was given a zone equal to that of each of its Western

Allies. If anything it was not a case of excessive concessions

to the USSR or of its encouragement by the Western Allies,

but of a transgression of simple justice towards it. The reason

the USSR did not insist on a zone equal to its contribution

to victory was that it wished to give further proof of its desire

and readiness to co-operate with its Western Allies in peace

as in war.

The same motives underlay Winant’s position as that of

Strang. The Americans felt that if the Soviet Union were

not given a zone equal to that of the American and British,

it might occupy a considerably larger territory at the end

of the war. John C. Campbell, formerly of the US State De¬

partment, writes that the USA had “but two ways of head¬

ing off what happened: 1) avoiding all agreement on zones

of occupation, thus taking a chance on where the various Al¬

lied forces would be when war ended ... 2) seeking agree¬

ment on a joint occupation with forces of all occupying

Powers serving side-by-side throughout Germany. The first

alternative would have risked the possibility of having the

Russians on the Rhine, which in early 1944 when the Soviet

zone was agreed on seemed more likely than that the Amer¬

icans and British would be on the Oder.” The second alter¬

native, Campbell says, was rejected by the State Department

because “though it would have given the West some foot¬

hold in East Germany, it would also have put Soviet soldiers

on the Rhine and in the Ruhr”.*** To avoid these situations

* W. Strang, Op. cit., pp. 213-14.

** Ibid., p. 214.

*** Foreign Affairs, January 1956, p. 315.

431

■ 1

the Americans backed the British plan for three zones of

occupation.

The recommendations drawn up by the EAC were ap¬

proved at the Crimea Conference, where, at the same time,

it was decided to give France an occupation zone and a seat

on the EAC. Territory from the British and American zones

was formed into a French zone. Three elements of synchroni¬

sed Allied policy—demilitarisation, denazification and de-

mocratisation of Germany—were formulated in the decision

on Germany adopted at the Crimea Conference. This was a

major triumph of Soviet foreign policy, a triumph conform¬

ing to the interests of all mankind, including the German

people.*

The question of dismembering Germany was raised by the

Western Allies at Yalta as well. Roosevelt spoke in favour

of dividing her into five or seven states.** Churchill declared

that the British Government in principle agreed to her dis¬

memberment.*** This question was turned over for consid¬

eration to a special commission set up under Eden’s chairman¬

ship. On March 9, 1945, on instructions from Eden, Lord

Strang forwarded to F. T. Gusev, the Soviet representative

on that commission, the Draft Terms of Reference for the

Dismemberment of Germany Committee, which stated that

the commission had to determine “in what manner Germany

should be divided, into what parts, with what boundaries and

with what inter-relationship among the parts”.*) On March 26,

1945 Gusev sent Eden a letter stating: “The Soviet Govern¬

ment understands the decision of the Crimea Conference on

the dismemberment of Germany not as an obligatory plan

for the dismemberment of Germany, but as a possible per¬

spective for pressure on Germany with the aim of rendering

her harmless in the event of other means proving inade¬

quate.”**) On Victory Day, May 9, 1945, an address from

the head of the Soviet Government to the people stated in

part: “The Soviet Union celebrates victory, but has no inten¬

tion of either dismembering or destroying Germany.”***)

* Vneshnaya politika Sovielskogo Soyuza ..., Vol. Ill, pp. 101-03.

** Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Malta

and Yalta , Washington, 1955, p. 541.

*** Ibid.

*) International Affairs, No. 5, 1955, p. 42.

**) Ibid.

***) Vneshnaya politika Sovietskogo Soyuza ..., Vol. Ill, p. 45.

432

Thanks to this Soviet stand, Germany was not dismembered

at the time. ‘ By the time of the Potsdam Conference in July

1945,” Neumann notes, “both Britain and the United States

had shifted views and dismemberment plans were dropped.”*

Subsequently, after the war, Britain and the USA

after all put their plan into effect, dismembering Germany

into two parts.

On the question of reparations from Germany Churchill

was, at the Crimea Conference, more hostile than Roosevelt

with regard to the satisfaction of the Soviet Union’s just

claims. It was agreed that Germany would be made to pay

in kind for the damage she had inflicted on the Allied powers

during the war. A Reparations Commission consisting of

Soviet, British and American representatives was formed in

Moscow to draw up a reparations plan. Roosevelt agreed

that the reparations should total 20,000 million dollars and

that half of that sum should go to the Soviet Union.** Chur¬

chill was opposed to such a fair decision. His motives were

that he did not wish Germany, which figured prominently in

his anti-Soviet plans, to be weakened by the exaction of

reparations and, in addition, he did not desire to help in the

restoration of the Soviet Union by satisfying its legitimate

claim to reparations. In this connection, the head of the

Soviet Government declared at Yalta that if the British felt

the USSR should receive no reparations at all it would be

better for them to say so frankly.*** The Soviet Union’s

legitimate reparations claims were never fully satisfied.

Churchill Seeks to Turn the War

Against the Soviet Union

The Yalta decisions stated that the USSR, Britain and the

USA reaffirmed their “common determination to maintain

and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose

and of action which has made victory possible and certain....

Only with continuing and growing co-operation and under¬

standing among our three countries and among all the peace-

loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be

* William L. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 80.

** Vneshnaya politika Sovietskogo Soyuza, 1947 (Soviet Foreign

Policy, 1947), Part 1, Moscow, 1952, p. 419.

»*< H er bert Feis, Op. cit., p. 536.

28-1561

433

realised—a secure and lasting peace.”* For the Soviet

Union this was a programme of action, but for Churchill it

was little more than a piece of eloquent writing. Before the

ink of his signature under the Yalta decisions had had time

to dry he began to act in opposition to them. In the spring of

1945 his actions might have not only wrecked the anti-nazi

coalition but led to more catastrophic consequences for the

world.

By that time he had dropped his Balkan strategy for the

simple reason that the Balkans had been liberated by the

Soviet Army. Instead, he evolved a German strategy which

required that Berlin should be taken at all costs by Western

Allied troops before the Soviet Army got there. Churchill’s

aim was to deprive the Soviet Army of the possibility of

capturing the nazi capital, to detract from the moral and

political significance of its struggle against fascism and obtain

a strong argument to support the claim that the British and

American forces had played the major role in defeating

Germany. Moreover, the capture of Berlin by British and

American troops would have placed almost the entire ter¬

ritory of Germany under Western control and left the Soviet

Army considerably east of the western boundary of the So¬

viet occupation zone. The idea was to prevent Soviet troops

from reaching central Germany.

Churchill writes that in March 1945 the decisive points

of his strategy and policy were:

“First, that Soviet Russia had become a mortal danger to

the free world.

“ Secondly , that a new front must be immediately created

against her onward sweep.

“ Thirdly, that this front in Europe should be as far east

as possible.

“ Fourthly, that Berlin was the prime and true objective

of the Anglo-American armies.

“Fifthly, that the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the

entry into Prague of American troops was of high

consequence.

“Sixthly, that Vienna, and indeed Austria, must be re¬

gulated by the Western powers....

* Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Malta

and Yalta, p. 975.

434

“ Seventhly , that Marshal Tito’s aggressive pretensions .. .

must be curbed.

“ Finally , and above all, that a settlement must be reached

on all major issues between the West and the East in Europe

before the armies of democracy melted”* Such was the pro¬

gramme of action charted by Churchill against the Soviet

Union. The second and last points of this programme plainly

showed the intention of the British leader to use military

force against the USSR. The prime and only “fault” of the

Soviet Union was that its armies were successfully crushing

the nazi armies and, in pursuing them, were advancing far¬

ther and farther westward, bringing liberation to the peo¬

ples of Europe. Churchill wanted the impossible: that Soviet

troops should beat the nazis without entering their territory.

His Berlin strategy had no chance of success not only

because it was a flagrant violation of the Yalta decisions,

which stated that Berlin and a vast territory west of it would

be part of the Soviet zone of occupation. It was thereby pre¬

supposed that this territory would be occupied by Soviet

troops. Churchill’s plan was fraught with extremely dangerous

consequences for the anti-fascist coalition, and another reason

it was unrealistic was that the situation on the Western and

Eastern fronts did not permit the Western Allies to put it

into effect. Therefore, at the close of March, Eisenhower

decided against Churchill’s plan for an offensive against Ber¬

lin, calling it “more than unwise; it was stupid”.** Instead,

he decided on an offensive along the line Kassel-Leipzig. He

communicated his decision to the Soviet Supreme Comman-

der-in-Chief. This was the liaison the Allies had agreed upon

at Yalta, but Churchill fumed with rage, because the “liberty”

taken by Eisenhower had deprived him of the possibility of

continuing to pressure Eisenhower’s Headquarters in an effort,

against common sense, to turn the Western armies towards

Berlin.

Consuming hatred of the Soviet Union and of the East

European peoples, who were aspiring for freedom and prog¬

ress, was muddling Churchill’s thinking. With reference to

the British political and strategic aims in March-April 1945,

Fleming writes: “If ... any one of the Allies had earned the

right to take Berlin, it was Russia. She had supplied the

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 400.

** Dwight D. Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 396.

28 "

435

vast bulk of the blood required to crush Hitlerism. She could

not be denied an occupation zone in Germany on any ground,

and if she was to have one in East Germany Berlin would be

in it.”*

On April 5 Churchill wrote to Roosevelt: “... the more

important that we should join hands with the Russian armies

as far to the east as possible, and, if circumstances allow,

eriter Berlin.”** But circumstances did not allow, and Chur¬

chill realised this two weeks later, for on April 19 he wrote

to Eden, who was in the USA at the time: “It would seem

that the Western Allies are not immediately in a position to

force their way into Berlin. The Russians have 2,500,000

troops on the section of the front opposite that city. The Ame¬

ricans have only their spearheads, say twenty-five divisions,

which are covering an immense front.”***

When it was found that the Berlin strategy could not be

put into effect, Churchill tried the largest piece of perfidy

undertaken in the course of the war against the Soviet Union.

He decided to come to terms with the enemy, with nazi Ger¬

many, to save what had remained of nazism, and, shoulder

to shoulder with the Germans turn, the guns against the

USSR. At the close of April the situation in some measure

favoured the realisation of this plan.

Firstly, nazi Germany was crumbling under the blows of

the Soviet Army, which was storming Berlin. The Soviet

assault was supplemented with an offensive of the Allied

armies in the west. Frantic to save something, their necks at

least, the nazi leaders intensified their attempts to strike a

bargain with Britain and the USA on the terms of surrender

to them and on continuing the war against the USSR.

Alarmed by developments, reactionary circles in Britain and

the USA were prepared to accept such a bargain in order to

save the remnants of nazism in Germany and use them against

the revolutionary movement in Europe. A consequence of

this was, in particular, the dispatch to Switzerland in March

1945 for negotiations with the nazis of representatives of the

British Field-Marshal Alexander, the Allied Supreme Com¬

mander in Italy—General L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of

the Joint Staff of the American 5th Army, and General

* D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., d. 169.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 446.

*** Ibid., p. 449.

436

T. S. Airey, Chief of Intelligence of the Combined Chiefs

of Staff.* Churchill was right when referring to these nego¬

tiations he wrote: “I realised at once that the Soviet Govern¬

ment might be suspicious of a separate military surrender

in the south, which would enable our armies to advance

against reduced opposition as far as Vienna and beyond, or

indeed towards the Elbe or Berlin.”** And how! The Soviet

Government strongly protested against these separate ne¬

gotiations, declaring that “this situation cannot help pre¬

serve and promote trust between our countries”.*** In April

the Germans pressed harder for a separate armistice in the

west. Goering and Himmler vied with each other in an effort

to reach understanding with Britain and the USA.

Secondly, Franklin D. Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945,

and was succeeded to the US Presidency by the narrow¬

minded and rabidly anti-Soviet Harry S. Truman. Churchill

was aware of these qualities and decided to use them to

secure a change of US policy towards the USSR. Without

US co-operation Britain could not strike a bargain with the

Germans and turn the front against the USSR. On April 24

Churchill wrote to Eden that a settlement with the Soviet

Union “can only be founded upon their recognition of

Anglo-American strength. My appreciation is that the new

President is not to be bullied by the Soviets.”** These two

phrases state the concept of relations between Britain and

the USSR and joy over Truman’s rise to power.

In the nazi camp Roosevelt’s death gave rise to hopes for

a miracle—that the Western Allies would turn against the

USSR and nazi Germany would survive. Under the date¬

line of April 29, the log of the German Supreme Command

contains the following entry: “Colonel-General Jodi says

that the war must be continued in order to gain time politi¬

cally.” This implied the hope that a wedge would be driven

between the Soviet Union and its Western Allies. “The

leadership hopes that as a result of this the Western Allies

may, at the eleventh hour, change their attitude towards

Germany.”***

The nazis, it must be admitted, had some grounds for such

* International Affairs, No. 2, 1959, p. 80.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 387.

