9
This volume includes some articles, written in post-war years, touching upon general questions of historical science and the history of literature—problems which might, in the author’s opinion, find fuller or different illumination through data on the history and literatures of the peoples of the East. The first article, “The Classical Oriental Studies and the New Problems”, serves as a general introduction to this collection.
In his historical articles the author has endeavoured to delineate, on the basis of the history of the East (principally China and Japan) and of the West (for the most part Western Europe), a general pattern of the historical process taking place in antiquity and the Middle Ages, that is, during mankind’s slave-owning and feudal stages (“The Slave-owning Formation”, “The ‘Middle Ages’ in Historical Science”). Taking as his starting point certain facts, now understood in a new light, of the cultural history of China during the period lasting from the 7th to the 12th centuries, the author suggests that one may discern in these the signs of that epoch known in the history of Europe from the 14th to the 16th centuries as the Renaissance (see the article on “The Philosophy of the Chinese Renaissance”). Then, drawing attention to certain phenomena in the cultural history of Western Turkistan and Iran in the period from the 9th to the 13th centuries, the author expresses the view that the conception of the Renaissance might be established in history as a worldwide phenomenon and not merely a localised one; as a phenomenon appearing in the natural course of the history of large civilised nations (“The Renaissance Epoch”, “Shakespeare and His Time”).
In articles on his researches in literature the author has sought— by juxtaposition of certain phenomena in the literatures of China and Japan, on the one hand, and the literatures of Europe, on the other—first, to trace the contacts existing between some literatures and to elucidate the nature of these contacts; second, to outline the traits that are common, or divergent, as the case may be, in the historical process of the rise and development of liter-
ature among different peoples (see the articles “Notes on Literary Contacts”, “The Problem of Realism in the Literatures of the East”). On the basis of this material the author has attempted to define important general questions of literature and to indicate the main paths of the history of literature (“Certain Questions concerning the History of World Literature”).
In every article in these two series the author has tried to show the part played by the humanistic principle in the historical process, its role as the eternal companion of mankind on its historic path, as the basic factor of social progress. The reader will find a generalised summary of the author’s view in the concluding article in the volume, “The Substance of History”.
It seems to the auther that the contents of this book as outlined above afford a reason for entitling it West—East: Inseparable Twain.
Oriental studies originated as part of philology, in its primary, historically traditional meaning as research in ancient writings.
This philology came into being in the West as well as in the East during late antiquity, which in the West corresponded to the Hellenistic period, and in the East, in China, to the time of the Han Empire. Alexandrian scholars collected literary works of the classical period—the city-state epoch—of their antiquity; the Chinese, those of the classical period—the lieh-ko epoch—of their antiquity. Not only were collections made, but work was inaugurated on the establishment of their true texts. This, in its turn, required research on the written work itself. Thus, the essential purpose of philological studies took shape and became classical: it consisted in the collecting of the writings of the past, the establishment of the true texts and their interpretation.
These essentials underwent no alteration in the Middle Ages and this applies equally to both West and East. Only the field became more extensive: in the West, it included not only Greek and Roman antiquity, but also Hebrew (the Bible); in the East, manuscripts included not only those of ancient Confucianism and Taoism, but also of Buddhism (the Tri-pitaka). New trends appeared in the work: the main purpose of study now became the interpretation—exegesis (as it was called in Europe), hsiin-ku (as it was called in China). The interpretation had to be correct—hermeneutic (the European term), cheng-i (the Chinese term). The objects of exegesis and hermeneutics also changed: they were for the most part those old writings upon which the ideology of the ruling classes of the time was based. In Europe, these were Christian writings; in China, Confucian. The interpretation that answered official ideology was considered to be the correct one.
With the advent of the Renaissance, both in West and East, a
new stage in philology was entered upon. Its modernity consisted in the substitution of criticism for exegesis, of the philosophical explication of the content of the writings in place of hermeneutics, an explication given now in the light of Renaissance humanism which had begun its long struggle with the dogmatism of of facial ideological orthodoxy—religious (Christian) in Europe, philosophical (Confucian) in China. A struggle was also waged against the spirit of scholasticism, the educational system that inculcated dogmatism Thus, the scholastic philology which was the final stage of philology in the Middle Ages was replaced by humanistic Renaissance philology. . , , J. ..
In the new times, philology was to a certain extent the continuation of Renaissance philology, except that its range was extended to include the medieval classics. The spirit remained the same-the traditional humanistic. Rut the fundamentals of humanism changed: it became wholly converted to rationalistic philosophy which had then become the guiding principle of knowledge. In connection with this, the elements of criticism which had appeared in philology during the Renaissance epoch now gained strength, and, what was particularly important, the philologists attention was directed towards separating the genuine from the false in ancient writings and investigating their authenticity. This tendency was characteristic of the philology of the Enlightenment epoch both m West and East. It is plainly evident in, for example, the philological school (k ao-cheng) in China, in Sinology (kangaku) and home (Japanese) studies (,kokugaku) in Japan. In this way was the philology shaped that later became known as classical in Europe.
It will be understood that researches into the genuineness of the ancient writings and their various interpretations were associated with the social interests of the time. Since the historical purpose of the Enlightenment—the central epoch of modern history—was the struggle of the new, capitalist order then in process of formation against the old feudal order, the destructive and conservative tendencies acquired particular force. During the Enlightenment they were signalised in the efforts of some scholars to prove, by direct or indirect means, the historical legitimacy of the existing order, and in the efforts of others to prove the opposite. It was thus in the case of classical philology in France, it was thus m the case of the classical philology of China and Japan. Rut the object of philological studies remained the same—the writings of bygone ages; and the content of studies the examination ot these writings—also remained the same.
Philology as a whole is the offspring of all civilised peoples with an old culture, whether Western or Eastern, but Orientalist philology, or Oriental studies in their initial form, are the ou-
spring of the West, that is, of those countries for which the “Orient” constituted a different and peculiar world, the opposite of their
own—the Occidental world. . . ,
Oriental studies assumed their final form at the beginning ot the 19th century, but began to take shape earlier. In the modern period, intensive colonial expansion, capitalist by nature, was taking place for the second time in history, the first having been feudal.