**■* Correspondence. .., Vol. II, p. 206.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 429.

**) Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal. No. 6, 1960, p. 89.

437

calculations. In any case, this is borne out by Churchill’s

actions at the time. On November 23, 1954 he wrote: “Even

before the war had ended and while the Germans were sur¬

rendering by hundreds of thousands and our streets were

crowded with cheering people, I telegraphed to Lord Mont¬

gomery directing him to be careful in collecting the German

arms, to stack them so that they could easily be issued again

to the German soldiers whom we should have to work with

if the Soviet advance continued.”*

It was not blameworthy that arms were collected and

stacked, but the fact that Churchill was getting ready to co¬

operate with German troops against the Soviet Union and

planned to issue weapons to German soldiers for use against

the USSR was quite another matter. It meant that Britain

was quite willing to enter into an alliance with the Germans

and work hand in glove with them in turning the guns

against the USSR.

But this could not be done without the USA, and as a

first step in that direction Churchill decided to come to terms

with the Americans on the conclusion of a separate armistice

with the Germans in the West in violation of the most im¬

portant agreements signed with the Soviet Union. Here is

the story as told by Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of

the US President’s Staff: “An exciting sequence of events

that built up to the climax of the unconditional surrender of

Germany began on April 25. I was at lunch with my brother

at the Army-Navy Club when a telephone call from the

White House sent me hurrying to the Pentagon Building.

There, at 2 p.m., I found the President, General Marshall,

Admiral King and Major-General Hull waiting for a tele¬

phone call from Prime Minister Churchill. We were gathered

in the communications centre, a portion of the enormous

Pentagon guarded even more closely, if possible, than the

offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was a connection

on a secret line to a small switchboard in Churchill’s offices

at No. 10 Downing Street in London. Shortly after I arrived,

the Prime Minister was on the ‘secret’ as he called it. I

listened in with the President.

“Churchill said he had information from Sweden through

the American Minister that Himmler had asked Count

Bernadotte to make an offer to America and Britain of the

* The Times, November 24, 1954, p. 8.

438

surrender of all German forces on the Western Front, inclu¬

ding those in Holland, Denmark and Norway. Churchill

reported that Himmler said he was speaking for the German

Government....

“Truman told the Prime Minister that America could

agree only to an unconditional surrender on all fronts in

agreement with Russia and Britain. Churchill was anxious

to end the war. Truman said he was, too, but we must stand

by our commitments.”*

This thwarted Churchill’s plans. There were two reasons

for this: the strength of the Soviet Union and the will of

the peoples. Churchill blames the failure of his plan on the

USA. “The United States,” he wrote, “stood on the scene of

victory ... but without a true and coherent design. Britain,

though still very powerful, could not act decisively alone.

I could at this stage only warn and plead. Thus this climax

of apparently measureless success was to me a most unhappy

time. (I moved amid cheering crowds) ... with an aching

heart and a mind oppressed by forebodings.”** However, the

USA was likewise powerless to do anything in the direction

desired by Churchill.

Roosevelt had been aware of Churchill’s ideas on this

score. In Hyde Park in December 1944 he “talked reflectively

of British ability to get other countries to combine in

some sort of bloc against the Soviet Union and said soberly,

‘It’s what we’ve got to expect’ ”.*** For Churchill America

was of particular interest in this light. He would obviously

have given her the opportunity to bear the brunt of the war

he was planning against the USSR. There is no doubt that

this was his line of thinking. He spoke of the prospects of

another world war in a telegram to Eden on May 4.** But

the prospects were unfavourable.

As early as May 16, 1944 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff

wrote to the Secretary of State that at the close of the war

“the outstanding fact to be noted is the recent phenomenal

development of the heretofore latent Russian military and

economic strength. ... In a conflict between these two powers

[i.e., Britain and the USSR.— V. T.] the disparity in the mili¬

tary strengths that they could dispose upon that continent

* William D. Leahy, Op. cit., pp. 354-55.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 400.

*** D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., p. 162.

*) Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 439.

439

would, under present conditions, be far too great to be over¬

come by our intervention on the side of Britain. Having due

regard to the military factors involved—resources, man¬

power, geography and particularly our ability to project our

strength across the ocean and exert it decisively upon the

continent—we might be able to successfully defend Britain,

but we could not, under existing conditions, defeat Russia.

In other words, we would find ourselves engaged in a war

which we could not win.”* This was one of the two principal

reasons underlying the US stand and the collapse of Chur¬

chill’s plans.

The second was that under no circumstances would the

people have supported a “switch” of the war against the

USSR, which they rightly and justly regarded as their lib¬

erator from fascism. In an article published in 1955, Wood¬

ward wrote: “Public opinion indeed outside the areas directly

under Russian control would not have understood, and to a

large extent would have been outraged, by the threat of

force against an Ally which had in fact taken for so long

the weight of the German attack on land and whose resist¬

ance had made possible the invasion of German-controlled

Europe from the west.”** A memorandum on “international

communism” was prepared for Truman on the eve of the

Berlin Conference. Among other things, it pointed out that

as a result of the heroic feats of the Soviet troops . .. “the

majority of Europeans regard them as their liberators. Even

in the West the Red Army receives the major share of the

credit.”***

Thus, neither the balance of power nor moral and political

factors favoured the implementation of Churchill’s adventur¬

ist designs. The popular nature of the anti-fascist coalition

was pronounced at the time. Created by the will of the peo¬

ples to fight fascism, it was, by their will, preserved in the

spring of 1945 when the joint efforts of the USSR, Britain,

the USA and their Allies brought the long-awaited victory

over Germany. The act of military surrender, whose terms

were dictated by representatives of the Supreme Commander-

* Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conference of Berlin,

1945, Vol. I, Washington, 1960, p. 265.

** Llewellyn Woodward, “Some Reflections on British Policy”, 1939-

45; International Affairs, July 1955, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, p. 283.

*** Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conference of Berlin,

Vol. I, p. 278.

440

in-Chief of the Red Army and the Supreme Commander

of the Western Allied forces, was signed by the German

High Command in defeated Berlin on May 8, 1945.

Britain

and the United Nations Organisation

Almost immediately after the Moscow Foreign Ministers

Conference in October 1943, the British Foreign Office ini¬

tiated preliminary discussions with the US State Department

on questions of procedure in connection with the agreement

reached at Moscow to set up an international security or¬

ganisation. At the same time, a special Interdepartmental

Committee in London engaged in drawing up recommenda¬

tions which the British Government would submit at the

time the future world body was set up. This activity resulted

in five lengthy memoranda dealing with the pattern, functions

and aims of the planned organisation. The British plan en¬

visaged retaining in the new organisation many features

of the Covenant of the League of Nations, but made it more

flexible. Moreover, provision was made for the possibility

of regional organisations emerging side by side with the

world body and in some way linked up with it.

When the War Cabinet examined the prepared recom¬

mendations, the question of regional organisations at once

acquired paramount importance. Churchill supported the

idea of setting up regional bodies for Europe, America and

Asia, as well as, possibly, for Africa. He formulated his views

on this issue in a memorandum of May 8, 1944, in which

he enlarged on the idea of regional organisations, an idea

which in his mind meant preserving the Anglo-American

military bloc and promoting co-operation between the two

countries after the war. He planned to fit a British-controlled

United States of Europe and the Anglo-American mili¬

tary alliance into the future edifice of a world security body.

He regarded the Anglo-American bloc as a means of

removing American objections to a regional federation in

Europe and as a bulwark for a declining Britain in post¬

war world politics.

Churchill worked on these ideas throughout the latter half

of the war. In May 1943, when he was on a visit to the

United States, he invited a large group of American leaders

(Roosevelt was not present) to the British Embassy and

441

expounded to them his ideas about setting up an association

consisting of Britain, the USA, the USSR and, possibly,

China, if the Americans wanted “to prevent further aggres¬

sion in future by Germany or Japan”. Subordinate to this

World Council there should be three Regional Councils: one

for Europe, one for the American Hemisphere, and one for

the Pacific.* To allay American fears that the British might

use the European Council against the USA, Churchill said

it was imperative that “the United States and the British

Commonwealth worked together in fraternal association”.

This co-operation was to be so close as to lead to some sort

of integration of US and British citizenship, the joint use

of more military bases for the defence of common interests,

the preservation of the Combined Anglo-American Staff and

the working out of a common line of foreign policy. The

Americans at once saw what Churchill was driving at. US

Vice-President Henry A. Wallace said he was anxious “lest

other countries should think that Britain and the United

States were trying to boss the world”. Churchill did not

deny it. “I made it perfectly clear,” he says, “that they ought

not to put off necessary and rightful action by such sug-

a* 3 5 in¬

gestions. • 1

Churchill dwelt at length on these ideas in his memoran¬

dum of May 8, 1944 to the War Cabinet when it examined

the nature of the future international security organisation.

In face of opposition from the prime ministers of the Domin¬

ions, Churchill had to drop his idea of regional alliances,

but the idea of a United States of Europe remained in his

plans.***

At Dumbarton Oaks, USA, representatives of the USSR,

USA, Britain and China met in conference in the period from

August 22 to September 28, 1944 for preliminary talks on

the charter of the new organisation. It was recommended

that in addition to a General Assembly representing all

members, the new organisation should have a Security Coun¬

cil to act as the main body responsible for the maintenance

of world peace and security. The Security Council would

have 11 members: five permanent members—the USSR, Brit¬

ain, the USA, France and China—and six non-permanent

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 717.

** Ibid., p. 721.

*** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., pp. 454-56.

442

members elected for a term of two years by the General As¬

sembly. Provision was made for other bodies—a Military

Staff Committee, an Economic and Social Council and an

International Court of Justice.

All questions save two were settled with relative ease and

speed. These concerned the voting procedure in the Security

Council and the list of foundation members of the future or¬

ganisation. By tradition, the British and Americans had a

separate discussion of all the questions that were later brought

up at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. This discussion, says

Sir Alexander Cadogan, who represented Britain at Dum¬

barton Oaks, showed that the Americans had come provision¬

ally to the conclusion “that the permanent members of the

Council should have a right of veto on any subject in which

their own interests were involved, and that parties to a dis¬

pute should therefore be allowed, as in the League, to vote

on it”.* The idea of a veto in the Security Council, around

which bourgeois politicians and the bourgeois press raised

a clamour after the war, was thus advanced by the Amer¬

icans. When the British opposed this idea during the separ¬

ate Anglo-US talks, the Americans told them “that without

a provision of this kind it would be difficult or impossible to

get the plan through the Senate”.**

At Dumbarton Oaks the Soviet representative spoke in

favour of the principle of unanimity among the permanent

members in the settlement of issues in the Security Council,

but encountered opposition from the British representative.

The American representative abandoned his original stand

and aligned himself with the British representative.

In the USA there were lengthy arguments over this ques¬

tion. One group of statesmen opposed the veto, another,

which included military leaders, Cordell Hull writes, was

“willing to go farther than many of the political advisers in

agreeing to Russia’s position that the veto should be applied

without exception”.*** This implied that the Americans might

return to their former stand.

What should be Britain’s stand in this case? It was not

easy to oppose both the USSR and the USA in this issue.

After pondering the situation the London politicians came

* Ibid., p. 456.

** Ibid.

*** Cordell Hull, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1470.

443

to the conclusion that the principle of unanimity was not bad

after all, even for the British Government. It is said that

Churchill was influenced by the opinion of Field Marshal

Jan Smuts, who in September 1944 wrote him a series of

letters on the question of the international security organisa¬

tion. Smuts pointed out that the veto issue was “one which

involves the honour and standing of Russia among her Al¬

lies”, and recommended accepting the Soviet proposal. He

offered two arguments in favour of this: firstly, if the So¬

viet proposal were not accepted the Soviet Union would not

join the contemplated organisation and would “become the

power centre of another group” and, secondly, “a brake like

unanimity may not be so bad a thing” for Britain as well.

“Where so much is at stake for the future,” Smuts wrote in

conclusion, “we simply must agree, and cannot afford to

differ.”*

Another factor influencing the stand of the British and

US governments was that the peoples of Britain and the USA,

like those of the rest of the world, wanted a world peace¬

keeping body in which the USSR, Britain and the USA

would act in a spirit of complete concord and co-operation,

and they wanted the coalition of Great Powers, which had

won victory, to ensure world peace. “The American and

British people were still counting on a continuation of co¬

operation with the Soviet Union after the war,” Herbert Feis

notes, summing up the results of the Dumbarton Oaks

Conference.**

All this told on the Yalta Conference, where the issues

outstanding at Dumbarton Oaks were finally settled. In De¬

cember 1944, before the Yalta Conference opened, Roosevelt

submitted new proposals for the voting procedure in the Se¬

curity Council, meeting the desires of the USSR. “This calls,

you will note,” he wrote to Stalin, “for the unanimity of the

permanent members in all Council decisions relating to a

determination of a threat to peace, as well as to action for

the removal of such a threat or for the suppression of ag¬

gression or other breaches of the peace. As a practical matter,

I can see that this is necessary if action of this kind is to be

feasible. I am consequently prepared to accept in this respect

the view expressed by your Government in its memorandum

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 183-84.

** Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 437.

444

presented at the Dumbarton Oaks meetings on an Interna¬

tional Security Organisation.”* This put an end to British

vacillation, and a decision on this question was adopted in

the wording suggested by Roosevelt. In addition, Britain and

the USA promised to support the suggestion to invite the

Ukraine and Byelorussia as foundation members of the world

body.

At Yalta it was decided to convene a United Nations Con¬

ference in San Francisco, USA, on April 25, 1945 to draw

up the final text of the International Security Organisation’s

charter.

On the day the San Francisco Conference which instituted

the United Nations Organisation opened, April 25, 1945,

Soviet and American troops made history by establish¬

ing contact on the Elbe River in Germany. While the

preparations for the conference were under way the British

Government was preoccupied with the balance of votes at

San Francisco, because it would be attended by only nine

delegations from Europe, while Latin America would be

represented by 19 delegations. It sought to use the question

of inviting a Polish delegation to San Francisco to compel

the Soviet Union to agree to a remodelling of the Polish

Government, which would bring reactionary elements into

prominence. When this was rejected the British thought of

postponing the San Francisco Conference in order to pres¬

sure the USSR. Churchill was prepared to go so far as to

hold the conference without the USSR,** but these were help¬

less gestures. The times had changed and questions of this

kind could no longer be settled without Soviet participation.

Churchill found he could not even suggest postponing the

conference, for it would have meant going against the wishes

of the US Government.

At San Francisco a sharp discussion flared up round the

question of how the unanimity of the permanent members

of the Security Council would be implemented in practice.

Bound by the Yalta decisions, the British Government could

not openly demand a revision of these decisions. Therefore,

in collusion with the US Government, it used the bloc of

small countries that took shape at the conference to “specify”

the use of the veto to the disadvantage of the USSR. This

* Correspondence ..., Vol. II, pp. 173-74.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 636-37.

445

was done under the screen of demagogic declarations about

the rights of small countries and so forth. The most active

part in these attacks on the principle of unanimity was played

by Herbert V. Evatt, the Australian Foreign Minister. The

decision that was finally adopted on this question proved to

be satisfactory to the USSR.

Britain was particularly anxious about how the United

Nations Charter (the name was suggested by the British

delegation at Dumbarton Oaks) would embody the idea of

international trusteeship, which the US Government had

urged throughout the war.

The Tehran Conference, held at the close of 1943, had

been unable to deal earnestly with the problem of colonies

in the post-war world. Roosevelt mentioned the colonial prob¬

lem to Stalin, and this opportunity was taken by the Soviet

delegation to record its unconditional stand against colo¬

nialism. Stalin told Roosevelt that “he did not propose to

have the Allies shed blood to restore Indochina, for example,

to the old French colonial rule”. He welcomed the develop¬

ments in the Lebanon as “the first step toward the independ¬

ence of people who had formerly been colonial subjects”.*

He agreed with the trusteeship idea, emphasising that he

had in mind the creation of a system that would help the

oppressed peoples gain their independence sooner. Edward

R. Stettinius says Roosevelt related the following episode:

“When Churchill objected, the President said, ‘Now, look

here, Winston, you are outvoted three to one.’ ”** By “three”,

Roosevelt meant China, which had supported the idea of

international trusteeship at the Cairo Conference.

In December 1944 the Americans again raised the trustee¬

ship issue, this time in conversation with Halifax. In this

connection Churchill wrote to Eden: “Pray remember my

declaration in a speech of November 1942, against liquidat¬

ing the British Empire. If the Americans want to take

Japanese islands which they have conquered, let them do so

with our blessing and any form of words that may be agree¬

able to them. But ‘Hands Off the British Empire’ is our

maxim.”***

* Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Cairo

and Tehran, 1943, p. 485.

** Edward R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, The Yalta

Conference, Garden City, New York, 1949, p. 238.

*** Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. 531.

446

The principles of the future trusteeship system were ag¬

reed on at the Yalta Conference, where it was decided that

the UN Charter would provide for a territorial trusteeship

machinery which would take over the mandated territories

of the League of Nations, the territories wrested from the

Axis countries at the termination of the war and any other

territories that might voluntarily join the trusteeship system.

The provision for the voluntary inclusion of territories into

the trusteeship system greatly restricted the importance of

the planned system as a means facilitating the independence

of colonial countries. This provision was recorded on British

insistence with US backing.

The Soviet Union was engaged in the final battles against

Germany and, desiring to preserve unity in the anti-fascist

coalition, was thus unable to achieve more at Yalta. How¬

ever, several months later the military situation was such as

to enable the Soviet Union to do much at San Francisco

towards making the trusteeship system conform more fully

to the interests of the enslaved nations.

The discussion of the destiny of colonial peoples, con¬

ducted at various inter-Allied and international conferences

during the war, was marked by an acute struggle between

the USSR, which was championing the interests of the en¬

slaved peoples, and the imperialist powers, Britain, the USA

and France among them, who, each in its own way, pressed for

the preservation of colonialism. Through the efforts mostly

of the Soviet Union the problem of colonies was taken out

of the exclusive jurisdiction of the colonial powers concerned

and turned into an international problem. Thanks to the So¬

viet Union and in spite of the desires of the colonialists the

discussion of this problem proceeded from the angle of

liberating the oppressed peoples of dependent and colonial

countries from the yoke of imperialism.

At the San Francisco Conference it was forcefully demon¬

strated that in the anti-fascist coalition the Soviet Union

was the only consistent champion of the freedom of the

enslaved nations. Woodward notes that the “Russians ...

wished to insert in the Charter a statement that the ultimate

objective for ‘trust territories’ and colonies generally was

independence. With American and French support the

British delegation obtained a more limited statement.”*

* Ibid., Op. cit., p. 535.

447

Speaking of the alignment of forces at the San Francisco

Conference, the American historian McNeill points out that

“the Soviet Union ... championed the rights of colonial

peoples” while “the Americans supported the British and

French”,* i.e., colonialism.

At San Francisco the sharpest struggle between the Soviet

delegation and the delegations of the colonial powers flared

up over the question of the aims of the United Nations Or¬

ganisation with regard to the colonial peoples. This was the

principal issue of the discussions of the trusteeship system.

Much depended on how this issue would be decided. Firstly,

the inclusion in the UN Charter of the principle of independ¬

ence would inevitably give powerful impetus to the national

liberation movement and be a call to the oppressed peoples

to activate their efforts with the objective of winning inde¬

pendence as quickly as possible. If this principle were to be

rejected and something else incorporated in the UN Charter

in its stead it would bring grist to the mill of the colonialists,

enabling them to maintain, with references to the authority

of this key conference, that the time had not come for

granting independence to the colonial peoples. This sort of

“settlement” of the issue would have been a serious obstacle

to the national liberation movement. Secondly, the incorpora¬

tion or non-incorporation of the principle of independence

in the UN Charter would determine the future attitude of

that organisation towards the desire of nations for liberation,

and how far the UN could be utilised to facilitate the strug¬

gle of the peoples for independence.

The US stand on this issue at San Francisco convincingly

demonstrated the colonialist character of US policy. The

American draft of the UN Charter’s chapter dealing with

international trusteeship stated that the purpose of trustee¬

ship was to enable the colonial territories to achieve self-

government. The British draft stated that self-government

for the peoples concerned was the purpose of trusteeship. The

French draft did not even mention self-government, speak¬

ing only of “the progressive development of the political in¬

stitutions” in the trust territories.** The USA, Britain and

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 597.

** S. B. Krylov, lstoriya sozdaniya Organizatsii Obyedinennykh Natsii,

Razrabotka teksta Ustava Organizatsii Obyedinennykh Natsii, (1944-

1945) (History of the Establishment of the UNO. The Working Out of

the UN Charter [1944-1945]), Moscow, 1960, pp. 157-58.

448

France were supported by the Netherlands, the Union of

South Africa, Belgium, Australia and some other countries.

A colonialist bloc thus emerged as soon as the San Francisco

Conference opened. It made every attempt to obtain a dec¬

laration to the effect that the time had not come for raising

the question of independence for the colonial peoples, that

this was a matter of the distant future, and that for the

present self-government was as far as the colonial people

could go.

The Soviet delegation opposed the colonialists with the

demand that the UN Charter contain a provision on inde¬

pendence as the objective of the planned trusteeship system.

It suggested that Chapter 1 of the Charter proclaiming the

general purposes of the UN should state that the UN would

promote friendly relations between nations “on the basis of

respect for the principle of the equality and self-determina¬

tion of peoples”.* This principle obviously ran against the

grain of the imperialist powers, whose ideology and policy

is founded on the inequality of nations. However, the world

situation in this period was such that the colonial powers

could not tell the world they did not consider all nations to

be equal. Ruth B. Russell writes that the Americans clearly

did not like the Soviet proposal but they “agreed that it

would be difficult to oppose the principle”.** The Soviet

proposal for inserting in the UN Charter the principle of

the equality and self-determination of peoples was accepted.

Correspondingly the Soviet Union submitted amendments

to the American draft of the Chapter on trusteeship, suggest¬

ing recording in the Charter that the purpose of trusteeship

was not only self-government but also self-determination

with the active participation of the peoples of the colonial ter¬

ritories in order to achieve complete state independence as

soon as possible.*** This proposal was supported by China,

Iraq, the Philippines, Egypt and a number of other countries.

“The British, French, Netherlands, South African and United

States delegates,” Russell says, “were against including the

controversial word. They elaborated previous arguments,

stressing that ‘self-government’ did not exclude independ¬

ence.”** This marked the beginning of the second stage of

* Ibid., p. 111.

** Ruth B. Russell, Op. cit., p. 811.

*** S. B. Krylov, Op. cit., p. 157.

*) Ruth B. Russell, Op. cit., p. 816.

29-1561

449

the Soviet Union’s struggle for the inclusion in the UN

Charter of the principle of independence for oppressed

nations.

The British, American and other colonialist delegates

found their position difficult. They had to oppose an idea

which had the sympathy of all freedom-loving nations and

which was being championed by the Soviet Union with all

the weight of its immense international prestige. The ar¬

guments offered by the opponents of independence were

both untenable and contradictory. While declaring that “self-

government” did not exclude “independence”, they were

nonetheless opposed to the term “independence” figuring in

the Charter. They maintained this would be tantamount to

interference in the internal affairs of the colonial powers.

However, it was not clear why the provision on self-govern¬

ment was not qualified as interference as well.

The British argument against the inclusion of the prin¬

ciple of independence as the aim of the international trustee¬

ship system was that it would shatter colonial empires, which,

they said, were a blessing to mankind. The British African

colonies, the British delegate said, “saved us from defeat”,

adding that the same could be said of the French and Bel¬

gian colonial empires which were a “machine for the defence

of liberty”. “Could we really contemplate as the conscious

aim of our deliberations, the destruction of this machine or

its separation into its component parts?” The insertion of the

principle of independence in the trusteeship chapter, he

held, would “be unrealistic and prejudicial to peace and

security”.'"'

In order to calm public opinion the American delegation

published a statement in which it “explained” its stand: in the

American view “‘self-government’ was intended ‘clearly’ to

include the attainment of independence ‘if the people of a

trusteeship area so desire and are prepared and able to as¬

sume the responsibilities of independence’ ”.* ** This “ex¬

planation” only showed the reluctance of the Americans to

recognise the right of the colonial peoples to independence.

It convinced nobody, and the US delegation, Ruth Russell

says, were worried lest the omission of the independence

clause from the Charter would “enable the Soviet Union ...

* Ruth B. Russel, Op. cit., pp. 823-24.

** Ibid., p. 817.

450

■

to capitalise on ‘Western’ opposition”.* The US Secretary

of the Interior insisted that the USA come out “in favour

of the rapid advancement of dependent peoples towards self-

rule and independence” for this was essential “to American

moral and political leadership”.**

Acting together, the Americans, British and French

succeeded in deleting from the Soviet draft the words “the

speediest achievement of complete state independence”.

However, through Soviet insistence a compromise wording

was accepted and inserted in the UN Charter. It stated that

the progressive development of the trust territories “towards

self-government or independence” had to be promoted.

After agreeing to this wording the Soviet Union secured the

addition of the words: “as may be appropriate to ... the

freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned”.*** This

was a major achievement which conformed to the aims of

the national liberation movement.

The objective of the imperialist powers was to deprive the

UN trusteeship body of authority and restrict its functions

as far as possible. The Soviet Union steered a totally different

course at the San Francisco Conference. In face of British

and French opposition, it secured the inclusion of all the

permanent members in the UN Trusteeship Council. Thus

in the Council were not only colonialist powers but also a

country that had no colonies and sympathised with the liber¬

ation aspirations of the colonial peoples. This was recogni¬

tion of the fact that concern for the destinies of enslaved

peoples was a matter of the whole of mankind, and not only

of colonialist powers. Having secured a seat on the Trus¬

teeship Council, the Soviet Union obtained the possibility

of consistently using it to champion the oppressed peoples.

On Soviet initiative it was ruled that “the trusteeship

system shall not apply to territories which have become

members of the United Nations, relationship among which

shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign

equality”.** The USA, Britain and France were thus depri¬

ved of the possibility of imposing on India, the Philippines,

Syria and the Lebanon the status of trust territories.