It, was inaugurated by the West European states: either those which were already capitalist, such as Holland and England, or those which were rapidly becoming capitalist, such as France. The pnn-cipal targets for expansion were the old civilised countries of the East—India, Indo-China, Indonesia, China, Iran, as well as countries relatively young, but rapidly developing their culture-Turkey and the Arab domains on the Mediterranean seaboard of Africa. At different times, all these were included in the sphere of the colonial empires of Holland, England and France, either as colonies, semicolonies or dependencies (to a greater or lesser degree).
Colonial expansion required not only armies, but also the acquirement of a definite range of knowledge and information on the part of the colonisers about the countries to which they penetrated. This included information about the state of the Eastern countries at that time, with the addition of a knowledge of their history and culture. At a later period, it was known as the study of countries, and a special branch of it was the study of “living Oriental languages” This term was used to distinguish the modern tongues spoken by the peoples of the East from the “dead” languages (for instance, that of ancient Egypt), that is, the languages of extinct peoples, or the “classical” languages (such as Sanskrit), that is, the languages used in ancient times by peoples still in existence.
Parallel to practical Oriental studies, as this trend was termed, another branch developed, which became known as scientific Oriental studies. This received an impetus from the increasing and deepening interest in the East. Undoubtedly, this interest was dictated by practical considerations: the combination of military forces with technical and economic superiority was sufficient for colonial conquest, but for the administration of subjugated countries or maintaining as dependencies countries which had preserved their political independence, a comprehensive knowledge of these countries was a necessity. Here the justice was evident of an ancient truth formulated after the Mongol conquest of China by Yehliu Ch uts’ai, the learned K’itan counsellor of the Mongol khans: “Mounted on a horse, you may conquer a kingdom, but mounted on a horse you cannot govern it.”
It would be unjust, however, to the representatives of scientific Oriental studies, to attribute their efforts solely to the requirements described above. Apart from the question of whether their studies were of service to the politicians or not, a great many Orientalist philologists wTere inspired by a genuine and disinterested desire
for knowledge about the peoples of the East, their history and their culture. Their respect for the Eastern peoples is well known. In the case of some Orientalists there was even a touch of veneration, as though the ancient formula ex Oriente Zmr assumed new life in their minds. And, of course, the humanitarian sciences, bringing their own requirements and developing rapidly in the 19th century, played a part of immense importance. The common features of the historical life of many peoples, manifested in this century with new force, demanded the formulation and treatment of large-scale problems, which without a study of the East would be impossible. In view of this, Orientalists were confronted with a special task: existing knowledge had to be supplemented by more detailed, more exact and more fully elaborated information about the history, culture, and ideology of the peoples of the East.
Naturally, the best sources of information were the ancient writings of these peoples, and for that reason scientific Oriental studies were inevitably philological. Moreover, they had to be on a level and of a trend typical of the philological science of modern times: they had to be critical.
The writings studied by Orientalists were very different. If we were to classify them under headings familiar to us nowadays, they would include historical, economic, juridical, philosophical, religious and literary works. That is why the entire complex of the humanitarian sciences was to be found in Orientalist philology. It was an interrrelated complex, not a mechanical mixture. An understanding of ancient literature involved, first and foremost, an understanding of its script and language—the writing and language of the period to which it belonged, or the writing and language in use in the literature of the time. Therefore, the Orientalist-philologist needed not only a knowledge of the given Eastern language and its script, but also a historical knowledge of them. The understanding of an ancient text meant a grasp of its literary nature, since every written work, no matter what its content and form, is a literary work. (That is, if we do not regard the conception of “literature” within the narrow limits introduced in the 19th century, but view it in the traditional meaning, as the term for written works expressing a definite idea through the medium of language in its written form, expressing it precisely as the idea demands.) Therefore, every philologist should be a specialist in literature in the broad sense of the word. Furthermore, since comprehension of an old work meant a grasp of its content and since this content, no matter what it might concern, was always historical, the philologist had to be a historian on the widest scale.
Qualifications such as these called for specific knowledge on the part of an Orientalist-philologist. We often use the term “complex
knowledge”, and this is justified, on the whole, if the nature of this complex is rightly understood. A correct idea of it may be obtained if we understand its constituent parts. The constituents are the branches covering religious beliefs, philosophical views, scientific conceptions; branches examining cultural phenomena, both material and spiritual, and within the latter the phenomena of art and literature. It would be incorrect to suppose, however, that Oriental studies had not yet attained the level of special sciences, such as linguistics, literary studies, art studies, sociology, history, economics and philosophy, and for this reason were confined to a sphere where elements of all these sciences are found intermingled, but still lack the specific quality indispensable to every science. If opinions like these are held, the existence of Orientalists who specialise in linguistics, literature, economics, history, etc., should be regarded as a transition to a higher level of Oriental studies: or even more, perhaps, as a sign that the end of the Oriental studies of the past has arrived.
There can be no doubt that the appearance of Orientalist specialists is an entirely new fact in the history of Oriental studies. Neither can there be any doubt that it evidences a step forward in Oriental studies. But to think that the specialised Orientalism can eliminate the “complex” would be a mistake. Neither the one nor the other eliminate, or can eliminate, each other. The objects of their research are totally different, and this leads to a difference in the methods and purposes of work. The object of scientific Orientalism in its traditional form is ancient writing, a definite literary work. When it is investigated, this study must of necessity be of the complex type, because the manuscript itself is complex. No matter what the content of a literary work may be, it is a fact of actual history, and every fact of actual history contains in itself, in one form or another, in one or another proportion, a number of elements of the historical reality of its own time. For this reason, it is impossible to study an old work as such from any other standpoint than as a unity of the various aspects of reality expressed in it, distinguishing these aspects, but making no artificial isolation of one from another.
A different situation arises when, because of some feature in a given work, it is accorded a place among others which, inasmuch as they manifest this feature, are regarded as kindred works, or at least as relatively close. Then, it is not the work itself that is being studied as a definite example of ancient literature, but a certain phenomenon manifested in this work and typified by its own definite feature. Since every phenomenon possessing a peculiar feature is of a specific nature, its study should be conducted by specific methods. If the given phenomenon is of a specifically economic nature, then the approach to it should be that of economic science; if it is of a linguistic nature, it should be treated as such, and so on.
In this lies the distinction between two branches of scientific Oriental studies, arising historically and coexisting naturally:
namely, the complex, acting within the bounds of philology as a general humanitarian science, and the specialised, acting within the bounds of certain sciences as parts of the humanitarian cycle.
What appears at first glance a perfectly clear picture may actually prove to be fairly complicated. The difficulty lies in this: it is not always possible to distinguish the feature especially typical of the given work; in other words, it is not always possible to make a definite division of the texts into historical, philosophical, literary, etc. If, for example, the documentary nature of the material is taken as a basis, then it may appear at once that the easiest of all to single out are legislative works. But among them are some in which articles of the law are accompanied by opinions, or are even stated in the form of opinions; this places them under the headings of juridical and philosophical. In other instances, a law or statute is supplemented by an account of the past history of that particular law: this places the work under the headings of both juridical and historical. If the historical nature of the material is taken as a basis, then the writing in question may be placed, it would appear, among historical works. But the point is that historical material in its pure and stark form may be found only in annals, chronicles, etc., that is, in the purely factual form; while in other works elements of reality are sometimes combined with elements of imagination, and, moreover, not unconscious invention (mistaken for reality by the author) but frank invention. These may be, for example, works wherein historical personages are made to deliver speeches which actually they never uttered, but which the author considers they might have uttered. In some works, historical data is presented not as a simple, straight, forward narrative of events, but is served up in a particularly elaborate form; this is because, in addition to narrative, the author wishes to produce the desired impression upon the reader and evoke the desired emotions. Consequently, works exist which would seem, by their data, to be historical, but which contain elements of a publicist nature and of creative art. Works exist that are characterised by a combination of philosophical judgements, publicist rhetoric and poetry. The essential point here is that the infeasibility of placing many ancient works under a definite heading as purely typical of that category is not an accidental phenomenon, but a structural one inherent in their specific nature; they are not a combination of different kinds of literature, but a particular type.
It is understood, of course, that the historical movement in literature consists in the creation of more and more new types of literary works, either stemming from the earlier, or connected with them, or emerging independently of these: new types sometimes more complex than the foregoing, occasionally simpler, but just as
complete and valuable. The conception of the literary value of a work has nothing to do with the type to which it belongs, but relates to its content and form.
Significant though the ideas in a work may be, they cannot ensure it high literary value if the form in which it is presented is unwieldy. On the other hand, no external perfection of form can endow a work with value if the underlying idea is insignificant, or the author has been unable to give it significance. Consequently, the fact that more and more new types of literary work are constantly appearing cannot be regarded merely as an indication of differentiation of literary work; particularly of the kind that, overcoming the preliminary complex character, supposed to be a sign of its primitiveness, raises literature to a new and far higher level. It would be erroneous to understand the historical process in this way. The genuinely historical nature of the research scholar’s position lies in his faculty for discerning the literary value of significant works of any type, any historical epoch, and in particular, in never considering the newer literary types as invariably superior to the earlier ones.
These things should be kept in mind not only by the Orientalist-philologist conducting research in ancient literature, but also by the Orientalist studying some particular science, such as history, literature, etc. The Orientalist-historian is not obliged to carry on research in a literary work as such, but must be fully aware of the literary nature of the work from which he draws data for his theories. In short, all the research done on original material should be coupled with a clear conception of the historical nature of this material; the content of philological and specialised Oriental studies remains different, of course. The former consists in the study of written works as evidences of the spiritual culture of a certain epoch; the latter consists not in the study of these literary evidences, but in the study of certain specific spheres of the historical and cultural life of peoples as reflected in these literary works. Both these branches of scientific Oriental studies afford answers, each from its own standpoint, to a general problem: the description and elucidation of the history and culture of Eastern peoples, taken as a whole, as well as in its various fields and epochs.
The question is: are Oriental studies, as a particular complex of sciences, dying out? This was a question of burning interest which arose at a time when the formation of special branches of these studies was complete. We may well ask ourselves, for example, whether the study of the history and fine literature qf Japan differs in principle from that of any other country. Is it because Japan’s history and literature are so profoundly indigenous, so individual? But,
after all, every people has its own individual history and literature. It was still possible to speak of the peculiar originality of the history and culture of Eastern peoples at a time when, in the West, the conception of “exoticism” was current, a conception of something very special, profoundly alien to everything European, and possessing a powerful attraction mainly because of its alien and mysterious character. This conception enjoyed especial popularity during the latter half of the 18th and the first half of the 19th century in France, England and Germany. It found reflection not only in belles-lettres but also in science. Later, the idea of the exotic aspect of the East disappeared from serious studies, and during the most recent period became particularly alien to us. Thus, even this ephemeral basis for the existence of Oriental studies as a special “complex” of sciences has long been non-existent.
The claim to existence of any science as an independent field of knowledge depends upon whether it has its own object of study. What particular object does the Orientalist keep in view in his studies of the history of an Eastern people, its literature or economics? The object is identical with that of the student of history, literature or economics of any of the Western peoples. True, a science may obtain the right to an exclusive position, if not to independent existence, when its researches are conducted according to its own methods and approaches, suitable to this science alone. But the whole history of scientific Oriental studies proves that they have not, nor ever had, any exclusive methods. Since Orientalists were scholars from different Western countries, and had received the general training customary for their time, they employed methods prevailing in science at that time. Another thing: it is utterly wrong in principle to assume that the study of, let us say, the history of Turkey, calls for methods totally different from those used in the study of France s history. In short, neither in the object of research, nor in its methods, does any branch of Oriental studies differ to any extent from a corresponding field of Occidental studies. Then why do we still talk of “Oriental studies”?