* Ibid.

** Ibid., p. 819.

* ** Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 1945, Chapter XII,

Article 76, p. 25.

*) Ibid., Article 78.

20 *

451

Through the efforts mainly of the Soviet Union the UN

Charter particularly where it concerned dependent territo¬

ries was turned into a more effective instrument than the

League of Nations Covenant. However, the UN Charter

was the result of a compromise, hence its measure of

weakness.

The San Francisco Conference showed that at the con¬

cluding stage of the war, when the Soviet Union’s political

and other potentialities increased, the Soviet Government

came forward more and more energetically and effectively

as the champion of the colonial peoples’ struggle for free¬

dom. At the same time, the USA formed an ever closer bloc

with Britain, France, the Netherlands and Belgium on the

platform of colonialism. There were three reasons for this.

First, with the war drawing to a close, American ruling cir¬

cles felt more and more strongly that the USA should take

over some territories belonging to Japan and other coun¬

tries. McNeill points out that the “change in the American

position on trusteeships between the time of the Moscow

Conference of Foreign Ministers (when Hull first formally

broached the idea) and the San Francisco Conference meas¬

ured the growth of military influence in the determination

of American post-war policy, and served, also, as an index

of how the changed military position of the country reacted

upon traditional views of imperialism. From 1944 onward

American official opinion was far less critical of the British

Empire than had been the case in the first years of the war.

The possible advantages of being able to use British bases,

scattered so conveniently over the world, had dawned on

American military leaders; and their own ambitions in the

Pacific made it illogical for them to voice criticism of analo¬

gous British arrangements in other parts of the world.”"'

Secondly, the powerful post-war upsurge of the national

liberation movement which ultimately brought about the

downfall of the colonial system influenced the American

stand. This upsurge directly threatened colonial interests not

only in their traditional British form, but also in their

American variants. Thirdly, the powerful wave of socialist

revolutions which soon brought a number of European and

Asian countries to the road of socialist development was

regarded by America’s rulers as a menace to the capitalist

* William Hardy McNeill, Op. cit., p. 597.

452

world, and in face of that menace they sought to form a

bloc with their imperialist rivals against the Soviet Union

and the revolutionary movement. Cordell Hull considered

“it inexpedient to insist too vigorously on anti-colonialism

because of the need for the colonial powers’ continued

support for American policies in Europe”.* The death of

the realist Roosevelt and the installation in the White House

of people who thought differently expedited the change of

the American stand on the colonial question.

On what was for Churchill another sore question, that

of regional arrangements, it was recorded in the UN Char¬

ter that nothing in it “precludes the existence of regional

arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters

relating to the maintenance of international peace and

security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that

such arrangements or agencies and their activities are con¬

sistent with the purposes and principles of the United

Nations”.**

The setting up of the United Nations Organisation and

the adoption of its Charter at San Francisco were positive

phenomena in world politics, and an indubitable achieve¬

ment of the anti-fascist coalition. Soviet foreign policy did

much to smooth the way for this achievement. At San Fran¬

cisco the USSR repeatedly demonstrated its desire to co¬

operate with Britain, the USA and other countries and

made reasonable concessions to them to attain that aim. The

New York Times reported: “The Conference record shows,

the delegates note, ten concessions by Russia.”*** In this

connection Fleming points out that this “was the record of

a Government willing to make real and important conces¬

sions ... in order to get agreement for a great undertaking

in co-operation”.*'

The British Government regarded the results of the San

Francisco Conference as satisfactory. On June 26 its dele¬

gation signed the UN Charter together with the other dele¬

gations. However, it obviously did not intend to use the new

organisation for the purpose it had been established.

Churchill felt that in spite of the existence of that organisa-

* F. R. Dulles and G. E. Ridinger, “The Anti-Colonial Policies of

Franklin D. Roosevelt”, Political Science Quarterly , March 1955, p. 18.

** Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VIII, Art. 52.

*** D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., p. 286.

*) Ibid., p. 287.

453

tion there had to be in the post-war world an Anglo-Ame¬

rican bloc which would secure world domination to Britain

and the USA. In conversation with Truman three weeks

after the San Francisco Conference (during the Potsdam

Conference), Churchill elaborated on his old idea of joint

Anglo-US utilisation of military bases, the preservation of

the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee and on agreement

between Britain and the USA in all regions of the world.

“Britain,” Churchill said, “was a smaller Power than the

United States, but she had much to give.” When Truman

observed that all this would have to be harmonised with the

policy of the United Nations, Churchill replied that “there

was nothing in it if they [military bases.— Ed.] were made

common to everybody. A man might propose marriage to a

young lady, but it was not much use if he were told that she

would always be a sister to him.” According to Churchill,

Truman seemed to be in full accord with this but noted that

it had to be “presented in a suitable fashion” so it would

“not appear to take crudely the form of a military alliance

a deux'* This policy did not hold out for the United

Nations the prospect of much success in the promotion of

international co-operation in the maintenance of world peace

and security. It could not but affect the Berlin Conference

as well.

Britain and the Potsdam Conference

After Britain failed to strike an eleventh-hour bargain

with the dying nazi regime in Germany and, in co-operation

with it and the USA, attack the USSR, she had recourse to

another plan designed to deprive the USSR of influence

over the settlement of European problems and to suppress

the revolutions in Eastern Europe. Under this plan the

United States troops that had occupied a sizable part of the

Soviet zone of occupation in Germany were not to be with¬

drawn until the Soviet Union had accepted all the Anglo-

US demands regarding its policy in Europe. It was proposed

to hold an urgent summit meeting and use the threat of force

to compel the Soviet Union to accept British and US terms.

On May 4, 1945 Churchill wrote to Eden that the “pro-

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 547-48.

454

posed withdrawal of the United States Army to the occu¬

pational lines which were arranged with the Russians and

Americans ... would mean the tide of Russian domination

sweeping forward 120 miles on a front of 300 or 400 miles.

This would be an event which, if it occurred, would be one

of the most melancholy in history.” To prevent this he

proposed that the British and Americans “ ought not to

retreat their present positions to the occupational line until

we are satisfied about Poland, and also about the temporary

character of the Russian occupation of Germany, and the

conditions to be established in the Russianised or Russian-

controlled countries in the Danube valley, particularly

Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans".*

The intention was thus to compel the USSR to allow

counter-revolution to be exported to the East European

countries, permit the suppression of the people’s democratic

revolution in progress in these countries, return these coun¬

tries to the capitalist system and turn them into Anglo-

American-controlled anti-Soviet spearheads. At Potsdam,

Fleming writes, the British and Americans presented a

“programme for insuring that Rumania and Bulgaria should

be organised on the Western model, and remain in the

Western orbit”.** The above extracts from Churchill’s letter

are testimony that this programme concerned not just these

two countries but the whole of Eastern Europe. Inasmuch as

there were Soviet troops in the East European countries, and

the Soviet Union thereby bore the main responsibility for

the situation in them, the Churchill programme envisaged

enforced Soviet participation in his counter-revolutionary

designs.

Churchill was not in the least disturbed by the fact that

this plan was a flagrant violation of the Yalta decisions and

of other agreements with the USSR. He said it would be

catastrophic if Britain firmly abided by all her agree¬

ments.*** Late in May 1945 when Truman’s personal

representative suggested to Churchill that with the USSR

“there had been an express agreement as to these zones”,

Churchill replied “that conditions had greatly changed”.**

* Ibid., pp. 438-39. Italicised by the author.—Ed.

** D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., p. 290.

*** Ibid., p. 483.

*) Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conference of Berlin,

1945, Vol. I, p. 67.

455

This convincingly shows the British Government’s attitude

to the commitments it had made during the war.

Churchill told the Americans that “we ought to seek a

meeting with Stalin face to face and make sure that an

agreement was reached about the whole front”.* In a mes¬

sage to Truman on May 12 he wrote of an “iron curtain”

and suggested coming “to an understanding with Russia, or

see where we are with her, before we weaken our armies

mortally or retire to the zones of occupation”.** He was

extremely worried when the Americans began transferring

their troops to the Far East and British public opinion began

to clamour for the demobilisation of the British Army. That

spurred him on to speed an urgent summit meeting in order

to intimidate the Soviet Union with Anglo-American

might.

This gamble was fraught with the danger of a war

between the Anglo-Saxon powers and the USSR. Churchill

was aware of this and took the risk deliberately. The British

Chiefs of Staff were instructed to study the possibility of a

war against the Soviet Union. We learn of this from the

diary of Field Marshal Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial

General Staff, whose entry under the date-line May 24, 1945

states: “This evening I went carefully through the plan¬

ners’ report on the possibility of taking on Russia should

trouble arise in our future discussions with her. We were

instructed to carry out this investigation.”***

The Americans realised that the British were steering

towards war with the USSR. Two days after Brooke studied

the planners’ conclusions, Joseph Davies, Truman’s personal

representative, had a conversation with Churchill and

reported to the President that it was the British Premier’s

purpose “to employ the presence of American forces and

their position in advance of their lines as trading material

to induce concessions from the Soviets. His policy was based

upon the ‘tough approach’. He was willing to run the great

risk which such a gamble entails.”*) Davies had no doubts

that this gamble was fraught with the threat of war.

* Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 445.

** Ibid., p. 499.

*** Arthur Bryant, Op. cit., p. 469.

*) Foreign Relations of the United, States. "The Conference of Berlin,

Vol. I, p. 78.

456

Churchill’s “attitude”, he wrote, “placed not only the future,

but possibly the immediate peace in real danger”."'

The Americans realised that if war broke out they would

have to bear the brunt of the fighting because Britain had

neither the potentialities nor the inclination to shoulder half

the war costs. They therefore had to decide urgently their

attitude to Churchill’s plans. When he urged the Americans

to take a “tough approach” to the USSR he took into

account the change that was taking place in the USA

towards a more hostile policy to the Soviet Union. In a

radio broadcast on May 22, 1945 US Under-Secretary of

State Sumner Welles declared: “In five short weeks since

the death of President Roosevelt the policy which he had so

painstakingly carried on has been changed. Our Govern¬

ment now appears to the Russians as the spearhead of an

apparent bloc of the Western nations opposed to the Soviet

Union.”"" Truman did not venture on the road suggested by

Churchill for several reasons. The principal reason was that

Britain and the United States were not strong enough mili¬

tarily for a victorious war against the USSR. This has

been stated plainly in the above-quoted conclusion of the

US Joint Chiefs of Staff of May 16, 1944. It was to be

found, among other documents, in the reference file of the

United States delegation at the Crimea Conference. Later

it was recorded in the dossier prepared for the Berlin Con¬

ference, which meant that American military opinion had

not changed in the spring of 1945.""* ** ***

The British military leaders held the same opinion. After

studying the report on the possibility of starting hostilities

against the Soviet Union, Field Marshal Alan Brooke wrote

in his diary on May 24, 1945: “The idea is, of course, fan¬

tastic and the chances of success quite impossible. There is

no doubt that from now onwards Russia is all-powerful in

Europe.”*'

Another important factor was that the hands of the

Americans were tied by the war against Japan, which the

British regarded as generally an “American affair”. The

* Ibid., p. 72.

** Congressional Record, Vol. 91, Part II, p. A 2507, k. 47.

*** Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conference of Berlin,

Vol. I, pp. 264-66.

*) Arthur Bryant, Op. cit., p. 470.

457

USA could not risk another war in Europe while the war

in the Pacific was raging, and desiring Soviet assistance in

the Far East the Americans were reluctant to let relations

with the USSR get out of hand. Moreover, in the spring

of 1945 the Americans knew that the creation of an atom

bomb would soon be completed and, therefore, as Feis

writes, felt that “if a contest of will against the Russians

involving possible transit into war should prove inevitable,

it would be better to have it come after we and the world

knew of this new master weapon”. 51. Besides, in Washington

it was realised that Churchill was provoking a clash with

the USSR not only to deprive it of influence in European

affairs but to strengthen British domination in Europe, which

clearly was not to the liking of the US Government. Joseph

Davies writes that Churchill was hoping to use American

manpower and resources to support the British policy of

“leading Europe”.* ** The American ruling circles naturally

were not inclined to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for

their imperialist rivals. On May 14 the US Government

courteously rejected Churchill’s suggestion and proposed a

three-Power summit conference to settle outstanding issues

stemming from Germany’s surrender.

In order to prepare for such a conference Truman sent

as his personal representatives Harry Hopkins to Moscow

and Joseph Davies (former US Ambassador in the USSR)

to London. Churchill tried to persuade Davies (and thereby

influence Truman) that a “tough approach” was the only

correct one towards the USSR. In his report of this con¬

versation Davies writes that Churchill “was bitterly hostile

to the Soviets”. He insisted on the need to use force against

the USSR so strongly that, as Davies says, “I told him

frankly that I had been shocked beyond words to find so

violent and bitter an attitude, and to find ... so violent a

change in his attitude towards the Soviets. ... It staggered

me with the fear that there could be no peace. I had heard

of such attitudes in Britain, but I had discounted these

reports. Recently, a banker in San Francisco had come to

tell me that a British officer, part of the British delegation

at the Conference [in San Francisco.— V. T.], had declared

* Herbert Feis, Op. cit., p. 637.

** Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conference of Berlin,

Vol. I, p. 73.

458

publicly at a luncheon club and with feeling that the British

and American armies should not stop, but go right through

and clean up the Red Army and destroy the Soviet menace

now when we were at it.”* From Davies’ report it may be

inferred that he came to the conclusion that Churchill was

thinking along the same lines as that British officer. Davies

further reports that “as I had listened to him inveigh so

violently against the threat of Soviet domination and the

spread of communism in Europe ... I had wondered whether

he, the Prime Minister, was now willing to declare to

the world that he and Britain had made a mistake in not

supporting Hitler, for as I understood him, he was now

expressing the doctrine which Hitler and Goebbels had been

proclaiming and reiterating for the past four years in an

effort to break up Allied unity and ‘divide and conquer’.

Exactly the same conditions which he described and the

same deductions were drawn from them as he now appeared

to assert.”**

Churchill intended to try to influence Truman directly

and for this purpose invited him to stop over in London on

his way to the Berlin Conference. Truman, however, cour¬

teously declined this invitation and through Davies informed

Churchill that prior to the Conference he was planning

to meet the head of the Soviet Government. This threw the

British Prime Minister into a fit of violent fury. He told

Davies that he “was both surprised and hurt that he should

be ‘excluded’ from the first meeting with Stalin after

victory.... He could never, never consent... . Such a meet¬

ing would be tantamount to a ‘deal’. ... He reiterated that

he could not possibly attend a meeting which was a contin¬

uation of a conference between the President and Marshal

Stalin.” Davies had to promise that no preliminary Soviet-

American conference would be held.***

Churchill’s “noble indignation” is shared by British offi¬

cial historiography. Woodward, for instance, writes that

Churchill “was certain to reject” the idea of a preliminary

Soviet-American meeting. And with clear displeasure says

that Truman went to Berlin “after refusing to visit Great

* Ibid., p. 70.

** Ibid., p. 73.

*** Ibid., pp. 68-77.

459

Britain”.* This showed the British Government’s insulting

pretensions and superiority complex in foreign policy, and

its dogged striving to infringe upon the interests and pres¬

tige of the Soviet Union. It is fair to ask why the British

Government was indignant when it heard the US President

wanted to meet the head of the Soviet Government? After

all there had been many such bi-lateral meetings between

the British and the Americans during the war, and they

had even drawn up the Atlantic Charter, proclaimed as the

programme for the future peace, without Soviet participation.

Another fair question is why after displaying indignation

over the contemplated meeting between Truman and Stalin,

Churchill demanded to meet Truman himself? In other

words, the British felt that a separate meeting between

Truman and Stalin was impermissible, and that a Churchill-

Truman meeting should take place. Does this not convinc¬

ingly show that vis-a-vis the Soviet Union the British

Government tried to use methods incompatible with Allied

relations?

Such were the sentiments of the British Government on

the eve of the Potsdam Conference, which was held

from July 17 to August 2, 1945. To a considerable extent

these sentiments underlay the actions of the British delega¬

tion, which was led first by Churchill, and then, after the

defeat of the Conservative Party at the Parliamentary elec¬

tions, by Clement Attlee.

The Conference reached agreement to set up a Foreign

Ministers Council as a standing body to prepare the coming

peace conference, draft the terms of the peace treaties with

Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, work out

the terms of the peace settlement for Germany and scruti¬

nise some other questions. The Council consisted of repre¬

sentatives of the USSR, Britain, the USA, France and China.

With the setting up of this Council the European Advisory

Commission was disbanded.

The principal success of the Conference was its decisions

on the German question. Germany would be regarded as an

integral political and economic unit despite her division into

zones of occupation. The political principles adopted by the

Conference envisaged that in the zones of occupation power

would be in the hands of the commanders of the occupying

* Llewellyn Woodward, Op. cit., p. XXXIX.

460

forces who would jointly make up the Control Council

designed to settle questions relating to the whole of Germa¬

ny. The economic principles provided for the establishment

of Allied control over the German economy, the disman¬

tling of war industries and the abolition of monopolies.

Germany, it was agreed, would be completely disarmed and

demilitarised, all nazi organisations would be abolished and

Germany’s development would be directed along demo¬

cratic lines. The decisions on these questions were passed

quite quickly, for they were prepared beforehand by the

European Advisory Commission, and the British and US

governments found it difficult to go back on the stand they

had occupied in the EAC.

No final decision on the exaction of reparations from Ger¬

many had been passed earlier, and Churchill with Truman’s

support did everything in his power to limit reparations to

the Soviet Union so that the latter would not grow stronger

at the expense of these reparations and, correspondingly,

Germany, which acquired increasing importance in the anti-

Soviet plans of Britain and the USA, would not grow

weaker. The compromise decision that was adopted did not

fully satisfy the Soviet Union’s legitimate claims.

The British and US delegations agreed to the transfer

to the Soviet Union of Konigsberg and the adjacent region

and promised to back this decision at the pending peace

conference.

There were heated arguments over the question of

Poland’s western frontiers. Poland’s democratic develop¬

ment caused dissatisfaction in London where it was felt

that it would be impossible to subordinate the policies of

a democratic Poland to British influence. The British dele¬

gation, therefore, insisted on demarcating Poland’s western

frontier along a line which would not embrace territory

rightfully belonging to the Poles, territory which had been

wrested away from them by the Germans. “The Potsdam

Conference of the three Heads of Government,” writes the

American historian J. P. Morray on this score, “had heard

President Beirut of Poland argue for fixing the western

frontier of Poland along the Oder and the Western Neisse

rivers.... Churchill opposed Beirut’s claim. ... It might be

thought a paradox that Churchill, who had urged Britain to

go to war against Germany on behalf of Poland and who

had declared himself at Yalta as being in favour of ‘sub-

stantial accessions’ of German territory to Poland, was now

arguing as a protector of the Germans against Polish

claims.’”’' The Soviet delegation, however, secured a just

decision of this question. Poland received Danzig, East Prus¬

sia (with the exception of the Konigsberg region) and terri¬

tory east of a line running from the Baltic somewhat west

of Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder to the basin

of the Western Neisse and along the Western Neisse to the

Czechoslovak frontier.

The British delegation militated against the democratic

governments of the East European countries. Their aim was

to secure Soviet agreement to changes in the composition of

these governments and the creation in the East European

countries of conditions in which reactionary, anti-popular

elements would have a free hand. Churchill, and Attlee

after him, clearly wanted to have the possibility of planting

“democracy” in Eastern Europe with the methods they had

applied in Greece, and this was exactly what the Soviet

delegation pointed out to them. The British and US dele¬

gations declared that Britain and the USA would not

recognise the governments of Hungary, Rumania and Bul¬

garia if they were not reorganised to suit the Western

Allies.

At the same time, Churchill showed touching concern for

Spanish fascism. The Soviet delegation proposed denounc¬

ing the fascist regime in Spain and rupturing diplomatic

relations with it. Churchill categorically opposed this pro¬

posal, stating it would be “interference in domestic affairs”.”” 1

The head of the Soviet Government pointed out that this

was not a purely Spanish affair, that the Franco regime had

been forced on the Spanish people from without by Hitler

and Mussolini, and that the Spanish fascists had fought

against democracy in the Second World War. To this

Churchill noted that Franco had sent his “Blue Division”

to the USSR but had not fought Britain, that Britain had

good trade relations with Spain, and that he was not going

to sever diplomatic relations with her. Truman backed him

up, and the Conference confined itself to a denunciation

of the Franco regime and to a statement that the USSR,

* J. P. Morray, Op. cit, p. 60.

** Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conference of Berlin ,

Vol. II, p. 123.

462

Britain and the USA would not support the request of the

present Spanish Government for membership of the United

Nations.*

At the Conference Soviet foreign policy scored an in¬

disputable success in that it secured the decisions on Ger¬

many that concurred with the interests of the peoples and

the cause of peace. These decisions were carried out in the

Soviet occupation zone, and had they been put into effect

in the other zones of occupation as well, the cause of

progress and world security would have been further

strengthened. The Potsdam Conference owed its success to the

Soviet Union’s consistent efforts to secure a democratic post¬

war peace settlement in Europe. Contributing factors were

the Soviet Union’s enhanced prestige and role in world

politics, the keen desire of the peoples for co-operation in

the post-war settlement between the USSR, Britain and

the USA and the Western Powers’ eagerness to draw the

Soviet Union into the war against Japan.

The fact that the Western Powers no longer required

Soviet assistance in Europe because the war against Ger¬

many had ended had a detrimental effect on the results of

the Potsdam Conference and led to the activation of anti-

Soviet intrigues by influential reactionary circles in Britain

and the USA who wanted to cut short the war-time unity

of the anti-fascist coalition. In Britain this was expressed

by the increased aggressiveness of the policies pursued by

Churchill, spokesman of ultra-imperialist circles. In the

USA, Roosevelt and his associates, who had soberly assessed

world developments, had been replaced by Truman and

a group of politicians inclined to use force to prevent the

growth of democracy and socialism. The activities of these

forces mounted gradually. After Germany was defeated the

European peoples focussed more and more of their attention

on questions of internal policy. In Britain the entire propa¬

ganda machine switched to these questions in order to divert

the people’s attention from the aggressive plans and actions

of the ruling circles in foreign policy and give the latter

more elbow room. Lastly, completion of the atom bomb in

the USA likewise had an adverse effect on the situation

in the Grand Alliance.

* Ibid., pp. 122-27.

463

The first atom bomb test was made at the Alamogordo

Air Base, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945. A detailed report

on this explosion was sent to Truman in Potsdam by

General Leslie R. Groves.* It was shown to Churchill and he

went into raptures over it. He at once began to urge Truman

to take a tougher line towards the USSR. He said to Alan

Brooke that it was “now no longer necessary for the Rus¬

sians to come into the Japanese war; the new explosive

alone was sufficient to settle the matter. Furthermore, we

now had something in our hands which would redress the

balance with the Russians. ... Now we had a new value

which redressed our position.” He said he could now say to

the Soviet Union: “If you insist on doing this or that, well....

And then where are the Russians!” The “well” implied that

it would be followed by a shower of atom bombs on the

USSR. Brooke notes that Churchill “was already seeing

himself capable of eliminating all the Russian centres of

industry and population”.**

The Americans were somewhat calmer in their attitude

to the atom bomb. This was seen in their stand when the

Potsdam Conference considered Far Eastern problems. Pos¬

session of the atom bomb did not shake the US Govern¬

ment’s intention to obtain Soviet assistance in the war

against Japan. This was Truman’s main goal at Potsdam

before and after he received General Groves’ report. The re¬

port arrived in Potsdam on July 21. On the same day it was

studied by Truman, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes,

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Generals Marshall,

Eisenhower and Arnold, and Admirals Leahy and King.***

On the next day Stimson showed the report to Churchill.

After this, on July 24 the Combined Chiefs of Staff Com¬

mittee laid before Churchill and Truman its strategic plan

for the conduct of the war in the Far East, which stated

in part: “Encourage Russian entry into the war against

Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may

be necessary and practicable in connection therewith.”*!

The British and US leaders approved this plan and the

appropriate negotiations were started with Soviet represent-

* Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conference of Berlin,

Vol. II, pp. 1361-68.

** Arthur Bryant, Op. cit., pp. 477-78.

*** Ibid., p. 1361.

*) Congressional Record. .., Vol. 97, No. 158, p. 6.

464

atives. At a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the USSR,

USA and Britain, General Antonov reported that Soviet

troops were being concentrated in the Far East, that the

USSR would enter the war against Japan in August and

that the Soviet Army would be operating against approxi¬

mately 50 divisions of Japanese and Manchurian troops.*

The Soviet Union thus acceded to the Anglo-American

request to enter the war against Japan. Even with Soviet

participation in the war, the British and American Chiefs of

Staff considered that Japan would be defeated not earlier

than November 15, 1946.**

In this period the United States was particularly in need

of Soviet assistance, for Britain could not be counted on to

take an active part in the storming of Japan proper. At

Potsdam the British said they could give only five divisions

for the concluding phase of the war against Japan, and that

of these only three divisions would be available at the ini¬

tial stage of the offensive; the other two would join much

later.*** Neither could the USA count on Kuomintang China

giving effective assistance in the Far East. The Kuomintang’s

inability to conduct successful military operations against

the Japanese was now obvious to all the American leaders,

civilian and military alike. Consequently, there was a press¬

ing need for Soviet assistance. In June 1945 the Combined

Anglo-American Intelligence Committee wrote in its con¬

clusions that the Soviet Union’s entry into the war would

finally convince the Japanese that complete defeat was

inevitable.*) Truman wrote in his memoirs that at Potsdam

it was extremely important to him “to get from Stalin a

personal reaffirmation of Russia’s entry into the war against

Japan, a matter which our military chiefs were most anxious

to clinch”.**) He explained why the Chiefs of Staff were

anxious for the Soviet Union to enter the war: “Russia’s

entry into the war would mean the saving of hundreds of

thousands of American casualties.”***)

* Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conference of Berlin,

Vol. II, p. 345.