No foundation for the isolated existence of Oriental studies would remain if these studies continued to confine themselves to the same objectives that had been formulated traditionally. The task of studying old writings remains, of course, as important as ever, but in what way does research on these differ in principle from research on the old works of the West? The tasks of special study of the history, literature, economics, etc., of the peoples of the East may still be as necessary, but are not these branches of Oriental studies included in the corresponding disciplines—history, economics, literature, linguistics, and so on? These studies may retain their exclusive, independent place only when new tasks appear for them, tasks that are specific and peculiar to Oriental studies alone. Tasks such as these exist, it seems to me, and confront us with especial clarity at this time.
Actually, it is not a question of tasks but of one task, very complicated in content and very prominent in its significance. And it has taken shape in the course of the history of this branch of science.
It is hardly necessary to prove that the theoretical foundations of the humanitarian sciences recognised in our time by research scholars of every country were built up during the process of the study of the European peoples’ history and culture, supplemented by material on the history and culture of the peoples of the Asian and African Mediterranean regions (mainly when dealing with antiquity); the historical life of the latter peoples had been closely associated with Greek and Roman life, and for a definite period they were directly included in the sphere of the Graeco-Roman world. It is on the basis of these theoretical principles that the study of the history and culture of all other countries and peoples, including those of the East, has been conducted.
Historically, this is perfectly natural: the theoretical foundations of the humanitarian sciences, still in force, were laid down in Europe in modern times, that is, at the historical moment when the technical, economic and social progress of the European peoples began to surpass that in the Asian countries, even in those which, like Iran, India and China, could look back on a great and very ancient civilisation. On the basis of this progress in the advanced countries oi Europe, development was rapid in every field of knowledge, including the social sciences. The development of the science of society reached its highest level in Marxism. Historians, philosophers, sociologists, economists and specialists in literature in the U.S.S.R. and also many scientists in other countries, conduct their studies on the basis of the Marxist theory of the socio-historical process.
I ne validity of this theory is revealed by the fact that researches carried out on this basis yield the most exact knowledge, confirmed by actual historical facts.
nf £^c?a .\cie.nce ls not stationary. It cannot be, since the outlook IiroLiCLa 1£ts Various fields of this science is continually being en-“ew primarily those that are provided by the current
o hhtnrv , h- °Pfen‘ rT,he ec>'8 and “^i <>“-«> °* the material PT ■„ y ae shape before our eyes are eloquently shown by the
ever" rieed° mankind durmg the last half-century. New data, how-own-r, n0t be temporary, it may be far distant from our pa^t hpnrpt if*10® 1S Stead!ly discovering new aspects of life in the forv’m eTpJ i6 Fange and 6Vel of our knowledge of mankind’s his-
to hotVoom1ptJieIdS excePtionally important new data, in respect Oriental Sfp P°ra/y-anp kast life‘ The tremendous strides That of the1 20th rpntmade m th1e,latter half of the 19th and the first half
verv extensiv! f T Wel1 known- This development assumed a ery extensive scale between 1910 and the 1960’s in our country
Our knowledge of the past and present history and culture of the Eastern peoples attained impressive proportions and a high degree of accuracy. This last we owe to the fact that our studies are based on the Marxist theory of social development.
The expanding range and higher level of our knowledge makes its own claims on theory. As the history of Eastern peoples, both past and present, unfolds before us in all its increasing variety and complexity, we find that no theory could predict it, that it must be supplemented by propositions stemming from the study of new material. Another striking thing is that some well-known and seemingly fully verified scientific propositions may appear in the light of new data in an aspect other than that to which we have been accustomed. Here 1 will permit myself to quote a few instances which, to my mind, may illustrate this idea.
The Marxist standpoint concerning social-economic formations is well known. According to it, the emergence of various social formations was observed in history, each of these being in itself a complete social and economic system. These systems developed consecutively, the next in turn replacing the preceding; this succession represents the ascendant trend of social development.
The Marxist standpoint regarding social-economic formations was founded upon the data of European history, and only in passing did it touch upon data of Eastern (principally ancient) history, for which insufficient data were available at the time, and in many cases they were inaccurately interpreted. As may be understood, the history of European peoples affords superb material for the construction of a general historical theory. European peoples include some who are ancient — the Greeks and Italians, with a long and comprehensively developed antiquity—an epoch of the slave-owning formation. These old peoples, and likewise the younger, who entered the current of common historical life at a later period—the Germanic, Slav, and Romance peoples—have known a comprehensively developed medieval period, the feudal epoch. Subsequently, they all entered the capitalist epoch and in recent times some of them entered the socialist stage. Consequently, sufficient material for the construction of a theory on historical formations and their succession may be found in Europe.
General positions, deduced from the history of European peoples, have aided Orientalists to understand correctly what they have observed in the historical process unfolding in the Oriental countries. A signal success for Marxism was the discovery in the history of those countries of identical formations which had been established on the data of European history, in particular the slave-owning formation in antiquity and the feudal formation in the Middle Ages. But the history of the East permitted of obtaining a more
P*act idea of the succession of historical formations. The history of Japan for example, proves that there are cases when a tribal a liance gives place to statehood built not upon the slave-owning, bui upon the feudal basis, and this despite the existence of fairly well-defined slave-owning relationships. China s history shows that a country may pass from feudalism to socialism, skipping the capitalist stage, despite the existence of long-standing and well-advanced capitalist relations. From a study of even these two instances one mav observe the part played by external factors—things taking place in close proximity — in the historical path of a people, f or the history of every people is always hound up with that of neighbouring peoples This relationship, of course, may vary greatly in character, intensity and scale, but it is always there That is why factors arising out of the community of historical life are active m the history of peoples. This community may be narrow, regional, embracing^ definite group of neighbouring countries, but it may become “ery wide, including entire groups of countries. In our times it has become world-wide, reaching a universal scale. Both in scale and character this community is as historical as everything e se 1 -
cial life. „ . . ,
Almost in each case such a community at a definite period embraces countries that are far advanced along the path of technical, economic, social and cultural progress, and countries ^ b and are at different phases of this stage or at different levels of the same phase. There is usually no complete evenness m the historical movement, and it is this unevenness that conditions the different positions of countries that are members of one community. One or several countries may occupy a leading position and whatever takes place in it or in them, influences the ivhole situation within the bounds of the given community. During the 7th century, in Eastern Asia, a region where a whole group of countries shared a common history, the leading position was held by China, which by that time had already gone through a prolonged and comprehensively developed slave-owning stage, passed on to the feudal system and was already far advanced along this path. Korea became a feudal count y at that time, and Vietnam followed suit.
In these circumstances, could Japan, emerging at that time from the patriarchal-tribal stage, transform her tribal alliance into a state on a slave-owning basis? And accomplish this although as we have mentioned above—there existed slave-owning relationships which might lead to the establishment of a slave-owning fsystem if conditions permitted? These conditions had to exist both ternally and externally. But the long-established feudalism of neighbouring countries, particularly China, did away with condi tions favourable to the re-emergence, within the given regional bounds, of a slave-owning system. It was because of this that the slaveowning elements in Japan receded into the background, and elements
2 3ana3 Jft 1380
which, though they had arisen under tribal conditions, could be transformed into feudal elements, came to the fore. These proved to be the forms that relations assumed between the mass of tribesmen, on one hand, and the elders and chiefs, on the other: relations that were expressed in “tribute” (the products of agriculture, hunting and weaving) paid to their leaders by the rank-and-file, and also labour for the common weal under the guidance and direction of those same elders and chiefs. It is easy to see that the three forms of feudal obligations subsequently established in Japan—the food tax, the hunters and craftsmen s tribute, and labour duties — reproduced old institutions in another shape, on a different basis. The part the external situation played in China’s ability to pass from feudalism to socialism, omitting the capitalist stage (although capitalist relations in an advanced state existed in the country) is familiar to everyone.
Naturally, historical instances parallel to those present in the history of Japan and China, were to be observed in the history of some European peoples, and these prove that the thesis on the succession of social-economic formations is not a law of history, but a scientific postulate. This would not have become so clear without the study of the history of Oriental countries, and, above all, would not have been revealed in its fundamental theoretical significance.
Another illustration of how data for the improvement of the general historical theory may be obtained from material on the history of the East, is seen in the conception of the Oriental Renaissance which has appeared in Soviet science.
So far, the essential point is that scholars discerned signs of a Renaissance epoch in the history of certain Eastern peoples. In some cases, as for example, in Georgia, its features were traced in certain literary phenomena or in pedagogical works; in others, such as China, they were discerned in certain phenomena of philosophy and literature; in still other cases—for instance, Armenia—they were evident in the entire content of culture. It should be pointed out that Soviet scholars visualised the Renaissance in those countries in its scientific-historical plane, on the basis of a definite conception of the general-historical content in this stage of a people’s history. They did not discuss it in the purely figurative context, as many scholars in the West and the East are apt to do, applying the term “Renaissance” freely to every new flourishing of art and literature, ignoring the historical period, that is, ignoring the general-historical—and within these, the socio-economic foundations.
It goes without saying that the impetus to the ideas of the Renaissance in the East was given by the history of the West, the history of European peoples. A particular epoch, which was termed the Renaissance, had been discovered in the history of European peo-
pies. It is discussed both by non-Marxist and Marxist scholars, but in different ways, of course. The former couple Renaissance phenomena principally with the history of culture, particularly art; the latter connect it with general history, and in that sphere, with socio-economic history. But the existence of a Renaissance epoch in the history of Western countries remains undisputed. The chronological boundaries—its beginning in the 14th century and its ending in the 17th—are likewise generally accepted. The task of European history at present, then, is to illumine the Renaissance phenomena in various Western countries, to investigate the content of these phenomena and their history, to determine their peculiarities in various countries, to elucidate their contacts within the bounds of certain countries, and also within the bounds of the entire group of countries which knew a Renaissance epoch.
The situation with regard to the Renaissance in the East is totally different. Since the starting point for asserting the existence of Renaissance phenomena in some non-European country is invariably the resemblance between these phenomena and those regarded in Western countries as indubitably Renaissance, the question always arises: did the Renaissance phenomena in the given Eastern country arise in connection with the Renaissance in the West? Was there, perhaps, a simple geographical expansion of the European Renaissance zone?
The question may be posed in this way only if two conditions are present: the general coincidence of the time factor of the surmised Renaissance in the given Eastern country with the chronology of the Western Renaissance; and the presence of identical elements in the Renaissance culture of the juxtaposed Eastern and Western countries*. This fully applies to the question of the Renaissance in Georgia and Armenia. In the c.ase of Armenia, the “classical”, that is, the Graeco-Roman, heritage is as valid as in Italy; and in point of time, too, the phenomena regarded as Renaissance developed within the general time limit of the Renaissance epoch in Europe. Moreover, the history of Armenia from time immemorial pertains as much to the West as to the East. Consequently, the discovery of a Renaissance epoch in that country may be treated as a necessary extension of the Western Renaissance boundaries.