** Ibid., p. 115.

*** Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 48-49.

*) Ibid., p. 36.

Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I, Year of Decisions, New York,

1955, p. 411.

***) Ibid., p. 314.

30-1561

465

Churchill and his military advisers went to the Confer¬

ence determined to secure from the Americans the reorgani¬

sation of the US Command in the Far East into an Anglo-

American Command. They felt this was necessary for two

reasons: first, to give Britain a bigger role in the settlement

of Far Eastern problems not only during the war but after

it, and, second, it would give them another argument in

favour of preserving Anglo-American military co-operation

after the war, something which Churchill and his Chiefs

of Staff were anxious to achieve. The Americans, however,

were not inclined to hamper their own freedom of action,

and, besides, Britain’s promise to furnish five divisions was

not sufficient grounds for taking the desires of Churchill

and Alan Brooke into account. On July 18 General

Marshall told a joint meeting of the Chiefs of Staff that the

American military leadership “could not . .. shoulder the

burden of debating the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ of operational

strategy with the British Chiefs of Staff”. The British were

promised they would be kept informed of this strategy, but

the Americans reserved for themselves the right to adopt

final decisions. If this did not suit the British they could

withdraw their troops. It was decided that the “control of

operational strategy in the Pacific Theatre would remain in

the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff”.* **

At Potsdam Churchill and Truman together with their

advisers considered the terms for Japan’s surrender. During

the discussion of this question it was found that Churchill

was anxious to preserve as much as possible of the existing

Japanese machinery of state together with the emperor in

order to forestall the country’s democratisation. Alan Brooke

pressed upon his American colleagues the need for “preserv¬

ing the dynasty”, while Churchill told Truman that the

Japanese had to be given the possibility of saving “their

military honour”/'” 5 '

The text of the Declaration on Japan was drawn up,

communicated to Chiang Kai-shek “as a matter of courtesy”

and published on July 26 in the name of the United States,

Britain and China. It demanded that Japan surrender un¬

conditionally and stated the terms for a peace settlement

* Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conference of Berlin,

Vol. II, pp. 85-86.

** Ibid., p. 81.

106

with her: the removal of warmongers, the establishment of

a peaceful order, the setting up of a peace-loving govern¬

ment in conformity with the freely expressed will of the

Japanese people, the restriction of Japanese sovereignty to

Japan proper, the disarmament of Japan, and so on. These

were considerably milder terms than those on which Germany

surrendered. Nothing was said about the preservation of the

emperor and the existing Japanese Government, issues which

worried the British. The Allies left themselves a free hand

in these matters.

1945 Parliamentary Elections in Britain

A change of government took place in Britain while the

Potsdam Conference was in session. In accordance with the

Parliamentary elections, whose results were published on

July 26, Churchill’s Conservative Cabinet was replaced by

a Labour Cabinet under Clement Attlee.

The last years of the war had witnessed an acute struggle

between progressive forces and reactionary elements in

Britain over the ways of the country’s post-war develop¬

ment. The nearer V-Day drew the colder the Government

became to the reforms it had promised to the people during

the difficult period of the war. It had become plain that

after the war the Conservatives would try to restore the

practices of the 1920s and 1930s and that they would oppose

any major change in the life of the country.

In this situation the main task of the British people was

to prevent a Conservative Government remaining in office

after the war. In order to remove the Conservatives from

office and then break their resistance to the programme of

post-war reconstruction, the Communist Party of Great

Britain suggested that at the coming elections all progressive

and radical forces should act together. It was the Commu¬

nist Party’s view that this bloc should include, in addition

to Communists, the Labour Party, the Liberals, the Co¬

operative Party and some other organisations. This, it was

felt, would be in line with the war-time experience of co¬

operation between different political forces. Since they had

been able to co-operate to achieve military victory it stood to

reason that they could co-operate in the implementation of

an agreed programme of social progress.

The Labour Party leadership, however, feared the

reforms suggested by the Communists, feeling they would

be a step towards changing the socio-economic system in

Britain. A slightly reformed capitalism suited them more

and they were prepared to go to extremes to protect it. For

that reason the Labour Party rejected the proposal of the

Communists to form a united progressive front. The Right-

wing Labour leaders, who had willingly co-operated with

the Conservatives, the political representatives of the monop¬

olies and of the extreme reactionaries, flatly refused to co¬

operate with the progressive forces.

On May 24 Churchill announced the resignation of the

Coalition Government, formed a new Conservative Cabinet,

the so-called Interim Government, disbanded Parliament

and named July 5 as the date for new elections to Parlia¬

ment. The Interim Government consisted entirely of ex-

Munichites, thereby demonstrating the intention of the

Conservatives to return to the pre-war home and foreign

policies.

The Labour Party took into account the swing of the

people to the Left and, at the elections, it put forward a

programme calling for the preservation of state control of

the economy, the nationalisation of a number of industries,

the Bank of England and transport, and the implementation

of social reforms. Having in mind the British people’s atti¬

tude to the USSR, the Labour Party stressed its intention

to preserve and develop the alliance and co-operation that

had taken shape between Britain and the Soviet Union dur¬

ing the war.

While opposing nationalisation, the Conservative Party

promised, it is true, to preserve curtailed state control over

the economy. On the whole, it did not present a concrete

programme, tending to criticise the Labour programme more

than divulging its own plans. The anti-Soviet press cam¬

paign, which rose to an intense pitch in the spring of 1945,

betrayed the Conservative Party’s real intentions towards

the USSR. This did not escape unnoticed by the British

people. Generally, the Conservative Party staked not so

much on an election programme as on the personal popu¬

larity of its leader, Churchill, posing as the military leader

who brought Britain to victory.

Churchill had done much to weaken the position of his

Party at the elections. He opened the election campaign

with a speech full of invectives against socialism, which he

468

compared with fascism. Moreover, he attacked the Right-

wing Labour leaders, who had been his immediate associates

in the Coalition Government. He said that if the Labour

Party came to power it would establish in Britain some sort

of Gestapo regime. 11 ' These absurd statements were resented

by the electorate. The Conservative press tried to soften

Churchill’s blunders but with no success.

Subsequently, in 1965, on the day after Churchill’s death,

when his role in history was grossly magnified, The Times

felt it could not pass over in silence his actions during the

1945 elections. “The conduct of Churchill during the cam¬

paign of the 1945 election,” the newspaper wrote, “will

always seem one of the strangest episodes of his career. The

swing against the Conservative Party, which had started

before the war, was so strong that even his reputation as a

national leader could be of no avail. But he could have

emerged from the election with that reputation untarnished.

Instead he indulged in accusations, imputations and even

personal abuse against his war-time colleagues which

shocked his hearers—even his friends—and embittered his

opponents.”**

The Conservatives suffered an overwhelming defeat at

the elections, getting 209 seats in Parliament. The Labour

Party scored an indisputable victory such as was unexpected

even by its leaders. It won 389 seats which gave it an abso¬

lute majority in Parliament. Before leaving the Potsdam

Conference to get the election results in London Attlee told

correspondents he hoped there would be an increase in the

number of Labour seats in Parliament but he did not count

on getting an absolute majority. Churchill left Potsdam

together with Attlee, and upon his departure told Stalin: “I

hope to be back.”*** He was confident the Conservatives

would be returned to office. The Communists—William

Gallacher and Phil Piratin—were elected to Parliament,

and the Liberals won 11 seats.

The voting on July 5 showed the change that had taken

place in the balance of political forces in Britain.

On July 26, the day the results of the elections were

* Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill. The Years of Achievement, New

York, 1963, pp. 481-82.

** The Times, January 25, 1965.

**■*' Lewis Broad, Op. cit., p. 493.

469

announced, an infuriated Churchill, insulted by the “ingrati¬

tude” of the British people, was forced to resign.

The new Government was formed by Clement Attlee,

leader of the Labour Party. Ernest Bevin became the Secre¬

tary of State for Foreign Affairs.

All the members of the new Government belonged to the

Right wing of the Labour Party leadership. The leading

ministers had gone through a school of state administration

under Conservative leadership in Churchill’s Coalition

Government. Co-operation between the Labour and Con¬

servative ministers in 1940-45 had been complete and close.

Churchill had not only trained most of the men who obtained

the key posts in the Labour Government but partici¬

pated in the formation of that government. Attlee and other

Labour leaders had intended to give the Foreign Office to

Hugh Dalton, but Churchill intervened and Bevin became

the new Foreign Secretary.

The British bourgeoisie showed no anxiety over the La¬

bour take-over of power, and this was not a very good sign

for the British people, who had linked their post-war hopes

with a radical change in British home and foreign policies.

The British ruling circles subsequently considered that

the Labour take-over of power in 1945 served them well

in the sphere of foreign policy. In face of the considerable

swing to the Left among the British people and the mount¬

ing wave of revolution in Europe and Asia the Labour

leaders could pursue an imperialist policy more successfully

than the Conservatives. They had firmer ties with the people

and they spoke on behalf of the working people, posing as

socialists, although their socialism was reformism pure and

simple, which had nothing in common with revolutionary

socialism. In 1956 Anthony Eden wrote that “it was fortu¬

nate” that a Labour Government opposed the Soviet Union

after the war.*

This opposition was set on foot as soon as Attlee and

Bevin arrived in Potsdam to complete the work of the

Conference. It was quickly found that the only change in the

British stand was that Bevin adopted a line that was more

aggressive than the one Eden had been pursuing. This is

excellently illustrated by Fleming: “Churchill did not

return to Potsdam, but Ernest Bevin, new Foreign Secretary,

* The Memoirs of Anthony Eden. Full Circle, Boston, 1960, p. 496.

470

sat in his place and British policy toward Russia did not

change an iota. Bevin was a Labour Churchill, still more

volcanic and irascible, without Churchill’s aristocratic graces.

Bevin had long been an inner member of the Churchill

Coalition Cabinet. His opposition to Russia was even greater

than Churchill’s.... Neither tact nor diplomacy would

restrain British attitudes toward Russia thereafter, as the

Conservative-dominated Foreign and Colonial offices

stiffened Bevin for conflict with the Soviets.””'

End of the War in the Far East

The Soviet Union honoured the commitment it had made

to its Allies to help hasten the end of the war in the Pacific.

In spite of the existence of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality

pact, Japan had been preparing to attack the Soviet Union

and had maintained the huge Kwantung Army on the

Soviet frontier for that purpose. By pinning down consid¬

erable Soviet forces, she had rendered substantial assistance

to her allies—Germany and Italy. This was a direct viola¬

tion of the neutrality pact. Therefore, when the Soviet

Union denounced that pact on April 5, 1945, it had every

grounds for doing so. The denunciation of the pact made a

powerful impression on Japan’s aggressive ruling circles,

and as they watched Germany’s formidable war machine

which seemed to be invincible crumble under the blows of

the Soviet Army they began to realise that the war had

been lost. However, they rejected the Anglo-American

Potsdam Declaration for they still had sufficiently powerful

forces to defend Japan. The Western Allies were still far

away from Tokyo.

Soon things began to move faster than either the Allies

or the Japanese had expected. On August 6 the Americans

dropped an atom bomb on Hiroshima. This was the first

time that a nuclear bomb had been used and it was an

unprecedented act of barbarism, the responsibility for which

devolves on.the British Government as well. In Quebec in

1943 Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed that if the atom

bomb were developed it would not be used without mutual

consent between the USA and Britain. Accordingly, on

* D. F. Fleming, Op. cit., pp. 291-92.

471

July 4, 1945 the British Government gave its formal con¬

sent to the United States for the use of the bomb against

Japan. Thus, to use the words of Lewis Broad, the British

journalist, “responsibility for what was to be done was shared

by the partners in the alliance”.* Another atom bomb

was dropped on August 9, this time the target being Naga¬

saki. The psychological effect was considerable, but Japan’s

armed forces, in effect, suffered no losses at all. The Amer¬

icans had no more of these bombs, and time was needed to

manufacture others.

The decisive moment of the war in the Far East had

come.

In A History of the War in the Pacific, written by Japa¬

nese authors, it is pointed out that the Japanese Govern¬

ment and military bodies “reacted very poorly to this de¬

velopment”, i.e., the atomic bombing; “the Government

leaders were not interested in the atom bomb—they were

interested in only one thing: the outcome of the meeting in

Moscow between Ambassador Sato and the Soviet Foreign

Minister scheduled for the evening of August 8”.** The Soviet

Government had subscribed to the Anglo-American Potsdam

Declaration and on August 8 Sato was told that on the next

day the Soviet Union would consider itself to be in a state

of war with Japan.