The position would be different if a Renaissance epoch had been discovered in some Eastern country which did not belong to the sphere of European culture, and if it should occur earlier than in the West; in other words, if any possibility of the transference of this Renaissance from the West was excluded. In a case like this we would have to acknowledge the total independence of Renaissance phenomena in that Eastern country. Such conditions did obtain trom the 10th to the 12th centuries in that region of the Middle East which included in a general cultural complex Iran, North-West India and Western Turkistan during the Middle Ages. In an instance uke this we would have to regard the Renaissance in that region
2*
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as a phenomenon emerging totally free of any dependence upon the European Renaissance. The more so in the case of China, if we are to speak of the period extending from the 8th the 12th century in its history. Any connection between Renaissance phenomena in the Chinese culture of those centuries and Renaissance phenomena in Europe and in the region indicated of the Middle East is excluded by the time factor. Renaissance phenomena arose in China many centuries previous to their rise in Europe and considerably earlier, even, than in the Middle East. The question might be posed in reverse: was the emergence of Renaissance phenomena in those countries where they appeared later connected with the appearance of Renaissance phenomena in the regions where they emerged earlier? But, in regard to China and Europe this question is futile, since connections require points of contact—historical and cultural. In the given instance neither the one nor the other existed on a sufficiently effective scale in those historical epochs.
A positive solution of the problem of the existence of Renaissance phenomena in the history of the peoples of Iran, North-West India and Western Turkistan, in the Middle East, and in the history of China, in the East, would be of immense importance not only for an understanding of the history of those countries, but also for a general evaluation of what was known in Europe as the Renaissance epoch. _
If we are not to apply the term to any epoch when science and culture and, in particular, art, literature and philosophy, were especially flourishing, and are to associate this propitious time with a definite stage in the general history of the country, then the Renaissance, as an epoch, becomes a strictly historical phenomenon, occupying its rightful place in the history of the given country. An understanding of this place and the content of the phenomenon itself is achieved through a study of the Renaissance in all the countries where it is observed. Then, the Renaissance epoch will be regarded as a natural and inevitable historical phenomenon. Otherwise, from the standpoint of world history, if this epoch is supposed to have existed in European history alone, it would appear entirely fortuitous. _
Further, we observe something else: the presence of an independent Renaissance and a “reflected” Renaissance. The factor of a common historical life among certain groups of peoples leads to the spread of phenomena that arise in a country with a progressive civilisation to other countries within the said community. So it was in the West, when the Renaissance that started in Italy, spread at different periods to the other countries of Western, Central and even Eastern Europe. In some of these, for instance, in England, the Renaissance began very late, in the 16th century, wThen it had already ended in Italy. So it was in the East, where the Renaissance which had begun in China, spread to other countries of Eastern Asia—at all events, to Korea and Japan. As may be supposed, the
countries influenced by a Renaissance that arose in a different land, did not reproduce it literally. The Renaissance phenomena were essentially indigenous, conditioned by the general trend of a country’s history and the requirements of the time; but in their general character and social nature they reflected the Renaissance as it took shape in the country of its origin. Therefore, if it is established that the Renaissance was not historically fortuitous, but historically inevitable, then this phenomenon should be regarded as belonging to the history of those peoples who in the past went through their own antiquity and their own Middle Ages, and among whom these social and cultural-historical systems developed to the full. The peoples in question, it appears, were those of China, India, Iran and Western Turkistan, Greece and Rome. This, then, might constitute another contribution made by the history of the East to the general theory of social development.
It is quite impossible at the present time to calculate or even predict all that Oriental studies may contribute to the social sciences. I consider that it will be possible to bring greater exactitude into our conception of the actual order in which socio-economic formations replaced one another. Very likely it will be necessary to devote particular attention to the fact that the replacing of one formation by another is not a single act, but a process in which an essential and, of course, particular part is played by two things: the decisive break-up of the decedent system and the establishment of the new. A considerable time may elapse between these two' points. For example, the transition from the slave-owning formation to feudalism consisted not only in the decline of slave-owning as a system then determining the whole social order, but in the establishment of the dependent status of a once free population. In the establishment of the new formation this second point is no less important than the first. The idea might be prompted, or so it seems to me, by the history of China, where feudalism was consolidated after the Yellow Turban rebellion had been crushed at the end of the 2nd century of our era. This was a powerful movement of peasants and artisans, who, formerly freemen, were now fettered by feudalism.
It is possible that in connection with this, we shall have to investigate the question of the existence of the particular transitional epochs that covered the last stage of one formation and the initial stage of the next. The process of the decline of one and the shaping of another went on during these transitional epochs. One such, in Western history, was known as the Hellenistic period, that is, from the 3rd century B. C., when the Hellenistic kingdoms were formed, to the 7th century A. D., when the Asian and North African regions of the Hellenistic world passed into the hands of new conquer-
ors, the Arabs. In the course of these centuries, in that vast and old region of history, the system of the ancient slave-owning woiid te into decline and the new, medieval feudal system was established The second great transitional period for the West was the epoch of the Renaissance: this led the peoples of Western Europe towards capitalism—beginning not with the countries where elements of capitalist relations appeared earlier than in others, but with those countries where these elements appeared later than in others and developed more effectively and rapidly; that is to say, beginning not in Italy, but in Holland and England, which were followed by France. In the East, the Renaissance arose in China, but the country that first became capitalist was Japan, where the Renaissance had been of the “reflected” type.
These are a few of the possible standpoints that the history of the East can suggest for the general theory of social development. Very likely, others—among them points ol a less general nature will be advanced. For example, it is possible that the centralisation of power in the feudal state will have to be examined in a new light. At the moment, scholars see this centralisation in so-called absolutism, in a particular political system which took form during the concluding phase of the feudal stage, lhis system is observed most vividly in France’s history during the 1/thand 18th centuries. The history of Japan during the period known as Tokugawa— from the 17th to the early 19th century—affords confirmation of the fact that centralisation of power might actually take shape during the last stage of feudalism. Confirmation is also found in the history of China from the 17th to the 19th centuries.
But, at the same time, the history of China shows the appearance of centralised power from the 7th to tlie 8th centuries at a far earlier stage of feudalism, during the period of general and comprehensive consolidation of feudal principles in economic, social and political life, when they reached the peak of their completeness and ' strength. From the 8th to the 10th centuries in the history of feudal Japan we encounter a parallel stage in the same system. And thus it appears that centralisation of political power may be not only a means of maintaining the already unstable and declining order, but also a weapon for the comprehensive establishment of the prevailing social-economic system.