On August 9, Soviet forces began a swift offensive in

Manchuria and in the first 24 hours inflicted a crushing de¬

feat on the Kwantung Army. The Soviet declaration of

war “was a stunning blow to the leaders of the Japanese

Government... . Even in face of the atom bomb state policy,

charted by the Imperial Council for the conduct of the war,

had undergone no modification.... But the Soviet declara¬

tion of war blasted all hopes of continuing the war. Only

now did the Emperor ... as well as other leaders of the

Government firmly make up their minds to end the war.”***

In Tokyo it was realised that this was the end, and the

Allies were informed that Japan was prepared to accept

the Potsdam Declaration provided the Emperor’s preroga¬

tives were preserved. The Americans (it is not clear whether

* Lewis Broad, Op. cit., p. 502.

** Istoriya voiny na Tikhom Okeane (A History of the Pacific War),

Vol. IV, Moscow, 1958, p. 206.

*** Ibid., p. 209.

472

they had agreed this with the British) did not give a direct

reply to this stipulation but what they said did not rule out

the possibility that the Japanese Government and the

Emperor would be preserved. On August 14 the Japanese

Government informed the Government of the USA that

the Emperor had issued a rescript accepting the Potsdam

Declaration and ordering the surrender of Japan.

On September 2 representatives of the Japanese Govern¬

ment signed the act of surrender on board the US battle¬

ship Missouri in the Bay of Tokyo. The signing was wit¬

nessed by representatives of nine Allied countries—the

USSR, the USA, Britain, China, France, the Nether¬

lands, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

That ended the Second World War, the greatest tragedy

and the greatest trial in the history of mankind.

CONCLUSION

During the Second World War British foreign policy

went through a number of stages, each of which differed

markedly both for the purposes pursued by Britain at the

given stage and by the conditions under which these pur¬

poses were pursued. In all cases the objectives of British

policy were determined by the class interests of the British

big bourgeoisie, which governed the country—whether in

the period of the phoney war or during the years of the

Grand Alliance. The extremely complex political and mili¬

tary conditions, which changed with lightning speed, com¬

pelled British foreign policy to zigzag and manoeuvre. At

decisive moments it conformed to the vital interests of the

people and that is precisely why it is possible to speak of its

success, if by such success is meant that Britain not only

survived but found herself among the victor powers.

The division of British war-time foreign policy into pe¬

riods is directly linked up with the division into periods of

the Second World War as a whole, but at the same time the

former has its own features and distinctions. Many variants

of the latter division have been produced, and each is a re¬

flection of the class approach to the history of the war and

depends on what country is taken as the basis for a scrutiny

of the problem and on whether the problem was approached

from a socio-political or military-strategic standpoint.

In dividing the Second World War into periods Soviet

historians use as their points of departure the major changes

474

that took place in the military and political situation under

the impact of military, political and economic factors.

Basically, British historians use the division into periods

given by Churchill in The Second World War. According

to Churchill, the first period embraces 1919 through 1940,

which he regards only as years of an armistice between the

two world wars; the second period—1940-41—witnessed

Britain fighting singlehanded; the third period—the Grand

Alliance—covers the span from December 1941 to the end

of 1942; and the fourth period—Triumph and Tragedy-

lasted from 1943 to 1945* This periodisation is used by

British bourgeois historiography for the history of foreign

policy as well.

In our view, the data assembled in this book enable us

to divide the history of British war-time foreign policy into

three periods: the period of the phoney war—from the

events of early September 1939 to Germany’s attack on Den¬

mark and Norway in April 1940; the period when Britain

was fighting for survival—from May 1940 to the end of

1942; and the period of planning and preparing the anti¬

democratic post-war settlement—from the victory at Stalin¬

grad to the end of the war.

The period of the phoney war was characterised by acute

contradictions between imperialist Britain and the socialist

Soviet Union. At the same time, the antagonisms between

the imperialist powers grew so sharp that war broke out

between the Anglo-French bloc and Germany. The British

imperialists hated the USSR so intensely that most of

them had been unable to appreciate the dimensions of the

German threat to Britain, a danger which grew with every

passing day. Blinded by class hatred they failed, together

with France and Poland, to use the possibility of defeating

Germany militarily in 1939. Instead, they doggedly sought

to stop the war with Germany and start a war against the

Soviet Union. “The phoney war,” writes R. Palme Dutt,

.. combined passivity against Hitler with plans of mili¬

tary adventures against the Soviet Union.”**

When in the spring of 1940 Germany turned her war

machine not against the East, as it was hoped in London

* Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vols. I-VI, Boston,

1948-53.

** Labour Monthly, March 1963, p. 103.

475

and Paris, but against the West, it became quite plain that

British foreign policy had foundered. Frustration was so

complete that at once the question arose whether Britain

would survive. The changed military-strategic and political

situation brought about a change of the role played by vari¬

ous contradictions in British policy at this stage. For some

time the threat from Germany and Italy and then from

Japan, i.e., antagonism between the imperialist powers, be¬

came the factor determining British policy. Their instinct of

self-preservation made the British ruling classes temporarily

move the contradictions with the Soviet Union into the

background. The foreign policy pursued with the objective

of survival at any price was founded on the need to fight

Germany, Italy and Japan, for the alternative was surren¬

der. But Britain did not have the strength to fight this war

alone, and for that reason long before France surrendered

the British Government came to the conclusion that there

would be a chance of survival only if in addition to the USA

the Soviet Union became Britain’s Ally. Hence, first (until

June 1941) the exploration of the possibilities of drawing

the Soviet Union into the war against Germany and then

British participation, together with the USSR, the USA

and a number of other countries, in the anti-fascist coalition.

Two factors compelled the British ruling circles to enter

into a coalition with the Soviet Union. The first was

survival, and the second was pressure from the people to

whom hatred of the socialist state was alien, by virtue of

which they had a better appreciation of the importance

of Allied relations between Britain and the USSR. B. Collier,

one of the authors of the British official history of the

Second World War, writes that the “national interest, soon

seconded by powerful evidence of popular sympathy for Rus¬

sia, demanded therefore ... all practical aid to Germany’s

new victim”, 1 * ** i.e., the Soviet Union. Another British author,

R. W. Thompson, says that the British policy of alliance

with the USSR was “a policy of despair based on

fear of Soviet collapse, and the consequent isolation and

collapse of Britain”/ 1 '"'

During the second stage Britain fought not only for

* B. Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, London, 1957,

p. 293.

** R. W. Thompson, Op. cit., p. 29.

476

imperialist interests but for her existence as a national state.

However, even at this stage the British Government did

not abandon its imperialist aims. With the improvement of

Britain’s position these aims and the antagonism between

capitalism and socialism grew more and more pronounced.

That, as R. Palme Dutt notes, was precisely why in British

policy the phoney war was “succeeded by the alternative

tactics of the peculiar alliance, when the withholding of the

Second Front for three years enabled the entire weight

of the Hitlerite forces to be hurled against the Soviet Union,

with the confident calculation and prediction of all the

Western General Staffs and politicians that the Soviet

Union would be destroyed. Their calculations were frust¬

rated.”*

The turning point in the Second World War came with

the Soviet victory at Stalingrad. It is to Winston Churchill’s

credit that he realised this at once. Britain had survived.

It would seem that this should have been an occasion for

rejoicing and jubilation. But the jubilation of the British

Government was poisoned, firstly, by the fact that Britain

had survived because of her alliance with a socialist state

and because of the unparalleled heroism and dedication

shown by the latter, and secondly, because the Soviet Union

had withstood a terrible onslaught and would emerge from

the war as a great world power. This changed the world

balance of power. British statesmen became more and more

preoccupied with the struggle against socialism. “By 1943,”

writes R. Palme Dutt, “panic seized the Western rulers at

the prospect of the fall of fascism and the victory of com¬

munism. The planning of the post-war Western front against

the Soviet Union and communism; the preparation of the

Anglo-American atom bomb under the Quebec Agreement

as the weapon, not against fascism, but for future domina¬

tion against the Soviet Union; the Churchill secret memoran¬

dum against ‘Russian Barbarism’ in post-war Europe; the

organisation of the Second Front, after the nazi armies were

already beaten, to prevent victory of the peoples in Europe:

all date from this turning point.” However, as Dutt con¬

cludes, “everywhere the peoples rose in the enthusiasm of

alliance with the Soviet people for liberation”.** In combina-

* Labour Monthly, March 1963, p. 103.

** Ibid.

477

tion with the necessity of somehow bringing the war to an

end, this enthusiasm prevented the imperialist circles of

Britain (and of the USA) from breaking up the anti-fascist

coalition before the war ended.

With the approach of victory the class contradiction be¬

tween Britain and the Soviet Union came to the fore and the

antagonisms between the imperialist powers receded into

the background. The Listener , a British journal, writes that

“the cold war existed from the very outset of the Grand

Alliance. As long as the supreme aim was the defeat of the

Axis, it lay unrecognised.”* But by the spring of 1945, as

Churchill admits, the “Soviet menace, to my eyes, had al¬

ready replaced the nazi foe”.** In the light of this admis¬

sion, it is small wonder that towards the end of the war

British policy-makers did so much to spoil the relations of

co-operation that had taken shape between the leading mem¬

bers of the anti-fascist coalition.

When people speak of the Grand Alliance as a “strange”

and “unnatural” alliance, they have in mind its Western

members. For the Soviet Union membership of the military

and political alliance with Britain and the USA was neither

strange nor unnatural. It was the operation of the policy

of peaceful coexistence, which in the specific conditions of

the Second World War led to military and political co¬

operation between the socialist Soviet Union and the

imperialist United States and Britain.

The nazi invasion of the Soviet Union put an end to a

period of peaceful co-habitation between the Soviet Union

and part of the capitalist world, and witnessed a gigantic

armed struggle between socialism, represented by the

USSR, and capitalism, represented by the Axis bloc. It

was not the Soviet Union’s fault that peaceful coexistence

was cut short with that bloc. What happened was foreseen

by Lenin as far back as 1919. He wrote: “. .. the future

will almost certainly bring many further attempts by the

Entente at intervention and possibly a rebirth of the pre¬

vious predatory alliance between international and Russian

capitalists, to overthrow Soviet rule in Russia, in short, an

alliance pursuing the old aim of extinguishing the centre of

* The Listener, Feb. 4, 1954, Vol. LI, No. 1301, p. 229, “The

Listener’s Book Chronicle”.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 495.

478

the world socialist conflagration—the Russian Socialist

Federative Soviet Republic.”*

Simultaneously there was a serious aggravation of the

contradictions between the imperialist powers, as a result

of which war broke out between them even before the Soviet

Union became involved in that war. In this situation, while

fighting the Axis powers the Soviet Union was able to pre¬

serve and considerably expand its relations, founded on the

principle of peaceful coexistence, with most of the capital¬

ist world.

In 1918 the possibility of Soviet Russia co-operating with

one group of imperialist powers in order to repulse the

attack of another was the subject of bitter argument in the

Bolshevik Party, but now the entire Party steadfastly adhered

to the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, which

envisaged the possibility, in the interests of socialism, of

military and political co-operation between the Soviet Union

and bourgeois countries. Lenin wrote that in 1918 we did

not seek an alliance with the Entente against Germany,

“although we do not in general reject military agreements

with one of the imperialist coalitions against the other in

those cases in which such an agreement could, without un¬

dermining the basis of Soviet power, strengthen its position

and paralyse the attacks of any imperialist power”.** Such

a situation obtained in 1941, and the Soviet Union not only

joined the anti-fascist coalition side by side with bourgeois

countries but was active in creating it and played a very

important role in it.

The Soviet Union co-operated politically with the other

members of the coalition to ensure victory over the common

enemy and prepare the future peace settlement. Economic

and trade relations expanded substantially compared with

the pre-war period and acquired a character of their own.

The Soviet Union received from and supplied its Allies

with various items under Lend Lease. During the war it

received key materials, equipment and machines, for exam¬

ple, 401,400 lorries. The deliveries of locomotives, fuel,

means of communication and various non-ferrous metals

and chemicals were of vital importance. However, as a whole,

the Lend Lease supplies did not and could not essentially

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 30, pp. 208-09.

** Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 361.

479

influence the course of the war. Allied aid played a very

small role in supplying the Red Army with weapons and

equipment. During the war the Soviet Union produced

489,900 pieces of artillery, 102,500 tanks and self-propelled

guns and 136,800 aircraft, while from the USA and Brit¬

ain it received 9,600 pieces of artillery, 11,567 tanks and

self-propelled guns and 18,753 aircraft, of which 14,013

were transport aircraft.'"' The Soviet Union co-operated

with the other members of the coalition in the sphere of

science and technology, but this co-operation took mainly

military requirements into account. Cultural relations were

also maintained, but their promotion was, naturally, limited

by the war-time conditions. Thus the Soviet Union’s rela¬

tions with the other members of the anti-fascist coalition

embraced all basic forms of co-operation under the prin¬

ciple of peaceful coexistence.

The salient feature of this stage was that coexistence

was extended to military co-operation between the USSR

and a number of bourgeois countries. Under this co-opera¬

tion the USSR received armaments from its Allies; the

USSR, USA and Britain co-ordinated (in very general

outline) their military plans; the members of the coalition

rendered each other direct military assistance through mili¬

tary operations against the common enemy.