The instances quoted will suffice, I think, to strengthen the validity of a thesis on the appearance of a new task confronting Orientalists: the task of reconstructing some positions in the general theory of social development, and through it some chapters in the science of society as a whole. I have limited myself to history, but corresponding viewpoints might be advanced also in the studies of lit-
erature, philosophy and, in general, in all humanities. One cannot but recognise the emergence of such a task at the present time, and this in itself creates a new justification for the existence of Oriental studies as a special branch of research, with a basis different in character to that upon which hitherto these studies have been built up and developed.
The accomplishment of a historical task such as this should leap to what I would call the surmounting of Europocentrism.
It would be as well to warn the reader that this is not a question of Europocentrism in the sense of a conception of the racial superiority of the “white” European peoples over the “coloured” peoples of other continents. The very notion of any such superiority seems absurd to scientists. Nor am I thinking of Europocentrism as the result of a conviction concerning the cultural superiority of European peoples over those of Asia and Africa. True scientists understand perfectly well that a conviction of this kind could arise only through lack of knowledge and lack of comprehension of even that which is known. The wide discussions recently conducted in various forums concerning the equality of West and East are profoundly alien to genuine scholars, and in particular to Orientalists. The mere suggestion of any inequality of peoples is both strange and incomprehensible, not to say harmful. Speaking of Europocentrism, I have in view our way of thinking: consciously or unconsciously we work on principles founded by European science. When I say “we”, I do not mean solely the scholars of this country or even of Europe and America, that is, the West in general; I include the scholars of the contemporary East, who do likewise.
This attitude is easily understandable and there is nothing wrong with it. It is accounted for by an indisputable fact—the level of world science at the present time. There can be no doubt that contemporary science in all its branches rests upon foundations created by science in European countries during the last centuries, at any rate since the 17th, the age of Descartes and Newton. The advanced nature of European science during these centuries is in itself a reflection of the general historical progress in these countries, which, during the above-mentioned period, led them to the forefront of the social and historical development of mankind. Therefore, it is quite natural that the science of physics at the moment is that same science which assumed form in modern times in Europe; that historical science is that same science which was founded by the historians of European countries, and so on. Since this is so, researches m the West are conducted on the level of European science; every tiue researcher must work on the highest level known in his science. It is understandable that scientists of the contemporary East do likewise, especially as many of them received their training in West-
ern universities. It is inconceivable that science should diverge from this path in the future, inconceivable because present-day science is a universal phenomenon, both as the result of the common activities of scientists of all civilised peoples, and as their common possession. If we can say that a common history exists then common science is, perhaps, the clearest expression of this, m the highest and truly humanist form. In some particular field science may struggle against one thing, and support another: ideals may be different, but the struggle for these ideals is conducted on the basis of generally accepted scientific principles, and if new ones are advanced, they must be on the level attained by the given science as a whole.
But when we come to consider the humanitarian sciences, scientific Europocentrism invariably remains fraught with the danger of the mechanical transference of categories discovered in the history and culture of the Western countries to phenomena observed in the history and culture of the Eastern countries. If, for example a category such as feudalism, stemming from Western history,'is legitimately used in the definition of certain phenomena m Eastern history, in no case can the identical Western forms of feudal rent be sought everywhere in the East, or, when these forms do prove to be identical in type, in the same correlation A category of social consciousness such as rationalism is justifiably found in the history of philosophical thought, not only in the West but also in the East, but this does not necessarily mean that rationalist phi losophy in India or China should take as its source the tormu a cogito ergo. sum. The same is true of any sphere of humanitarian
sciences. . , . . .
It is not simply a question of admitting the existence m the
East of its own particular forms of general categories discovered in the history of the West: the majority of scholars understand this perfectly. The important thing is to become imbued with the idea that the modelling of such general categories should be done on the material of both West and East. The modelling of a general type of slave-owning formation, in the light of which the diversity o r s concrete historical varieties becomes clear, cannot be based on the data of the history of ancient Greece and Rome alone; it should be built up on the comparative study of material typifying the stave owning formation wherever it existed, particularly where it mew all-round development. Such conditions are found to the iulJest extent in the history of five peoples: in Greece, Rome, Iran, India and China—two traditionally Western, three traditionally Eastern peoples. A juxtaposition of the corresponding periods of history of these five countries will bring out the specific constituent parts o the slave-owning formation, that is to say, all that is necessary o justify our regarding the social system of the given period as a slaveowning formation; it will also bring out those elements that >pi fy and individualise it in each country—its specific characteristics in the given, concrete historical circumstances.
When we turn to history and philosophy, we find a category such as rationalism in the history of philosophical thought in both West and East. It finds its clearest definition in the philosophy of the period from the 10th to the 12th centuries in China, in that of the period from the 17th to the 18th centuries in France. As we study it, it becomes clear that rationalism emerged in the remarkable epoch of the renewal of human consciousness, known in Europe as the Renaissance, but could not attain full development until the epoch known in the history of the West as the Enlightenment. This explains the principal historical task of rationalism—to serve as a basis for the readjustment of people’s minds during the transition from medieval authoritarianism to modern criticism. It also explains the different stages of rationalistic thought; the natural, historically effective boundaries of it become clear. Hence, what I have called the modelling, that is, the definition of the essence of rationalism as a philosophical category, becomes possible not as a purely speculative definition, but one built upon data drawn from the history of rationalistic views in different countries wherever these views were formed.
Some more examples might be given to illustrate the idea just expressed regarding the importance of the study of the East in overcoming scientific Europocentrism, which would lead to the improvement of the general foundations of scientific knowledge, but I think, for the time being enough has been said. It is necessary, however, to direct attention to what might prove to be a substantial aid in this work—the history of science in the East.