The period of the war showed that consistent implemen¬

tation of the principle of peaceful coexistence wholly and

fully conforms to the interests of the Soviet Union and the

entire world communist movement. The ties between the

Soviet people and the peoples of the Allied countries were

considerably strengthened and extended. In the Western

states the peoples learned more truth about the life of the

Soviet Union with the result that friendliness for the peo¬

ples of the Soviet Union was markedly enhanced. The So¬

viet Union enjoyed more prestige than ever before. Co¬

operation with other countries ensured a certain amount of

assistance to the Soviet Union against nazi Germany and

her satellites. This co-operation was of great positive sig¬

nificance to the cause of socialism. Undermining the forces

of reaction, it helped to create favourable conditions for the

triumph of socialist revolutions in a number of European

* P. N. Pospelov, Op. cit., p. 11.

480

and Asian countries, for strengthening the progressive

forces in the capitalist world and for a successful liberation

struggle of the peoples of colonial and dependent count¬

ries.

An extremely important result of the Soviet Union’s

struggle for peaceful coexistence in this period was that

the ruling circles of the countries of the anti-fascist coali¬

tion had to give formal recognition to peaceful coexistence

as a norm of the relations between the Soviet Union and

capitalist countries. This found expression in documents

drawn up by the leading members of the coalition to deter¬

mine the post-war arrangement of the world. Under the

Treaty of May 26, 1942, Britain undertook to co-operate

closely with the Soviet Union in order “to preserve peace

and resist aggression in the post-war period”. In this treaty

the two countries proclaimed their fidelity to such princi¬

ples of peaceful coexistence as territorial integrity, non-inter¬

ference in internal affairs, collective security, the honouring

of international commitments and economic co-operation on

the basis of mutual benefit.* These principles found their

embodiment, though much curtailed, also in the documents

on Soviet-US relations. The Moscow Four-Power Decla¬

ration on General Security of October 30, 1943, the Three-

Power Tehran Declaration and the decisions of the Crimea

and Berlin conferences were founded on recognition of peace¬

ful coexistence between the Soviet Union and capitalist

countries. This stemmed from the Soviet Union’s struggle

for coexistence and the intense desire of the people of the

capitalist countries, for coexistence. This is what made the

ruling circles of the US and Britain formally accept

coexistence.

However, the promise of post-war co-operation was not

destined to come true. Instead of becoming weaker, as the

imperialist politicians expected, the forces of socialism

gained in strength during the war, and as victory over

Germany, Italy and Japan drew nearer, the ruling circles

of Britain and the USA became increasingly apprehensive

about the fate of capitalism. Churchill was so alarmed by

the growth of socialism that in the spring of 1945 he was

prepared, together with the USA and the surviving nazis,

* Vneshnaya politika Sovietskogo Soyuza. .., Vol. I, pp. 235-38.

31-1561

481

to turn the guns against the victorious Soviet Union. This

design failed, but it showed the difficulties the Soviet Union

would encounter in its struggle for peaceful coexistence

after the war.

Both the USSR and Britain benefited by their military

and political alliance. It helped the Soviet Union to defeat

the nazis and saved Britain from defeat and devastation.

This is admitted not only by Soviet historians. Churchill

who did more than anybody else to belittle the significance

of the Soviet Union’s victory in the Second World War,

repeatedly referred to this question. In a speech in Parlia¬

ment in October 1944 he declared that “Russia is holding

and beating far larger hostile forces than those which face

the Allies in the West”.* He made many statements in a

similar vein during the war; far from all of them were

sincere. But in 1950, when through the efforts of Churchill

and like-minded people an end had been put to the Grand

Alliance and the cold war unleashed by them was already

raging, Britain’s war-time Prime Minister wrote in his

memoirs that he did not in the slightest degree challenge “the

conclusion which history will affirm that Russian resistance

broke the power of the German armies.. .”.**

Farther, he recalls that

“we all felt that even if the Soviet armies were driven back

to the Ural mountains Russia would still exert an immense

and, if she preserved in the war, an ultimately decisive

force”.***

The whole world knows that the Soviet Union staunchly

continued the war until victory was won, and was, conse¬

quently, the decisive force ensuring the triumphant comple¬

tion of the war for the peoples, the British people among

them.

The ideological struggle between imperialism and social¬

ism has embraced the history of the Second World War as

well. This explains why some bourgeois historians pass over

in silence and others belittle the Soviet Union’s contribution

to victory over the Axis powers. However, even in their

writings one finds recognition of the decisive role which the

Soviet Union played in the war. Noble Frankland, one of

* The Times, September 29, 1944.

** Winston S. Churchill, Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 352.

*** Ibid.

482

the authors of the official British history of the Second

World War, writes that “Britain and America, though

locked in the closest of alliances, had not the strategic

genius nor the military resources to defeat Hitler without

the massive support of Communist Russia”."'

One finds many analogous admissions in American

publications. In early June 1945, in a memorandum on the

state of the international communist movement, the US

State Department wrote: “Europe is emerging from probably

the most devastating war in its history” and “the majority

of Europeans” regard the Red Army “as their libera¬

tors”.** Even an ill-wisher of the USSR like George F.

Kennan admits there “was no prospect for victory over

Germany, unless it were with the help of Russia”.*** Cordell

Hull, war-time US Secretary of State, wrote: “We must

ever remember that by the Russians’ heroic struggle against

the Germans they probably saved the Allies from a nego¬

tiated peace with Germany. Such a peace would have

humiliated the Allies and would have left the world open to

another Thirty Years War.”*' Many American politicians

and historians consider that Soviet assistance was vital to the

Allies for victory over Japan as well.

The experience of Anglo-Soviet relations during the war

show that the Soviet Union is a reliable Ally. Today one

is astounded when one reads that when the Second World

War broke out the leaders of the British Government were

unable to assess even approximately the Soviet Union’s war-

industrial potential or its material (to say nothing of moral)

possibilities of putting up resistance to an aggressor, and that

they believed its military potential was smaller than that

of squire-ridden Poland.

The war demonstrated that the material resources of the

Soviet Union made it an extremely powerful Ally. The

moral spirit displayed by the peoples of the Soviet Union in

the struggle against the Axis won universal admiration and

will live through the ages as a magnificent example of

* International Affairs, July 1959, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 343.

** Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conference of Berlin,

Vol. I, p. 278.

*** George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, Chicago, 1951,

p. 77.

*) Cordell Hull, Op. cit., p. 1465.

31 *

483

staunchness in the struggle for freedom. The moral factor

played a key role in ensuring victory, for in war, as

Frederick Engels aptly noted, the ‘moral element ... imme¬

diately transforms itself into a material force”.*

An immutable principle of Soviet foreign policy is that

Allied commitments must be honoured. It manifested itself

in full during the war. This is admitted by British and

American war-time leaders. On February 1, 1943, Churchill

wrote:

“I told them that in my experience the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics had never broken an engagement or

treaty... .”** On February 27, 1945, he said: “I know of no

Government which stands to its obligations, even in its own

despite, more solidly than the Russian Soviet Government.”***

The fact that the Soviet Union rigidly discharged its

pledges is noted by American statesmen as well. US Secre¬

tary of War Henry L. Stimson writes that “the Russians

were magnificent Allies. They fought as they promised.”**

Admiral William D. Leahy, who was the war-time Chief-

of-Staff to the US President, noted: “Russia had kept every

military agreement made before that time.”*** This was the

cement that held the anti-fascist coalition together.

The politicians and historians who doggedly maintain

that Britain wanted neither the First nor the Second World

War ignore the facts. Along with other imperialist powers

Britain helped to start the First World War. As regards the

Second World War, the British ruling circles indeed did

not desire it in the shape in which they got it in September

1939. What they wanted was a war of their imperialist

rivals against the Soviet Union. They had long hoped for

such a war, prepared for it and made many sacrifices in

order to get it started. And when their plans misfired they

were caught flatfooted.

What hopes had the British ruling circles pinned on the

war, and what were their objectives? First and foremost to

* F. Engels, Selected Military Works, Russ, ed., Moscow, 1956,

p. 226 .

** Correspondence..., Vol. I, p. 90.

*** p an( j Zelda K. Coates, Op. cit., p. 78.

*) Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in

Peace and War, New York, 1947, p. 527.

**) William D. Leahy, I Was “there , New York, 1950, p. 317.

484

eliminate or weaken (first with the hands of the German

nazis and Japanese militarists, and then by placing the

entire burden of the war against the Axis on the USSR) the

Soviet Union, which was, at the time, the only socialist

state. In this way they planned to strengthen British

imperialism’s international position. The undermining of the

socialist revolution and the abolition of its basis would

inevitably have been followed by the weakening and the

cessation of the national liberation struggle in the colonial

and dependent countries. Moreover, it was calculated that the

weakening of Britain’s imperialist rivals in the course of the

war would insure the safety of her colonial possessions

against encroachments by them. In the long run, it was felt,

the war would strengthen the world capitalist system and,

above all, consolidate Britain’s position in that system. For

Britain’s imperialist rulers the war against Germany and

Italy was a war for domination in Europe which was the

last but one, if not the last, step towards world supremacy.

It is widely recognised that the London politicians are

among the most experienced and astute leaders of the bour¬

geois world. However, during the war events did not develop

as these politicians believed they would. The same may

be said of the results of the war.

The calculations with regard to the fate of socialism failed

to materialise. Indeed, the Second World War was a gruel¬

ling test for the Soviet Union. It was a test which unques¬

tionably no non-socialist country would have survived. Lenin

wrote: “Like every crisis in the life of individuals or in the

history of nations, war oppresses and breaks some, steels and

enlightens others.”* The Soviet Union emerged from the

war much stronger than ever before, with tremendous in¬

ternational prestige and influence. The American Professor

John Lukacs writes that “never in the history of mankind

was the power and prestige of Russia greater than in

1945”.** This brought about a further change in the world

power balance in favour of socialism. The defeat of the

fascists in Europe and of the Japanese militarists in the Far

East, combined with the enormous growth of the Soviet

Union’s weight in world affairs, created favourable condi-

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 23, p. 22.

** John Lukacs, A History of the Cold War, Garden City, New York,

1961, p. 18.

485

tions for socialist revolutions. A powerful wave of socialist

revolutions swept across a number of countries in Europe

and Asia, demolishing the capitalist system in them. The

peoples of these countries took the road of socialism and

together with the USSR formed the mighty socialist system,

uniting more than one-third of mankind. British imperialism

and its imperialist allies were unable to stem this revolu¬

tionary tide.

The hopes of the British ruling circles with regard to the

colonial system were likewise blasted. Far from strengthen¬

ing Britain’s colonial positions, the war shook them to their

very foundations. The socialist revolutions that broke out in

Europe and Asia at the end of the war stimulated the growth

of the national liberation movement in the colonies and

dependent countries. This movement developed into a na¬

tional liberation revolution, which put an end to the British

colonial empire in its old form. In connection with Chur¬

chill’s war-time statement that he did “not become the

King’s First Minister to preside over the liquidation of the

British Empire”, the American historian Morray notes:

“Mr. Churchill escaped presiding over the liquidation of

the British Empire by ceasing to preside.’” 5 ' This job fell to

the Labour Government, which presided when India and

many other British colonies achieved their independence.

Practically all the British colonial possessions won independ¬

ent statehood in the course of two decades after the war.

Britain’s place and role in the world underwent a radical

change after the war. Instead of strengthening the capitalist

world, as it was hoped, the war weakened it, particularly

Britain. The second stage of the general crisis of capitalism,

embracing the economy, domestic and foreign policy and

ideology of capitalism, set in during the war and the social¬

ist revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries.

The war accentuated the uneven development of capital¬

ism, on account of which Britain failed to win domination

in post-war bourgeois Europe. During the war she became

dependent on the USA economically, militarily and politi¬

cally, and this greatly restricted her potential of pursuing an

independent policy in international relations. Lord Strang,

who has had years of experience at the Foreign Office,

* Joseph P. Morray, From Yalta to Disarmament. Cold War

Debate , New York, 1961, p. 3.

486

draws the conclusion that Britain’s might is a thing of the

past and that if war were to break out today she cannot

save herself “without calling on the United States”* and

this seriously limits her “freedom of action in international

affairs”.** In January 1965 the British newspaper Guardian

wrote that Britain won “a delusive victory”, that she

“emerged from the war with more honour, but less power,

than she had at the outset”.***

Nothing came of the British ruling circles’ other calcu¬

lations linked up with the war. Nor were their plans for

joint Anglo-American domination over the post-war world,

which Churchill and his American colleagues had so

vigorously discussed in the course of the war, destined to be

fulfilled. The American historian Neumann rightly notes

“that World War II failed to achieve the hopes and aspira¬

tions voiced by Roosevelt and Churchill in August of 1941”*>

—happily for mankind. The peoples reject the idea of one

or two countries dominating the world. They want lasting

peace and international co-operation among equal nations.

* W. Strang, Op. cit., p. 329.

** Ibid., p. 378.

Guardian, January 25, 1965.

*) William L. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 99.

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