It must be acknowledged that the great progress made in Europe in modern times has obscured in our minds all that was previously achieved in the world, including Europe. Whenever we refer to the science of the Middle Ages, it is mainly for the purpose of pointing out how very badly things were going then in science and how splendidly they went afterwards. In this respect we are the direct inheritors of Renaissance moods. Our attitude to the science of the Renaissance itself is respectful, because we consider that during that epoch, at any rate in some branches of scientific research, foundations were laid that are still valid in our own day. Usually, in this connection names such as Copernicus, Giordano Rruno, and Galileo come to mind. An echo of the Renaissance attitude to antiquity is heard in our views of the science of that time: it is always referred to in the highest terms. But here, too, this is chiefly because the source of many ideas and conceptions, valid in modern science, dates from Graeco-Roman antiquity. In short, the things of bygone days that bear some resemblance to those of today, are valued, while those that were different then remain unnoticed or are rejected. And, of course, the science of antiquity and the Middle Ages, those two great epochs in the life of mankind, are not re-
garded as phenomena that were independent, essentially organic, complete in themselves and therefore, from that standpoint, most important for our scientific thought.
This is the situation with regard to our own European scientific heritage; and how much less esteem is felt for the science that arose and developed beyond European frontiers, in India, China and the Arab countries! Where it is noticed and even studied, this is mainly in the sphere of the history of culture, education and science in those lands, while its importance for the general theoretical principles of scientific knowledge does not receive, as a rule, the attention it deserves.
Yet attention should be paid to it. Apart from natural science, it is sufficient to glance at all that has been achieved in some countries of the East in the science of man and society. The history of philosophical thought in India and China is fairly well known to us. But usually we study the emergence and development of ideas and conceptions, that is, the philosophical thought itself, and pay too little attention to the way in which these ideas and conceptions were understood and evaluated in these countries. In other words, we neglect to make a proper evaluation of a science which has for its object philosophical thought. We apply in the evaluation of the philosophical ideas of the East terms that were evolved in philosophical science in Europe: for example, materialism, idealism, rationalism, intuitivism, mysticism, criticism, monism, pluralism and all the rest, never pausing to consider seriously if these terms are applicable in general where we want to apply them. Would it not be better to make use of the terms and characterisations evolved by scientific thought in the East? Do not those terms correspond far more closely to the nature and content of the phenomena to which they have been applied? At any rate, the first thing we should do is to submit these terms to the closest scrutiny, striving to understand them by means of themselves, as they took shape in the history of philosophical thought in the country we are studying. It must be fully realised that in India and China, during antiquity . and the Middle Ages, a rich, comprehensively developed philosophical thought existed, and also studies of philosophy with their own terminology, their own working nomenclature. In recent years, some work has been undertaken to elucidate of all this, but there is still no estimation of the significance of the studies of philosophy, as they assumed form in the East, for the general theory of philosophy, that is, for us, too. The modelling of the basic philosophical categories should be accomplished by means of the juxtaposition and estimation of all the existent data, both Western and Eastern.
All that has been said about philosophical science is equally applicable to the science of history. The countries of the East possessed not only a rich historiography but also a historiology—the study of the knowledge of history. Both the facts of history and the
historical process were interpreted from the standpoint of definite conceptions. In China, for example, conceptions were evolved of the general historical process, outlines of historical development were created which retain their significance for Chinese history until now, though sometimes under new, hastily adapted European designations. These conceptions cannot be accepted unreservedly, but it is essential to understand what they mean, why they arose, and in what relation they stand to the actual historical process. Furthermore, it is necessary to ponder on what they contain that should be taken into consideration, along with European data, in the elaborating of general principles of historical science. In short, it is necessary to take into account the theoretical thought of the East in every field of the studies of man and society, always bearing in mind that these were the particular fields elaborated in the East on an exceptional scale and with exceptional detail.
Work in this direction I call the overcoming of Europocentrism in science, and I regard doing away with it as one of the most important tasks in our day in the science of man and society. By such means, this science may become of truly general significance, that is, valid for the study of life and the activity of mankind throughout the whole of its historic existence.
The mission of Orientalists is to supply material for this process of overcoming Europocentrism.To do this, they must possess not only a knowledge of the countries of the East—their history, culture, education and science, but also the ability to juxtapose what they have observed in the East with what they know of the West. Naturally, the Orientalists must have a knowledge of the foundations of science worked out in the West, and- understand their origin, otherwise they will be unable to understand the problems confronting them, and still less to contribute to their solution.
When I speak of Orientalists, I do not mean only scholars of Western countries; I have in mind also the scholars of Eastern countries who study the history and culture of their peoples not only in the interests of science in their own country, but in the interests of international science. In cooperative work such as this the isolated position of the learned Orientalist as it took shape in the history of science in Europe will no longer exist; Oriental studies will acquire new significance. Not only will they be in no danger of extinction, they will acquire new foundation for their existence.
But will it be for long? The question is a perfectly natural one. The answer might be as follows: Oriental studies as a special branch of scientific research will continue to exist until they attain their new purpose, which is to contribute through its data to the elaboration of a general theory, embracing every aspect of the history and culture of mankind, a theory built upon the history of all peoples, regardless of whether they are Eastern or Western, and verified by the historical experience available to us.
This purpose will not only eliminate the danger of scientific Europocentrism; Asia-centrism will also become impossible. In the West, a kind of Asia-centrism might make its appearance among those Orientalists who still consider that all light comes from the Orient, forgetting the great light of the West. As to Asia-centrists in the East, who are imbued with a perfectly natural pride in the thousands of years of their countries’ history, the vast and comprehensive development of culture in them, they cease to see the same progress, on a scale by no means smaller, in other countries, above all in Europe. As there are no intrinsically progressive peoples, so there are none who are intrinsically backward. All the large civilised nations of East and West have known periods in their history when rapid progressive strides were made, and periods when the pace of progress slackened until, perhaps, it ceased altogether, resulting in temporary stagnation. No nation has the right to consider itself unique, superior to all others. Every nation should possess the sense of its own dignity and worth, but megalomania in a nation is as erroneous, dangerous and ridiculous as in an individual.
1965